The Life & Work of Immanuel Kant

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For several generations now, it's been a widely held view among serious students of philosophy
that the greatest philosopher to have appeared in the West since the ancient East is Immanuel Kant.
Kant was born in the town of Königsberg in East Prussia in 1724,
and died there at an age of almost 80 in the year 1804.
Many jokes have been made about the fact that he rarely left Königsberg
and never went outside his native province in the whole of his life.
Also about the fact that he stuck so strictly to a daily routine
that the inhabitants of Königsberg would literally set their watches by him as he walked past their windows.
He never married, and outwardly his life was entirely uneventful.
However, he was not at all the dry stick that my description so far would suggest.
On the contrary, he was sociable and amusing, elegant in dress and witty in conversation,
and his lectures at the University of Königsberg, where he was a professor for more than 30 years,
were famous for their brilliance.
Rather surprisingly, Kant was the first great philosopher of the modern era to be a university teacher.
Descartes, Denoza, Leibniz, Locke, Barclay, Jung, Rousseau—none of these were academic,
nor were most of the major philosophers in the century after Kant, the 19th century.
The obvious exception is Hegel, but Schopenhauer, Thierry de Gaulle, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Nietzsche—
none of these were academic philosophers.
It's only in the 20th century that nearly all important philosophers have been academics.
Whether this professionalization of the subject is a good thing is very much a moot point.
I suspect it's inevitable.
However, to get back to the first of the great philosophers,
the writings of Kant's youth and early middle age made him widely known
but all but a few of them are now virtually unread.
His lasting fame rests on a series of publications which didn't begin until he was 57
and continued into his 70s.
So we have the rare spectacle of a creative genius of the first order
producing all his greatest work in late middle age and old age.
His acknowledged masterpiece is The Critique of Turgenev, which was published in 1781.
It wasn't very well understood at first, so two years later,
he published a short exposition of its central argument as a separate book,
usually referred to as the Prolegomena,
and then brought out an extensively revised edition of The Critique of Theory in 1787.
There followed, in quick succession, his second great critique,
The Critique of Practical Reason, in 1788,
and then his third critique, The Critique of Judgment, in 1790.
Meanwhile, he had also published, in 1785,
a little book called The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics.
In spite of its unseductive title,
this book had had a simply immense influence on moral philosophy ever since.
With me to discuss Kant's work is a well-known contemporary philosopher,
the Geoffrey Warnock, Principal of Hartford College, Oxford,
and a former Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University.
So, Geoffrey, Kant was perhaps the most famous system thinker
in the contemporary era in philosophy,
and one notorious difficulty about expounding any system
where everything fits into something else
is where to break into it, how to make it start.
Where do you think is the best point to break into Kant in an exposition of history?
There certainly is that problem.
One of Kant's merits, in a way,
is that he was very good at making an immense range of views
fit together in a comprehensive and systematic way.
But if we are embarking on this,
I think it is important not to start off in too technical a way.
He's sometimes represented as conducting a sort of refereeing job
between the merits and demerits of rationalism and empiricism, for example,
discussing how there can be some etic necessary truths.
But I think one ought to go rather further back
to what the much wider and simpler concern was
that really generated these other problems.
And that, I would submit,
was his concern with an apparent conflict
between the findings of the physical sciences of his day
and our fundamental ethical and religious convictions.
He thought there was a prima facie conflict in consistency.
Can you spell out what he thought the conflict consisted in?
I think the central and simplest form of the conflict
was that it seemed to be a presupposition,
and indeed Kant thought a well-founded and proper presupposition
of the physical sciences,
that everything that happens is determined by antecedent happenings,
and that there is always a law on the basis of which one can say
that what happened was the only thing that could happen.
In the physical world?
In the physical world, yes.
But, of course, when we're thinking about our own conduct,
when we're thinking, say, about moral predicaments
we may find ourselves in,
we believe that we and everybody else have alternatives before us
and that there are various things we could do,
and it's for that reason that we have to accept the responsibility
to what we actually do.
That was one thing, and he thought that that was prima facie
contradicted by a presupposition of physical science.
In other words, how in a universe in which the motions of all matter
are governed by Newtonian laws of scientific law,
can there be free will?
Yes.
He was also concerned with the question
of how a god would fit in
to an essentially mechanical and physically determined universe.
