070: The Second Punic War - To the Victors...

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Episode 70. The Second Punic War. To the victor.
Battle of Cannae was a devastating blow to the Republic, and it would have been a death knell
for many lesser states in the ancient world. But much to the ire of his officers, Hannibal
declined to march upon Rome and chose to remain in southern Italy. While the Romans were certainly
brutalized, they had done anything but offer terms of surrender, and were ready and waiting
for any Carthaginian foray against their city. This defiance was not lost upon Hannibal, who,
despite achieving one of the greatest military victories in history, was faced with the grim
reality that the odds had not shifted too much in his favor, and that more bodies would be needed
to fill his ranks. In conjunction with the defeats at the Trebia and Trasimene, the outcome of the
battle convinced a number of Italian cities that the Romans were likely a lost cause.
The Punic commander was careful to grant clemency to any non-Roman prisoners he captured,
even going so far as to explain to the Italian POWs at Cannae that his wish was to only wage
war against Rome, and not her allies. Italian peoples such as the Samnites, Brutians, and
Lucanians, all tribes of southern Italy, leapt upon the opportunity to fight back against the Romans.
The predominantly Greek city of Tarentum, modern Toronto, was betrayed in a plot to
Hannibal's army in 213. But the most important settlement to change sides was Capua. Nestled
in the region of Campania, nearly 200 kilometers southwest of Rome, the nutrient-rich volcanic
soil made Capua one of the most agriculturally productive sites in all of Italy. It was also
quite close to Latium, and Hannibal was eventually able to use it as his headquarters for the winter
of 216-215. In terms of paper strength, this meant that up to 40% of Rome's Italian manpower
would have gone over to Hannibal's side at various points throughout the war.
This growing dependence on the loyalty of rebellious Italian cities would prove to
be quite the burden on Hannibal, and in many cases it outright backfired.
While the Senate was able to dictate terms to these various communities through a complex
system of alliances, the Barcid was experiencing great difficulty in trying to handle the politics
of each city that defected to him. For instance, Hannibal needed to intervene between the Brutians
and the Greek cities of southern Italy, the former looking to plunder the communities of the latter.
Many of these treaties would demand Hannibal's protection in case a consular army showed up
at their doorstep, which is indeed what happened. In the wake of Cannae, the Romans finally agreed
to adhere to the Fabian strategy and capitalize on their strengths, opting for the strategic
placement of multiple armies across Italy to guard against and harass any Carthaginian movements.
Those such as Fabius Maximus and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the shield and sword of Rome,
would guide this initiative. During their failed attempts to capture the cities of Nola and Neapolis
in 216, the preoccupied Carthaginian army was savaged on the initiative of Marcellus
and driven off the battlefield with severe casualties. This was the first defeat since
their descent from the Alps, and even some of Hannibal's Iberian infantry and Numidian horsemen
defected to the victorious Roman camp. Unable to coax his enemies into a pitched battle, Hannibal
could do little against the skirmishes and raids that ate away at his remaining manpower.
In spite of the defections by their peers and the generosity of Hannibal towards captured prisoners,
most of the Sacchii chose to remain allied to the Republic. This meant that Hannibal would
have to engage in time-consuming and costly sieges to try and assert his authority over
these regions, often meeting heavy resistance as he made them submit by force. Rome's renewed vigor
and seemingly bottomless supply of manpower was bad enough, but she could not tolerate
the rebellions of its former allies and aggressively pushed to retake many of these
settlements to show no weakness in front of their loyal Sacchii. Though the Senate was willing to
provide generous offers of clemency should they return to the fold, their vengeance against those
that didn't was swift and brutal. Any one of the captured cities would face the mass execution of
its leadership, or worse, the unleashing of legionaries to sack the city and enslave the
Placed under siege by Rome in 212, Capua was now a virtual albatross around the neck of Barca,
as was Tarentum when it was passed back and forth, which demanded his precious time and attention.
According to authors like Livy and Appian, Hannibal's stay in Capua was actually a
major turning point for the Carthaginian army as a whole. Apparently, Capua earned a reputation
in antiquity for being somewhat of a Sodom and Gomorrah, and for the battle-hardened veterans
who suffered through the abhorrent living conditions and the stress of one battle after
another, the temptations of the city was enough to erode their fighting ability throughout their
winter stay in 216. Most discount this idea as stereotypical moralizing, and the supposedly
poor performance could be explained away by the reality that, well, there were not that many
Severe casualties taken at Cannae and subsequent engagements were causing issues, and the miniscule
number of reinforcements sent by Carthage, much of which would be diverted to other theaters of war
like Spain and Sicily, made Hannibal ever more reliant on less experienced Italian troops.
Such were the events that occupied the southern peninsula between 216 and 212.
The siege of Capua had intensified in 211 as its populace starved. Hannibal could not allow it to
lest it irrevocably damage his reputation among the other Italian cities under his protection,
and return a valuable foothold to the Romans. In an attempt to draw the attention of the besiegers,
Hannibal opted to invade Latium for the first and only time throughout the entire war.
By using a series of tricks, much of the Punic army was able to sneak away from Capua without
raising suspicion, and the inhabitants of Rome were in shock to see the influx of refugees from
local villages that Hannibal had been attacking. The Senate debated on whether or not to recall
the force at Capua to defend the city, though Fabius firmly put his foot down and pointed out
that it was probably a ruse in order to disrupt the siege. To compromise, about 15,000 men were
sent to meet Hannibal in Latium while the rest of the army would maintain their siege.
