The Art of War: Urban Warfare

Soldier’s Legacy
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12 Video Views·Mar 12, 2025
Explore the history and tactics of urban warfare, where the environment rewrites the rules of engagement, and defending forces have the advantage. Learn from historical and modern-day examples of siege tactics and subterranean advantages.
What defines a battle?
From the palanquins, the chariot, and the horse-anchor of ancient history, to the siege
of forts and castles, to the advent of tanks, submarines, and aerial power, the parameters
of a battle, and, indeed, of a war, are defined by the tools and tactics available to each
side.
Nations with powerful navies will seek out naval combat, a society from the high mountains
will do their best to fight a desert adversary in the snow and bitter cold, and vice versa.
No matter the confrontation, no matter the conflict, wars are always defined by the conditions
under which all sides choose to meet.
But there's one set of conditions that lies so far out of the norm, with so many key differences
from any other sort of battlefield, that it deserves discussion all on its own.
Urban warfare.
It's been the nightmare of military planners for centuries, and one that's only gotten
worse in the modern era.
So why, you ask?
Well, it rewrites the rules of engagement, basically from scratch.
Whether we're discussing a military that relies on its close air support, or seeks
heavily mechanized tank engagements, or simply hopes to gather sufficient intelligence before
attacking a target, the unique demands and conditions of urban warfare violate every
expectation.
The battle space exists in three dimensions at all times.
Civilians are as common as enemy combatants, mobility and visibility are severely limited,
and behind every closed door is a potentially deadly surprise.
In this installment of the Art of War series from Warographics, we're going to be diving
into the tactics, the strategies and the challenges that define urban warfare, chart several major
examples through history, and take a look at how this unique environment continues to
define war today.
Before we dive in, it's important to discuss just what we mean when we discuss urban warfare,
which we'll understand as any combat in any densely populated or heavily industrialized
zone.
This can include large or small cities, towns, industrial areas, and even suburbs in some
circumstances.
The crucial piece is the presence of significant enough human construction, be it skyscrapers
or factories or whatever else, that many tactics of conventional warfare are no longer relevant.
This tactical disruption means that any conventional militaries trying to attack or defend a city
are at least somewhat out of their element.
Whatever policies and guidebooks they ordinarily rely on, those guides are probably going to
be insufficient, and with some exceptions, the majority of troops aren't going to be
personally familiar with the demands of urban combat.
This is a massive issue, because urban warfare stacks risks on top of risks on top of risks
in a way that no other theatre even comes close to touching.
As for what those risks are, let's just run through a few to start.
As we mentioned in the introduction, urban environments typically include a high saturation
of civilians, with limited time and ability to distinguish between them and enemy combatants.
Often this problem is made worse by the deliberate use of civilians as human shields, especially
by a defending military force entrenched within the city.
Even if they aren't held as hostages, civilians are often unwilling to evacuate or might help
a local defending force, and whenever violence breaks out, they're likely to be caught in
the crossfire.
The urban landscape also makes movement of heavy weaponry extremely difficult.
For example, good luck getting any use out of your tanks when they have to move single
file down a narrow street surrounded on all sides by windows that make a perfect vantage
point for snipers and rockets.
This problem also applies when trying to move any significant number of troops, especially
while attacking a city and attempting to probe unknown defences.
Urban areas strongly favour a defending force, and one of the major reasons for that is the
lack of cover, concealment, and positional awareness for an attacker.
The defending side is likely to know every alleyway, every sewer, and every rooftop,
while the attacking side is lucky if they have an accurate map of the streets.
The attacker completely forfeits the element of surprise, while having no way to tell whether
they're walking into a trap at any moment.
And let's talk about traps.
Not only does an attacking force have a very difficult time knowing where an enemy has
set up defensive positions, but those defensive positions are protected by thick concrete,
steel beams, and interior architecture that makes every floor of every building into a
maze.
This creates endless opportunities for the defending forces to set up booby traps, explosive
devices, vision-impairing devices like smoke bombs, or ambush sites that the attacking
force cannot anticipate.
