【生肉長篇】酋長老爺說意大利裝甲部隊學說發展(1918-1940)
迅雷不及掩耳之势如破竹
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8 次觀看·2025年11月6日
1939年4月,世界看見軍事部隊首次進行戰鬥
大多數人對此事件不太關注
主要是因為意大利的攻陷在阿爾巴尼亞是一件不可思議的事
而軍隊並不需要做太多
然而,在國際戰爭期間,意大利是世界上最頂尖的軍事力量
此事件也經常被視為意大利在二次世界大戰中的整體表現的結果
但還有一個有趣的故事
意大利如何發展出它非常現代的概念
對於一場戰爭的操縱,包括戰車,是一支全武力的動作
這就是,如果您不能從影片的頭像中得知
接下來的一系列影片,我會支持世界第二次世界大戰的頻道
我會介紹各項力量,以及他們如何發展出武裝武裝
在進入戰爭的前提
由於意大利在74年前的時間表中
是非常有參與對抗英國的
我們會稍微看一看它們
意大利武裝發展的故事,就像其他力量一樣,是在二次世界大戰開始
就像德國人一樣,戰爭的意大利經驗
不僅僅是在法國的陷阱
他們也在阿爾巴尼亞發生了一些很可憐的積極戰鬥
不僅僅是在阿爾巴尼亞發生了一些很可憐的積極戰鬥
但在土地上也發生了開放的操縱
在維多利亞和特里斯多州
載載軍隊和騎腳踏車的軍隊
使用了偉大的熱情和成就
無論是對抗弱勢的敵人
這些機動力量的顯著成就
將會影響意大利的宗教思維在接下來的兩十年
同時,意大利人也是非常有信心的內部燃料引擎
意大利人在戰爭結束後
有55,000輛車
但意大利人在戰爭結束後
有32,000輛車
有10,000輛車
比美國軍隊還多
他們也完成了100輛武裝車
自動引擎機
但是回到法國
法國有55,000名意大利人在一場
為了展示國旗的團結活動
他們看到了所有的色彩繽紛的戰爭場景和聲音
包括了戰爭機
其中一位看到戰爭機的軍人
是一名叫Alfredo Benicelli的戰爭機師
他也是一名大使
所以他對政治的認識也很深
他也對應戰爭的問題
我嘗試在1999年搜尋Fiat
甚至在Fiat 1000
但沒有任何成功
無論如何
他們創造的戰爭機
有40噸
遠遠超過德國A7V
它的240hp引擎
在另一個儲物櫃
可以把戰鬥車移動
在約7公里的速度
但是在優點方面
它有65毫米的導彈
以及6枚機動手榴彈
所以如果戰爭發生的話
應該會很糟糕
但並沒有發生
他們創造了兩枚
後來他們被遞交到利比亞
他們無法繼續戰鬥
因此被拒絕了
但這將會發生在未來
同時
另一個源頭是法國製造
或至少應該是
法國工廠是否有能力支援意大利人
但他們並沒有
後來
在5月1918年
三枚機動手榴彈和另一枚CA-1
出現了
它們被放進了
第一艘意大利戰機
Reparto Speziale di Marsia Carri d'Assalto
翻譯為
特殊部隊裝備車
並被放進了
現在操縱的
超過三次FT的速度
他們還改變了戰鬥裝備
變成了兩枚6.5mm機槍
他們預料的
這種超級快速的戰鬥車
並不完全明確
戰鬥車還應該
與軍隊結合
也許他們只是因爲可以
後來1918年
Fiat 2000更換了3CA1
變成了Batteria Autonoma Carri d'Assalto
即獨立的戰鬥車充電器
注意用戰鬥車這個詞
有點像火箭
這架戰鬥車1919年
被送到裏比亞
與第二架Fiat 2000一起
這架Fiat 2000證明
它可以達到
4公里時速的
並不可能
與戰鬥車繼續進行戰鬥
戰鬥車被撤離
一架在裏比亞消失了
另一架在15年前
在意大利消失了
1923年
Rapporto Carri Armati
戰鬥車部隊
站起來
只有300人
第一次提到
戰鬥車的官方目的
在1918年
戰鬥車部隊的
主要部隊用途
以及防禦的
主要部隊用途
這些都是
三級戰鬥車戰鬥車
戰鬥車
He had no particular position on the matter, he just laid out the arguments for and against.