Near the gates of Rome itself, the Roman and Carthaginian armies were locked in a standoff,
but before any battle could properly commence, a fierce storm sent lightning and hail down upon
the troops who scattered from the field. Perhaps taking it as a sign of divine displeasure,
or the fact that he had already acquired a satisfactory amount of booty, Hannibal retreated
from Latium back to Campania, only to discover that not only did he make little impact on the
conduct of the besieging army, but his ploy cost him the region. By the late summer of 211,
the citizens of Capua surrendered to the Romans under the mistaken impression that Hannibal had
abandoned them. While they hoped that their willingness to capitulate would engender good
will from the Romans, these feelings were not reciprocated. The enraged commanders saw the
leading politicians and members of Capua beaten and beheaded, and the rest of the Capuans were
sold into slavery and had their land auctioned off. Less than two years later, Tarentum would
finally succumb to the generalship of Fabius, enduring a vicious sack that would see the
deportation of its population and blundering of the city's well. The capture of Capua and Tarentum
had eliminated the fiercest anti-Roman parties among the southern Italians, which marked the
downfall of Hannibal's position in the region. Plutarch claims that the loss of Tarentum was
the point at which Hannibal knew deep down that the conquest of Italy was now all but impossible.
Still, the bargain was not yet beaten, and despite his perennial juggling act,
he inflicted a number of wounds against the Romans that kept them on their toes.
In 212, a centurion named Marcus Centennius Pennula received command of a large army based
on his supposed knowledge of Campania and Capua, which in theory would have allowed him to prevent
the Carthaginians from disrupting the siege. Hannibal managed to bait this centurion into
that wiped out almost the entirety of his 16,000-man force. A few months later, Hannibal
killed another 16,000 near the town of Herdonia in Apulia. In 210, the consul Gnaeus Fulvius
Cantumalis was overseeing a siege of Herdonia, and Barca led a surprise attack against the Roman camp
and slaughtered another 8,000 men, including the consul himself. But the most devastating blow to
the Republic would come in 208. Since he had returned to Italy in 211 after his spectacular
campaign in Sicily, Marcellus had spent most of his time battling jealous political rivals
rather than assuming command in the field. Though he had demonstrated himself a capable
and level-headed general in the past, Plutarch states that Marcellus had become obsessed with
protecting his honor and meeting Hannibal on the field of battle. He eventually would get his wish,
though not in the manner he was expecting. Barca was traveling near the town of Venusia
in modern Potenza, attempting to relieve a besieged allied town, only to come across the
army of Marcellus and his co-consul Crispinus. Rather than attacking them head-on or occupying
a fortified hill, Hannibal chose to hide several troops among the nearby trees and woods.
In an uncharacteristically foolish move, Marcellus and Crispinus personally led a small scouting
party to survey the area, only for a swath of Numidians and skirmishers to come barreling out
of the forest. Crispinus was hit by two missiles and mortally wounded, but escaped the immediate
carnage, while Marcellus was run through the side by a cavalry relance and killed. Hannibal was
elated by his success, though he went out of his way to treat the fallen consul's body with the
proper rights. With the death of Marcellus, Rome lost one of its greatest champions, and the demise
of both consuls was a blow not felt since the disaster at Cannae. While the war in Italy had
its ups and downs, there were major developments occurring outside of the peninsula near the
Atlantic Ocean. Let us pause the war in Italy and turn our attention to Spain, where the Republic
was making headway against Carthage's Iberian holdings thanks to the Scipiones family, including
the future Scipio Africanus.
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Unlike Sicily or Illyria, the Roman Senate fully committed to launching a major invasion of Spain
at the start of the war. Not only was the destruction of one of its allied cities the
catalyst for the conflict, Spain was an important strategic target.
The local Celtiberian tribes provided tens of thousands of soldiers for Punic armies,
and the Carthaginian treasury would never be bereft of silver,
so long as the mines continued to operate without interruption.
Hannibal made its value all too clear when he left his brother Hasdrubal in charge of
his Iberian holdings after crossing the Ebro River, and the youngest Barcid son,
Mago, would actually leave Italy to reinforce Hasdrubal's position in 215.
Commanding the Roman expeditionary force, numbering nearly 25,000 strong,
would be the brothers Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, the latter moving to Spain in 217
after surviving the defeat at the Trebia. Between 218 and 211, the main goal of the
Romans was to tie up Hasdrubal's forces to prevent him from sending any assistance to Hannibal.
Much of the fighting would take place on the eastern coast of Spain,
with the pro-consuls managing to recover the city of Saguntum from Punic control in 212.
