Sources: Aleksievich, Svetlana. Zinky Boys: Soviet voices from the Afghanistan war. Translated by Julia Whitby and Robin Whitby. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.
Amstutz, J. Bruce. Afghanistan: the first five years of soviet occupation. Washington, DC.: National Defense University, 1986.
Bearden, Milton. “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires.” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6(November - December 2001): 17-30.
Collins, Joseph. “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Methods, Motives, and Ramifications.” Naval War College Review 33, no. 6 (November-December 1980): 53-62.
DeYoung, Karen. “Overwhelming U.N. Vote Condemns Soviets.” The Washington Post, January 14, 1980.
Gompert, David C., et al. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.
Grau, Lester W., and Ali Ahmad Jalali. “The Soviet-Afghan War: Breaking the Hammer & Sickle.” VFW Magazine, January 2002.
Gregory, Paul R. Lenin’s Brain and Other Tales from the Secret Soviet Archives. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008.
Kakar, M. Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1995.
Khalilzad, Zalmay. “Afghanistan: Anatomy of a Soviet Failure.” The National Interest, no.12 (Summer 1988): 101-108.
Malashenko, Ye.I. “Movement to contact and commitment to combat of reserve fronts.” Military Thought (April-June), 2004.
Oliker, Olga. Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011.
Payind, Alam. “Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 21, no. 1 (February 1989: 107-128.
Reuveny, Rafael, and Aseem Prakash. “The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union.” Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (October 1999): 693-708.
Zain, Omar Farooq. “Afghanistan: From Conflict to Conflict.” Pakistan Horizon 59, no. 1 (January 2006): 79-86.
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On December 27, 1979, Chairman Hafizullah Amin of Afghanistan celebrated.
After religious insurgents, democratic activists, and even rival communists had taken up arms,
Amin had finally secured a Soviet military presence to help him control his rebellious nation.
He proudly told his dinner guests,
The Soviet divisions are already on their way here.
Paratroopers have landed in Kabul.
All is going well.
However, they were not there to help him.
By dawn the next day, Amin would be dead, and the Soviets would enter a conflict from which they would never recover.
The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan was the result of decades of geopolitical interests and sunk costs.
During much of the Cold War, Afghanistan was a neutral state, closely orbiting the Soviet Union.
The landlocked kingdom was a springboard for Soviet influence in the Middle East and India.
Through millions of dollars in economic investment, officer training, and diplomatic support,
the Soviets kept the mountainous realm on a tight leash.
Initially, this tight leash meant a close alliance between the communist juggernaut and the Afghan leadership.
Afghanistan welcomed Soviet assistance, especially since their deep rivalry with Pakistan left the kingdom without any partners.
However, the conservative, religious, and nationalist Afghan people generally resented Soviet influence.
Anti-communist incidents throughout the 1960s and 1970s worried the Kremlin that their influence over Afghanistan might be threatened.
The 1970s were a turbulent time in Afghan politics.
The monarchy was toppled in 1973 by Mohammad Dawood Khan, much to the Kremlin's approval.
The Soviets expected him to be little more than a figurehead,
while the Soviet-trained officers held the real power.
However, Dawood proved more independent than expected.
The Afghan president increasingly maintained an anti-communist, anti-Soviet dictatorship.
His policies came to a head on April 26, 1978.
After major demonstrations following the death of a prominent communist Afghan ideologue,
Dawood imprisoned the communist opposition and planned to execute them.
Hafizullah Amin, a prominent Afghan communist under house arrest, decided to act first.
The morning after, communist revolutionaries stormed the presidential palace.
After a fierce fight, they overwhelmed the presidential guard.
Dawood was killed, and a new government under Nur Muhammad Taraki took over.
While the role of the Soviet Union in the coup is debated,
there is no question that the events were welcomed by the Kremlin.
Moscow recognized the new regime almost immediately.
However, Soviet hopes for a secure and loyal Afghanistan would remain a pipe dream.
Taraki embarked on a radical reconstruction of Afghan society.
His regime decreased the role of Islam in society,
pushed through controversial land reform,
invited countless Soviet advisors, and terrorized the people into submission.
His rule marked the start of a series of uprisings by various conservative Islamic clans.
These would be united under the umbrella term Mujahideen, who used Afghanistan's
inhospitable and mountainous terrain to wage highly effective guerrilla warfare.