He noted that some people thought that the next war would be totally mechanized.
He also noticed that some people thought that the next war would be fought without any great use of land forces at all.
The air force and chemical warfare would just do the job on its own.
Remember, Italy was also the land of Dewey, the hugely influential advocate of air power.
Either way, he advocated against, for now, mass adoption of tanks,
as he felt that technological improvements would be such that they would turn such a mass into an expensive museum collection very quickly.
Besides, look where Italy is likely to fight next, mountains.
Not exactly great tank country, really.
1924 saw the emergence of the commander of the tank detachment into the writing sphere, Colonel Enrico Martese.
He wrote an introduction to tanks for the new Central Military School,
a combined arms training center established in 1924.
This is all fairly basic stuff, but he did put forward the idea of the Semavente, a self-propelled artillery piece.
He also proposed the classification of tanks into light, medium, and heavy,
the L, M, and P, which would eventually show up in the designations.
The heavy tanks were breakthrough tanks,
whilst the medium and light tanks would accompany the infantry for more general attacks.
The next year, under Martese's guidance, the tank detachment published a manual on the use of the tank,
the new concept here being the idea that light tanks could be used for reconnaissance or in support of cavalry units.
Italy, of course, only had the Fiat 3000s, but the idea was still put out there.
In between these two publications, another infantry officer, Eduardo Verce,
published a book also named I Cari Armato,
which was something of a commercial coffee table book,
a primer on tanks and tank thought,
to include observations of what other nations were doing,
which was always a topic of interest and discussion in Italy.
Again, like Cabriali's book, it didn't actually advocate for anything much new,
just listed out a bunch of capabilities, liabilities,
and presented it all for the reader to draw his own conclusions.
In 1927, Martese published another article,
this time on anti-tank operations.
He pointed out that mines, artillery, and anti-tank rifles would be suitable for the job,
but did not mention the possibility of a tank doing it.
After all, tanks were only going to be used in the attack, right?
Also in 1927, the tank detachment was expanded to become the tank regiment,
the Regimento Cari Armati.
Again, apologies for the Italian.
It consisted of five battalions, each of 20 tanks.
Four were split up around the Po Valley,
a little inland from the mountainous borders,
but located so that they could respond to any incursion from the likely enemies,
particularly Austria and Yugoslavia.
They would be used for counterattacks in conjunction with the infantry forces.
The fifth battalion was in Rome,
where it could look snazzy for PR photos,
and could also be used to put down any upstarts
who thought they could take issue with Mussolini's government.
There were some attempts made at training the tank units in the mountains,
where the borders were,
but only very small, light, low-center-of-gravity tanks could really operate.
Eventually, the Italians would provide for this requirement.
The 1928 manual for the use of infantry divisions, however,
did provide some thought to the protection of tanks.
After all, there was much out there now which could kill one.
Combined arms was the key in this manual,
with the use of aircraft and artillery to deal with enemy anti-tank defenses,
whilst the tanks themselves would be dispersed a little bit
to make somewhat less inviting artillery targets.
The 1920s ended with the acquisition of Italy's first light tanks,
but at this point they were designated fast tanks, Caro-Veloci.
These were four Carden-Lloyd Mark V tankettes,
with an additional 24 to be built locally.
Capable of nearly 40 kilometers an hour on good ground,
these would doubtless receive a great glee
by these speed-loving Italians and designated CV-29.
They were attached to the armored car squadrons,
which were themselves attached to the tank battalions.
In the 1930 exercises, the tanks worked with the infantry
whilst the armored cars and CV-29s
hung out with the cavalry and the bicyclists.
