World War 2 The Complete History (2000) Part 3

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The tension, the fear, the anxiety of a decade has lifted.
The pace of history had accelerated in the last year, taking the continent on a roller
coaster ride of emotions.
In 1938, Britain had feared war, issued gas masks, and called up reserves as Hitler took
the continent to the brink of conflict over his demands that Czechoslovakia's German minority,
the Sudeten Germans, be incorporated into a greater Germany.
The democracies of Britain and France met with the dictatorships at Munich in perhaps
the first modern summit meeting.
The result is a settlement dictated to the Czechs that gives Hitler all he desires.
The people of Europe rejoice at the news, believing a new order has come to pass, one
that promises a lasting peace, with a commitment by the great powers to negotiation, not war.
The continent believes Hitler has no further demands.
The Sudetenland joins the Reich.
The illusion of success crashes to ruins within months.
The remainder of Czechoslovakia is torn apart, divided by avaricious neighbors orchestrated
by Germany.
The Nazis now target their ambitions upon the state of Poland, demanding the return
of German territory given to the Poles after World War I.
These demands conceal a dark strategy of endless German eastwards expansion, the product of
an insatiable hunger for land to be taken from Slavic peoples thought inhuman by Nazi
ideology.
There can be no compromise, no appeasement.
Unlike the Czechs, the Poles refuse to bow to Hitler's demands.
Britain joins France in making an alliance with Poland.
The final connection of the path to war is made by Joseph Stalin.
The Soviet leader makes an alliance with Hitler.
The deal gives Hitler a free hand to destroy Poland.
The Communists are rewarded with half of Poland, pushing their borders westward.
In just weeks, the Polish state is torn apart, destroyed, either subsumed into the German
Reich as German territory, or subjected to the darkness of occupation by either Nazi
or Soviet troops.
The Allies stand helpless as the country they promised to aid is overwhelmed, modern armoured
and mechanised armies sweeping aside the cavalry and foot soldiers of Poland.
Then nothing.
After weeks of furious fighting, calm descends on the continent.
The time that followed the destruction of Poland in just five weeks of frenetic activity
came to be called the Phony War, the war that wasn't really happening.
Now imagine me in the marginal line, sitting on a mine in the marginal line.
Now it's turned out nice again, the army life is fine.
The phrase was coined in the United States.
Britain talked about the Boer War and the Twilight War.
The French talked of la drogue de guerre.
In Germany, they called it the Sitzkrieg.
France and Britain demonstrated their decision to end appeasement and honoured their decisions
to aid Poland, but the democracies did little to actually help Poland in any material way.
They did little that could indirectly help the Poles by distracting or diverting Hitler's attention.
France's commander-in-chief, Gamelin, saw the war only in terms of defending France,
repulsing a German attack.
This mentality spread down throughout the French army.
No attempt was made by France's heavy artillery to shell German industrial towns,
which were well within range.
Small probing attacks were made into Germany.
When the French reached the Siegfried Line, fortifications which were the German equivalent
of France's Maginot Line, they stopped.
The inactivity, the passive waiting, sapped the moral strength and the will of the French army,
demoralizing the many thousands of reservists summoned away from their civilian lives.
Britain proved equally reluctant to engage the Germans.
Britain, in particular, was seized by fear of air raids.
A proposal by the RAF to satellite the Black Forest was rejected,
the bombing of German arms factories forbidden as an attack on private property.
A proposal by Churchill to mine Germany's rivers, important arteries to the economy of the Reich,
was rejected by both Britain and France on the grounds that reprisals might be provoked.
The first death of a British soldier did not occur until December 1939.
This was in severe contrast to World War I,
when, in the same time, 50,000 British servicemen had died.
It's no surprise that the war seemed phony.
The public mood of determination and resolution that had swept the democracies
when war broke out gradually faded away.
The willingness to resist an expected immediate attack melted into boredom.
