"Welcome to China Truths. Today we will examine China’s Interference and Influence in Canada’s Politics and Society, including: Canadian Political Aides Targeted by Beijing to ‘Deceptively Control’ Officials Canada–China Ties Moving From Elite Control to ‘State Capture’ Two-Thirds of Canadians Concerned About Foreign Influence Through Social Media Some MPs Knowingly Engage in Foreign Interference
Now, let’s dive into the details 00:00 - Introduction 00:30 - Canadian Political Aides Targeted by Beijing to ‘Deceptively Control’ Officials 04:15 - Canada–China Ties Moving From Elite Control to ‘State Capture’ 09:23 - Two-Thirds of Canadians Concerned About Foreign Influence Through Social Media 12:05 - Some MPs Knowingly Engage in Foreign Interference #china#chinatruths#chinanews"
Welcome to China Truths. Today we will examine China's interference and influence in Canada's
politics and society, including. Canadian political aides targeted by
Beijing to deceptively control officials. Canada-China ties moving from elite control
to state capture. Two-thirds of Canadians concerned
about foreign influence through social media. Some MPs knowingly engage in foreign interference.
Now, let's dive into the details. It's all covered in today's China Truths.
Canadian political aides targeted by Beijing to deceptively control officials.
Beijing is targeting Canadian political aides in the hope of covertly influencing
their bosses by controlling event schedules, shaping talking points,
and handling requests from community groups, according to newly released documents.
A Sept. 8, 2021, intelligence assessment from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
or People's Republic of China, also targets political staffers.
The assessment was recently released by the Foreign Interference Inquiry,
which has been investigating allegations of Beijing's interference in Canada's elections
and targeting of parliamentarians. Staffers control schedules and often act as gatekeepers
for their employers. These staff are thereby placed in positions where they can clandestinely
and deceptively control and influence the activities of elected and appointed officials
in ways that support PRC or CCP interests, said the report, which was first covered by
Blacklock's reporter. The potential for staffers to influence officials manifests in several ways,
such as preventing certain community groups' requests from being seen,
framing talking points to align with Beijing's narratives, or organizing public events at
locations favorable to PRC interests, such as businesses owned by a Chinese proxy or
culturally significant sites like city halls or legislative buildings, Size said.
Size noted that political aides do not need to be known China supporters to become targets,
rather, the CCP will also seek to co-opt those who do not openly oppose or speak out against
the PRC or the party. Size said aides are then persuaded to adopt Beijing-friendly positions
and speak out against a broad range of what the Chinese government perceives as anti-PRC actions,
such as raising human rights concerns or traveling to Taiwan in an official capacity.
Similar concerns about the targeting of staffers were highlighted in a separate 2022 National
Security Assessment from Size. The briefing was released by The Inquiry last month.
Local community networks are a key vector for facilitating FI, or foreign interference,
activities. For example, PRC officials often conduct FI activities through local networks
that are tied to, but not necessarily directed by, PRC officials, on a regular basis, said the March
briefing. The key components of the Beijing-led foreign influence networks include staff of
targeted candidates, and, elected officials, as well as Chinese officials in Canada, leaders of
local Chinese-Canadian community groups, and Canadian political candidates or officials
themselves, according to the site task force. This network structure, used for interference
at all levels of government, enables an adaptable, resilient approach to extending and enabling PRC
covert influence, Size said in the assessment. While both Size assessments did not provide
specific cases of political staffers being influenced by China, a summary of federal
government intelligence released to The Inquiry has suggested the existence of such operations.
The summary said that prior to the 2019 election, a group of 11 federal candidates and at least 13
aides were assessed to be either implicated in or impacted by China-linked threat actors in Canada,
including PRC officials. The summary noted that some of these targeted individuals appeared
willing to cooperate in FI-related activity while others appeared to be unaware of potential
FI-related activity due to its clandestine nature. In one example, intelligence reports
indicate that officials from the PRC met with political staffers and specifically
conveyed their expectation that the staffers screen their candidates' attendance at certain
events, such as those hosted by Taiwanese officials, the summary said. Political staffers
are important points of contact because they are part of the information flow process to
elected officials and often influence the schedule of events that a candidate attends.