It is perhaps worth pausing at this point
to see where Italy stood in the world
with regards to mechanization
when the decade changed.
On the plus side, it was one of the few countries
to have triple-digit numbers of tanks.
It also accepted that tanks needed to be used
as part of an all-arms operation.
On the downside, basically the entire fleet
consisted of WWI vehicles,
which, granted, put it in good company
with France and the US,
and had not conducted any particular experimentation
with heterogeneous units,
such as the British and the Americans
had tried in the late 1920s
with their temporary mechanized forces and so on.
Still, there was time yet before the next war,
and the Italians would not stay wed
to the idea that strategy had to involve
slow-moving infantry units slugging it out.
Tanks were not originally going to be
a part of the solution, though.
There was one final change
to the Italian tank fleet
which crossed into the 1930s,
which was the upgrade to the Fiat 3000.
Some 50 tanks were given a newer,
more powerful engine,
but it was down-geared a little bit
to make a slightly slower top speed
of 21 kilometers an hour,
but this did mean
somewhat better cross-country performance.
They also replaced the machine guns
with a cannon,
a pretty reasonable-for-the-time 37mm Slash 40.
A couple of new tank manuals came out in 1931,
one for the Fiat units
and one for the Carden-Lloyds.
Not that they were particularly revolutionary,
they really just did the same
tanks support the attack
and are not used in defense thing,
but the Carden-Lloyd manual
did make a brief mention
of the possibility of their use in reconnaissance
for the mobile light units
of Cavalry and Bersaglieri.
Come 1932,
and the Inspector of Infantry
had a chat with the Inspector of Cavalry,
and they tried out some maneuvers
of the Horse Cavalry
and the Bicycle Bersaglieri
as a combined force.
This proved to be somewhat successful,
and so the Inspector of Infantry,
a General Ottavio Zuppi,
in 1933 published Isaleri.
Zuppi,
who was a highly experienced
and powerful figure in the Italian Army,
was not particularly enamored
of the static fighting
which the army was currently
training and equipping for.
The battering of infantry formations
supported by tanks and artillery
into the enemy's defensive line,
he thought,
was going to be a little bit painful.
Like a number of his counterparts
in other European nations,
he believed that the solution
was to apply a strategy of maneuver
and rapid movement.
Light mobile forces,
such as cavalry and bersaglieri,
could do this.
Still,
they would need some support,
and the airplane
and the Caravallocci
could provide that.
Of course,
they would need more Caravallocci
to do it.
In the meantime,
a platoon of Fiat 3000s
and one of CV 29s
was used in an amphibious
landing exercise further south.
Zuppi's ideas of infusing
these elite,
decisive units
with aggressive élan
and maneuvering around
the enemy met approval,
and so the Saleri divisions
started being created.
In order to give them
sufficient tanks to support them,
the Carden-Lloyd tankette
was used as a start point
for the improved version,
the CV 33.
This came with
a twin 6.5 mm machine gun,
still fixed in the hull,
and was capable of topping out
at over 40 km an hour.
It was cheap,
it seemed to do the job
of supporting the Saleri divisions,
and so
production tabs were opened,
with some 1,200 being built,
leaping Italy into the front runners
in terms of numbers
of tanks on strength.
On the downside,
this meant that Italy
had huge numbers of tanks
suited for supporting horse cavalry,
which could arguably be said
to be a bit of a wrong term
in terms of acquisition.
For the three Saleri divisions,
three groups were formed
under a cavalryman
named Colonel Garvasio Bittossi.
He was a fan of tanks,
but also of the horse,
and his was the not uncommon view
of the interwar period
that the tank was a complement
to the horse cavalry,
not a replacement for it.
As with the slower tanks,
the CVs were to be used
only in the attack,
and the idea of engaging other tanks
didn't really enter into things.
The CVs were directed
into infantry tank units
and cavalry tank units,
depending on who they were supporting,
Bersaglieri or infantry.
Their organization and doctrines,
though,
remained basically identical.