The situation would once again change radically
when Taraki was assassinated by his second-in-command Hafezullah Amin.
Although he repeatedly professed his love and loyalty to the Kremlin,
Moscow saw Amin as incapable at best, and treacherous at worst.
Within two months of his rise, the Politburo decided direct intervention
was needed to secure Soviet interests in Afghanistan.
The Politburo had been divided on actual military intervention.
The KGB, however, was adamant Amin was a threat to Soviet interests.
The plan was to replace Amin with their puppet,
Barbarak Karmal.
To facilitate the transition, 80,000 soldiers,
1,800 tanks, and 2,000 armored vehicles would enter Afghanistan.
By December 17, Leonid Brezhnev had signed the invasion decree.
By the time of the invasion order, Soviet troops and operatives
already permeated the Afghan army.
Soviet advisors were everywhere in Afghan command.
A month earlier, Soviet forces, disguised as Afghans,
were incorporated into the Presidential Security Forces.
Soviet regiments had also assured access to several key roads,
notably the road between Kabul and Soviet territory.
On the night of Christmas Eve, the Soviet 40th Army
started its first incursion into Afghanistan.
As soldiers crossed into the north of the country,
Soviet technicians and advisors within the Afghan army
sabotaged an organized Afghan response.
Two days later, the coup to overthrow Amin began.
Codenamed Operation Storm 333,
the goals were to take the Tajbeg Palace and kill Amin,
occupy various key government buildings,
and block the Afghan army from reinforcing Kabul.
The Soviets dispatched 13 groups for these objectives,
which were a mix of Spetsnaz, paratroopers, and Afghan collaborators.
The Afghans had reinforced the palace.
Earlier botched plans to poison Amin had put the defense on high alert.
In total, the Afghans had around 2,500 forces present.
Nonetheless, the defenses were quickly overwhelmed.
After a short but fierce battle, lasting no longer than 45 minutes,
Soviet forces entered the palace,
systematically cleared its rooms, and killed Amin.
That same night, Karmal was flown in.
The operation had left 300 Afghan soldiers killed,
and thousands surrendering.
At the cost of 15 operatives killed,
the Soviets were now in complete control of Kabul.
Operation Storm 333 marked the start of the occupation of Afghanistan.
The invasion followed two main land routes and one air corridor.
The Red Army quickly took core strategic targets,
like cities and military strongpoints,
but failed to deal with the Mujahideen in the countryside.
The Soviet army lacked a strategy to fight the guerrilla war,
meaning the occupation quickly devolved into a pattern.
The Soviets held the major cities,
while the opposition held sway in the remote Afghan countryside.
The Mujahideen resistance was one of several problems the Soviets faced in Afghanistan.
While they expected to be hailed as liberators,
the Soviets achieved little but to unite the Afghan people against them.
Karmal's armed forces proved untrustworthy and inefficient,
forcing the Soviet army to deal with mutinies and uprisings.
What started as a simple supportive action to facilitate a coup,
became a long-term occupation,
provoking unrest and international condemnation.
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Internationally, Moscow stood alone.
The United Nations overwhelmingly condemned the invasion.
The United States imposed a trade embargo on various Soviet products,
led by a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow,
and stranded the SALT II Treaty in the Senate.
China and many Arabic countries condemned the Soviet invasion,
demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Opposition would not be limited to just words.
The Afghan Mujahideen received military aid from several nations,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, and especially Pakistan.
By 1980, the failure of the Soviet plan was on full display.
The cities and major roads were mostly under Soviet control,
but about 85% of Afghanistan was controlled by the guerrilla fighters of the Mujahideen.
The attacks in the mountainous Afghan hinterlands failed to yield any results.
The Soviets increasingly played a defensive role,
brutally suppressing anti-Soviet activity in the areas under their control.
The Red Army and their Afghan allies violently quashed protests,
like the three-hut uprising in February 1980 and the student demonstrations two months later,
killing around 800 and arresting up to 7,000 people.
Adding to Soviet pressure was the Mujahideen,
who constantly disrupted the supply lines into the Soviet-controlled cities.
The Kremlin hoped these challenges would be answered by Karmal's troops,
who constantly proved completely incapable of dealing with the situation.
This forced the Soviets to commit yet more troops and resources,
especially to secure the road between Kabul and the Soviet border.