He wasn't the first philosopher, even the first major philosopher,
to see these problems, was he?
No, no, certainly not.
They'd been really quite a preoccupation for philosophers
all through the 18th century,
ever since the sort of great leap forward, so to speak,
in the physical sciences at the end of the 17th century.
Among the empiricists, for example,
Bartholdi had been preoccupied with this sort of problem,
and among those in Kant's own tradition,
conspicuously Leibniz.
No, he certainly wasn't the first.
Why was he so deeply dissatisfied, as he obviously was,
with what his predecessors had done about this problem?
Well, he thought, and I think correctly,
that his predecessors had tried to
somehow resolve this conflict, or bring it to an end,
by downgrading the pretensions of the physical sciences,
and that's certainly true of Bartholdi,
and I think it's true of Leibniz as well,
and to somehow present them as inferior,
and not having a claim to be an equal contestant
with metaphysical doctrine and argument.
And for one thing, I think Kant thought that the record
showed that that was not the right way to proceed,
because on the one hand, the physical sciences
seemed to proceed smoothly and progressively,
and triumphantly, with everybody agreeing
what had been established and what hadn't.
And on the other hand, philosophers looked to him
like a sort of chaotic battlefield.
I know philosophers agreed with any other philosopher,
and no doctrine was accepted for more than a few years
before some of these things broke itself.
That's one thing.
But then he also thought, and I think this is more important,
that Hume, in particular, had raised serious doubts
about the credentials of philosophy
as a sort of possible intellectual enterprise at all.
And he thought that Hume's challenge, if I can call it that,
had raised a serious doubt as to whether what philosophers
were professing was even, in principle, possible.
He made a famous remark once about reading Hume
having woken him from his romantic slumber.
If you take it to what you're now saying, it refers to this.
Yes.
What was the awakening, in fact?
What did Hume awaken him to?
The problem, I think, in a crude nutshell,
was this, that Hume, and indeed Leibniz,
and such other philosophers have thought about him,
had accepted the general view that propositions
can be exhaustively divided into two classes.
On the one hand, there are what used to be called
truths of reason, what Kant called analytic propositions,
where, in a sense, they're really true by definition,
like a triangle has three sides and a bicycle has two wheels.
Those, they said, could be known a priori,
they are an independent theory of experience.
On the other hand, there were substantial propositions
which tell of something not so implicit in the terms of reason.
These, they said, were substantial and informative,
but couldn't be necessarily, they were always propositions,
and could be established only on the basis of experience or experiment.
And Hume said, and Kant thought he was quite right,
that if that was right, then philosophy itself
was in a serious predicament,
because it didn't put itself forward,
on the one hand, as an empirical science
based on observation and theory,
and on the other hand, it didn't want to say
that all it was doing was elaborating a set of tautologies,
analyzing the terms in which we speak and think.
And Hume's question was, well, is there anything else
that a philosopher could possibly be doing,
if he wasn't doing either of those?
But didn't Hume realize, and Kant after him,
that it also created a serious problem for the natural sciences?
Because scientific, unrestrictedly general scientific law,
are also propositions that are neither analytic,
they can't be deductively arrived at by logic,
nor can they be proved from experience.
Didn't they both realize that too?
I'm not sure.
It would be, I think, a diversion at the moment to go into it.
Really, what Hume thought about it,
I think Hume thought that the sciences
could sort of carry on as a body of empirical knowledge.
Though, of course, in that case,
without the claim to establish that anything was necessary,
Kant's view, though, was certain,
that this belief in an exhausted dichotomy was mistaken.
He had no doubt that it was mistaken,
because while one might question the credentials of philosophers
in claiming to put forth synthetic propositions
that were both synthetic and necessary,
that might be questionable.
Kant had no doubt that this was a perfectly common force,
so to speak, in the natural sciences and in mathematics,
so that there certainly were, undoubtedly there were,
propositions which were not analytic,
but were not empirical and contingent either.
In other words, propositions which applied to the world,
but yet which we didn't as it were derive from the world,
but which we could establish simply by argument.
And he called them synthetic a priori.
Yes, yes, yes.
Now, if such propositions apply to the world,
but are not, so to speak,
laid off from the world by experience, by observation,
how do we arrive?
Well, yes.
One has to introduce here, I think,
one of Kant's most important distinctions
between what he called things in themselves,
or the world as it is in itself,
and appearances.