The 1933 maneuvers went ahead,
and little CV 33
came in for a fair bit of praise,
although it was observed
not to be fantastic in the mountains,
as it was hoped.
1934 started to show
a further shift in Italian thinking
from the line of battle
to the war of maneuver.
A Colonel Sebastiano Visconti Prasca
put out La Guerra decisiva,
which advocated strongly
for the war of maneuver,
using all arms,
including tanks,
to assist the infantry and cavalry.
The slower units
would punch the hole
in the enemy lines,
which the slavery units
would then exploit.
He also advocated
the use of balanced teams,
not emphasizing any branch too much.
He may have been involved
in the publication
of the new manual of 1935,
the Directive for the Use of Large Units,
the premise of which
was also advocating maneuver warfare
as the tactical doctrine
of the Italian army,
and which was used
as the basis for the 1934 maneuvers
as a test
before the official publication.
Again, though,
be the unit
a standard infantry formation
or a salary formation,
the tank was still
only a supporting weapon.
The 1935 manual
stressed boldness and initiative.
1935 also saw
a minor change to the design
of the Caravaggio.
The CV.35 was released
to replace the CV.33.
The main differences
were that the machine guns
were changed to 8 mm,
and the construction
was a change
between bolts and rivets.
There was a new engine as well,
and reliability was excellent,
but top speed
stayed about the same.
Another 1,200 or so
of these would be built,
giving Italy
basically the largest
armored fleet in the world
in the mid-1930s
with some 2,500 tanks.
Of course,
we would consider
most of them tankettes today,
but in the 1930s,
the distinction
was not quite as solid.
Regardless,
one advantage of this
was that Italy
was basically
the only country in the world
which could conduct exercises
involving large numbers
of tracked armored vehicles,
which would give it
a little bit of a leg up
in practical, tactical thinking.
It wasn't just the tanks
that were starting to demonstrate
the combustion engine.
1935 also saw
Italy stand up
its first fully motorized division,
and none too soon
for the invasion,
the next invasion,
I should say,
of Ethiopia
was on the horizon.
This was going to be
no small escapade,
and having been rather embarrassed
the first time the Italians tried it,
they weren't going to muck around
this time.
Still,
because of the distances involved
and past experience,
German opinion
was that conquering the country
would take about a year and a half.
The Italians managed it
in about seven months.
To give an idea of the scale,
the 11 companies of tanks
in three battalions
were to support
11 divisions from Eritrea.
Still,
despite the surprising success,
there was still room for improvement.
Two very important points
were driven home.
Firstly,
that,
especially over the long distances
of Africa,
motorization was incredibly important.
The Italians were starting
to head in that general direction anyway,
as best as the economy would allow,
but it was nice to see
some reinforcement of the idea.
The second was driven home
at a place called
Dembeguina Pass,
possibly Italy's toughest
fight of conflict,
and the only engagement
in which more than one tank was lost.
The lesson was that
tanks needed to have a turret.
Being as it was a pass,
the fixed machine guns
were unable to come to bear
on a close enemy,
especially once the tracks
had been disabled.
Within three weeks,
the army published a manual
entitled
The Norms for the Use of Tank Units.
It emphasized again
that the tank was a weapon
of movement and of the attack,
it should not be employed
without reconnaissance,
and should be used
in close conjunction with infantry,
and the crews
should never leave their tank.
They also put out
a requirement for a new tank,
which had a turret.
Opinions and discussion
came after the Ethiopian war.
One of the more prominent pieces
was written by a general
Angelo Pudnami,
in which he strongly advocated
for motorization of the entire army,
though he did not go as far
as to elevate the tank
to a weapon of prominence
beyond supporting other units.
There were, however,
a few minor problems at this point.
Firstly,
Italy was one of the least
motorized countries
in the modern world.
It had about one vehicle
per 112 people.
This was something of a result
of the government's
nationalist policies.
A desire for self-sufficiency
led to high tariffs
on imports of fuel
to discourage its use,
and also of imported vehicles.
The car manufacturers,
like Fiat,
had no foreign markets
to speak of
because of the tit-for-tat tariffs
which were on the cars.