The blackout, the rationing of food, the evacuation of children far away from home,
the closure of places of entertainment became irritations.
The numerous emergency laws passed in the first months of the war
imposed controls and interferences on and into everyday life
that seemed pointless and irrelevant.
It was not just Allied passivity that created the phony war.
The Germans were in no great haste to raise the pace of the action.
They sought to consolidate their gains in Poland.
Some German generals thought the army not ready for war
and hoped, as many did in Britain and France, that the war might wither away
and a peaceful compromise emerge if neither side upset the other.
Perhaps another reason for the phony war is the simple fact
that the weather of that winter was some of the most severe in living memory.
It was only upon the oceans did the war seem real, not phony.
Germany's naval strategy was to attack enemy ships wherever possible
using both surface raiders and U-boats.
In the very last weeks of the peace, numerous surface ships had slipped out of German ports
and disappeared into the expanse of the ocean.
The entire U-boat fleet put out to sea and took up position in the Atlantic.
As war broke out, immediate attacks began upon merchant shipping
with clashes between the naval forces.
The anchorage of Scobble Flow in Britain's far northern Orkney Islands
was used as a forward base by the British fleet in attempting to seal the North Sea.
On the night of October 13th, a German U-boat daringly entered the anchorage
and torpedoed the huge British battleship Royal Oak,
which capsized with the loss of 833 British sailors.
In the coming war, the U-boat and the aircraft carrier would become
the dominant weapons of naval warfare.
But the first encounters of the war at sea involved surface action.
Germany had built a fleet of large ships, surface raiders,
designed to make long cruises into the oceans,
sinking and destroying merchant trade.
One such ship was the Admiral Graf Spee.
She had sunk Allied shipping in the Indian Ocean
and off the coast of South America had fought a battle with British forces,
which she had powerfully outgunned.
Engine problems forced the Graf Spee to take refuge
in the neutral Uruguayan port of Montevideo.
In classic subterfuge, the ships of the Royal Navy
used false signals to convince the Germans
that a massive British fleet was assembling over the horizon.
The Germans chose to scuttle the Graf Spee.
The encounter was presented to the British people as a great victory.
The Graf Spee had taken many British prisoners
and transferred these to her supply ship, the Altmark.
Altmark was cornered off the coast of Norway
and took refuge in neutral Norwegian waters.
A team of British marines daringly stormed the Altmark,
the British themselves violating Norwegian neutrality,
and rescued the prisoners.
Britain had learned some of the lessons of World War I
and immediately introduced convoys against U-boat attack,
resources restricting the extent to which escorts could be provided.
Churchill, as Britain's first Lord of the Admiralty
in charge of Britain's Navy,
showed the wild, maverick side of his nature,
insisting that defense measures were not enough
and demanded search-and-destroy patrols be launched against submarines.
This was against all advice,
that this was proven to be a poor way to deal with U-boats.
Churchill rejected the advice of the admirals.
The result was that the British aircraft carrier,
the Courageous, was sunk and another badly damaged.
War was being fought on land, in Europe,
in the forests of Finland.
The global conflict that became World War II
was, in many ways, a number of small wars
that broke out at the same time and aggregated together.
One such conflict was that fought
between Finland and the Soviet Union.
The fighting that broke out at the end of November 1939
was the direct outcome of the Nazi-Soviet pact,
in which Stalin demanded Finland become part of Russia's sphere of influence.
The fighting was a result of Finland's rejection of Stalin's demands
that their shared frontier be moved further into Finland
and that Finnish islands be given to the Soviet Union.
The Russians feared invasion
and wanted to push their borders further west
as they had done in Poland.
Stalin was prepared to offer compromise,
but the Finns saw the USSR as an implacable enemy
and believed that concession would only bring further Soviet demands.
Russian forces attacked across the whole length of the border.
The Soviet Union mounted a full invasion of Finland.
The Russian soldiers were told
that Finnish workers would rise to welcome them
as liberators from capitalism.