Now, on the question of things in themselves,
I mean, Kant would have said,
we can't make any demands.
I mean, things in themselves simply are as they are,
and there's nothing we can do about that.
But if you move to the top of the world as we experience it,
as it presents itself to us as an object of experience,
to the world of what he called appearances,
then, he said, it's a different matter,
because there are certain conditions, he claimed,
which any world must satisfy
if it is to be a possible object of experience at all.
For, well, us and other people, too.
He thought it crucial that the world
is a common object of experience
to an indefinite array of subjects.
And if there is to be something
that can be experienced and known about in common
to a community of subjects of experience,
then, he argued, there are conditions which it must satisfy.
And we can say a priori
that appearances must satisfy these conditions.
Would it be correct to put what you've just said
in the following sort of way,
that what there is for us to experience,
or perceive, or know,
must, of course, depend on what there is to experience.
But it must also depend on what apparatus we have
for experiencing or seeing it.
And that the apparatus that we have is a contingent matter.
I mean, to use a modern example,
we happen to be equipped to interpret
electromagnetic waves of some frequencies, but not others.
That's to say, we can receive and interpret
heat waves and light waves,
but we don't receive and interpret radio waves and X-rays.
And it's imaginable that we might be
by the terms of those that we do.
Now, Kant is saying,
this being so,
for us to be able to experience anything at all,
it must be such as is appreciable by our apparatus.
By the apparatus we have.
Yes, yes.
Now, that's not to say that nothing else can exist,
but only that it can't, so to speak, exist for us,
that we can't know it.
Yes.
Is that right?
Well, I would quantify that in one way.
Kant didn't, I think, want to get into considerations
about what our sensory equipment specifically is,
and what kind of eyes and ears we have.
I think he was trying to say something more general than that,
that the notion of a subject of experience
presented with a world as an object of experience
requires that it should have sensory capacities of some kind,
and intellectual and conceptual capacities of some kind.
But he didn't want to say they must be of this specific kind or that.
I mean, he wouldn't have been interested in whether our eyes
were different from those of gestures,
just that we must have some way of perceiving.
But the point then is that we bring certain, as it were,
predispositions there,
and only what fits into those predispositions
can be experienced by us.
That's absolutely right, yes.
And this was something, the nature of which, I think,
had not occurred to any philosopher before.
No, genuinely not, yes.
Now, what sort of entirely novel view of the nature of human knowledge
did this begin to lead to?
Well, he put forward the claim that if one thought carefully enough
and argued long enough,
one could specify what he called the form of any possible experience.
He gave the name of this the metaphysics of nature,
sometimes the metaphysics of experience, he said.
What he called the matter, that was a contingent matter,
it might be this or that actual matter,
but he thought one could spell out and think out
what the form of any possible experience must be.
And this would be a body of doctrine
that would tell you something about the world, of course,
not telling you what its essential form is,
but telling you something necessary,
something that couldn't be otherwise.
And because there are such propositions,
that was why Hume and others of his predecessors were wrong
in analysing all possible propositions
into either analytic, which would be true or false,
by nature of the terms used,
and synthetic, or a posteriori,
which were true or false according to observations.
Absolutely, yes.
We've now got a third kind.
Yes.
Now, can you give us an example or two
of the concepts of propositions which are of this sort?
Well, putting it in the most general terms,
they divide into two broad classes.
First of all, Kant tried to deal with
what he called the form of sensibility.
And he thought that here one could spell out
and work out the fundamental character of space and time.
He thought these were imposed upon our experience
by the nature of our sensibility.
I want to stop you there,
because I think this is a very hard idea for people to grasp.
Yes.
He was saying that space and time
don't characterise things as they are in themselves.
Yes, indeed.
But are inescapable modes of experience for us.
That's right.
And we can only experience things in these dimensions,
yes.
But independently of our experience,
these dimensions can't be said to exist.
That's certainly right.
If somebody said, well, what about the creation as it is in itself?
What kind of spatial and temporal order is there?
Kant would say, not a discussable topic.
All we talk about is that world
which is an object which carries to us
the world as it appears.
And he thought that here,
it's very arguable whether he was right perhaps,
but he thought that in thus bringing in space and time
as forms of sensibility,
he was in effect bringing in geometry and arithmetic
based on objects.