But because nobody
could afford fuel for them,
there wasn't much
of a domestic market
for the things either.
As a result,
there was something of a cap
on the production of capability
to the Italian industry.
What would eventually be proven
to be a fatal cap,
it should be said.
It also meant
that the Italians
had something of a shortage
of people who knew
how to either drive
or maintain motor vehicles.
It would be up to army training
to try to redress this gap.
New tank unit manuals in 1936
generally covered
the same ground as before,
but it did at least
give official sanction
to the idea of using armour
for the reconnaissance role,
as opposed to simply supporting
the operations of other arms.
Around now, also,
the tanks changed
their system of designation
to weight and type
rather than of role.
Light tanks now had
a model beginning with L,
the mediums M,
and the heavies P,
as proposed a decade prior.
The number following
was the weight of the vehicle
in tonnes,
and the model number
was the year of construction.
So, for example,
the CV-35 became the L-3-35,
being a three-tonne light tank
introduced in 1935.
There were, again,
two additional important events
which happened in 1936.
The first was that
the Spanish Civil War kicked off,
and the Italians would send
quite a substantial force
to help out Franco's nationalists.
This force included 60 tanks.
The base of the force
was the Trento Division,
which was the motorized division
created in 1935.
As you might expect,
eventually the Italian tanks
ran into Soviet tanks,
the T-26 with the 45mm gun
slightly outgunning
the twin machine gun on the L-3.
In a rather chaotic battle
near Toledo,
which was started
when an Italian and a Soviet officer
started chatting to each other,
each thinking the other was friendly,
the final score was
three L-3s lost to the T-26s,
and three T-26s
lost to Italian artillery pieces.
The idea of a war of manoeuvre
was also given some trial
during the operation to capture Malaga.
Seeing an opportunity
to exploit a breakthrough,
General Ruata,
commanding the Italian volunteers,
sent three motorized columns
headed by armoured cars
and light tanks
in a quick movement to grab Malaga,
and then the pursued
the retreating Republican forces
for the following week.
There was one major tank battle
around Guadalajara,
which started OK for the Italians,
who pushed their anti-tank guns forward,
and eventually saw the 20-strong
Italian force come a cropper
when they ran into
a full company of T-26s.
The Republicans then counterattacked
using a massive 70 T-26s
against the Blackshirt Division.
The nearby Littorio of the regular army,
which was also fully motorized,
held on for a couple of hours,
counterattacked successfully,
threatening the Republican position,
but the collapse of the Blackshirts
meant that Littorio had to fall back.
Although lessons would be implemented
about using a little bit more reconnaissance
and better integration of arms,
the performance of the Italian army in Spain
did indicate that the idea
of rapid offensive operations
had something to recommend it.
In the meantime,
further events were taking place
in Libya in 1936.
Under Colonel Bittossi,
the former commander of the CVs
attached to the Saleri Divisions,
a mixed motorized regiment was stood up.
It was a temporary unit,
but it was also,
despite the name, more mechanized,
with a variety of subunits,
including machine guns,
infantry, tanks and motorcycles,
making a fairly rapid and flexible unit
without the liabilities
of bicycles and horses.
Further, during its training,
Colonel Bittossi advocated
that the tankers practice
as if their tanks had turrets,
on the basis that he was confident
that the next generation of tanks
would indeed actually have one,
and so they had better
sort out their tactics ahead of time.
The next move was in July 1937
with the creation
of the 1st Armored Brigade.
On paper,
it consisted of three battalions of tanks,
a Bersaglieri regiment of two battalions,
accompanied each of motorcycles,
anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns.
In practice,
it was a little understrength,
but they tried it out
in the summer maneuvers anyway.
Its tactical purpose
was as an assault unit,
punching a hole in the enemy line,
though there was thought
that it could operate in a maneuver role
if given additional supporting units,
especially in conjunction with the Saleri.
While the reports
of the exercises were being written,
a 2nd Armored Brigade was stood up.
