The real reason Argentina’s economy is such a mess

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Timestamps:
00:00 Intro
01:29 Argentina 100 year economic decline
04:15 Half-hearted industrialization
08:36 Disastrous free trade
13:29 Make up your mind Argentina
20:05 Sponsor
This is Argentina's capital, Buenos Aires, a hundred years ago. A rich, rapidly developing
city with inhabitants that, on paper, looked to be on the path of becoming as rich as Britain,
just like other upcoming nations like Canada and Germany. However, after 1930, Argentina stagnated
and then declined after 1976, while the other countries just kept growing, along with Britain.
This century of relative decline earned Argentina the questionable honor of being the only country
in the world that regressed from advanced to developing economy status. So, what happened?
What caused Argentina's unique decline? Melee supporters will tell you that protectionism and
state interference under people like Perón and de Kirchner is to blame, while opponents will tell
that actually hardcore free market fundamentalism has been tried in Argentina many times, for
example under the military junta in 76, Menem in the 90s, Macri in 2015, and this always ended in
a massive economic collapse. But what if both of them are right? What if there's a much deeper
story that can explain Argentina's terrible economy under both left and right-wing approaches?
If you're interested in that story, then this video is for you. So, sit back and relax as we
take a deep dive into the sad story of Argentina, a hundred years of economic decline, starting with
the growth miracle years in which Argentina supposedly became a rich country, the years from 1860 to 1929.
Chapter 1. A deceptive growth miracle. This graph shows Argentina's per person GDP as a
percentage of what was at the time the richest economy in the world, Great Britain. Throughout
its miracle years, the income of the average Argentinian arose from 42% of that of Britain
in 1860 to almost 80% in 1929. This dynamic made Argentina look much more similar to successful
British settler colonies like Canada than more typical Latin American countries like Brazil.
So, what caused this? Why was Argentina growing so fast and how did that compare to
Canada and Brazil? According to recent economic research, the most likely explanation
comes from the gradual opening up of Argentina's economy since independence, combined with rapid
globalization and new shipbuilding technologies which rapidly reduced the prices of Argentinian
imports while raising the prices of what they could earn with agricultural exports such as wheat
and livestock. Therefore, during this era it became increasingly profitable for Argentinian farmers
to invest in the exploitation of Argentina's massive fertile underdeveloped Pampian grasslands,
which they could do thanks to the increased availability of British capital.
Meanwhile, Brazil and other Latin American nations did not have these fertile lands and instead
depended heavily on exporting far less valuable resources like coffee. On the other hand,
while Argentina's growth miracle looked a lot like that of Canada on paper, Canada's growth
was much more broad-based as by this time it had already developed a healthy manufacturing sector.
Interestingly enough, while Argentina had profited immensely from increased free trade
under globalization, Canada had during this same time period increasingly turned to tariffs
to protect its industries. So, in short, Argentina's economic boom was mostly a consequence
of them opening up their economy at a time that the products from their main natural resource,
fertile land, was in very high demand. In that sense, it was not very different from the rest
of Latin America, it's just that they got much more lucky with their geography for this specific
time period. Luck that would soon run out as Argentina entered the 1930s, a decade of global
crises and increased protectionism. Chapter 2. Half-hearted industrialization
This graph again shows the performance of Argentina's economy versus that of the British
economy for the period of 1930 to 1976. This is important because while during this period
Argentina's economy kept growing, its relative economic power was already declining,
especially if we compare it to ex-British colonies like Canada and Australia. At first,
Argentina's decline was simply a consequence of globalization going into reverse, meaning that it
suffered heavily from the collapse of its agricultural exports due to increased protectionism
in Britain while Canada and Australia got a special deal from Britain as ex-colonies.
Just as today, in the 1930s, protectionism was the latest global trend. For industrialized
countries like the UK and US, it was a response to the global depression which made voters pretty
upset to say the least, compelling populists to fight other countries with tariffs for a bigger
slice of the economic pie. Economists generally consider this wasteful as higher tariffs by one
country tends to lead to trade wars where everyone loses. However, for non-industrialized nations
like Australia and Argentina, protectionism is often considered good practice as it may help them
to industrialize. US founding father Alexander Hamilton called these types of policies infant
industry protection policies and he successfully used tariffs to protect developing American
industries from established British ones. During this decade, it was not just Argentina but also
Australia and many more developed nations that tried to do this protectionism as well.
So, why did infant industry protection fail in Argentina while it was much more successful in
countries like Australia? In my research, I could find two main reasons and both have to do with
Argentina's sky-high level of inequality where oligarchs are massively influential in politics.
