Sources: Chan, Amy. “Greek Tragedy: Italy's Disastrous Campaign in Greece.” HistoryNet. HistoryNet, November 22, 2019. https://www.historynet.com/greek-trag.... Gonsalves, Simon (2017) "The Italian Army in the Second World War: A Historiographical Analysis," The Great Lakes Journal of Undergraduate History: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/gljuh/vol... Kretaner. “Greek Armed Forces 1940-41 WW2 Weapons.” WW2 Weapons, January 10, 2020. https://ww2-weapons.com/greek-armed-f.... Tsirpanlis, Zacharias N. “The Morale of the Greek and the Italian Soldier in the 1940-41 War,” Balkan Studies: Vol 25, 111-141. https://ojs.lib.uom.gr/index.php/Balk...
Music: Armchair Historian Credits by Zach Heyde Armchair Historian Prelude by Zach Heyde To All the Glory by Howard Harper-Barnes Shadow Call by Giatns' Nest The Portal by Bonnie Grace No Rest for the Weary by Anthony Earls Letters From Heaven by Reynard Seidel Behind the Dusk by Trailer Worx Leaps by Jay Varton Choirs of War by Dream Cave The Longest Path by Kikoru
In early October 1940, the Chief of the Italian General Staff, Pietro Bedoglio,
was ordered by Mussolini to begin preparing for the invasion of Greece, and on the 28th,
using the recently annexed Albania as a base, the Italian vanguard of two divisions advanced
into the Pindus Mountains. From the outset, progress was slower than anticipated,
and within eleven days the Greeks had stopped the invasion dead in its tracks,
and to make matters worse, the Italian logistical system collapsed. By the 14th of November,
the Greeks had pushed the Italians back to the border and began a unified counter-offensive,
which shattered the Italian line and threw them into a panic. In some places,
the Greeks penetrated as far as 50 kilometers or 31 miles into Albania. The counter-offensive only
ended after the Greeks lost momentum and a stalemate then ensued, which would only be
broken in April by the Germans. This leads us to today's question. How did the Greeks manage
to repel an invasion by a seemingly much stronger power? Before we begin, I'd like to thank our
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Hi, I'm Griffin Johnson, the Armchair Historian. As we've seen in previous videos,
Benito Mussolini's aspirations to recreate the Roman Empire were hindered by the poor performance
of the Italian military in the Second World War, and this was just one major reason why Italy was
more or less reduced to a German client state as the conflict continued. More so than in any
other campaign, the Italian invasion of Greece, which ended with a bailout from the Germans,
cemented this dependent relationship. In many ways, Italy's invasion of Greece was an attempt
to imitate the expansionist policies of their German ally. Up to this point, Italy's only
conquests had been in Ethiopia and Albania, while Italian participation in the Second World War
had been limited to the French Alps and North Africa. But Mussolini was a man of boundless
ambition, and had become convinced that the fastest method of securing dominance over the
From the outset, Italian logistics and maneuverability were compromised by the
harsh climate of the Pindus Mountains, combined with an unusually cold winter.
By December, conditions were nearly arctic, foreshadowing what was in store for their
German allies one year later. Pack animals quickly began dying of hypothermia, and tens
of thousands of men on both sides developed frostbite. But these were not insurmountable
obstacles, and the hardy Italians were no strangers to bad weather or rough terrain.
They also possessed a substantial number of tanks, modern infantry weapons, and a strong air corps.
In contrast, the majority of Greek troops had to make do with a truly archaic arsenal,
consisting mostly of equipment left over from the Great War. Furthermore, the Axis stranglehold over
Europe cut them off from ships of ammunition or spare parts. In terms of air power, the only force
the Greeks could muster consisted of a mere 79 planes. Yet despite their advantages, the Italians
would soon find that the armor, which had proved instrumental in the deserts of Ethiopia, were
useless in the Pindus Mountains. Meanwhile, the air force that had terrorized the Republicans in
the Spanish Civil War would be given a harsh lesson in humility by the British RAF, which
flew many sorties in defense of Greek airspace from the island of Crete during the invasion.
The British were also able to supply the Greeks with accurate and reliable intelligence on enemy
troop movements and strategic objectives, thanks to having cracked Italian military encryption
protocols. The character of the Italian military establishment was also a major contributor to the
disaster. A culture of mistrust created bitter personal feuds in which generals were more
concerned with humiliating each other than they were with defeating the enemy.