The opinions from the commanders
of the two armored brigades
are perhaps not surprising in hindsight.
The armored brigades
were fine for adding
a little bit more punch
to a supported division or corps,
but they were too small
to be capable of true,
independent, self-contained operation.
The units needed to be enlarged
and turned into divisions.
The difference
between the two positions
was that the 1st Armored Commander
wanted the division created immediately
and 2nd Armored's
didn't see any point to it
until proper tanks
were available to fill it.
In which case,
in the meantime,
do some augmenting,
maybe with self-propelled
47mm anti-tank guns,
that sort of thing.
In the meantime,
in another corner of Italy,
Solari and motorized divisions
were being exercised.
Some doubts started to be expressed
as to the capability
of these divisions
against a proper mechanized unit,
and it was particularly concluded
that the tanks used to support Solari
needed to have a cannon as well.
Not that this was
particular news to anyone,
and Ansaldo were still working the issue,
albeit at a fairly low priority.
With a couple thousand tanks
in the inventory already,
the other shortfalls
in capability in the military
were being addressed instead.
One interesting note, though,
was that,
though the importance of armor
was underlined,
it was not,
in the view of the writers,
to the exclusion of the horse.
They still felt that the horse cavalry
was more capable overall
than an armored unit was.
Though the horse was far from gone
in Italian thinking, though,
that didn't stop the Italians
from making a very significant leap.
Most other tanking nations
progressed from brigade to division
by 1939,
but the Italians went one stage further.
They decided that the best use
for the armored division
was to be part of an armored corps,
and so they created
the Corpo d'Armato Carazzato,
one of two armored divisions
formed from the two armored brigades,
and also two motorized infantry divisions.
Combined this corps
with the Solari Corps
of three Solari divisions,
they made the Army of the Pole,
which was Italy's primary force,
and it was intended to protect
Italy's industrial regions,
which were unfortunately
close to the border.
This is impressive enough,
but then one has to look
at how they were used.
In 1938,
Italy's doctrinal policy changed
officially in a publication
entitled
The Tactical Doctrine in Realization
in the Year 16,
which is based off
of the fascist calendar.
It was changed to
High Speed Mobile Warfare,
what the Italians would call
Guerra di Rapido Corso.
The only acknowledgment
of front lines really now
was in the use of heavy tanks
in one battalion of the armored division
to punch through the enemy's line.
The armored divisions
would be the primary force
with the other arms,
including aviation and artillery,
supporting them.
The tanks would be used en masse,
and as much as possible
avoid frontal attacks.
Whenever breaches were created,
they would then be exploited
by the motorized and mechanized
lighter forces,
and also the salarii.
This doctrine was thoroughly modern.
However,
though the mind
may well have been willing,
the body could not necessarily keep up.
The make-up of the armored division
was as follows.
It was to have a very large
armored regiment
of some 140 tanks
in five battalions,
four battalions of medium tanks
and one of heavy tanks.
The heavies would be used
for that breakthrough,
whilst exploitation
and hasty attack
was the function of mediums.
Two battalions
of larry de Bersaglieri
and one of motorcycle Bersaglieri
would be the infantry force
with a company of armored cars.
The artillery support
consisted of two battalions
of artillery,
an anti-tank company,
and two anti-aircraft batteries.
You might be able to see
an immediate flaw in the plan.
Although the doctrine
and table of organization
called for medium and heavy tanks,
the Italians only had light tanks
in the inventory.
Worse,
only one armored division
could actually be brought up
to anything
approximating full strength.
The second one
was really just a cadre shell
awaiting personnel
who knew an intake
from an exhaust pipe.
The Saleri divisions
weren't actually much better off.
After the experience of Spain,
some cross-attachment was in order.
The third division
was ordered to hand
all of its motor vehicles
to the other two,
increasing their percentages
in motorization,
but turning the third
into an entirely horse-borne affair.
This was actually deliberate.
There was still
plenty of terrain in Spain
which did not suit
the motor vehicle,
and in the eyes
of the Italian high command,
maintaining a hippo mobile unit
was desirable.
