Churchill and Roosevelt's Gentlemen's Agreement | Warlords | Timeline

A few years after the Second World War ended, Winston Churchill told his private secretary. No lover ever studied every whim of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt. Churchill was reflecting on the most famous transatlantic relationship in history. Its popular image, and Churchill's own depiction, is of a golden age of collaboration. A far-sighted American president is seduced by the bravery and eloquence of a beleaguered prime minister and rides to his rescue. But this rosy picture is largely myth. In reality, the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt, the two great leaders of 20th century democracy, began with a bruising psychological duel. It ran in tandem with the parallel duel between the two 20th century tyrants of totalitarianism, Hitler and Stalin, which led to the Nazi invasion of Russia. Like the duel of the dictators, it was riddled with mutual suspicion, false promises, and evasion. Even when the two men grew closer, it became apparent that they were fighting for entirely different long-term objectives. In that lay the seeds of bitter disillusion and disagreement about how to bring freedom to hundreds of millions of people. On May the 10th, 1940, on a bright spring morning in Washington, President Roosevelt called a meeting of his cabinet to discuss astonishing news coming in from Europe. Nazi forces were smashing into France, Holland, and Belgium. In Britain, there was political turmoil. Harold Ickes, the American Secretary of the Interior, was a senior member of Roosevelt's government. While we were at cabinet, word was brought in that Chamberlain had resigned. The president said that he supposed that Churchill was the best man that England had, even if he was drunk half of his time. That evening, Churchill became British Prime Minister. A few days later, he told his son, Randolph, there was only one way to beat Hitler. I shall drag in the United States. Little did Churchill know that his entire strategy for winning the war depended on seducing a man who not only thought him a drunk, but also held a dislike for him that stretched back more than 20 years. The roots of that dislike lay in Roosevelt's memory of the one and only face-to-face meeting he'd ever had with Churchill. In 1918, as American Undersecretary for the Navy, and before he was disabled, he'd visited France and Britain. He later remarked that Churchill, then Britain's first Lord of the Admiralty, had been a stinker, lording it all over us. The two men had not seen each other since, and in the decade leading up to the Second World War, they appeared to be polar opposites. Roosevelt, the charismatic president. Churchill, the has-beens stuck in the political wilderness. Roosevelt, the scourge of European colonialism. Churchill, the diehard defender of the British Empire. But one thing united them. They both understood from early on that Hitler presented a new and terrible force with which peaceful coexistence would be impossible. So when Churchill returned to the cabinet as first Lord of the Admiralty on the outbreak of war, Roosevelt immediately started a transatlantic cable correspondence with him. My dear Churchill, it is because you and I occupied similar positions in the World War that I want you to know how glad I am that you are back again in the Admiralty. Privately, Roosevelt told the American ambassador to Britain, Joseph Kennedy. I have always disliked him since the time I went to England in 1918. I'm giving him attention now because there is a strong possibility that he will become prime minister, and I want to get my hand in now. The first test of the relationship between these men, who had so little in common, took place in the intense crucible of Hitler's blitzkrieg. Churchill's opening tactic was to try to shock Roosevelt into helping Britain and France. 15th of May. The scene has darkened swiftly. I trust you realize, Mr. President, that the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long. You may have a completely subjugated, Nazified Europe established with astonishing swiftness. Churchill told Roosevelt that Britain's very survival could depend on the immediate loan of 50 American destroyers, mothballed since the First World War. The next day, Roosevelt refused him. Churchill's first request had resulted in instant disappointment. But for the president, the loan was too big a political risk. The United States was still a land of peace, trying to enjoy life and bound by neutrality laws. Then, three weeks later, the Italian dictator, Mussolini, entered the war. Roosevelt had asked Mussolini to keep out. That night, he showed his anger. On this 10th day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor. Roosevelt promised Britain and France immediate practical help. We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation. Churchill was thrilled, as his private secretary, John Colville, noted in his diary. It seemed that this time, the president was going to deliver. June the 12th, 1940. Winston seems to hope that America will come in now, at any rate, as a non-belligerent ally. As Paris prepared for the Nazi onslaught and its children were evacuated, Roosevelt even followed up with a private message to Churchill and the French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, reinforcing his promise to help. This government is doing everything in its power to make available to the Allied governments the material they so urgently require. Churchill pounced on Roosevelt's promise. 