In their efforts to secure victory, the art of diplomacy was as important as the art of war
when it came to gaining the allegiance of the local Celtiberian leaders. According to Livy,
over 120 Spanish tribes were said to have defected to the Scipio brothers over the
Admittedly, much of their diplomatic success would be tied directly to their prowess in battle
against Hasdrubal and his ilk, and the Romans could redirect the tribe's more aggressive
tendencies against Carthaginian-backed neighbors. Rather than being forged between the chieftains
and the Republic, many Iberians saw the relationship as a personal one between
themselves and the Scipiones, which would partially explain the later success of the
While not as great of a commander as his brother, Hasdrubal made do with what he had,
and still needed to deal with revolts in both Spain and Africa alike, but 211 proved to be
something of a disaster for Rome's Spanish operations. In an effort to destroy the
Carthaginians outright, the brothers split their forces in half so they could deal with the armies
of Hasdrubal Barca and other Punic generals. In his haste to pursue reinforcements headed
to the Barca camp, Publius was killed in a skirmish after being struck in the chest by a
javelin. Gnaeus would also meet his demise less than a month later, and it appeared that the
Romans were back to square one in a theater that had been going remarkably smooth throughout the
entirety of the war. When the elections of 210 came around, few if any candidates threw their
hat into the ring to acquire the seat for Proprietor of Spain. Livy suggests that this
was not a particularly desirable post, for even though some of the surviving officers and generals
were able to prevent any substantial Carthaginian gains, there were serious problems with regards
to morale and supplies. Only about 10,000 additional soldiers were available to bring
over to reinforce the 18,000 or so that were stationed in Spain, a third of the total number
of Carthaginian troops in the region. Trying to condemn with this on top of the resurgent
Carthaginian military presence and any wayward Celtiberians was going to be a serious undertaking
for even an experienced commander, but to the delight of the crowd, one man stepped forward
to undertake this operation, Publius Scipio the Younger, the son of the now-deceased elder Publius
Scipio. This choice was quite exceptional, for although he had been actively serving since
Hannibal's invasion, Scipio was no more than 24 years old at the time he assumed command.
This was not in accordance with Roman custom, since such a position would have required him
to have passed through the cursus honorum and usually serve a term as consul by his early 40s.
Technically, he would not have been elected in a popular vote either, but appointed directly by the
Senate instead. These were desperate times however, and given the general lack of talent and limited
resources available for the job, the Senate could not turn its nose when help presented itself.
With the death of his father and uncle, Scipio was also the paterfamilias of his highly respected and
influential family, and it would have been a matter of pride that he continue where his
predecessors left off. But young Scipio demonstrated that he was more than just a mere pup looking to
restore his clan's honor, and it is in Spain where he honed his craft on his journey to becoming one
of the greatest commanders of antiquity. He was rather unorthodox in style, but longer hair,
a youthful beardless visage, and philhellenic tastes, he resembled Alexander the Great more
than a traditional Roman commander, a comparison that Scipio did not shy away from. Yet his bravery
and ability to lead could not be doubted. His first order of business in 209 was to order a
siege of New Carthage, the largest Punic colony in Iberia that was set up by Hamilcar Barca two
decades prior. A bold strategy, for it would severely damage the stability of Carthage's
holdings given its strategic and symbolic value, and it hosted the Barca war chest containing many
tons of silver. It may have even seemed foolish given the lack of manpower under his employ
and the defenses of the city. But Scipio would capitalize on the overconfidence of the Barca
brothers, who dispersed their armies across Iberia and left behind only a small garrison to guard the
city. Through careful observation of the tide's fluctuation in the harbor, he coordinated a
two-fold attack by land and sea that saw the Romans successfully get past the walls and storm
the settlement, claiming the Carthaginian crown jewel of Iberia and all the valuables that came
with it. This was a shocking blow to the Barcas, who tried to partake the city and destroy the
Roman force. In 208, Hasdrubal and Scipio clashed near the town of Baicula in the modern Haien
province, with the young commander coming out the victor in his first major battle.
The Celt-Iberian elites began to take the young Scipio quite seriously and gradually defected
over to his side. Like with his father and uncle, diplomacy manifested itself as personal relationships,
and Scipio was very conscious to earn their trust by safely returning the Spanish wives
and children he captured in his taking of cities. This was reciprocated by the chieftain saluting
him as king, an honor that was firmly but politely declined, and upwards of half of Scipio's army were
local Iberian warriors. Still, these tribes could be fickle. A rumor of Scipio's death prompted one
of the local rulers to kickstart a major revolt that had to be put down by the commander. This
same rumor also sparked a mutiny among some of his own soldiers, many tiring of their service
and demanding their back pay, and Scipio was able to calm his war-weary troops before ruthlessly
executing the ringleaders of the plot. Down but not out, the 60,000 strong army of the Carthaginians
still outnumbered the Roman force of 45,000 and were now under the command of Hasdrubal Gizgo,
a new general taking over the responsibility of Hasdrubal Barca. 207 was largely uneventful,
but the next year saw Hasdrubal Gizgo and Mago Barca bring their army to the region of Ilipa,
modern Seville, where he positioned his troops on top of a fortified hill overlooking the plains
below to coax the Romans into one final engagement. Scipio saw fit to meet this challenge,
and while he initially deployed his infantry in a traditional manner, his troops were able to
skillfully maneuver in the midst of the battle to outflank the Punic force. The Romans utterly
destroyed their foes, a testament to Scipio's tactical ingenuity and rigorous training of his
men that enabled them to trounce a much larger army, something that was unheard of for much of
the Hannibalic War. The last remaining Carthaginian stronghold at Gadi soon surrendered, as the Punic
commanders considered Iberia to be a lost cause, and retreated back to Africa. With the capture of
Gadis and the expulsion of the Barcids, much of southern Spain fell permanently under the authority
of Rome, at least Carthage's former holdings. The rest of the Iberian Peninsula would not be
fully conquered until the reign of Augustus Caesar, however, and many of the tribes would rise up in
rebellion or raid into Roman Iberia, causing problems for the next two centuries. Still,
the success of Scipio cannot be underestimated, for he at a tender age had seized an integral
part of the Carthaginian Empire in only a few years, despite the odds stacked against him,
enriching the strained Roman treasury with mountains of silver that he displayed in Rome
following his return to Italy at the end of 206. What happened to Hannibal's brothers, Hasdrubal
and Mago? As I explained earlier, one of the main objectives of the Spanish expedition was to prevent
other sons from Hamilcar Barca from invading Italy and providing Hannibal with the additional
troops and supplies he would need. For the most part, the fighting in the region kept the Punic
commanders occupied, but when news of the floundering war effort in Italy reached their
camps, they opted to cut their losses in order to come to the aid of their elder brother.