He thought that geometry and arithmetic
dealt with forms of sensibility
and were bodies of synthetic a priori.
Given that he says that there are propositions of this special kind
which apply to the world but are not derived from the real world,
could I just intervene?
I was going to say that his synthetic a priori proposition
divided into two broad parts.
We've only dealt with one of them, of course.
If I could just very briefly bring in the second.
Right.
He thought that there are also what he called
forms of the understanding.
In a sense, forms of thought.
And I suppose the fundamental principles
which he tried to show were conditions of possibility of understanding
would be first of all the principle of universal causal determinants
which he thought was one of them.
And then, rather unfortunately,
he also tries to show that Newton's law of the conservation of matter
states conditions of possibility of understanding.
Now, in order to arrive at the sort of total picture
that we are beginning to build up,
let me just recapitulate up front.
Kant is saying that because all of our knowledge and experience
comes to us through our sensory and mental apparatus,
it all comes to us in forms which are sense-dependent and mind-dependent.
Yes.
And that we have no direct access to things as they are in themselves,
independently of all possible experience.
Now, given that the modes of apprehension that we have are whatever they are,
possible experience must, as it were, fit in with it
to be able to be experienced at all.
And part of his project as a philosopher, therefore,
was to carry out a large-scale investigation
into what the nature of these forms was.
Yes.
And if that investigation is successful and complete,
it will tell us what the limit of all possible knowledge is.
Is that right?
Yes.
And that anything that's outside that is just simply unknowable.
Yes.
Now, the implications of this are absolutely radical,
not only for what is included, but for what is left out of that.
That's certainly true and fundamentally true.
And I find it hard to believe that it wasn't, so to speak,
something of a disappointment to Kant,
that this is the position he got himself into.
Because one gets the impression from the way he embarks on his inquiries
that he would like to build a sort of firm foundation
for theological speculation about God and the soul
and metaphysical speculation about the cosmos.
Whereas what he actually finishes up doing
is saying that there can be no such foundations,
because all we can establish foundations for
is the notion of possible experience
and what will be the object of possible experience.
And if you try to go beyond that,
if you try to raise questions about how the cosmos could be characterized
by independence from possible experience,
or if you try to talk about God and the soul,
then your enterprise must collapse,
and the experience of that must collapse.
Now, Kant thought that it was impossible for us to know
whether God existed or not,
or if he existed or not,
but he did himself believe that God did exist,
and that he did himself, didn't he?
Yes, he did.
Now, he was very clear that this was a matter of faith
and not something that was knowable.
Yes.
But how, on his own premises,
is talk about God or the soul even intelligible?
Yes.
Well, that's a very good question,
and one on which he is, as we say, slightly shifted.
What he wants to say,
and this is rather interesting,
it involves him sort of turning the whole issue upside down,
in a rather interesting way,
some of his predecessors had made the supposition
that our moral convictions and attitudes
and our religious convictions
stand in need of some kind of metaphysical foundation
and a type of right in the form of theology,
philosophical ethics.
Well, Kant finishes up putting the thing exactly the other way up.
He says that we are not only entitled to moral convictions
and religious convictions,
he thought it inescapable that we should tell them.
And these would lead us to, essentially,
metaphysical doctrines about God and the soul.
But that those doctrines themselves,
if they had any foundation of thought,
it consisted directly in our primitive moral convictions themselves.
So it's those that are fundamental.
Is he saying this?
That it just is an inescapable empirical fact
that we're all directly familiar with,
that whether we like it or not,
most of us, at least, simply do have moral convictions,
which we find ourselves unable to ignore,
even when we want to.
And that's a fact.
Now, for these convictions to have any real validity or significance at all,
the essential moral terms,
like good, bad, right, wrong, praise, blame, etc.,
for these to have any significance at all,
there must be some freedom of choice.
It must be possible for some of us, some of the time,
to have done other than we did.
Otherwise, the term would mean nothing.
But how is that possible,
on the one hand,
in a world in which all notions of matter
are governed by Newtonian laws?
Because that was one problem that you started us off with
right at the very beginning of the discussion.
But also, for us to have free will,
which he thinks is an inescapable consequence
of the direct experience we do have of moral categories,
then there must be some sort of moral realm.
Is that correct?
Yes, yes.
Now, how does he get even further than that?