15th of June. We must ask as a matter of life and death to be reinforced with these destroyers. We will carry out the struggle, whatever the odds, but it may well be beyond our resources, unless we receive every reinforcement. But on June the 17th, France surrendered to the Nazis. Roosevelt believed that Britain too could go under. But he was wrong. There was no point in trying to rescue a drowning man. Just days after the promise of help, he slammed the door shut. The 19th of June. President R. has turned down our demand for 40 destroyers. We need them badly. This opening skirmish in their duel was a shattering blow to Churchill. In reality, he was deluding himself in thinking, even fleetingly, that Roosevelt could at that stage have made any declaration committing Americans to the prospect of war. We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation. And yet Roosevelt had made an unequivocal promise of help. It should have been a warning. Presidential words, both private and public, could not be taken at face value. By late June 1940, Churchill was isolated. Hitler was master of Europe. Roosevelt's promises of help had come to nothing. But the shock of Hitler's conquests had forced many Americans into a rethink. Opinion polls showed that the number willing to help Britain, even if it meant the United States being dragged into the war, jumped from 30 to 60%. And Roosevelt could see that Churchill and the British intended to fight on, come what may. In these changed circumstances, Churchill asked once again for the loan of America's World War I destroyers. 31st of July. Mr. President, with great respect, I must tell you that in the long history of the world, this is a thing to do now. This time, Roosevelt, on much safer political ground, said yes. But to keep the United States Congress happy, he insisted on a legal agreement under which Britain, in return for the destroyers, gave America 99-year leases on military bases in the Caribbean and Newfoundland. Churchill did not mind the Americans having the bases, but felt humiliated that it should be made to appear a trade. The transatlantic phone call with the American Attorney General, Robert Jackson. He remarked... -"Empires just don't bargain." Jackson replied... -"Republics do." It was the first tiny dent in Churchill's beloved empire. But the value and morale was priceless. Announcing the destroyer deal to the House of Commons, he was jubilant. The 20th of August. The PM ended his speech by comparing Anglo-American cooperation, will it one day be unity, to the Missouri River and saying, let it roll on. I drove back with him in the car, and he sang Old Man River, out of tune, the whole way back to Downing Street. The autumn of 1940 hardened Roosevelt's view that Churchill was worth backing. The Royal Air Force beat off the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain. Hitler's invasion plans were stalled. Those close to Churchill, like the War Secretary, Anthony Eden, and his private secretary, John Colville, would see him begin to relax. Tuesday, October the 8th, 1940. The PM, dressed in his blue siren suit, dined with Eden in his new dining room at Number 10. He was in great form, and amused Eden and me very much by his conversation with Nelson, the black cat, whom he chided for being afraid of the guns, and unworthy of the name he bore. Try and remember, he said to Nelson reprovingly, what those boys in the RAF are doing. So far, all Churchill had been able to offer Roosevelt was grim warnings. But now, with Hitler for the moment thwarted, he could show Roosevelt, too, his lighter side. I cannot feel that the invasion danger is past. The gent has taken off his clothes and put on his bathing suit, but the water is getting colder, and there is an autumn nip in the air. But the brutal truth was that Churchill needed Roosevelt more than ever. By late 1940, the fight against Hitler was bankrupting Britain. Churchill pleaded for massive American aid. Within his long cable to Roosevelt was one short, stark sentence. 7th of December, the moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies. In fact, Roosevelt had already decided to help. He'd just been re-elected President of the United States for an unprecedented third term. Having promised Americans their country was not going to war, yet he believed that Hitler could not be stopped without American help. He now came up with a way of achieving these contradictory aims. He would finance and equip the British to do the fighting and keep the Nazis away from the United States. On December 29th, 1940, Roosevelt broadcast his big idea to Americans. We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us, this is an emergency as serious as war itself. There will be no bottlenecks in our determination to aid Great Britain. Roosevelt's speech sent shockwaves throughout Europe's capitals. In Berlin, the Nazi propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, sensed the sea change. 