After the Battle of Baikala in 208, Hasdrubal led his army along Hannibal's former route,
cutting through Gaul and the Alps before arriving in Italy by the spring of 207,
though it is worthy to note that he faced much less trouble making his crossing thanks to his
trailblazing older brother. Despite killing both of the Roman consuls the year prior,
Hannibal had been struggling to hold his position and was pushed ever deeper into the heel of the
Italian peninsula. A second Carthaginian army, bolstered by a great number of Celts recruited
by Hasdrubal along the way, would give him the breathing room that he needed, and he had hoped
to coordinate with his brother to lead the Romans into a two-front war in Italy. Unfortunately for
the Barcids, the current consul Gaius Claudius Nero had captured one of the Carthaginian messengers,
and with the extracted knowledge he was able to predict the movements of Hasdrubal's army.
Joined by his co-consul Marcus Livius Salinator, Nero confronted Hasdrubal in June of that year
at the Metaurus River in northeastern Italy. The Carthaginians tried to dodge the Romans,
hoping to get around them and make their way to Hannibal's camp, but they were caught in the act,
and forced into open battle. The fighting was fierce, but the quick thinking of Nero allowed
him to pull a body of soldiers and wheel around the Carthaginian right flank. Hasdrubal was caught,
and was either cut down or committed suicide in the fighting, along with 10,000 of his troops
dying in the battle, with the rest fleeing into the countryside. With respects to the movements
of Hannibal's surviving brother Mago, he made his way towards Italy after the loss of Spain,
first making a pit stop on the Balearic Islands before landing in Liguria in the border of Gaul
in Italy. There he intended to gather numerous mercenaries and bring another army to the
peninsula by 204, but like with Hasdrubal, he too was cornered by a consular army,
and suffered injuries in a battle that led to his death in 203. The demise of the Barque brothers,
especially the loss of the Metaurus River, was the final nail in the coffin for Hannibal's war in
Italy, and he himself fell into a great depression upon learning the fate of his siblings. Rome
dominated virtually all theaters of conflict, and the noose slowly tightened around the Carthaginians.
The war would move into its final stages, and would lead to exactly what Hannibal feared most,
a Roman army at the gates of Carthage itself.
By this point in the war, Sicily had supplicated, Spain submitted, and Macedonia was mollified.
Most of the rebellious Italian communities were brought back into the fold, and the Celtic tribes
to the north were unable to link up with Hannibal, though they would continue to cause problems,
such as their sack of Placentia in 200. Hasdrubal and Mago were dead, and so were the chances of a
reinforcing Carthaginian army to divide the attention of the Romans. Hannibal was contained
in Brutium, and though his prospects looked increasingly hopeless, he was still a dangerous
threat. Any attempts to dislodge him from his position were going to be tricky, and decisions
regarding the next steps were under debate in the Roman Senate. Scipio, on the other hand,
envisioned a daring scheme to finally drive the Barquids out of Italy, an invasion of Africa.
It wouldn't be the first time the legions would march on Carthaginian territory.
Marcus Attilius Regulus led an ill-fated expedition during the First Punic War,
and Tiberius Sempronius Longus was actually on the way to invade North Africa in 218,
before returning to Italy to confront Hannibal. Scipio knew that Hannibal would almost certainly
leave Europe to protect Carthage, especially if the Carthaginian Senate felt pressured enough to
demand his return. But the venture would necessitate a great amount of resources and
manpower to pull off. However, Scipio also knew that victory was not going to be achieved by
merely driving Hannibal out of Italy, but by crushing the Punic city and demanding its
submission to Roman authority outright. One of Scipio's fiercest opponents was none
other than Fabius Maximus himself. Fabius was ultimately concerned for the sake of Italy,
as he felt that such a large invasion would deprive the peninsula of the manpower required
to defend it against a possible Carthaginian attack. It is also possible that this rivalry
stemmed from jealousy on the elder statement's part, as Plutarch suggests. A staunch conservative,
Scipio's ambition and unabashed willingness to fluff up his own image left a bad taste in the
delayer's mouth. His position overseeing Spain was already unprecedented, but Roman custom was
defied once again when he was elected to the position of consul in 205 at the tender age of 30,
when the position was normally only available to those 42 years and older.
Despite being renowned as one of the greatest Romans within living memory,
Fabius feared that if Scipio won the war through an aggressive military operation,
he would be considered an abject coward for advising a cautious strategy against Hannibal's
army. This excessive concern for his personal honor seems out of character, but Fabius was said
to have become increasingly morose and emotional in his final years, a likely consequence of the
recent death of his beloved son and the stress of overseeing the security of Italy for the better
part of two decades. One of the critics supporting the denouncement of Scipio was Cato, a novice homo
who greatly admired Fabius and attacked Scipio's excessive philhellenism and un-Roman style of
leadership. This man would in time be better known as the cantankerous Cato the Elder,
and one of the fiercest advocates for Carthage's eventual destruction. Yet Fabius and Cato were
outnumbered by those in favor of the African invasion. Scipio was granted the consulship
and the right to lead an army into Africa. A stipulation was required that Scipio provide
the necessary funds and manpower out of his own pocket for the expedition. Money was in no short
supply, with the booty collected in Spain and generous donations from excited Italian towns
providing ample food and equipment. Raising troops was not going to be a problem either.