The Finnish army was small and poorly equipped
in nearly every aspect.
However, its troops had been intensively trained
to operate in their native forest terrain,
to operate in the dense woods of summer
and the depths of winter snows.
What's more, the Finnish soldiers were motivated
by a fierce and determined patriotism.
The Russians outnumbered the Finns by more than 150%.
Their imagined easy advance ended in stalemate.
The Finns absorbed and repulsed repeated attacks
and the Russian superiority in air forces
was negated by the short Arctic winter day and poor weather.
The Russian tanks were negated by a simple improvised weapon,
the Molotov cocktail,
a bottle filled with gasoline and tar
which was thrown into tank engines, setting them on fire.
The communist tactics were naive,
separating their tanks from their infantry.
The Russian armor was hunted down amongst the forests
by Finnish infantry on skis.
The Russians attempted to swamp the Finns by weight of numbers
using crude human wave mass attacks.
The result was massacre by machine gun fire.
Throughout the Finnish war and the early stages
of the eventual conflict with Nazi Germany,
Soviet forces would be severely weakened
by the butchery of Soviet high command in Stalin's purges.
The communist dictator destroyed the leadership of his army
through a paranoid fear of plots and planned coup d'état.
Incredibly, the Russian forces
had no white winter camouflage or winter survival skills
and simply froze to death through the absence of winter clothing.
Finland appealed to the League of Nations.
In its last major intervention in world affairs,
the League proved as impotent as ever to prevent the war.
The USSR was expelled from the League
and all member states urged to support the Finns.
With Germany supporting the Soviet Union,
such help the world could give Finland had to pass through Norway.
So tortuous was this route,
the Finns had to fight alone and unaided.
As 1939 passed into 1940,
the Finns turned to the counterattack
and won a series of stunning victories against the Soviets.
Whole divisions of communist infantry surrendered
and vast numbers of heavy weapons were captured and turned on the Russians.
The Finnish successes brought the Russians to the negotiating table.
They also made the Finns believe that ultimate victory was possible
and led them to push for a hard bargain with the Soviet Union.
These tactical successes were a distracting illusion
from the true strategic position
that Finland would, in the long run,
be crushed by the sheer weight of her larger neighbor.
Finland was falsely encouraged
by a British and French plan to aid Finland.
In reality, this was a plan to seize
neighboring neutral Sweden's iron ore deposits.
The Finns judged that it was not a serious offer
that Britain and France would really carry through.
In the time being, as the negotiations persisted,
the Soviet army reorganized and mounted new heavier attacks.
The Finnish army could take no more
and, in the end, crumbled.
Early in March 1940,
the Finns signed an armistice with the Soviets in Moscow.
The USSR could have pushed on to total victory
and occupied the whole of Finland,
installing a puppet communist government.
Yet they did not.
They accepted territory, more than they originally demanded,
but still leaving Finland's democratic institutions
and the bulk of her territory intact.
It may be that the Soviet Union
wished to avoid war with Britain and France
and wished for freedom to negotiate in the new Europe.
In fighting Finland,
the Soviet Union lost more than 200,000 men
to the Finns' 25,000.
The Red Army lost credibility
and its final success was ignored by the world
or drove Finland, a democratic nation,
a natural ally of Britain and France,
into the arms of Hitler.
As soon as the peace between Russia and Finland was concluded,
secret approaches were made by the Nazis
who saw Finland to be an ally in the coming final conflict,
a war of destiny to destroy Soviet communism.
Germany supplied Finland with new modern equipment
and the Finns rebuilt a modern army
and planned for revenge against Russia.
The armies of 1939,
the armies which took their place in northern France,
represented a way of fighting war,
a relationship between the armed forces and society
that is almost impossibly remote to the present.
The British force that was slowly, unit by unit,
being ferried across the Channel to the fields of northern France
went under the title of the British Expeditionary Force.