29th of December, 1940. The USA is sliding increasingly into war psychosis. But will Roosevelt actually declare war? In London, this was precisely the question that Churchill was now asking himself. And he began to harbour an illusion that would bring both disappointment and great distress. I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States... Roosevelt's first act, after his inauguration in January 1941, was to introduce the legislation for what became known as Lend-Lease Aid. Churchill saw it as the first step on an inevitable and intentional road to war. The PM is delighted by the new American bill, which contains wide powers for the President in every sphere of assistance to us. He says this is tantamount to a declaration of war by the United States. There were further private signs of Roosevelt's apparent intentions. At this very moment, Harry Hopkins, the President's closest political associate, arrived in Britain and gave Churchill an unequivocal assurance. The President has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means, he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him. There is nothing that he will not do so far as he has human power. Churchill knew that under the United States Constitution, the President could only ask for a declaration of war. Congress had to approve it. But while a vocal minority of Americans wanted to have nothing to do with Europe's war, the majority wished to help. Churchill told John Colville. The important element is the boldness of the President. He will lead opinion and not follow it. He does not want war, but he will not shrink from war. Even more encouragement came from a second American visitor to London, Wendell Wilkie, the Republican candidate defeated in the presidential election. Wilkie gave Churchill a handwritten message from Roosevelt. I think this verse applies to your people as it does to us. Sail on, O ship of state. Sail on, O union strong and great. Humanity with all its fears, with all the hopes of future years, is hanging breathless on thy fate. To Churchill, the obvious meaning was that the President was preparing to fight side by side with him. But when Wilkie returned to Washington, the first question Roosevelt asked him about Churchill was... Is he a drunk? Ten months on, the private suspicions remained, and Roosevelt was making different noises to different people. What Churchill did not yet understand was that nothing Roosevelt said could be taken at face value, nor, despite his surface charm and affability, how impenetrable and elusive the President really was. Around this time, the American War Secretary, Henry Stimson, described how impossible it was to pin Roosevelt down. His mind does not follow easily a consecutive chain of thought, but he is full of stories and incidents and hops about in his discussions from suggestion to suggestion, and it is very much like chasing a vagrant beam of sunshine around a vacant room. But Roosevelt's lack of clarity and commitment was a deliberate cover, sometimes to keep his real intentions secret, sometimes to keep his options open. And his bonhomie was deceptive. Later, Roosevelt's wife, Eleanor, would warn Churchill. When Franklin says, yes, yes, yes, it doesn't mean he's agreeing, it means he's listening. But as yet, Churchill realised very little of this. And could only proceed on the basis of what he saw and heard. That continued to be encouraging. In March 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Bill. Roosevelt followed up with a rip-roaring speech. The British people need tanks and guns and ammunition and supplies of all kinds. From America, they will get tanks and guns and ammunition and supplies of all kinds. In the audience was the new British ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax. He felt there could only be one interpretation of Roosevelt's words. March the 16th, 1941. Certainly no such speech has ever been made by the head of a state not at war, without putting it into war. But those who knew Roosevelt best sensed that he was playing a double game with Churchill. After a private meeting with him, his Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, noted in his diary, I may be mistaken, but I don't think that the president has in mind to do anything very dramatic to help England at this time. There was one immediate test of how far Roosevelt was willing to go. Lend-Lease could only work if supplies were shipped safely across the Atlantic. Salman Roosevelt's cabinet privately urged him to allow American ships to form armed convoys. Roosevelt, rebuffering. April 2nd, 1941. The president said that public opinion was not yet ready for the United States to convoy ships. This was his whole attitude anyway, that he seemed to be still waiting and not ready to go ahead on all out aid for England. It was the first sign of backsliding and not the attitude of a man who intended to give his people a firm lead. But Churchill could not have come at a worse time. He was entering his darkest period of the war. In April, Hitler's armies smashed Yugoslavia and Greece. The Germans seemed invincible. Rommel was driving the British Eighth Army out of Libya. The U-boat toll on British shipping in the Atlantic was rising. And Roosevelt, in the view of several of his most senior cabinet members, was retreating on his commitment to support the British. 