His own experienced force, hardened by their campaigns in Spain, would be more than the
match for any of Hannibal's veterans or African troops scrounged up to defend their city.
His reputation for victories also attracted many volunteers, looking either to take their revenge
or to enrich themselves with Carthaginian treasure. Nearly 30,000 Roman soldiers took part,
and were stationed in Sicily awaiting their commander's arrival. But Scipio could also count
on allies to assist in his expedition. Enter Massinissa, a prince of the Massilii tribe of
Numidia. Massinissa and his father, King Galla, were aligned with Carthage for much of the Second
Punic War, and fought bravely against the Romans. Considered by Livy and Polybius to be one of the
greatest men of his age, the prince spent almost a decade in Spain warring against the Scipiones
until the Battle of Ellipa in 206. For his loyalty, he was promised the hand of the beautiful
Carthaginian noblewoman, Safonisba, a love match that inspired dozens of plays and works
of art over the millennia for its tragic nature. As is fitting, numerous factors would end up
driving a wedge between Massinissa and the Carthaginians. For starters, Galla would die in
roughly 207-206, but his kingdom would be passed to Oesalkes, who in turn would die only a few
months later. Before he could return to Numidia to be coronated, a Massilian nobleman named Mazaitolos
killed Oesalkes' eldest son, and declared himself the guardian of a surviving prince,
seizing the throne in all but name. Massinissa led an army back to Numidia,
and successfully reclaimed his throne from the pretender, but this move was not entirely
appreciated in Carthage. Mazaitolos was married to Hannibal's niece, and the Carthaginians had
no interest in involving themselves in the civil war as long as they were given the troops and
Aside from that, the Punic leadership had been looking towards other prospects
to prepare for the inevitable Roman invasion, namely the Numidian king Syphax. He was the
wealthy ruler of the rival Massasulian tribe, initially recruited by the Romans to engage in
a proxy war against both Carthage and the Massilians, and the Senate even sent military
advisors to instruct Syphax's army. With the tide turning against them, the elders of Carthage opted
to secure his loyalty by any means possible. Scipio made a personal visit to the king to try
and convince him to renew his friendship with Rome instead, jeopardizing his own safely by traveling
alone, which indicates how important of a role the Numidians played in the conflict.
While Syphax initially promised Scipio his continued loyalty, the Carthaginians sweetened
the deal by offering Sophonisba to him instead. A loyal daughter and a Carthaginian patriot,
she used her charm and intelligence to woo Syphax into moving in favor of her homeland,
and so he ended up defecting to the Punic side. They directed the Massasulian king to attack the
vulnerable Massilians, crushing Massinissa in a battle that left him with only a handful of troops.
With such injuries inflicted against his person, Massinissa rightly felt abandoned by the
Carthaginians, and so he turned instead to his former adversary. After meeting each other in
Gades during the end of Scipio's campaigns in Spain, Massinissa pledged his friendship to both
Scipio and the Roman Republic, one which he would loyally maintain for nearly sixty years.
In the spring of 204, a fleet of forty quinquerims and over four hundred transfer vessels
sailed from the city of Lilibaeum to the shores of Carthage, landing near the city of Udica at
Cape Farina in modern Tunisia. To the horror of his superstitious comrades, Scipio himself is said
to have stumbled and fell upon the beach as he disembarked from his ship, only to gleefully
save face by proclaiming that he had struck a hard blow against Africa. The Romans and Massinissa's
cavalrymen immediately set about plundering the African countryside and destroying the
Carthaginian tribe to stymie their progress while Scipio prepared to besiege Udica.
A sort of impasse quickly formed throughout the rest of the year as the Romans were struggling
to make headway against Udica while the Carthaginians were unable to keep them from
ravaging the lands around them. The winter of 204-203 saw an ongoing negotiation between Scipio
and Hasdrubal Gizgo, but arbitrated by King Syphax, who pushed for a treaty that would see
the exit of foreign parties from their respective lands. Scipio appeared to entertain the notion,
but in reality was only intending to buy time. Roman soldiers disguised as slaves moved around
the Carthaginian camp, gathering information about its layout and the number of men inside of it.
One evening, the Numidians and Carthaginians awoke from their slumber after the smell of ash and smoke
filled their huts, along with panicked screams and shouts. Scipio used his reconnaissance to
launch a night attack, sending his loyal officer Gaius Lilius and Masinissa to devastate Syphax's
camp as his own army torched Hasdrubal's. Thousands were killed, and Syphax and Hasdrubal barely
managed to escape with their lives. Though the Roman and Greek authors may have bent backwards
trying to whitewash Scipio's willingness to use treachery under the auspices of a truce,
the consul was utterly ruthless in his determination to win the war. Meanwhile,
Hasdrubal and Syphax regrouped after summoning more troops, leading a combined army of 30,000
to a location known as the Great Plains. The Romans soon set out to meet them, and the combined
leadership of Scipio and Masinissa utterly crushed the Carthaginian-Numidian force, scattering what
appeared to be Carthage's last hope. Syphax had been driven abroad to his capital city of Kirta
in modern Algeria, and Scipio felt confident enough to entrust Masinissa and Gaius Lilius
with enough soldiers to restore the exiled Numidian to his throne. Kirta's inhabitants
quickly surrendered, and Syphax was taken by the Romans in chains. Though Masinissa gained back his
kingdom, the reunion with his beloved Safanisba ended in tragedy, as she opted to commit suicide
rather than be taken prisoner by the Romans. Nevertheless, the entirety of Numidia now
belonged in Masinissa's hands, and Scipio was free to march against Carthage unmolested.