It went under the same name as that born
by the British army in the First World War.
The army resembled that of 1918 in more than just name.
In appearance and mindset, in philosophy,
in the mental framework of the senior officers,
it was a war equipped to bring victory in 1918.
It is a fact of military history
that victorious armies prepare for their next war
by anticipating an exact replica of the past.
One of the first acts of the army
was to prepare trench lines,
constructing the defensive positions
which had dominated the fighting 20 years before.
Initially in the month following the outbreak of war,
the BEF comprised little more than 150,000 men.
It was placed along the Belgian border
between two French armies
and under the overall command of French generals.
In addition, an expeditionary air force was created by the RAF.
This had just under 10,000 men with 12 squadrons of aircraft.
This BEF was modern in that it was motorized.
Its troops traveled on trucks, not marched on their feet.
Its heavy artillery, the big guns,
weren't towed by horses.
They were mechanized.
But the BEF was not an offensive force
that could carry the war to Germany.
Its strength was diluted,
not concentrated into specialized armored units,
as had been so powerfully demonstrated
by the Germans in Poland.
It lacked adequate communications.
It was poorly trained.
The air component was weak and not integrated
to supply any real support for the army.
Through the winter, the BEF dug trenches,
caught up on training,
and waited to see what would happen.
In the spring of 1940,
the BEF was supplemented by territorial units,
reserves of part-time soldiers.
Its strength then began to approach 400,000.
But nearly half of these troops were little more than labor,
had little military value,
and almost no equipment.
The BEF conformed to the traditional pattern
of what Britain expected of its soldiers.
Traditionally, the British army was small
and used to police less technically sophisticated
civilizations within the worldwide empire.
A small number of disciplined soldiers
with technically advanced weapons
were able to control large subject populations.
The soldiers that manned this army
were by tradition professionals,
seeing the soldier as a job
rather than a patriotic duty.
Tanks had been one of the most startling innovations
of the First World War.
They had developed from agricultural tractors
as armored vehicles
to cross the morass of no man's land
into the hail of machine gun fire
that had made conventional charges
by infantry with bayonet
and by cavalry with sword or lance
bloody killing grounds.
Tanks had played significant roles
in the great victories of the British in 1918,
but amidst the confusion of the war,
to read the true potential of the weapon
required a leap of imagination
that was made difficult by the Allied victory.
The British expeditionary force
was a conventional traditional army
that simply added tanks
to the normal structures.
The thinking that guided the BEF
was the product of severe debate
between the wars on what a tank could do.
Those who argued for all armored formations
as adopted by Germany
were sidelined and defeated.
So the BEF was an army
where infantry fought on foot,
guns were towed to battle
and dug in for set-piece bombardments,
and cavalry,
although now in armored vehicles,
used lightly armored vehicles
that would enable them to fulfill
the cavalry role of scouting
in pursuit of defeated infantry.
Tanks were attached
to the infantry to allow foot soldiers
to cross no man's land.
The British army traditionally
was small and professional.
France had a different relationship
between soldier and state.
The tradition of the citizen in arms
that dated back to the Revolution
remained.
As a continental European power
with borders with aggressive neighbors,
France had traditionally maintained
a large army based upon conscription,
upon national service,
upon the duty of the citizen
to the state.
Once again in 1939,
their army had been called up,
reservists mobilized.
It was a massive force
of nearly three million
that stood alongside the British army.
To create this vast army,
France had relied on each generation
of its young men passing through
conscripted national service.
The bulk of these vast numbers
of reservists were placed in the uniform
with just a single year's training,
as much as 10 or 15
years previously.
In terms of military
thinking, the French had failed
to learn the lessons of World War I,
as had the British.
French tanks
were over 3,000 in number,
the equal of those in the German army
and were technically
high in quality.
But they were designated
to accompany infantry,
not to act as an independent strike force.
The army as a whole
was poorly equipped.
France was unable to bear
the economic cost of supplying
such a huge force with mechanized transport.