What he says about himself,
thinking about theology and religion specifically,
he says that he had denied knowledge in order to make room for faith.
He had simply shown why it was
that the subject matter of theology, if I could put it like that,
is not a possible topic of knowledge.
But then he says, what's alarming about that?
Because we've all known all along
that it's essentially a matter of faith.
But, as you rightly say,
and one could claim,
his arguments have really been rather more radical.
It isn't just that when I talk about God,
I'm saying things that I don't know to be true.
His argument really seems to lead to the conclusion
that I don't know what I'm saying.
What I'm saying doesn't really mean anything.
But he was very reluctant to draw that conclusion.
What he tries to say is,
all I've done is to show that it's not a matter of knowledge or proof.
And his point on that, I suppose, is this,
that whereas it's superstitious to rest on faith
over a question which can actually be decided one way or the other,
if the question can't be decided one way or the other,
it's not irrational to have belief on one side.
Absolutely. Yes. Yes.
At the very beginning of this discussion, Sir Geoffrey,
you said that the problem that could usefully be regarded
as having, as it were, launched a problem to the government
was a perception of an apparent conflict
between Newtonian physics and the requirements of ethics.
How, in the light of everything we've said up to this point,
did he solve that problem?
Yes.
To really a quite minimal extent, I think.
And I think this was something of which he was himself perfectly aware.
What he would claim is that
by making clear the distinction
between the world as an appearance, as an object of experience,
and the world of things in themselves,
he is in a position to say there is the world of appearances
and the physical sciences, in principle, give us the whole truth like that.
And he believed that they did.
He had no doubt that Newton had got it absolutely right
and that physicist's description of the world as an object of possible experience
was correct and could be exhausted.
But, he says, bear in mind
that we are there talking about the world of appearance.
There is also the topic of things in themselves
and there is room, so to speak, there
for other sorts of concepts altogether
of free will, of rational agency, right and wrong, good and bad, the soul.
There is room for these concepts,
not in the world of appearance, but outside the world of appearance.
Of course, he saw that on his own principles
he would have to say that these other matters
couldn't be topics of knowledge.
And, I mean, had you said to him,
do you know that there is such a thing as free will,
he would persistently have said,
no, I do not know any such thing.
All I know is that there is room for that possibility.
And that I can't help believing that there is.
Oh, sir. Yes, you would have gone on to say that too.
Given that, on this view, ethics comes to us somehow
from outside the world of all possible knowledge,
does he have a view about where it comes from or how we get it?
Well, he thought it came out of reason.
I think it will help us to understand that problem further
if you tell us what the main conclusions of his moral philosophy were.
It's quite impossible, I think, in the context of this discussion
to go into the arguments in which he supported those.
Yes.
But if you are able to outline the conclusions for us briefly,
I think that will contribute to an understanding.
I think one could say something quite briefly about that.
What he really tries to do in his moral philosophy
is somehow extract the essentials of morality
from the pure concept of rationality.
He says the essentials about any agent
of whom one can think or speak in moral terms
is that he must be a rational being
capable of thinking of reasons for and against doing this and that.
And he tries to argue that the essential requirements of morality
are really built into the concept of rationality itself,
essentially trying to show that...
Well, he seems to try to show
that only a body of principles of action
corresponding to our principles of morality
could consistently, i.e. rationally,
be universally adopted by a community of rational beings.
That's what he tries to show.
And there is the famous categorical imperative
which almost directly derives from that.
Yes.
Perhaps I should ask you to formulate it.
Well, he says act only on that maxim
by which you can at the same time will
that it should be a universal law.
And I think that is the idea.
He wants to say that what morality really imposes on us
is conditions on conduct which require,
and I think he also thinks uniquely determined,
the assent of any possible community of rational creatures
to do what he's trying to do.
Now, Kant's philosophy is notoriously difficult to understand
at the first encounter,
and I'm sure that many of the people listening to this discussion
between you and me are experiencing this difficulty now.
I think fundamental to the difficulty is his contention
that of things as they are in themselves,
we simply have no knowledge and no way of acquiring them,
that we are, as it were, permanently screened off from this
by our own limitations.
And these are partly limitations, as it were, in time and space.
Yes.
Is it helpful, you think, to point out to people,
look, in a quite different context,
something very much of this sort
is what many religious people have always believed,
that, as it were, real reality is outside this world of our experience,
outside space and time,
and that this world of our experience is ethereal
and perhaps illusory in some metaphysical sense.