Following the Battle of the Great Plains and the surrender of Syphax,
the people of Carthage were in a state of fright and horror. After a failed counterattack against
the besiegers of Utica, and with the Roman army only a few miles from their walls, a group of
Carthaginian ambassadors made their way to the camp of Scipio under the banner of truce. Terms
were offered, and though the Punic envoys appeared to nod and agree to the demands being presented to
them, their true motive was to send messengers across the sea and bring Hannibal Barca back to
Africa. Proposals demanding Hannibal's return were thrown around by the members of the council
following Scipio's night attack, but the defeat at the Great Plains was the impetus to move forward
with it, as the elders could not entertain the idea of their greatest general remaining on
Italian soil while their mother city fell to Scipio's army. These negotiations with Scipio
were likely just a ruse so that they could delay the impending siege before the Barca commander
came to their rescue. The order to return home was not taken too kindly by Hannibal,
who was said to have been in a state fluctuating between fury and sorrow. Truthfully, he was at his
lowest point, as he was now cornered in Brutium, both his brothers having been killed trying to
reinforce him. But to Hannibal, history had repeated itself, and he bemoaned the fact that
he ended up sharing the same fate as his father, Hamilcar, both of them being hamstrung by a
weak-willed aristocracy that caved at the slightest bit of pressure, while giving little support to
its generals who were on the front lines. As per Livy, the general cried out against his fate
by proclaiming, quote, Those men who were long trying to drag me back here by blockading the
shipment of reinforcements and cash are no longer using devious means to recall me, but doing it
openly. So Hannibal has not been defeated by the Roman people, who have been so often
slaughtered or routed, but by the Carthaginian senate with its carping jealousy.
After 16 years of fighting in the peninsula, Hannibal would depart from the shores of Italy
back home to Carthage at the close of summer, evacuating with whatever was left of his army.
He landed some distance away from Carthage near the town of Hadrumentum,
but his arrival was enough to give the Carthaginians a cause for celebration,
and they defied the terms of the treaty by attacking the Roman ships and the ambassadors
inside of the city. Scipio, somewhat hypocritically, was infuriated at the betrayal of the truce,
and set about a campaign of fire and sword to ravage the countryside and enslave any he came
across. Near the modern Siliana governorate in Tunisia, the Roman and Carthaginian armies would
meet at the plains of Zama for a final confrontation in the autumn of 202. According to our sources,
Hannibal possessed a larger army than that of Scipio, though the exact numbers are not really
given or are wildly out of portion, but we can assume that the Roman army had around 20,000
troops, and the number of Carthaginian soldiers was roughly 30,000. In contrast to Hannibal's
engagements earlier, the Romans now held the upper hand in terms of cavalry thanks to Massinissa and
his 4,000 Numidian riders, aided by the flat plains that surrounded the area. Perhaps Hannibal
could counteract them with his own cavalry force of 2,000 horsemen and 80 war elephants, but by
this point the Romans were accustomed to their presence, and the disciplined veterans could
handle them if they came in contact with the beasts. These experienced soldiers were far
better trained than those of Hannibal, as most of his original veteran force had been gradually
lost due to attrition, replaced by less seasoned recruits. They would have to do.
On the night prior to the battle, a private meeting was held between both commanders,
who conversed about the nature of generalship and the fickleness of fortune, which allowed Hannibal
to bring Rome to its knees for much of his adulthood, only to leave him as an old man,
struggling to defend his country against his hated enemy. After a tense, if polite, conversation,
both men returned to their camps and prepared for the trial that lay before them.
At dawn, the two armies deployed for battle. The Romans were arrayed in their usual triplex
acius formation, with the Hastati, Principes, and spear-wielding Triarii lined up behind one another.
They differed in their spacing though, and the columns of troops were arranged with noticeable
gaps between them. Massinissa and his Numidians would be stationed on the right wing, while
Lilius would command the Italian cavalry on the left. Hannibal would follow a similar principle
as the Romans in keeping his seasoned troops behind the main body of infantry, with his newer recruits
such as the Ligurians and Celtiberians in the front, the African troops in the middle, and
Hannibal's veterans in the back. On the left would be the remaining allied Numidian horsemen,
and the right would be the Carthaginian cavalry, with the infantry being screened by the elephants.
These elephants would actually kick off the battle, prompted by their fear of the trumpets
and war cries of the men stationed behind them. As they thundered forwards, the columns of Roman
troops quickly formed up into wide lanes, allowing the elephants to pass through them without harm.
The Velites and other skirmishing units then set upon the elephants with javelins like a swarm of
angry bees, driving the pachyderms out of the infantry lines so they could be destroyed without
risking the safety of the legionaries. During this tumult, Lilius and Massinissa charged the
Carthaginian cavalry, overwhelming them with their superior numbers and chasing them off the battlefield.