Most of France's
guns were towed by horses.
There were still horse
cavalry regiments.
The infantry marched on foot into battle.
Orders were sent by messenger,
not by radio or field telephone.
The nation
which went to war was, however,
confident of victory.
Opinion polls
of the citizens that were soon to wear
uniforms showed that 75%
of France supported military
action against Hitler over Poland.
Generals
have always stressed the need
for focused goals.
In this, the French army was
devoid of inspiration.
Its only goal was to resist.
France's army
thought the lesson of World War I
was that the defense held the upper
hand in combat, that the machine
gun, in entrenched positions,
could defend against
battalions.
This had been the hard-learned lesson
of France's Western Front.
For the French soldiers
defending their country's western borders,
the defining moment
in the history of World War I
had been the Battle of Verdun,
a complex of forts on the western
front that had been resolutely
defended to the death,
with hundreds of thousands of casualties
on both sides.
France saw the path
to victory in 1939
as making their whole country
into a new Verdun,
against which Germany could be provoked
to attack. Attacks
which would break against the fortress walls
so decisively that German strength
would be destroyed.
This tactic produced
the Maginot Line of forts,
a fantastic complex
of defenses.
In the spring of 1940,
the British army also sent troops
into these forts, and many
of the fortifications which British soldiers
hastily dug and reinforced
were attempts to extend the Maginot Line
towards the sea.
Economy had ended the line at the
Britain and France were both
centers of large worldwide
empires, and often the soldiers
both countries deployed were troops
from those empires.
Indian troops were to be seen in the fields
of France as part of the British army.
France deployed many troops
from its army of Africa.
Some of the forces that were being
assembled against Germany were Poles
who had undertaken incredible journeys
escaping via Hungary,
Bulgaria, Turkey and the Middle East
to somehow link up once more
with their British and French allies.
A definitive mission of the phony war
were the raids which the British
and French air forces did mount
against Germany. These were
raids of leaflets.
In the early months of the war,
Britain in particular clung to the belief
that Germany might still be persuaded
to listen to reason and
negotiate a peace.
For several months the Royal Air Force
scattered leaflets all over
Western Germany setting out a
logical reasoned case against
Nazi expansion into Europe.
There appears to have been no effect
on public opinion in the Third Reich.
The only value of the raids
was in training crews
in navigation over Germany at night.
Neither German,
British nor French air forces
sought combat during the phony war.
Attacks were made
on shipping and photographic
reconnaissance was made.
If during the phony war
the events on far distant oceans
and peace on the supposed
battlefields of Europe seemed
remote and disconnected from
the everyday experience of the population
so too must have seemed
the far distant events of Asia.
Few Europeans
may have given much thought
to the vicious war that was being
fought in China by the army
of the Empire of Japan.
Little did the people of
Europe envisage that the war
in Asia would link together
with the fighting in Europe.
Japan was
fighting to occupy and control
the resources of China, a vast
but weak and chaotic country.
Japan sought to eventually
replace the European powers
as the imperial master in Asia.
European colonies
such as Hong Kong
strengthened their defenses
fearing the war might spread across
from China.
That war was
itself a complex tangle
of wars, a conflict
within conflicts.
China fought Japan
but within that war two Chinas
fought Japan, the nationalists
the official government of China
and the communists,
the alternative government.
Within this war
the nationalists and communists
continued their own civil war.
Japan pioneered
the strategy of extending the war
to the whole of the enemy, both civilian
and soldier alike.
A series of brutal campaigns
from the air and the ground
massacred innocent civilians
to intimidate and cow the Chinese population.
On March 7th, 1940
the Queen Elizabeth, then
the largest passenger liner in the world
completed its maiden voyage
docking in New York.
The liner had dashed across the Atlantic
at top speed.
The voyage was kept a total secret.
The ship had traveled alone
without escort, relying on
her high top speed to outrun
any possible attack by Germany's U-boats.