This road went by the Panjshir Valley,
where warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud permanently threatened Red Army logistics.
The Soviets launched nine offensives in attempts to dislodge him,
and every single time, the guerrillas used the terrain to foil these offensives.
The Mujahideen also received considerable international assistance.
Over six years, the CIA funneled $3.2 billion worth of weapons,
economic assistance, and military training to the Mujahideen and their Pakistani allies.
This notably included surface-to-air missiles that challenged Soviet aerial dominance.
Pakistan played a major role in this conflict as well.
It served as a key ally, financier, and operational base for the Mujahideen.
Britain's MI6 was also deeply involved.
It notably assisted Massoud in the Panjshir Valley, supplying his forces with high-tech equipment,
but it also provided training to Mujahideen forces through its office in Islamabad.
Between 1981 and 1985, both forces used brutal tactics on each other and the civilian population.
The Soviets used chemical weapons, airstrikes against civilian targets,
and massacres of civilians suspected of sabotaging the Red Army.
Various Mujahideen factions engaged in extreme torture.
By the end of 1985, over 4 million Afghans had fled the country.
These ruthless measures did little to end the war in either side's favor.
The Soviets were drawn further and further into an unwinnable conflict.
To the new Secretary General, Mikhail Gorbachev, that was abundantly clear.
Under his leadership, the Soviets started to search for an exit strategy.
The challenge mainly consisted of withdrawing from Afghanistan while saving face.
To accomplish that goal, the Kremlin set out on a gradual withdrawal,
while strengthening the communist regime to a point where it could survive on its own.
To strengthen national consolidation, Gorbachev removed Karmal.
He stated that the main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far
is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help.
He was replaced by Mohammad Najibullah.
Although he tried to reunite the country by releasing prisoners,
legalizing political parties, and positioning Islam as a unifying factor,
mistrust toward the government persisted.
Alongside the change in leadership, the Soviet Union gradually started to distance itself
from military activities in Afghanistan.
It grew the Afghan army and restricted Soviet activities to assisting roles.
Although the army grew rapidly, it also suffered a 10% annual desertion rate,
and new attacks against the Mujahideen failed to yield any concrete results.
In 1988, the Geneva Accords were signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Both nations agreed to refrain from interference in each other's territory
and allow Afghan refugees to voluntarily return to their homes.
The agreement was also signed by the Soviets and the United States, who acted as guarantors.
By signing the Accords, the Soviet Union officially committed to withdrawal,
which would take place over the following year.
Soviet withdrawal was completed in two ways,
with the first during the summer of 1988 and the second over the following winter.
The withdrawal was mostly conducted peacefully, with the notable exception of Operation Typhoon.
As the withdrawal took place, the Soviets negotiated ceasefires with local Mujahideen
commanders. Among them was Ahmad Shah Massoud, still holding the Panjshir Valley.
Dmitry Yazov, the defense minister of the Soviet Union, feared that his troops
posed an existential threat to Najibullah's regime after the Soviets withdrew.
Here, Yazov ordered the 40th Army to violate the agreement with Massoud.
The attack resulted in 600 Mujahideen casualties.
In the end, the final operation of the Soviets in Afghanistan was emblematic of the entire
conflict. It accomplished no significant strategic goal and left hundreds dead.
For the Soviet Union, the war was a fiasco.
It had cost them billions of dollars and around 70,000 casualties.
Furthermore, it had damaged the reputation of the Soviet Union beyond repair.
The capability of the Red Army was cast in doubt, emboldening anti-Soviet sentiment,
leaving many potential detractors to believe that the mighty superpower could be defeated.
Veterans openly critiqued Soviet leadership,
weakening the Communist Party's stranglehold over public discourse.
Within a year, the Eastern Bloc would collapse and the state itself only lasted two more years.
The war had left Afghanistan in a state of disrepair and turmoil.
Najibullah, too, failed to unite the country.
The Mujahideen continued fighting, transforming the Soviet-Afghan War into the First Afghan Civil
War. Mujahideen factions, democratic forces, and ultimately the Taliban would take control
of Afghanistan. The war led to approximately 2 million deaths, over 7 million internal and
external refugees, and threw Afghanistan into a spiral of political instability,
factionalism, and extremism, from which it has yet to emerge.