For an attacking army, small unit formations are often the only way to move troops into
a thickly settled urban environment, but they also leave the soldiers in those small units
isolated and blind to their surroundings, with a defending force that sees them coming.
Modern militaries post-WWI have another layer of complications to worry about, and it's
a problem that's gotten worse as those militaries grow more advanced.
While air power is an immensely valuable tool in most fields of battle, it's limited at
best in an urban environment.
Enemy positions are typically concentrated under the cover of buildings, which both resist
close air support and strafing fire and make the positions themselves difficult to see.
And anything less precise than strafing runs are potentially disastrous.
Indiscriminate bombing campaigns are likely to kill large numbers of civilians, as are
rocket and missile strikes, and though historical examples like the bombing of Tokyo and Dresden
in WWII clearly indicate that attacking forces don't always avoid mass civilian casualties,
those are also examples that don't include the attackers pushing ground troops into the
same city.
As soon as that happens, any air attack large enough to cause collateral damage also presents
a significant risk of friendly fire.
And then there's the grim reaper of urban warfare, a factor we haven't even touched
upon yet.
The snipers.
To get a picture of just how devastating and ubiquitous sniper fire can be, imagine standing
on a busy street in whatever major city you're closest to, and the literal thousands of windows
that you can see from the sidewalk.
In an urban warfare environment, every single one of those windows is a potential vantage
point for a sniper, and there can be dozens of snipers in those windows at any given time.
They can operate completely alone, and if the attacking force can even spot which window
a sniper is firing from, they're likely to be gone by the time the attacker gets there.
For a defending force, snipers are a massive force multiplier, and individual snipers throughout
history have logged kill counts deep into the triple digits.
Even if those sharpshooters are an anomaly, it's not hard to imagine that the average
sniper might be responsible for a dozen or more enemy deaths over the course of a city
defense.
Multiply that number by the number of snipers a defending force might have in the field,
and the death toll spirals out of control.
Even with these compounding frustrations, we're still not done adding obstacles for
the attacking side.
Not only do aggressors in urban warfare forfeit much of their equipment, but they also need
other specialized equipment at odd and unpredictable times.
Take night vision goggles as an example.
Where in most other combat scenarios it's usually a safe assumption that they'll be
needed at night, this isn't the case in an urban environment, where a building's windowless
interior can plunge an attacker into complete darkness on a moment's notice.
Even worse, urban warfare poses a strong likelihood of at least some subterranean fighting, be
it in sewers, or parking garages, or subway systems.
Here, complete darkness, incomplete maps, and spatial disorientation make an attacking
force even more vulnerable.
We could repeat this process with a range of other technology, with most modern examples
including robotic platforms and see-through wall equipment.
These might make an attacker's job a little easier, but aren't well developed or widely
available in the best of circumstances.
And we're still not done.
Frankly, we could spend an hour talking through all the complications to urban warfare that
we haven't even mentioned yet, but in the interest of time, we'll give you some quick
hits instead.
Close quarters combat is often an afterthought for professional militaries, but with one-on-one
engagements taking place in a square as small as your bathroom, soldiers without hand-to-hand
training are grossly underprepared.
So are soldiers who haven't had the opportunity or reason to drill procedures to clear a room,
breach a door, or maneuver around each other in small areas.
Simple means of concealment, like tarps and rooftops, deeply complicate intelligence gathering
by an attacking side, while defenders can store caches of resources and weapons all
around a city, moving freely between them in order to never run out of supply.
And the defending side has full access to civilian materials, like large vehicles or
concrete traffic barriers which can be pushed into the streets in order to block off certain
areas or guide attackers toward a trap.
It should be crystal clear by this point that urban warfare overwhelmingly favors the defending
side, especially when that defending force is posted in a city they know well, or where
they can rely on a helpful civilian population.
As such, urban defensive tactics lean heavily on the defender's ability to use their environment
as a weapon and to constantly think creatively about how to inflict the greatest number of
casualties on an attacker.
For the attacking side, tactics and strategy alike are all about minimal loss.