These oligarchs tend to get their wealth either from Argentina's fertile lands, thus profiting
from free trade, or from its emerging industry, thus profiting from protectionism. In highly
unequal societies, where money rules politics, politics tend to be much more volatile as moneyed
interests can bribe the army to take over the government. Indeed, if we look at this graph,
we can see that Argentina was rocked by several violent coups during this era, meaning that
tariffs or other privileges were sometimes abruptly revoked or changed. This is a problem
because it's very difficult to build lasting industries in these circumstances. However,
in the end, Argentina's industrial oligarchs mostly dominated this period, meaning that the
country saw a rise in industry and, sadly, a decline in agricultural production. However,
this brings us to the second problem with Argentina's infant industry protection,
which is corruption. You see, if done well, industries are temporarily protected from
outside competition while furiously competing inside the country. However, in Argentina,
that never happened as industry bosses convinced the government to protect them from
all competition, meaning this industry never became very productive. So, where infant industry
protection worked in the US, Canada and then later in Australia, it failed in Argentina because it
was not properly implemented. This meant that in the 1970s, an era of global economic turmoil,
Argentina found itself not competitive enough to earn enough foreign exchange to support the
currency, which promptly collapsed, leading to inflation and a loss of economic activity and
tax revenue for the government. However, different than before, this interventionist government had
developed a tendency to create money to offset that decline in taxes, increasing inflation to
almost 5000% per year. The resulting discontent among the public gave rise to yet another coup,
where a military dictatorship installed a wealthy, free-market-loving rancher
as its new economy minister, with a mission to bring free-market economics back to Argentina.
To switch the organization of the economy from a top-down to a bottom-up performance,
we must go through a very bitter pill, trained at the University of Chicago,
in a normal market system that works fairly easily.
The late 1970s marked a global economic revolution. Protectionism and state intervention
was out and free-market economics was in. For developing economies like Argentina and,
in a more extreme case, China, free-market economics emphasized that to grow countries
needed to control inflation by moderating government spending and then to remove
most restrictions on trade, like tariffs, as well as those on money flowing across borders.
This could potentially give developing countries a shortcut to develop through
foreign direct investment, FDI for short. Using FDI rather than developing homegrown industries,
developing countries could, in theory at least, convince foreign manufacturers to build factories
in their countries from where they could export to the west, which was now committed to free trade.
In 1976, Argentina looked perfectly positioned to dominate this model,
as the military junta installed a well-connected free-market-loving economist
and wealthy businessman, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, as economy minister.
Mr. de Hoz then installed bright Argentinians educated at the University of Chicago in key
posts. For example, he installed Adolfo Díaz, who was a pupil of Milton Friedman himself,
as head of the central bank. However, ironically, it was not Argentina but rather communist China
that would successfully attract FDI to transform its economy. Meanwhile, Argentina did succeed in
attracting foreign capital, but it was mostly of the speculative kind.
So, what did China do differently than Argentina? Three things.
First, while China's political institutions were firmly captured by elites, these were much more
stable than those in Argentina, where it was difficult for foreign firms to believe that
reforms would not be quickly reversed. Indeed, in the 1980s, after a brutal depression, quite a few
trade restrictions were reintroduced, and while de Hoz brought inflation under control by creating
a depression, it soon again spiralled out of control as the next government tried to span
itself out of that depression. Such unpredictability is not great if you're trying to build factories
worth millions of dollars in a country. However, that does raise the question, why did Argentina's
economy go through this brutal recession in the first place, while China did not? This brings us
to the second major difference between the free market reforms of China and Argentina, which is
that Argentina did it suddenly through shock therapy, rather than doing it gradually through
free trade zones as they did in China. The consequence of shock therapy was not just that
it created hardship, leaving Argentina's ruling elite vulnerable, causing political instability.
The consequence in Argentina was also that it produced economic instability, that is,
by opening up quickly, Argentina's inefficient industries were quickly demolished. But that
also destroyed a valuable source of tax and foreign exchange revenue, thereby causing inflation and
the reintroduction of tariffs, making Argentina less attractive again for foreign firms.
This contributed to free marketeer Menem then instituting a fixed exchange rate to the US
dollar in the early 1990s. To maintain it, he heavily restricted government spending, thereby
creating instability and reducing inflation. However, because inflation was still higher than
in the United States, the fixed exchange rate essentially meant that Argentina became relatively
more expensive over time and therefore a less attractive destination for foreign direct
investment. In contrast, China actively kept its exchange rate low in this period. So,
given that China was more politically and economically stable and remained much cheaper
thanks to undervaluing its exchange rate, it should come as no surprise that Argentina
failed to attract much FDI. This left Argentina with a demolished industrial base and without a
new foreign one to replace it. And it forever increased unemployment and inequality in the
country. So, while China's government made it attractive for foreign investments that benefited
the country in the long term, liberalized Argentina was stuck with speculative investment flows,
which made Argentina's feel temporarily rich from time to time. But given that such speculative
investments can leave at any time, it once again left Argentina open to a global crisis,
which is exactly what happened in 1998 when the Russian and Brazilian crises caused foreign
capital to quickly flee Argentina, setting the stage for even more political drama.