Inter-service rivalries were just as severe, with each branch cooperating as little as possible
out of fear that doing so would undermine their own political relevance. This was not helped by
internal competition for the limited resources they had to work with, as Italy was a largely
agrarian country, which unlike Germany, did not have large occupied territories to plunder.
These issues prevented the use of the combined arms tactics that their German allies had used
so successfully in France and in Poland. Italian generals were also astonishingly
unwilling to consider new tactics, preferring instead to believe that properly motivated
and equipped infantry units could accomplish anything in sufficient numbers. This attitude
was highlighted when Italian observers compiled a detailed and insightful report on German tactics
and handed it to Chief of Staff Badoglio only for him to promptly dismiss it with the words,
we'll study it when the war is over. But contrary to popular perception,
the Italian army was not wholly incompetent. The issue did not lie with the morale or training of
the average soldier, but instead lay in the systemic failures of the military establishment
as a whole. Even Erwin Rommel noted that when given proper leadership, the Italian troops
under his command displayed incredible bravery. But this quote from the war diary of a disgruntled
Italian general underlines the lack of foresight or strategic planning that went into the campaign.
Someone will say in 15 days we must be ready to march against Yugoslavia, or in 8 days we will
attack Greece from Albania, as easily as saying, let's have a cup of coffee. The Duce hasn't the
least idea of the differences between preparing war on flat terrain or in mountains in summer
or in winter. Still, less does he worry about the fact that we lack weapons, ammunition,
equipment, animals, raw materials. The factors we've discussed so far, though important, were
not enough to guarantee an Italian failure. That was guaranteed by the resolve displayed by the
Greek people. Before the war, Greece was a nation suffering from many internal divisions. Prime
Minister Ioannis Metaxas had been a veteran of the Great War who had taken to politics after
becoming alarmed by the growing communist movement among the Greek peasantry. But after
failing to secure popular support, Metaxas was appointed Prime Minister by the King of Greece,
George II. Shortly thereafter, Metaxas used the threat of a communist uprising to abolish
parliament and establish himself as an authoritarian dictator. But despite the fact
that his regime was deeply unpopular, Metaxas was a genius propagandist whose total control
over the Greek media allowed him to spin a narrative of Italian cowardice and incompetence.
Then, on August 15th, weeks before the declaration of war, an Italian submarine
torpedoed a Greek light cruiser. This coincided with a major festival to the Virgin Mary,
and the pious Greeks reacted by elevating the deceased crew to the status of religious martyrs.
Metaxas could not have wished for a more perfect opportunity, and the state propaganda machines
went into overdrive, whipping the nation into a patriotic frenzy for the coming righteous conflict
against the vile Italian oppressors. The subsequent tenacity with which the Greeks resisted
invasion was seen on numerous occasions, such as the Battle of Hill 731, in which an entire Italian
division, supported by an armored element, was repeatedly repulsed by a single battalion of
Greeks defending an important mountain pass. This act of heroism has often been called
the Modern Thermopylae, and ultimately caused the Italian Spring Offensive to be cancelled.
Yet despite their numerous successes, the Greeks were ultimately doomed by factors beyond their
control. Even with British aid, their army had effectively run out of supplies by March of 1941.
War material captured from the retreating Italians provided only a temporary solution.
And by the time the Germans invaded, the Wehrmacht faced an enemy that barely had enough ammunition
for a month of sustained fighting. In total, at least 250,000 Greek reservists never even saw
combat, as their country lacked the means to provide them with so much as a pair of boots.
As the mainland collapsed, the government withdrew to the island of Crete, one of the last targets of
the German Balkan Campaign. British, Greek, and Anzac forces would be tested against over 20,000
airborne troops in the largest airborne invasion up to that point. Hitler would go on to blame the
invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia for the failure of Operation Barbarossa, allegedly stating,
if the Italians hadn't attacked Greece and needed our help, the war would have taken a different
course. While the Fuhrer may have been exaggerating, there is no doubt that the conflict in
Southern Europe was a significant drain on the limited resources of the Axis. Given all of the
evidence discussed so far, it's easy to see how the Italian invasion was doomed from the start.
Italian strategists ignored every lesson of modern warfare, pushing troops into battle
with neither the equipment nor the support they needed to accomplish their mission. In the end,
individual heroism could not compensate for the abject failures of the Italian military
establishment. And even after Greece finally capitulated, its remaining soldiers took up
arms in the British Army of North Africa, while many civilians fought as partisans,
forming one of the strongest and most effective resistance movements of the war.
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