Canada-China ties moving from elite control to state capture
China's influence on Canada is evolving from influencing political and economic elites to
a more dangerous form of state capture, says a former diplomat posted to Canada's embassy in
China. Charles Burton, a sinologist who is now a senior fellow at the think tank Synopsys,
made the remark during a September 26 event in Ottawa for the launch of investigative journalist
Sam Cooper's third edition of Willful Blindness, a book that examines China's influence in Canada.
Sam concludes in the book that the current state of Canada-China relations is not only
informed by comprehensive elite capture, but is also moving incrementally towards full state
capture, Burton said at the event. Full state capture threatens the integrity of our democratic
institutions and undermines the values of openness and honesty and the freedoms of
citizenship that define Canada as a great nation, Burton said. He highlighted the role of China's
United Front Work Department, which is running a myriad of influence operations here in Canada
aimed at undermining the country's democratic foundations. According to research cited by
Public Safety Canada, the United Front organization is China's primary foreign
interference tool. Canadians need to learn about the United Front Work Department and
take this threat from China much more seriously, Burton said. We need to cease tolerating the
self-interested, willful blindness of our political and economic elite and replace it with renewed
Canadian patriotic, willful awareness. First published in 2021, Cooper's book explores the
relationship between the CCP and organized crime, detailing their involvement in the illicit drug
trade and money laundering through casinos and Vancouver's real estate market. In the 2022 update
to his book, Cooper examined intelligence on the United Front's election interference networks.
He delved into a disinformation campaign on the Chinese platform WeChat, which targeted former
conservative MP Kenny Chiu during the 2021 election for his criticism of Beijing's human
rights record and his promotion of a foreign interference registry. Cooper expressed extreme
concern about Beijing's increasing aggressiveness and its influence tactics, a topic discussed in
the most recent edition of his book. I'm learning new information that, is, of extreme concern,
these very same election interference and Chinese Communist Party police station networks,
which I'm saying involve organized crime leaders and Chinese secret security services,
are not only threatening, especially diaspora residences, but, they're also harassing,
surveilling, and potentially violently attacking, Cooper told The Epoch Times.
We now have cases in Australia, potentially Canada, and, around the world, where it's
suspected that Chinese operators in these networks could endanger, perhaps even threaten with death,
or perhaps even kill dissidents who want to speak out against China.
In response to extensive media reports about Beijing's secret operations,
Ottawa launched the Foreign Interference Inquiry to investigate Chinese interference in Canada's
2019 and 2021 elections. Commissioner Marie-José Hogue acknowledged this influence in her interim
report published in May. Before Parliament's summer break, a bill aimed at increasing
resilience against foreign interference quickly passed into law. Bill C-70 creates a foreign
influence transparency registry and increases criminal penalties for foreign meddling.
When asked about the security measures in place for next year's upcoming election,
Cooper said the new law is a good step, but he expressed doubts about its effectiveness.
I still don't think the new law in place has the power to really prosecute people
involved as foreign agents in attacking Canada's elections and attacking Canadian citizens.
So I'm just not confident that by the next election, we will have enough protections in
he said. Other speakers at the September 26 event highlighted that there is now a
growing sense of awareness of China's malign activities among the public and officials.
Michel Junokatsuya, former chief of the Asia-Pacific Unit at the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service, pointed to a recent outreach campaign by RCMP or Royal Canadian
Mounted Police in Montreal to the Chinese diaspora community. In July, RCMP in Quebec
launched an online campaign seeking tips on Beijing-linked foreign interference activities.
Officers also conducted door-to-door visits in Montreal's Chinatown and nearby Brossard
to raise awareness about the threat. The RCMP in Montreal have been very successful in reaching
out to the Chinese community, Junokatsuya told the Epoch Times. I'm a little bit concerned and
puzzled why other departments, other RCMP units, across Canada are not doing the same thing,
if anything at all, in Vancouver, Calgary, and other cities like Toronto.
We should have this outreach program like Montreal has done.