Chapter 4. Make up your mind Argentina In the early 2000s, the world was still
convinced about free market economics. However, after experiencing a 5-year long crisis well
before the west would have its own crisis in 2007, Argentina was no longer sure the free market
economics of Menem was the way forward. So, Argentina went back to protectionism under the
Kirchner political dynasty. Their protectionist state interventionist program reinvigorated the
economy, but it ended with ever increasing inflation. Then, the Argentinians voted for
a free market reformer, Macri, who opened the country up to the world again, cut spending,
brought back foreign money, but ultimately failed to convince foreign investors to stay for the
long term, meaning this term yet again ended with a recession and increased inflation.
Argentina then returned to the Kirchner dynasty, which reintroduced protectionism,
grew the economy, but at the cost of ever increasing inflation.
This then provided an opening for Argentina's most radical free marketeer to date,
Javier Mele, who has promised to save Argentina by once again taking it back on the path of free
market fundamentalism. But, can he do it? Well, to answer that question, I think we need to dive a bit
deeper into the patterns that we have so far observed. First of all, I want to stress that
Argentina is not the only country in the world that regressed from developed to developing economy.
As we've seen, Argentina was never a properly industrialized economy like Canada, Australia or
the US. It was always agrarian. It just got lucky for a couple of decades when the combination of
free trade and undeveloped fertile grasslands made some Argentinians fabulously wealthy indeed.
After that era, Argentina tried protectionism and free market fundamentalism many times. And yet,
where other countries succeeded in each of these approaches, Argentina failed time and time again.
But why did Argentina fail at both protectionism and free market economics? According to Nobel
prize winning economists Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, countries get rich not because of their
favourable geography that Argentina has, not because of their culture, but rather because
they have inherited the right political and economic institutions. To explain exactly how
this works, they have come up with the following framework. Let's start with political power,
which helps certain groups in society take control of the political institutions,
like the government. According to Acemoglu and his colleagues, different types of colonization
can explain a lot of patterns that we see today. Specifically, in most Latin American countries,
Spanish settlers encountered rich civilizations which, after conquering them, they then sought
to dominate through oppressive institutions. These oppressive political institutions created
economic institutions like big state-owned banks, laws that permitted slavery, or a corrupt police
force that prioritized protecting the wealth of the land-owning Spanish-descended elite.
On the other hand, in British settler colonies like the US, Canada and Australia, the native
population was almost completely wiped out. Therefore, they did not need to be economically
dominated, which meant their inhabitants started on a more equal footing. Therefore, they created
more inclusive political institutions, and then these in turn created more inclusive political
institutions, such as labor protection laws, laws that permitted hundreds of small banks to emerge,
and courts that protected the property rights of everyone, not just those that were already
wealthy. In this framework, inclusive economic institutions allow for faster economic growth
because they allow for what famous Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter called creative
destruction, which refers to a process where an economy continuously innovates, and innovation
disrupts and thereby destroys outdated businesses, but replaces them with more productive ones.
This process creates economic growth, but it also redistributes wealth from old to new business
elites. So, in ex-British settler colonies, inclusive political institutions allowed for
more economic growth and redistribution of wealth to innovators. On the other hand,
in Latin American countries like Argentina, old, often agrarian elites controlled political
institutions, which they then used to rig the economy in their favor, keeping them rich,
and as a by-product prevented the economy from growing as fast. However, to make this story
even more depressing, Asimoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that this system is self-reinforcing.
In highly unequal societies, some people have so much money that they can use it to capture
political institutions. In more inclusive societies, people may be rich, but not rich enough to fully
capture political parties. Therefore, in these types of societies, if an economy is not working
for the masses, they can mobilize more easily to take charge of political institutions, which make
the economy work for the majority again. This means that economies like Canada and Germany face
the same trends, and move between protectionism and free trade from time to time, like Argentina,
but because their institutions are not captured by elite that use these for protectionism,
they are able to make these transitions work. So, in short, the only thing that is exceptional
about Argentina's story is that it was blessed with huge resource wealth that could easily be
exported at the start of the 20th century. Once these fortunate circumstances were gone,
it became clear that Argentina was actually always a typical Latin American economy,
stuck in a high inequality, low growth and highly volatile economic and political state.
Therefore, it makes sense that, like in many other Latin American countries, Argentinians
are increasingly desperate for a candidate to get them out of that predicament. Will Millet be the
one to do it though? There are some hopeful signs, but also many signs that he is just another market
reformer in the spirit of the Junta, Minim and Macri, that is temporarily creating an investment
I'm hope I'm wrong on that and that Argentina soon busts out of its toxic political economic
dynamic. In fact, there are some hopeful signs that Millet is more pragmatic than he lets on.
You can read all about that in the sponsor of this video, The Economist. Specifically,
I recommend this article which explains how Millet's government is trying to get
Argentina to make better use of its natural resources. Then follow that up with this
article about how Millet will deal with the challenges that I just talked about,
like the overvalued peso. Finally, I highly recommend going back in time to contrast the
vibes around Millet now with this analysis of Argentina's previous free market president,
Macri, and then go back in time to this analysis about the shocking crisis that ended the Menem
free market reform years in the 1990s. Indeed, if there's one concept about Argentina's 100-year
economic history, it's that The Economist was covering it. This is why I'm so excited to say
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