The first of the armored divisions,
Ariete,
was stood up
on the 1st of February 1939.
Sentoro was stood up in April,
and before you could say,
I love Mussolini!
It was sent off
to fight in Albania.
It was just as well
that the Albanians
didn't put up much of a fight.
The deployment
was not an unmitigated success,
with problems with supply
even requiring air delivery of fuel,
as well as other logistical
and maintenance problems.
And this was still
before the Italians
received anything
approaching a modern tank.
The Spanish Civil War
ended just in time.
The armored corps
was now short a division,
and the solution
was to convert Littorio,
now returned from Spain,
with its group of veteran troops,
into the 3rd armored division.
The corps
was put through its paces
in the 1939 exercises,
and again,
much was made of the fact
that the tanks
were not what was needed.
The exercises
did go well though,
and also the Germans
were sure to send an officer over
to talk about
the Polish campaign experience.
In general,
he observed
that the Italians
were on the right track
with their doctrine,
if not their equipment.
In about September 1939,
the Italians
finally started to receive
delivery of a medium tank
with a turret.
The catch
is that the M1139
was designed
based off of an older doctrine.
The cannon
was mounted in the hull,
suitable for forward firing
in the attack,
whilst the turret
mounted machine guns
to prevent another
Dembegrina pass
in the mountains.
It was an improvement,
to be sure,
but it would be another year
before the cannon-turreted vehicle,
the M1340,
showed up.
In the meantime,
the L6 light tanks,
which were basically
an L3,
upgraded with a turret
and a 20mm cannon,
started showing up,
but they ended up
being sent
to the Saleri
and motorized divisions.
There weren't enough tanks
for the actual tank units,
so all production
of the mediums
had to go in that direction.
Sentoro
was at the end
of the supply line
in Albania.
When they attacked Greece
in October 1940,
it was still
equipped with 163 L3-35s.
It would not get
any medium tanks at all
until much later.
This also meant
that the original design
of the armoured division
had to be changed
in order to meet
the practical realities
of the lack
of industrial capability.
The unit was arguably
a little bit tank-heavy
to begin with,
which was a common failing
amongst basically
all the tank powers,
so the five battalions
in the tank regiment
was reduced down to three,
two medium
and a heavy,
although,
of course,
in practice,
this meant
too light in the medium.
The Bersaglieri
kept their two motorised
and one motorcycle battalions,
and the artillery regiment
increased its anti-aircraft component
to a battalion,
whilst losing
the anti-tank company.
This turned into
a divisional anti-tank battalion,
and the division also
had an engineer battalion.
And so it was
when the Italians
decided to join in
the fun in 1940.
The later developments,
such as the additions
of the Semeventes
or the Autoblindas,
I'll leave for a future episode.
To summarise,
the Italians started out
with an apparently proven experience
in World War I
of tanks used
in a close support of the infantry
where manoeuvre
didn't seem possible,
and the horse and bicycle
for a rapid movement
where it was.
The most likely place to fight
was going to be in the mountains,
the northern borders,
and tanks were procured
for that role,
and for rapid operations
supporting horses
and bikes.
The African expedition
emphasised the importance
of motors for operation
and supply over long distances,
and though the Italians
may have been a bit archaic
in their confidence
in horse cavalry,
they were not stupid enough
to think that horse cavalry
would survive in the line of battle.
The only way to succeed
was with speed and manoeuvre,
moving faster than the enemy
could react,
hitting them where they were weak,
and then supported by ranged arms
like artillery and air power.
They had the right idea,
but arguably were using
the wrong tools.
They did eventually figure it out
on their own,
before seeing the German example
of Poland,
but by this point
they were let down
by the lack of Italian
industrial capacity.
They simply couldn't create
the right equipment
in time to be of use.
So whilst the doctrine
was pretty much on point,
Italy would go to war
hobbled by older tank designs
of inadequate production numbers.
And there you have it,
the Italians.
I think it's the Soviets next.
Take care.