21st April, 1941. I found everybody rather discouraged by the war news and by the fact that the president doesn't seem to be keeping his leadership in regard to the matter. I cautioned him on the necessity of his taking the lead. Roosevelt made one move. He allowed the American Navy and Air Force to patrol further into the Western Atlantic. But this gave only small extra protection to the shipping lanes between Britain and America. It was little use against the Hitler, who now controlled most of Europe and was threatening the whole of the Middle East and India beyond. Churchill pleaded with Roosevelt for more help to stop the Nazis. At this moment, much hangs in the balance. I feel Hitler may quite easily now gain vast advantages very cheaply, and we are so fully engaged that we can do little or nothing to stop his spreading himself. Roosevelt's reply shocked Churchill. The president appeared not to see what he was fussing about. Personally, I am not downcast by more spread of Germany for additional large territories. There is little of raw materials in all of them put together. Not enough to maintain nor compensate for huge occupation forces. For Churchill, Roosevelt's message revealed a devastating truth. It showed that the president simply didn't care about the Middle East, viewing it as part of an outdated empire he preferred the British to do without. What mattered to him was supplying Britain through the Atlantic in order to keep Hitler away from America. The next day, May the 2nd, Churchill toured the bombed city of Plymouth. In public, he was keeping his chin up. But Hitler's destruction and Roosevelt's message had pitched him to rock bottom. Friday, May the 2nd, 1941. The PM, in worse gloom than I have ever seen him, dictated a telegram to the president, drawing a somber picture of what a collapse in the Middle East would entail. Then he sketched a world in which Hitler dominated all Europe, Asia, and Africa, and left the US and ourselves no option but an unwilling peace. In desperation, Churchill told Roosevelt he must come to his rescue. Mr. President, the one decisive counterweight I can see would be if the United States were immediately to arrange herself with us as a belligerent power. It was a year since Churchill had become Prime Minister, and he was back to square one, on bended knees to Roosevelt, begging him to join the fight, threatening disaster if he didn't. The evasiveness of the man on whom he had pinned everything was dashing all his hopes. In May, 1941, Winston Churchill was at his lowest ebb. It seemed President Roosevelt was letting him wither on the vine. He minuted his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. It seems to me as if there has been a considerable recession across the Atlantic, and that quite unconsciously, we are being left very much to our fate. It was not just Churchill who was in despair. In Washington, several of Roosevelt's most senior cabinet members were in mutinous mood at the president's apparent inertia. On May the 12th, 1941, the Interior Secretary, Harold Ickes, organized a secret meeting with the War Secretary, Henry Stimson, the Attorney General, Bob Jackson, and the Navy Secretary, Frank Knox. Ickes noted in his diary, I had called this meeting to see to what extent the men mentioned would be willing to join in some written representation to the president. All of us found ourselves in complete agreement. None of us could account for the president's failure of leadership. Two days later, another senior cabinet member, the Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, recorded in his diary a meeting with Harry Hopkins, the man closest to Roosevelt. Hopkins said the president has never said so in so many words, but he thinks the president is loath to get us into this war, and he would rather follow public opinion than lead it. At this pivotal moment, Roosevelt appeared to suffer some form of psychological crisis. Pressured by the small, but still vocal, minority of isolationists on one side, and the hawks in his cabinet on the other, he spent much of May 1941 in bed, and rarely went to the office. He had a mild cold, but was not otherwise physically ill. When asked by one of the staff what was wrong, his personal secretary, Marguerite Le Hand, passed it off by saying, What he's suffering from most of all is a case of sheer exasperation. Churchill's ever more desperate cables could only have added to his feelings of oppression. Whatever happens, you may be sure, we shall fight on, and I'm sure we can at least save ourselves. But what is the good of that? The war was going from bad to worse. After conquering Yugoslavia and Greece, the Germans were now beating the British out of Crete. On May the 27th, Roosevelt got up from his bed, and once again seemed to lay down the gauntlet to Hitler, declaring an unlimited national emergency. It is unmistakably apparent to all of us that unless the advance of Hitlerism is forcibly checked now, the Western Hemisphere will be within range of the Nazi weapons of destruction. But the skeptics in Roosevelt's cabinet, like Harold Ickes, saw it only as glib words. There was no lift to his speech. Right at the end, he did declare a total emergency, but to declare a total emergency without acts to follow it up means little. In Berlin, Roosevelt's speech was eagerly analysed by Joseph Goebbels. We must wait and see what he does next. In any case, there is no talk of war at present. At the moment, he doesn't dare. Nine days later, Goebbels' boss, Adolf Hitler, let Roosevelt off his hook. At dawn on June the 22nd, 1941, three million Nazi troops advanced into Russia. Churchill breathed an enormous sigh of relief. Sunday, June the 22nd, 1941. On going to bed, the PM kept on repeating how wonderful it was that Russia had come in against Germany when she might so easily have been with her. To Churchill, the invasion showed more than ever Hitler's global ambitions and could only compel Roosevelt to draw nearer to war. But Roosevelt drew a different, more subtle conclusion. He quickly calculated that Russia's forced entry into the war could help America continue to stay out. Instead, Russia could be a second nation to be financed to fight Germany. Roosevelt wrote to one of his closest associates, Admiral William