Is it helpful to say that,
or do you think that just obscures the issue?
No, I don't think it does.
If, for example, one raises the rather, in a sense,
hypothetical and idle question
what sort of being one would have to be
to be acquainted with things as they are in themselves,
the only possible answer you can get either can't
is you'd have to be God, in fact.
That's to say you would be acquainted with things
in some timeless way
and without any kind of spatial limitations
and with no particular sensory limitations
on the mode of your acquaintance.
And I'm not thinking in English or French
or any other particular language.
Your acquaintance with the universe
would be not subject to any of these limitations.
And it would say, well, and what would I have to be to be like that?
The only answer is I'd have to be God.
It's a very striking feature, I think, of Kant's philosophy
that although he conducted his philosophy impeccably
in accordance with the criteria of philosophy,
he didn't call on faith or revelation or anything of that kind,
but relied purely on argument
and was working as it were entirely from within
the central tradition of Western philosophy
through predecessors like Locke and Hume and Leibniz and so on.
Nevertheless, he does arrive at conclusions
which are strikingly capable of cohabiting with religious belief.
Well, yes, except for the uncomfortable fact
that we mentioned earlier
that he has to say that strictly speaking
all discourse on those topics is unintelligible to us.
We don't really know what we mean.
And that's a proposition that theologians have been a bit charrier of accepting.
They might even say that nowadays more and more are accepting.
Well, that may be true.
Another difficulty about reading Kant is simply the prose style.
I mean, there are philosophers,
Deans one, Plato's another, Schopenhauer's another,
who are beautiful writers and a pleasure to read.
But Kant's best friend couldn't say that about him.
It's opaque, it's difficult, it's obscure.
Why did he write so badly?
I think there are perhaps three things one might say.
I think partly it's due to the fact
which you mentioned right at the beginning
that he was by profession,
and very single-mindedly by profession, an academic.
And he does write in a very heavily academic style
with a great taste for technical terminology and jargon
and what he called architectonic.
It is all very academic.
But another important point to remember about the critiques,
and this again connects with something you said at the beginning,
was that by the time he was seriously launched
on writing what he knew to be his masterworks,
and hopefully his masterworks,
he was nearly 60,
and he was actually dogged by the thought
that he might die before he got it all done.
And there's no doubt that those hundreds of pages
between the ages of 60 and 70
were written extremely fast.
He was just writing in a hurry.
And I think that has...
Of course, 200 years ago the expectation of life
simply was very much shorter than now,
and it was perfectly reasonable
to think that he might die quite soon.
Yes, so that he was writing in a hurry.
Another point, a slightly less obvious one,
is that he was, and still by that date somewhat unusually,
writing in German,
which had at that date barely become accepted
as a sort of decent language for academic and learned use.
Leibniz, I don't believe Leibniz ever wrote German.
It was all either French or Latin.
Either French or Latin, yes.
And there just wasn't a sort of established style
of academic learned German prose for Kant to adopt,
as, for example, for Bach in Hume there was.
I mean, English didn't become a well-established language
for that kind of learned use.
And I think that may have been a problem, too.
He had no sort of models.
It's a great sadness, I think,
because it's a huge unnecessary obstacle
to understanding the work of somebody
who after all is an almost incomparable thinker.
I said at the very beginning of this discussion
that he's been regarded for generations
by large numbers of professional philosophers
as the greatest philosopher since the 1880s.
Why does his reputation look quite that way?
I think I would mention two qualities
as entitling him to his pinnacle of fame.
I think he was quite exceptionally penetrating
in the sense that he was able to see an intellectual problem
in something which had previously been taken for granted
and was not worth much attention.
He was able to see where the problems were.
And I think that's one of the greatest philosophical gifts,
to be able to see that there is a problem
where everybody else is going on quite happily
without thinking about it much.
Then I think the other thing,
and this connects perhaps with his academic professionalism,
he was extremely good at seeing how it all fitted together
and how what he'd said on this topic might repercuss,
so to speak, on what he'd said somewhere else.
And he was very self-conscious about it
and professionally methodical in this sort of way.
He does, I must say, to me, make writers like, say,
Barclay and Barclay, and indeed Hugh,
look rather like amateurs.
Thank you very much.