Independent MP Kevin Vong applauded the efforts of allies in combating Beijing interference,
particularly the recent arrest and charging of Linda Sun, former deputy chief of staff to the
governor of New York. Sun and her husband, Chris Hu, were accused of spying for Beijing and working
to undermine U.S. democratic processes. I think the CCP's golden era of being able to interfere
in Canada at the extent, the depth, and the breadth that they have been, is probably starting
to end now that Canadians have woken up to how extensive they've been, he told the Epoch Times
at the September 26 event. Two-thirds of Canadians concerned
about foreign influence through social media. Four in five Canadians are concerned about false
information affecting the next federal election, while many also fear foreign actors exploiting
social media to influence opinions, according to an Elections Canada Commission survey.
The survey, which was delivered to the agency in April and first covered by Blacklock's reporter,
asked 2,501 Canadians whether they thought different types of electoral interference
could have any impact on the outcome of the next federal election in Canada.
The largest proportion, 80 percent, of electors said they believed the spread of false information
online could have a moderate or severe impact on the outcome of the federal election.
The second-largest proportion, 69 percent, said that foreign countries or groups using
social media and other means to influence the political opinions of Canadians could have an
impact. The concerns align with investigations of the ongoing Foreign Interference Inquiry,
which is scrutinizing the use of traditional and social media platforms by foreign actors
for interference. As part of the evidence submitted to the inquiry, a July 2023 intelligence report
from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CISE, warned that Chinese-language media in
Canada play a crucial role in promoting pro-Beijing narratives and facilitating censorship within
the Chinese diaspora. The report highlights WeChat, a messaging and social media application
widely used by the diaspora, as presenting enduring challenges because it provides a
platform for the Chinese government to exert control and influence by spreading false information.
It also said the app, which many in the diaspora use to communicate with family and friends in
China, facilitates Beijing's surveillance, repression, and influence over overseas Chinese.
Chief Electoral Officer Stéphane Perrault was asked about the capacity of the federal
elections watchdog to monitor social media platforms like WeChat during his September
24 testimony at the inquiry. Perrault confirmed that Elections Canada had been monitoring WeChat
since 2019. He also noted that a team of 27 individuals was monitoring content across
similar platforms in 15 languages during the last election, including Chinese, Cantonese,
Punjabi, and Russian. For the upcoming election, he said the number of personnel dedicated to this
task will increase to 41. This is a reflection of the fact that our electoral process is
increasingly impacted by online conversations, and social media will play in the future an even
greater role than it has in the past, he told the inquiry. Concerns over foreign money being
used to influence Canadian politics were also cited among Canadians, with 68% of respondents
viewing this as a potential risk, and 64% expressing concern about foreign hacking
targeting electoral systems. Some MPs knowingly engage in foreign interference.
Some Canadian MPs knowingly engage in actions that can be considered foreign interference,
the former head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Saiz, says.
David Vigneault's assertion is similar to a conclusion reached by a group of lawmakers with
security clearance on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians,
NSICOP, who said in June that some parliamentarians have been wittingly working
with foreign actors. Vigneault's remarks were made in a private hearing, in-camera,
held by the Foreign Interference Commission conducted in August.
His comments, along with those made by the current Saiz leadership team at the hearing,
were captured in an unclassified summary report made public by the commission on September 27.
Vigneault divided MPs into three different categories when evaluating their activities
in relation to potential foreign interference. His responses are captured under the heading
wittingness. Clearly, some MPs have no awareness of the FI, or foreign interference, threat and are
surprised when Saiz speaks with them or they read some piece of information, he is paraphrased as
saying about the first category of MPs. The second category involves those who know what FI is and
that there is a line, but are unsure of its precise boundaries, according to Vigneault,
who left Saiz in July. And then there is the third category, as described by Vigneault,
a smaller subset of elected officials are plainly aware that their actions cross the line into FI.
The June 3 NSICOP report based on the review of intelligence documents stated that some
parliamentarians began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election.
The report said these activities included communicating with foreign missions to get
election support from community groups or businesses, which the diplomatic missions
pledged to discreetly mobilize in favor of a candidate, as well as knowingly or through
willful blindness accepting funds from foreign diplomatic posts. The activities also involved
providing foreign actors with confidential information on fellow parliamentarians,
knowing that such information will be used by those officials to inappropriately pressure
parliamentarians to change their positions, as well as responding to the direction of foreign
officials to improperly influence other elected officials or parliamentary proceedings, NSICOP
said. The report said China is the most active foreign state interfering in Canada.