Leahy. The Russian diversion will mean the liberation of Europe from Nazi domination. And at the same time, I don't think we need worry about any possibility of Russian domination. After his psychological crisis in May, Roosevelt suddenly felt liberated. He swung into action, asking Congress to supply Stalin with everything he demanded with no strings attached and chiding his government into action. He said, I am sick and tired of hearing that the Russians are gonna get this and they're gonna get that. The only answer I want to hear is that it is underway. He directed most of his fire at Stimson, who looked thoroughly miserable. In his outburst today, the president said that we must get the Russians the arms, even if it was necessary to take them from our troops. And I felt very badly about it. He was really in a hoity-toity humor and wouldn't listen to argument. What Stimson failed to realize was that Roosevelt did not care about taking arms from American troops. He had no wish or intention that they should fight. That was for British and Russian soldiers to do, with weapons supplied by the United States. Churchill's belief that events in Russia would move Roosevelt closer to war had been reinforced by an invitation from the president across the Atlantic for a face-to-face meeting. Before he sailed, Churchill had confided to Queen Elizabeth. I do not think our friend would have asked me to go so far for what must be a meeting of worldwide importance unless he had in mind some further forward step. On August the 9th, 1941, Churchill, full of anticipation, arrived in Placentia Bay off the Newfoundland coast. Roosevelt, supported by his son, Elliot, was waiting. According to Elliot's account of their first dinner, Churchill immediately seized his chance to make a direct appeal to the president. Churchill reared back in his chair. He slewed his cigar around from cheek to cheek and always at a jaunty angle. For a time, his talk was colored over with an insistent note of pleading. You've got to come in beside us. If you don't declare war... Declare war, I say, without waiting for them to strike the first blow. They'll strike it after we've gone under. You must come in if you are to survive. The two men were determined to get on. But on the second evening, one subject threatened to disrupt the conviviality, Empire. The Americans had been driving a hard bargain over Lend-Lease, insisting that in return, Britain would promise to remove trade barriers with the British Empire. According to Elliot Roosevelt, that argument flared up at Placentia Bay. The kettle began to bubble up and once or twice nearly over. Churchill's neck reddened and he crouched forward. Mr. President, England does not propose for a moment to lose its favored position among the British dominions. The trade that has made England great shall continue and under conditions prescribed by England's ministers. You see, said father, it is along in here somewhere that there is likely to be some disagreement between you, Winston, and me. For the moment, the argument was good-natured and Churchill left Placentia Bay full of optimism. Back in London, Churchill informed his cabinet that Roosevelt had said he would deliberately look out for an incident which would allow him to bring America into the war. The president has said that he will wage war but not declare it and that he will become more and more provocative. But in Washington, Roosevelt was giving a very different interpretation of the meeting in Placentia Bay. He told the press, There has been an interchange of views, that's all. The country is no closer to war. For Churchill, Roosevelt's words were another shattering disappointment. He cabled Harry Hopkins, the president's closest political associate. There has been a wave of depression here about the president's many assurances about no commitments and no closer to war, et cetera. Churchill's one remaining hope was for the sort of incident he claimed Roosevelt had privately talked of. In the coming weeks, German U-boats in the Atlantic sank two American destroyers. Roosevelt finally agreed to allow American warships to escort merchant shipping in the Atlantic and responded with his toughest words yet. When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. Then in the sinking of a third American destroyer, over a hundred crew died in the USS Reuben James. Churchill sent Roosevelt his condolences. 2nd of November, 1941, I am grieved at the loss of life you have suffered with the Reuben James. I salute the land of unending challenge. But this most deadly incident yet brought no further action. Roosevelt did not even break off diplomatic relations with Germany. Once again, there had been rhetoric, but no move to war. Churchill had to accept that dragging in America had failed. And Roosevelt's elusive behavior over the previous 18 months begged the question of what game he had been playing all along. The president himself kept his cards so close to his chest that he never told a single soul relative, crony or colleague whether at any stage he'd intended to fulfill Churchill's hopes and bring America into the war against Hitler. But it is possible to piece together the mental jigsaw. We will extend to the opponents a force. Roosevelt used words and promises, some of them misleading or exaggerated to boost Churchill's resolve to fight on. The president has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means, he will carry you through. He used American money and industrial muscle to finance and equip Britain and