How to Win a Civil War in Ancient Rome

Welcome to this instructional manual on how to win the loyalty of your troops during a civil war in ancient Rome. I will focus my attention on the tumultuous final years of the Republic in the 1st century BC and in the early empire going into the 1st century AD. Here is a literal blueprint of the Roman army during our period. There are 10 cohorts of 6 centuries. The centuries of the 1st cohort were double strength. There were 4 units of 40 cavalrymen. Commanding a legion like this would have been a small officer corps and the legate, the target audience for this instructional manual. A real legion would not have looked like this however. Detachments called vexillations were posted on other duties. Units were not at full strength due to injury, desertion or death and there would have usually been accompanying auxiliary troops. In the earlier middle republic, troops were conscripted from landowning Roman citizens for specific campaigns as per Rome's treaties. Rome's allies would have provided troops to fight alongside these Roman citizens. Any remunerations through pay and booty barely covered the losses they incurred by being away from their property for years on end. By 100 BC however, citizens who did not have any property were recruited into the Roman army and served continuously for multiple campaigns. After the social war, the previous distinction between allies and the Romans was no longer nominal, it was non-existent. To the rural proletariat that made up the lion share of To the rural proletariat that now made up the lion share of the Roman army, any pay and booty was a suitable reward for service. Men could make a real career in the army and Rome began to sleepwalk into having a full-time professional army. This is the context, but how did a commander win the loyalty of these troops to not fight external enemies of Rome, but their fellow Romans? Money doesn't stink. By far the easiest way to gain and maintain the loyalty of your soldiers is to make them rich, or at least relatively so. As Salus noted when referring to Marius' fresh recruits in 107 BC, everything that pays seems honourable to men who had nothing. I don't want to paint the picture that all soldiers were now rural paupers. Landed men still served the state, but the armies levied by the Dynasts of the late Republic drew increasingly from the demographic that had nothing in terms of wealth and political influence. Pay was steady, consistent and it was guaranteed. The state had paid troops from the early Republic, but this was always soldiers' secondary source of income from war. According to Tacitus, legionary pay was about 225 denarii per year. Money was deducted for food, clothing and arms, so actual pay was much less. Pay was akin to that of a labourer in ancient Rome, but this was not the whole story. Soldiers received a bonus, a donative as it is known. Whenever their general or emperor felt that they needed to bribe him, after 13 BC, Augustus institutionalised a retirement package in the form of a large donative for veterans. The soldiers began to expect that their commanders and emperors would give them donatives on special occasions, such as when the Emperor Galba announced his heir to the German legions in 64 AD. He thought that telling them first was enough. If the German legions were one thing, it was spoiled. They wanted a naked bribe to accept Galba's heir. According to Tacitus, this spark started the fire of disconsent that ultimately led to Galba's murder. Booty taken in war eclipsed pay and donatives, but required conquest and engagement against wealthy foes. The commanders of the German legions did not have access to such enemies, so scanty pay had to suffice. It was not enough. One legate was flogged to death after a minor skirmish with the Germans over a small grain ship. Commanders of the late republic had it easier. Booty was won by commanders in war, but it is not clear whether commanders had authority to do with the booty as they pleased. Regardless, savvy generals always laden their troops with booty to ensure that they would continue fighting and fighting well. Caesar's legendary. His spoils were, quote, a fund open to all for the reward of valor. According to Plutarch, this is partially why Caesar's men were superior to their Roman counterparts. Swords into ploughshares. Cicero wrote that no profession is better than agriculture, and it seems that this love of farming and landowning was not necessarily restricted to the aristocracy. Land did not need to be allotted to soldiers of the early republic, since to be a soldier, they had to own a certain amount of land. When their property qualifications were gradually reduced and then dropped, land became a method of providing remuneration for veterans, of which there are countless examples. Another reason why a general might want to settle his veterans in colonies is to provide a pool for future recruitment. Pompey's settlements in the east provided recruits for his newly raised legions, as did the young Octavian when he raised his private army from the Caesarian settlements in When Octavian rebranded as Augustus, among many other things, he settled much of the old republican troops into Italian colonies, far removed from civil society. He couldn't afford violent and belligerent soldiers in the newly demilitarized center of his empire. Finally, land allotments were done away with altogether in 13 BC, when the retirement donative was introduced. It is therefore clear that the soldiers were not only after a plot of land, but hard cash. It is likely that most soldiers simply sold their plot of land after they were given it anyway. Following the Eagle In HB's Rome, Mark Antony has a hilarious line where he puts Caesar's mind at ease by saying that Lucius Farinus, who probably wasn't in the 13th legion by the way, won't leave the legion because, quote, he would follow the eagle up Pluto's ass. While obviously fictitious, this highlights how some soldiers were bound to their unit and commander through personality and morality. This was exploited. Oaths were taken by individual soldiers from the early republic. They swore to obey their commander, to follow him wherever he leads, and to accept the punishment for desertion or disobedience. Augustus, the shrewd propagandist that he was, made the western empire take a personal oath to him before the battle of Actium. This laid the groundwork for the imperial cult that was to develop. Tacitus noted how the imperial portrait was kept in legionary camp's temple, to which the soldiers would recite their personal oath to the emperor every single year. It is questionable whether an oath would prevent soldiers of the early principate from rebelling, especially bearing in mind the troublesome and greedy Germanic legions. The usual punishments against desertion do not apply in civil war. Commanders couldn't chastise their troops for leaving an enemy's camp and joining their own, as did happen. Rather, it was encouraged and the formerly enemy soldiers integrated well. Anyway, the side that the troops deserted to usually won the war. Fortune favours the bold. In war, victory breeds victory. Winning one battle gave the victorious army a psychological edge. Caesar, before his defeat in Greece, had an aura of invincibility, managing to capture Rome and Italy with a single legion. Luck was not an uncontrollable variable that could determine battles for the Romans. It was a quotable thing. Sulla, for example, gathered a reputation for being incredibly lucky, and his troops knew it. When he crossed from Greece to Italy in 83 BC, the soldiers of consular armies sent to stop him deserted to his camp. His men knew that luck was on their side. To command the loyalty of the troops, a general needs to be charismatic. To show the difference this made, I will compare two commanders. In the middle of Caesar's civil war in 47 BC, some of Caesar's soldiers demanded to be discharged and given the money and land that they were promised. To their shock, Caesar quietly gave them all that they asked for, but he addressed them as citizens, not soldiers. This took them back. They begged Caesar to serve him once again. Here, Caesar's charisma turned a mutinous unit into one grovelling to serve him, but that was the mighty Caesar. One of the least charismatic generals of all time, Hordonius Flaccus, was governor of Upper Germany in 64 AD. Tacitus describes him as having no strength of character and no authority, not fit for the unruly German legions. He failed to quell even murmurs of troops, almost leading to a full-scale rebellion. On one occasion, the mere memory of this spineless governor enraged one legion into flogging its commander to death. This is the same unfortunate commander from earlier. As I've discussed, there are myriad ways to win and maintain the loyalty of your troops in a civil war. The most effective are to give them money and land. It seems that every man does indeed have his price. You can inspire your troops with charisma, court them with your luck, and impress them with your victories. But if you don't line their pockets, they will never follow you.