If the defender is entrenched in an urban environment and the attacker isn't willing
to just level the city, then the attacker will absorb truly staggering losses relative
to what the defending side has to endure.
After the urban battles of World War Two, military doctrine generally states that at
least six attacking troops are needed for each single defender within a city.
No amount of careful consideration can turn the situation to the attacker's favor.
And even in the best case scenario, the attacking side is walking into a meat grinder.
Ancient historical examples of what we would now consider urban warfare are relatively
uncommon for a few key reasons.
Historical attackers had a far better chance at starving out a city through siege tactics
food was available and, in many parts of the world, military forts and castles were either
kept separate from cities or used to concentrate battles in one area in those cities.
The demands of melee-based warfare also made it much more important to mass in formation
as a defender as a single fighter charging an enemy squadron with a sword doesn't really
hit the same way as a sniper at 200 meters.
Although it was certainly not uncommon for cities and towns to be sacked after they were
captured, it was far more likely that a defending force would win or lose on the outskirts of
the city, leaving it undefended when that pillage ultimately did take place.
True urban warfare was a rare occurrence and, whatever did go on, it's unlikely that the
historical sources of the day stuck around to see it.
The phenomenon of urban battles became far more prominent in the years after the Napoleonic
Wars as both cities and military tactics evolved.
An illuminating example comes from the Battle of Monterrey during the Mexican-American War
as a force of over 6,000 men, led by Major General Zachary Taylor, marched on the town
of Monterrey.
It was protected by over 5,000 Mexican defenders under a commander, Pedro de Ampuda, who saw
Monterrey as a defensive advantage rather than a challenge.
Ampuda quickly fortified Monterrey, establishing a base of command within its unfinished cathedral.
The American forces were unprepared for a siege and planned for an assault with infantry.
But the early stages of the fighting saw the American squad exposed while trying to cross
open fields, wide streets, and a nearby river.
This was an early example of the devastating cost urban warfare inflicts on an attacker,
but also provided a platform for innovations.
Taylor's second attack, two days later, quickly assimilated the lessons he'd learned.
This time, the Americans avoided open streets and engaged the Mexicans house to house, blasting
through the walls of one building to get to the next.
Taylor also recognized the acute risk of civilian casualties and was ultimately able to force
a surrender on mutually agreeable terms.
Although rural warfare was far more common in the 19th century, the American Civil War
and Franco-Prussian War each contributed their own early examples of urban warfare, reinforcing
the importance of the tactics and strategy we've already discussed.
And while the First World War saw far more in the way of cities and villages being destroyed
than actual urban combat, the Second World War was very much the opposite.
In fact, it was World War Two that really defined what modern urban warfare was going
to be like.
The months-long Battle of Stalingrad was perhaps the most defining urban battle of the entire
war, fought between hundreds of thousands of troops from Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union.
The Nazis attacked Stalingrad with no intention of holding back, and leveled much of the city
with artillery fire and air raids.
But this bombardment came as refugees were streaming into Stalingrad, not out of it.
Because of this, the city's Soviet defenders were unwilling to give up their positions.
Instead, they reacted by transforming the half-standing city into a deathtrap, fortifying
it with minefields, bunkers, and tank and artillery defences set within buildings.
Nazi forces pushed into the city, and for months, they and the Soviets engaged in a
horrific battle of attrition.
Eventually, the Nazis were able to use their limited air power and heavy machinery to wear
down the Soviets, but Soviet forces incurred mass casualties nonetheless.
In a series of events we'll hold off describing for time's sake, and please note we've
done a video on the events of Stalingrad on the Megaprojects channel, the Soviets were
able to regain the offensive, and after months of frustration, they turned their city into
a killing field.
The Soviet soldiers split into hundreds of highly mobile squads, some fifty to a hundred
troops each, and then into innumerable, tiny squadrons of three to five men each.
Those squadrons moved freely within the rubble and what remained of the burned-out husks
of buildings, doing unfathomable damage via sniper fire and hand-to-hand combat.