then Russia. We must be the great arsenal of democracy. And he was willing to use the American Navy and the Air Force to defend the Atlantic. What this added up to was one of the most brilliantly self-interested political strategies of all time. Roosevelt was defending America and opposing Hitler, his two core aims at almost no cost to American lives. And at the same time, he ignited a massive increase in arms production which finally brought the United States out of economic depression. The extent to which Roosevelt deliberately intended all this or whether it was the result of his bobbing and weaving in the face of events will always remain unclear. As for the one thing Churchill wanted above all, an American declaration of war, of that, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests Roosevelt never had the slightest intention. Churchill's great hope had been an illusion. Even lend-lease had made practically no difference. It only provided 1% of Britain's weapons in its lonely year of 1941. Then on December the 7th, the Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt was brutally hurled into war. A state of war has existed in the United States. Roosevelt did not ask Congress to declare war against Japan's ally, Germany. As it turned out, he was saved the choice. Four days later, Hitler declared war on the United States. Churchill's relationship with Roosevelt was about to be transformed. For Churchill, it would be a double-edged blessing. After Pearl Harbor, Churchill sailed immediately to Washington to be at the side of his new fighting ally. Events had liberated their relationship. Churchill calculated the physical closeness was the way to cement it. Sometimes, as the British ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax observed, to the point of Churchillian eccentricity. January the 4th, 1942. Winston has been working like a beaver here and doing a grand job. He's got onto the most intimate terms with the president who visits him in his bedroom at any hour. And as Winston says, it's the only head of state whom he, Winston, has ever received in the nude. Apart from all other merits, what a wonderful showman he is. Roosevelt could at last humor Churchill's attempts at seduction. At the end of his visit, he told him, It is fun to be in the same decade with you. But beneath the smiles, those close to Roosevelt, like his labor secretary, Francis Perkins, noticed a new steel in his soul. He was a changed, more potent and dedicated personality. He was different. The terrible shock of Pearl Harbor, the destruction of his precious ships, the unknown hazards which war might bring to the people acted like a spiritual purge and left him cleaner, simpler, more single-minded. This change in Roosevelt would have a vital impact on his relationship with Churchill. 1942, a year when the war was still going badly, was their honeymoon period. But it couldn't and wouldn't last. In the end, Churchill lost his duel with Roosevelt. He failed to persuade him to bring America into the war. Japan and Hitler did that. What this meant was that Roosevelt was not fighting Churchill's war, but his own. And the two men had very different long-term objectives. Beyond the defeat of Hitler, Churchill wanted, above all, to preserve the British empire, which was an anathema to Roosevelt. And it was over empire that they had their first real argument. In the spring of 1942, Churchill had allowed negotiations to go ahead with Indian nationalists, mainly to ensure India's loyalty in the war. When the talks broke down, Roosevelt blamed Churchill. The feeling is almost universally held here that the deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the British government to concede to the Indians the right of self-government. I feel I must place this issue before you very frankly, and I know you will understand my reasons for so doing. Churchill was enraged by what he saw as Roosevelt's meddling. According to one witness, the string of cuss words lasted two hours into the night. He drafted a furious reply. I am greatly concerned to receive your message because I am sure that I could not be responsible for a policy which would throw the whole subcontinent of India into utter confusion while the Japanese invader is at its gates. In the end, Churchill sat on the message. But he let Roosevelt know that he would resign over India if he was pushed too far. And there was a second gulf between them. Britain had gone to war for the freedom of Europe, specifically the independence of Poland. But as 1942 wore on, Churchill was beginning to see a new threat to Europe. The man who'd become the third ally in the fight against Hitler, Joseph Stalin. He told his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the ancient states of Europe. Roosevelt saw it very differently. As far as he was concerned, the cause of the war in the first place was the infighting between Europe's ancient imperialist nations. And he began to see in Stalin someone who would help him rid the world of that imperialism. Also in 1942, he remarked. The European people will simply have to endure Russian domination in the hope that in 10 or 20 years, the European influence will bring the Russians to become less barbarous. These opposing views held the seeds of increasingly bitter disagreements. The third duel of the warlords would be between Churchill and Stalin. At stake was the future liberty of Europe. The casualty of that duel would be the trust Churchill had worked so hard to build with his new friend across the Atlantic.