With the elephants and horsemen out of the way, the Hastati loudly beat their swords to their
shields out of excitement and threw themselves at the opposing front line to the cheers of their
comrades. The Gallic warriors and Romans savagely thrashed one another, but the experience of
Scipio's men was enabling them to push the Carthaginian army back step by step. The front
ranks of Hannibal's army began to retreat, but either killed or were killed by their own men
in their attempts to escape through the back. Hannibal's African troops remained steadfast in
their phalanx, despite the blood and gore of the bodies that filled the space between them and the
enemy line. A trumpet soon sounded from the Romans, recalling the Hastati caught up in the pursuit of
the fleeing Gauls so they could return to their positions and resume formation. The leveled spears
did little to dissuade the resolve, and the Carthaginian soldiers were no more disturbed by
the volleys of javelins and hacking of swords. The battle continued to reap a bloody toll on both
sides, but the rumbling of thousands of hooves drawing ever closer to the rear of Hannibal's army
signaled the end of the battle, as Lilius and Massinissa led their cavalrymen into a vigorous
charge that utterly broke the Carthaginian's resolve. So concluded the Battle of Zama,
the Romans suffering a total of 1,500 casualties while Carthage lost nearly 20,000 in the fighting,
and around the same number were captured. Hannibal himself fled back to his ancestral
estates in Hadrumentum before delivering the bad news to Carthage in person. Scipio quickly
dispatched his own embassy to the city, concerned that another consular elected official would try
to have him replaced and steal the glory of ending the war. The following terms of the treaty were
presented to the elders of the city. Carthage was to be disarmed, giving up their entire naval
fleet and war elephants, barring ten triremes. Along with their reduced military capabilities,
they were also not allowed to declare war against any power within or outside of Africa
without being first given the Senate's approval. All prisoners of war and Roman deserters must be
returned, and 100 males of the Carthaginian elite would be handpicked by Scipio to remain
as hostages in Rome. With regards to monetary compensation, 200 talents of silver per year
were to be paid to Rome over the next 50 years, amounting to 10,000 talents in total,
or about ten times the amount paid after the end of the First Punic War. In return, Carthage was
allowed to keep its cities and territories in Africa that were held prior to the war,
though King Massinissa's claims were to be protected. Polybius himself considered this
to be a fair punishment for the aggressors in a war that had caused as much devastation as it did.
Perhaps Rome had learned its lesson from the Treaty of Lutatius and its dealings.
This does not mean that it was positively received by the Carthaginian Senate or its
citizenry who protested the terms and considered the possibility of refusing it outright.
Ironically, one of the fiercest proponents of agreeing to the terms of the treaty was none
other than Hannibal himself, who was enraged to find out that members of the council were
dragging their feet on the matter. He violently grabbed the most vocal of these speakers and
yanked him off the council floor, at first excusing himself on account of his military manners,
before urging his fellows to think rationally and to salvage what they can lest the Romans
decide to destroy the city and enslave its people. With little in the way of options,
the elders agreed to Scipio's terms, and following its ratification by the Roman Senate,
the Second Punic War had finally been brought to an end.
Upon hearing the news of the treaty, the joy and adulation in Rome was beyond description.
Scipio, now given the cognomen Africanus to celebrate his victories, held the largest
triumph in Roman history up to that point, presenting over 120,000 pounds of silver in
his parade. Arguably the most powerful and widely respected man in the Republic,
he and his descendants would continue to dominate the political life of Rome for most of the second
century, playing key roles in the expansion of its borders or finding themselves embroiled
in controversy. Fabius Maximus, the shield of Rome, never lived to see the ultimate triumph
over Carthage, for he had died the year before, in 203. Despite the bitterness and hatred of Scipio
that gripped him in his final years, it is said that every Roman citizen contributed money to
his funeral out of reverence for his role in the defense of Italy. Cato too earned a reputation
for bravery and loyal service, and would become a major player in Roman politics as a stalwart
conservative and moralist. A decade and a half of warfare had exacted a terrible toll on much of
Italy, particularly in the southern regions. Appian claims that Hannibal's army had destroyed
upwards of 400 settlements and killed over 300,000 Italians. These numbers may seem quite high,
but not so much when we consider that Trasimene, Trebia, and Cannae left a body count of about
100,000 dead on the battlefield alone. Never mind the additional casualties of those killed
in another decade of fighting, the ravaging of the countryside year after year had repeatedly
interrupted the work of the farmers. Starvation was felt throughout the entirety of the peninsula,
and diseases would be exacerbated by the resulting malnutrition. Sicily, a great supplier of Italian
grain since the First Punic War, was thrown into a state of great upheaval from 215 onwards,
and it appears that the Senate had to go so far as to buy massive amounts of grain from Egypt to try
and battle the famines. One of Hannibal's main strategies was to undermine the ties between the
Romans and the Sacchii, but despite the defection of some high-profile settlements, most remained
loyal, even under the threat of attack by the Carthaginians. It was still a tense atmosphere
after Hannibal's army absconded to Africa and the peninsula was reunited, but rather than
undermining the newly-mended relationship or seeking retribution, the Senate decided to grant
amnesty to all parties, except for the Brutians, who were among the first to revolt and the last
to submit. Though they did not experience any fighting on their territory until the very final
years of the war, the Carthaginians found themselves in a very troubled position.
Their military had been effectively neutered, they had lost whatever was left of their overseas
empire, and were now unable to expand any further. Reparations to Rome were going to
have to be paid off, even if they were trying to rebuild what had been destroyed by Scipio's
marauding army. Yet, they would be guided through this time of peace by the steady hand of Hannibal
Barca. While he had failed to fulfill his life's mission to break the power of Rome, Hannibal
pushed away his depression by becoming passionately involved in the politics of the city for the next
few years, pushing reforms on taxes and corruption that helped stabilize the Carthaginian economy
and assist in the payments to the Republic. Understandably, the Romans were rather
suspicious of his intentions and behavior, exacerbated by anti-Barca factions in both Rome
and Carthage that would accuse Hannibal of attempting to seize power. Perhaps looking
for any excuse that they could, the Roman Senate issued a formal investigation into Hannibal's
actions in 196, demanding his surrender so that he could be taken in for questioning.
