“The fires themselves are pretty much out. There’s a few smoldering remains, but the trouble has just begun,” says Edward Ring, director of Water and Energy Policy for the California Policy Center. “It’s going to be very hard to get everything rebuilt in Los Angeles.”
In this episode, we do a deep dive on the California wildfires. How did they originate? Why was the devastation so horrific? Could they have been prevented? What is the scope of the damage? And in the aftermath, what should be done?
Tell me a little bit about this question of insurance. Why is it that apparently,
a number of insurance companies were quitting homeowners in the year prior to these fires
happening? How big an issue is that in the aftermath?
It's a very big issue and a very complicated issue. The insurance companies got out for a
they got out because they weren't seeing any evidence that we were taking the kind of
precautions we need to take to mitigate fire risk. And, you know, you can talk about cities that are
up in the in the conifer forests in northern California, you know, the city of Paradise
actually lost more homes in the fires of 2020. Actually, that was I think that was 2018. They
lost more homes than was lost, than were lost in Los Angeles a few weeks ago. Wikipedia says
it's only 11,000 homes, but Congressman LaMalfa, who represents that area, says it was 18,000
homes. I tend to believe him. Again, you can't prevent all these fires, but if you manage the
forest appropriately, you can you can prevent a lot of them. You know, there's a Shaver Lake,
which is administered by Southern California Edison. It's a watershed and a lake, a reservoir
in the central Sierras that has 20,000 acres of managed forest owned by the utility surrounding
that. And they've been doing what they call total ecosystem management with thinning, burning, and
selective timber harvests for the last 40 years. There was a fire that burned 300,000 acres in
2020 in that area, and it literally went all the way around Shaver Lake, and the watershed,
the 20,000 acres in Shaver Lake, didn't burn. And the wildlife biologists, and I've talked to
the current one and the retired two of them who have managed that property over these
these decades, claim that the species counts are actually higher in these managed forests. By
managing these forests in a manner that is congruent with what was historically normal
in those forests, the species actually thrive more than in, for example, the national forests
in California, which are almost completely hands-off. And of course, if you have a catastrophic
fire in those forests, the species are, you know, they're wiped out. So that wasn't being done, and
the insurance companies looked at the these communities all over and fire, you know, urban
wildlife interface areas, wildlife urban interface. They said, there's too much risk. We can't write
premiums for these people anymore. And they eventually, you know, looked at the situation
in the foothills of Los Angeles and said, these neighborhoods are equally vulnerable. We just,
we can't write insurance policies. And the other reason they couldn't write insurance policies is
because they weren't permitted to raise their rates by the state of California to recognize
the elevated risk. And they also were prohibited from passing on their reinsurance costs because,
you know, if they see elevated risk, insurance companies, and we're just, a lot of us are
learning this for the first time, but insurance companies themselves have insurance, you know,
the reinsurance or the assurers, and those companies would look at the risk profiles
in these areas and say, well, we will issue you reinsurance policies, but you're going to have to
pay more because we see more risk. And then the state of California wasn't allowing the retail
insurance companies to pass those costs on in the form of higher premiums. The state of California
also made it difficult for out-of-state insurance companies to come into California and compete.
So all of those things combined to make the insurance companies, a lot of them leave. And now,
you know, the companies that are left are in a pretty bad position, but less bad because they
already canceled some of the policies. Those people had to go to what's called the FAIR
program, Fair Access to Insurance Resource, or something like that, set up by the state of
California. They estimate the damage from this fire to be about $250 billion. That's the latest
number I saw. Who knows? No one knows yet. But we do know how much money they've got in the FAIR
program, which is less than $300 million, maybe one-tenth of one percent of the amount of the...
Now, FAIR's share of all these claims that are on the way is not 100 percent of the claims,
but let's say it's 10 percent of the claims. That's $25 billion, and they've got less than
$300 million to work with. So they're in a pretty desperate situation, and there's no way out of it
apart from a federal bailout. And hopefully, the federal bailout will have some terms and
conditions to reform some of the regulations. If you have elevated risk of fire, then you're
going to have more claims. And then if you have elevated, through over-regulation, costs to
rebuild, I mean, it costs $400 to $500 a square foot to construct a home in California, whereas
in... I think the best state was Arkansas or somewhere like there, it's $150 a square foot.