She was sent to New York
to complete fitting out
and escape attack by air raids.
The enormous size of the liner
and her high speed
made her as potent a weapon of war
as any battleship,
delivering the resources of war
in vast quantities.
In the coming years, she and her
sister liner, the Queen Mary,
would make any number of high speed journeys
across the ocean, always alone,
always in top secret.
In April 1940
the phony war disappeared
and broke into real action.
Germany mounted
an invasion of the neutral Scandinavian
country of Norway.
Hitler saw Norway as a
weak northern flank.
The remote port of Narvik
in the far north of Norway was the outlet
for Swedish iron ore,
essential for the German war effort.
During the Finnish-Russian war
France and Britain had planned
to seize the port and deny it
to German shipping on the pretext
that they were aiding the Finnish fight
against Russia.
This scheme was abandoned after the
Finnish collapse against the Soviets.
Germany's war effort was largely
economically self-sufficient
and did not depend on international trade.
For those resources which
Germany did not possess,
rubber and oil, advanced technology
had found exact substitutes
which could be created from coal.
One of the few materials
which Germany needed to import
for its armament industry was ore
with which to produce the highest grade steels.
These had to be
obtained from Scandinavia,
actually from the neutral country of Sweden
but via the equally neutral Norway.
Britain's war of resources
was dependent on free Atlantic sea trade.
Shipping came under intense
attack and the battle of the
Atlantic between the two navies
was to become a crucial conflict of the war.
For Germany's navy, the key problem
was access to the open sea.
Germany's coastline was short
and easily closed off
by the opposing British.
The German navy had already put to sea
before the war had broken out.
Now, as the conflict extended,
the key resource for the
German navy was to gain further coastline
from which to base U-boats
and surface raiders.
The coast of Norway, with its fjords
and deep inlets, provided a series
of harbors and bases to the Germans
that would enable them to threaten
merchant shipping and evade the efforts
of the Royal Navy to counter-attack.
Norway and Sweden were
countries walking the tightrope of neutrality.
In a war which
depended on internationally traded
materials, it would be increasingly
difficult to remain neutral
and have neutrality respected.
If Germany violated
Norwegian neutrality, so
did Britain and France.
At the same time
as the attack upon Norway,
the Nazis turned against Denmark.
Denmark had remained a neutral
country in every European affair
since 1815, and
was accepted by all powers
as part of Germany's backyard.
Denmark
was, by nature, pacifist
in politics, with the military
held in low regard.
In 1940, the Danish
army was just 14,000 strong,
the navy just five ships,
the air force 50 planes.
The invasion of Denmark began
at 4.15 a.m.
on the morning of April 9th.
The Danish government capitulated
just one hour and 45
minutes later.
Denmark was attacked because
it was in the way,
an innocent bystander in the path
of the attack upon Norway.
All the countries
that were to come under occupation in the war
had to choose how to deal with
their conqueror.
Denmark chose the path of least
resistance. As a result of the
capitulation, the Danish government
retained power over Denmark's
internal affairs. The price
was what some call
collaboration. Yet, it was
a policy supported by elections.
For the Danish
population, it was a recipe
for survival.
Norway had hoped to remain
neutral. Although a country
comparable in size to Denmark,
its armed forces were stronger,
and the country was to provide
a stronger resistance to the Nazis.
Norway had its own
Nazi party, and its leader,
Vidkun Quisling, was installed by the Germans
as president of the occupied
Norway. His name
was to become synonymous with treachery
and collaboration, as he tried to
impose a Nazi system
on his country. As the
Germans mounted their invasion, their troops
embarked, their aircraft and ships
fueled and armed. They were
taking part in a carefully planned operation
to grab resources needed to
further fight the war.
History conceals from
us the confusion endured by
both sides in 1940.
If there is a lesson of military history,
it's the way in which the most extensively
planned operations simply
do not turn out as planned.