Other Soviet troops dug their tanks into rubble and camouflaged them, only firing their weapons
when enemy tanks were right on top of them.
For months, entire platoons on both sides would lay down their lives to capture one
floor of a building here, one hollowed-out warehouse there, and the fighting was coupled
by Russia's worst winter in decades.
By February, the Nazis surrendered, with total casualties from the battle estimated at 400,000
Germans and through a quarter of a million Soviets.
Moving to the Pacific theatre, there's one example of urban warfare that stands above
the rest.
The Battle of Manila, which took place over a one-month period in 1945.
As the centre of power in the Philippines, Manila was crucial to the crumbling Japanese
war effort, and when Allied forces attempted to lay siege to the city, its Japanese defenders
responded with brutal force.
At the time, some one million Filipino citizens were still inside Manila, and when Japanese
forces realised they couldn't strike outward at the Allies, they instead struck inward.
Men, women, children were forced to endure not just their role as human shields under
artillery bombardment, but systematic mass murder, rape, and torture at the hands of
Japanese marines.
The accounts of these atrocities are truly horrific to read, and probably deserve a video
of their own.
When the Allies did attempt to take the city directly, they did so through brutal street
fighting, moving house to house in what used to be a city.
When the Allies finally prevailed, they handed the residents back a piece of land that was
little more than rubble and corpses.
The Cold War, and its many proxy conflicts, would see no shortage of urban warfare themselves.
But stay with us as we bypass those examples, and head straight to the 1990s.
More specifically, the Siege of Sarajevo during the Bosnian War.
Although Bosnian Serb forces were able to successfully besiege the city of Sarajevo
in 1992, they lacked the manpower to take the city outright, and instead resorted to
an offensive use of urban warfare tactics to grind the city down to nothing.
We've belaboured the point already that urban warfare tends to strongly favour the
defender.
But in this case, the Bosnian Serb attackers used the city to their advantage.
Amidst indiscriminate shelling, which often targeted schools and hospitals, a legion of
Bosnian Serb snipers spread throughout the city.
Not only did those snipers kill thousands of civilians, but they forced the rest of
the city's residents to starve, rather than attempt to find food, water, or sources of
heat.
They also turned certain streets into so-called sniper alleys, where anyone brave enough to
pass would almost certainly be killed for their trouble.
The siege wouldn't lift for years.
Near the end of the Siege of Sarajevo, a similarly devastating battle was taking place some 2,000
kilometers away in the city of Grozny, the capital of Russia's semi-autonomous Republic
of Chechnya.
In this three-week battle, Chechen guerrillas warred with an unprepared force of Russian
troops, with half a million Chechen civilians caught in the middle.
The Chechens were the defending side, and as such, they were able to incur major losses
on the Russian side within the first few days of the conflict.
The Russians had little preparation or education on how to properly engage in urban combat,
and their troops, tanks, and armored vehicles alike were left exposed for Chechen rocket-propelled
grenades to destroy.
Conversely, the Chechens were able to set ambushes, use subterranean advantages like
the sewer and metro systems, and rearrange street signs in order to cause confusion and
fool the Russians into friendly fire incidents.
Realizing that they weren't ready to take Grozny outright, the Russians resorted to
20 days of artillery shelling.
And once the city had been adequately tenderized, they were able to attack again.
This time, the Chechens responded with decentralized force, carried out by snipers and men in small
units, and again incurred serious losses on their enemy at every turn.
By the end of the battle, Russian forces were able to secure Grozny, but many of the Chechens
were already gone.
And they would use these tactics in one city after another, across their region, deliberately
drawing Russian soldiers in, even at the expense of their own homes.
The historical examples that we've covered chart a clear course of progress and innovation
when it comes to individual tactics within urban warfare.
But they are also a sobering reminder of just how little room there is for change within
urban conflicts, regardless of any evolution in how war is more broadly fought.
Automatic weapons don't matter much if you're still aiming up at seemingly empty windows.
Air support isn't much good if you want to avoid civilian casualties.
And it doesn't matter how shiny and new your tanks are if they're going to be blown up
by RPGs while travelling single file down Main Street.