Barca was not stupid, and he knew that his time in the city was up. A ship was prepared,
and in the cover of night, he sailed away from Carthage, never to return. Initially,
he went to Tyre, but eventually made his way to the court of the Seleucid ruler Antiochus III,
where he remained for much of his later career. Rome was now the uncontested master of the
central and western Mediterranean, establishing its first territories in Iberia and having fought
on multiple fronts simultaneously. This pushed the Roman perspective beyond being Italo-centric,
as it began to be pulled into situations further abroad. For his loyal service to the Republic,
King Massinissa earned the friendship of Rome, his position secure as the ruler of all Numidia
until the end of his days. Scipio had provided him several gifts as befitting his role
and oversaw his coronation, and while this may be symbolic of Rome's approval of his kingship,
it was to Massinissa's benefit. The Senate would consistently show favoritism to Numidia to the
detriment of the Carthaginians, which would precipitate the outbreak of the Third Punic War.
Anti-monarchical history aside, this pattern of sponsoring the coronation of kings for political
gain would become a common fixture of Roman foreign policy, one that they gradually became
more comfortable with as time went on. Though the Carthaginians were once again
placed under the yoke, the fighting was not yet over for the Roman Republic.
King Philip V of Macedonia had earned the ire of the Senate, for he chose to ally with Hannibal
in the wake of Trasimene and Cannae to take advantage of the distracted Romans,
since he was concerned about the encroachment of this wayward Italian power across the Adriatic.
The end of the First Macedonian War was inconclusive, but Rome attracted the attention
of some of the factions of the Hellenistic world. Attalus I of Pergamon and the Aetolian League
had formed an alliance with Rome against Macedonia in 211, and several Greek states,
including Egypt, were mediators overseeing the peace talks between the Senate and Philip.
Antiochus III had now received one of the Republic's greatest enemies into his court,
the conquest of Syracuse, the largest and wealthiest Greek city west of the Aegean,
showed how the Romans were not only eager to seize its treasures, but also much of the works of art.
With tens of thousands of battle-hardened legionaries and highly experienced commanders,
Rome possessed one of the most formidable fighting forces in the world. Fresh off the heels of their
victories in the West, they would now turn their full attention to the Greek East,
kickstarting a chain of events that would see them transform from a major European power
into the heads of a Mediterranean-wide empire.
With that, we can finally bring our look at the Second Punic War to a close.
But before you go, I have quite a few announcements to make, so please strap yourselves in.
Firstly, I am pleased to announce that I've been invited to be a guest speaker at the
Intelligent Speech Conference for 2022, the trailer for which you likely heard earlier
in this episode. I, along with several other history podcasters will be presenting a topic
of choice to talk about, with the event taking place online via Zoom on June 25th, starting at
9.45am EST and will continue throughout the rest of the day. The title of my talk is going to be
Across the Indus, Encounters between the Greek and Indian Worlds, 323-30 BC. If you are interested,
please do check out the link in the episode notes and the podcast description under the header
Intelligent Speech, and for those buying a ticket, you can use the code H-A-G-E to get yourself a
discount. It will be great fun, and I do hope you'll be able to join for a wide array of
fascinating talks. Secondly, let us talk about the upcoming show schedule.
With the Second Punic War done, we will move on to our next topic,
the Fourth Syrian War and the Early Career of Antiochus III.
This will cover three episodes, which hopefully will be done by early June.
Long awaited by you listeners, we will finally begin our series on the Hellenistic Far East,
the story of Greco-Bactria and the Indo-Greeks. I have already made the itinerary available on
my social media accounts, but suffice it to say that it will comprise 12 episodes in total,
with six regular episodes and six interviews, one released almost every week throughout the
rest of the summer. Despite my difficulties over the last several months to adhere to a solid
schedule, I already have four of these episodes ready to publish, and the rest just need to be
recorded. I have put a tremendous amount of time and energy into those scripts, which are double
the length of an average episode, and I am very proud with how they have turned out. We will be
there soon, so please, only a little bit longer. Thirdly, I want to let you know that I have once
again expanded the collection of show bookmark designs, this time one based upon Hellenistic
Egypt, with a portrait of Cleopatra VII emblazoned upon it. It is available on my store page on Etsy,
along with my other designs, links to which can be found in my show notes or on my website.
This also kinda leans into my last announcement. I've never entertained the idea of a fundraising
goal before, but during this upcoming September, I will be finally making a trip to Europe for the
first time, more specifically Rome and Naples. Because of this, I am offering a bit of a
fundraiser to help offset some of the costs to visit these archaeological sites and museums.
For every $100 raised between now and the end of August, I will release smaller bonus episodes
based upon topics that I otherwise would not normally cover. For instance, the history of
Rosetta Stone, the imperial iconography of the Seleucid Anchor, reviews or roundtables on media
like movies or games based upon the Hellenistic and ancient world, interviews, and more. I'm also
open to suggestions, and please do note that these episodes will not be locked behind a paywall,
but will be community-driven and freely made available for all. Funds can be contributed by
either purchasing my bookmarks or donating via Ko-Fi, and I will be posting status updates
intermittently to give an indication of how much has been donated.
Now, that is the last of my status updates. I hope you all enjoyed this series, and in the
meanwhile, thank you all so much, and you've been listening to The Hellenistic Age Podcast.