The fighting in Norway became
caught up in just such confusion.
As the German
forces sailed up the coast, they
encountered British forces, not a
defense. They were involved
in an offensive operation of their own.
There had been
intensive pressure in Britain to end the
phony war, to do something.
Britain and France
had decided, unbeknownst to Germany,
to lay mines in Norway's
coastal waters. The
aim was to force German shipping
out from Norway's neutral waters
into the open sea, where they
could become victim to British destroyers
and submarines.
The mining operation
ran into the German invasion.
Hastily, the British
revived the plan to occupy Norway.
It was planned badly,
poorly controlled,
and from the first to last
an operation conducted in a
climate of confusion.
The action started badly.
Units embarked on ships,
got off their ships, were ordered back
aboard, leaving behind their
heavy artillery.
An amphibious operation, it was planned
by admirals and generals who so
jealously kept their independence,
they traveled on separate ships.
The fighting
was to be amongst the subarctic mountains
and fjords of Norway, yet
ordinary British infantry was pitted
in combat against special mountain
troops of Germany.
Troops were sent without anti-aircraft
units, only to be subjected
to bear constant Stuka attack.
Despite some determined action by the
Royal Navy, after having been initially
caught off guard when British destroyers
completely devastated a large force
of German ships, the poorly
equipped and organized British troops
were pounded from the air and
driven to constant retreat by the
mountain troops, led by some of Germany's
best generals.
After just two weeks of fighting,
the Germans were in complete
control of the south of Norway,
and British and French troops were
undertaking the first of what
were to be a series of desperate
evacuations by sea.
The initiative
for this action came from Churchill
and displayed Churchill's
habit of proposing wild strategic
adventures on the fringe of war
at its very worst.
It was a habit which had caused his downfall
once before.
In World War I, just such a similar
venture into Turkey at Gallipoli
had caused the deaths of many
thousands of British troops, and
since many of those troops had been from
Australia and New Zealand, had even
threatened the British Empire.
Fear and hesitancy that Gallipoli
was being repeated only
contributed to the failure of the
Norway campaign.
The combination of the utter surprise
which the Germans managed to effect
and the chaotic organization
of the British and French forces
meant that just such a fate
may have again awaited Churchill.
Instead, the events in Norway
were to project Churchill to the
height of power.
That a disaster that might have consigned
Churchill to the footnotes of history
catapulted him to a paramount
position proves such a thing
as destiny exists.
The timeline of the war is a complex
weave of events, of cause
and effect tangled together.
Already,
elsewhere in Europe, the war
shifted into a higher gear.
A picture was being drawn upon
a bigger canvas as the German
invasion of France and the Low Countries
began. Yet,
in Britain, the chain of
cause and effect that spread
from the Norway campaign was still
to play out.
The government had been led by Neville Chamberlain.
Chamberlain has earned
an unfortunate place in history
as the principal architect of appeasement,
forever to be associated
with the Munich Agreement that had
consigned Czechoslovakia to oblivion
with promises remained
and trust betrayed.
Chamberlain, in fact, only
represented the views of nearly
everyone in Britain and her ally
France. Chamberlain's
fault was to take Hitler
at his word. He has
compounded his fall in the eyes
of history by a series of dramatic
speeches that were all too quickly
to be confounded by events
to the discredit of the man.
On his return from Munich,
describing a meeting with Hitler
where the dictator had made a vague agreement
never to go to war with Britain,
Chamberlain had waved a single
sheet of paper and famously
promised peace in our
time.
A principled man,
Chamberlain had been devastated by the outbreak
of war, seeing it as a failure
of his political life.
The conduct of the war, its phony
nature, was as much a
product of Chamberlain's clinging to a
desire that somehow a peace might
be grabbed, even at that late
stage. While
Chamberlain led Britain, no bomb
ever fell on German
territory. After
six months of the phony war, on
April 6th, as the Germans were leading
their invasion fleet for Norway,
Chamberlain had made a speech where he
famously declared, Hitler has
missed the bus. Chamberlain
confidently predicted victory,
arguing that Hitler had failed to act
while Britain and France were still
arming for war.