So you also have... And that's all regulation. And maybe they don't have enough regulations in
Arkansas, but we have to find some kind of balance. We have to deregulate enough so that
people can construct homes at an affordable cost per square foot. And if we did that, not only
would we have fewer claims because we'd done something with our wildfire management prevention
policies, but the claims themselves would be lower because the rebuilding cost would be lower.
So on both ends of that equation, the insurance companies in California had a really challenging
situation. So you've started to answer my next question, which is, give me a framework for
how to take the next steps. You talked a little bit about how to get insurance companies to be
interested again. We talked a little bit about getting rid of some of the red tape and bureaucracy
to be able to start building quicker. What else needs to happen to move forward now?
When the president visited Palisades on Friday, we were asked to come up with
a list of the laws and regulations in California that ought to be scrapped. A lot of people were
asked that question. So a lot of people are going to be presenting their list.
My list, which is based on getting a hold of land use attorneys and water rights attorneys,
builders, civil engineers, foresters, there's like 50 already, 50 recommendations.
And there's so many of them. Some of them are explicitly for forestry.
Others, like the California Environmental Quality Act, affect everything. You can't just
scrap it. So then there's an assortment of ways to reform it. And we can talk about that
one in particular, because that's one of the big ones. But again, to try to answer your question
in detail, it's an overwhelming list of things that California does that nobody else does.
Or maybe Massachusetts does and New York does. But you go to Texas, you want a building
permit. I was talking to a controller for a land developer in Texas a few years ago,
and he said, yeah, we had to pay, our building permit was $2,500. And we were astonished,
because in California, it's anywhere from 50 to 100, or even over $100,000. And we said,
$2,500 per home? And he goes, no, no, no, that was for the whole subdivision.
And they can put their plans forward in Texas and get approval in weeks, sometimes days. And
in California, it can take decades. It can literally take decades to build a subdivision
in California. You're litigating, and you're jumping through hoops perpetually, and spending
for, if it's a big, let's say it's a subdivision with 600 homes, you will spend decades, and you
will spend hundreds of millions of dollars trying to get approval to build it. The list
is overwhelming. The California Environmental Quality Act is probably the one that everybody
talks about the most. And in 1970, when that was passed, it was the first of its kind in the
nation. And all it said was, put together a statement, when you apply for a building,
if you have an impact on the environment, describe what it is, and describe what you're
going to do about it. And people would turn in two or three page documents with a reasonable
assessment of what was going on. And again, this was before we had the genomics, and before we had
the chemistry to look for parts per trillion, and little genetic variants in single species
management. And they would get approval. But it was a way to make, we're not filling in the bay.
We're not knocking down the whole forest. It was reasonable precautions that people had to take.
Now, California Environmental Quality Act requires documents that can be volumes.
And they have to go through a lead agency. I have a flow chart I posted showing the process.
And sometimes there's more than one lead or so-called responsible agency. But you have to
get that thing through the California Air Resources Board. You have to get it through
the Coastal Commission if it's within five miles of the coast. You've got to go through the responsible
agency, maybe the county, so you've got to go there. And you have all these agencies that have
to sign off on it. And at every stage in the process, any third party attorney, not somebody
with standing in the community who maybe they don't want a subdivision on the hillside next to
their home, that person would have standing. No, it can be anybody. There are law firms in other
states that, you know, just fly into California because it's such a positive. And this goes back
to crony environmentalism. It's a business model. Have you heard of sue and settle? During the Obama
administration, that really got out of control where environmentalist groups would sue an
environmental protection agency over some alleged misconduct that's going on on a piece of land or
with a manufacturing plant or whatever. And the EPA would immediately settle and give them $100
million. You know, it's a business model. And they're not all frivolous. I'm not
claiming they are. And I don't want to come across like every single lawsuit is frivolous.
But so many of them are. And so this California Environmental Quality Act, for example,
could maybe say third parties cannot sue. It has to be just the district attorney in the county
or the state's attorney general. And that's it. And limit it to them. That would be a huge reform.
So there are ways to try to fix the California Environmental Quality Act. The governor claims
he's going to exempt new home building from the California Environmental Quality Act,
and that'll help. But there's all kinds of other environmentalist regulations that they're going
to have to navigate anyway. So it's going to be interesting to see how that plays out.
I don't know if I answered your question. Again, to answer that question in detail would be very
difficult. But we, you know, in practice, functionally speaking, we've got to streamline
the process to rebuild. And we've got to start managing our forests and our wildlands in a way
that is going to reduce the fuel load. And we need to invest in practical water and energy
infrastructure in the state instead of all of these heavily subsidized experiments.