And as we move into modern urban battles, it should quickly become clear that this set
of rules isn't changing any time soon.
Don't believe us?
Well, take the liberation of Mosul, Iraq, which took place over the course of several
months in 2016 and 2017.
During this battle, over 100,000 US-backed Iraqi troops attempted to take Mosul back
from between 5,000 and 12,000 defenders fighting for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
US planners assisted in the Iraqis' preparations, with their objective being to first isolate
the city and then to clear it, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, using as much caution as
possible.
This was known as the bite, clear, and hold model.
Establish a perimeter around a neighbourhood, thus biting down on it, penetrate into it
with special operations troops and technicians, peening into fighters and booby traps, and
then move on while infantry forces established a lasting security.
But as you can probably see coming by now, the Islamic State defenders used their advantageous
position for all it was worth.
They used copious amounts of heavy weaponry, employed suicide bombers, deployed cheap and
expendable drones, and used the tried and true methods of urban defence in order to
slow down the coalition forces.
It was by no means a clean process, but for months Islamic State fighters were able to
withdraw from neighbourhoods before they were overrun or pinned down.
They also used civilians liberally as human shields, forcibly recruited child soldiers
and civilians, and even deployed chemical weapons during the defence.
Eventually coalition forces boxed the Islamic State fighters in too tightly, and despite
heavy casualties even in the last days of fighting, they were able to declare victory
nine months after the battle had begun.
In all, the liberation of Mosul would claim more than 10,000 civilians.
It displaced two million more, and levelled large parts of the city.
And all this for coalition forces to overcome an Islamic State defence that utilised perhaps
one-tenth of the troops the coalition did.
Even since then, urban warfare has been central to conflicts in Libya, Yeven, and elsewhere.
But we'd be remiss not to mention the biggest, most glaring example of all, Ukraine.
And despite a wide range of examples, including intense fighting that is still ongoing today
in Ukraine's eastern regions, it's the siege of the city of Maropol that we'll focus on.
Beginning with the blockade that started on March 2nd, 2022, the port city of Maropol
and its half-million residents were besieged by invading Russian forces.
Despite the large number of civilians within the city, Russia continually bombarded it,
destroying power and water infrastructure, shelling civilian areas, and bombarding unthinkable
targets like a maternity hospital and a theatre that had been clearly marked as a site where
children were taking shelter.
By mid-March, Russian troops had begun to enter the city with tactics and leadership
that were clearly informed by the lessons learned from attacking Grozny and elsewhere.
Despite Ukrainian soldiers' best efforts to limit civilian casualties, the fighting
destroyed a large portion of Maropol and the Russians were able to take most of the city.
The surviving defenders, along with over a thousand civilians, were boxed in at the Azov
Stal'an and Steelworks plant, a ten-square-kilometre sprawl of workshops, houses, and tunnels.
Although the defenders at the plant were eventually forced to surrender, they held out for the
better part of three months.
And if it were not for Russia's complete disregard for the well-being of civilians,
they likely could have lasted longer.
As we look into the future, toward not just a continuation of the war in Ukraine but potential
flashpoints like Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Kashmir region,
it's reasonable to expect that urban combat will remain an unavoidable element to modern
war.
And as our examples today have illustrated, there's only so much that enhancements in
technology can do to alter the urban battle space.
By its nature, urban combat is deeply resistant to new tactics from an aggressor, even while
it is a hotbed of innovation for a defender.
After all, there are only so many ways to try and infiltrate such a complex target,
and endless ways to use confusion, versatility, and the fog of war to a defender's advantage.
More than anything, engagement in urban warfare is a series of promises.
Whatever battle this is will become a war of attrition.
There will be civilian casualties, the attacking side will be punished relentlessly for their
efforts, and the city, the town, or the industrial zone of interest will become a hellscape.
For those who have the choice, urban combat is a nightmare to be avoided at all costs.
And for those who find themselves stuck inside it, urban combat is a nightmare, one that
they and their comrades will be very, very lucky to survive.