Once again, Chamberlain's words were
soon to be ridiculed by events
as the war began for real.
A debate in Britain's
House of Commons was called
to discuss the Norwegian campaign.
The House met for two
days in continuous session.
Member after member rose to
criticize Chamberlain.
Aged war heroes came to the House
in uniform and medals and stood
in condemnation.
Famously, Leo Amory,
one of the most senior members from
Chamberlain's own Conservative Party,
quoted words from Oliver Cromwell,
spoken in the House
200 years previously.
Pointing at Chamberlain, he said,
You have sat too long
for any good you have been doing.
Depart, I say,
and let us have done with you.
In the name of God, go.
A vote
followed. Chamberlain's party
deserted him, and the government's majority
of 200 was cut to 81.
The result
stunned Chamberlain, and
visibly shaken, he left the House
with chants of Go, Go,
Go, resounding
in the chamber.
Chamberlain, in fact, did not
relinquish power easily.
He asked the opposition parties,
principally the Labour Party,
to join a coalition government.
The Labour leader, Attlee, refused,
saying Labour would only serve
under a different Prime Minister.
Chamberlain held a meeting
with King George VI, Churchill,
and the most senior minister,
Lord Halifax, who was Britain's
Foreign Secretary. Halifax
was the choice of those in government
to succeed Chamberlain.
The King asked Halifax to form
a government. Halifax declined.
Uncharacteristically, Churchill
achieved his life's ambition
by remaining silent.
Churchill was chosen because of his
dissociation from the politics
of appeasement. He alone,
of politicians outside the central
establishment of British politics,
had an arsenal of political and strategic
creativity, coupled
with instinctive, innate, and powerful
talent for the game of war.
He himself later remarked on his
taking office,
I thought I knew a great deal about it all,
and I was sure I should not
fail.
As he became British Prime Minister,
Churchill regarded himself
as fulfilling a personal destiny.
Churchill's rise
to power was the last act of a
course of events started by the fighting
in Scandinavia.
Churchill's acts in those
first days of office displayed
a wise presence.
Taking the advice of RAF officers,
he forbade sending
more units to France, reasoning
they would be fighting a lost cause.
These plans had a place
in another battle,
the Battle of Britain, that was to follow.
Churchill
was a natural leader, a natural
strategist, but in those first
days he was incapable of
influencing events.
Already, history was swirling
about Britain, her leader,
and her people. History
which was already swamping Britain's
French allies under an avalanche
of war.
Next time on
World War II, The Complete History.
The population
of Europe comes to yearn for the
years of the Phoney War,
as all expectations of victory,
all predictions of how
things will be, are wiped
away in weeks.
As the German success in
Poland is repeated and magnified
by a new, ever greater
blitzkrieg of armored war.
The Maginot Line
is bypassed, and the British
and French armies are drawn into
a simple German trap,
cut off, surrounded,
with their backs to the sea.
The British are evacuated
by an armada of small boats.
In the miracle of Dunkirk,
the army is saved
to fight again.
The Germans swing south
and destroy France.
The ancient, dominant power of Europe
is defeated in weeks,
and forced into humiliation
of surrender by a vengeful
Germany.
A weary and defeated France
descends into a hell of
occupation and the shame of
collaboration.
Britain now stands in its
direst hour, alone,
weak, separated
by only 20 miles of sea
from her Nazi enemy.
The people of Britain
experience the terror, the fear
that other European powers
have endured, the fear of invasion,
of subversion, of
occupation.
Invasion and attack
is expected.
Every desperate reserve of
improvised defense is deployed.
Hitler offers
peace once more.
The reply from Churchill
is of pure defiance.
To fight on the beaches,
to fight on the streets,
to never
surrender.
