The Birth of the Roman Empire

History of Race
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#Roman #Empire #Birthof #Augustus #Caesar"The causes for the decline and collapse of the Roman republic are as studied (and debated) as the causes for the eventual collapse of the Roman empire. But while looking at the reasons why the republic atrophied, we must not neglect the most obvious cause of its end - that Augustus seized power and instituted reforms that crippled the independence of republican institutions.
This history documentary explores the dynamic political world of the early principate and looks at how Augustus was able to succeed where Caesar had failed and radically transform Rome forever. "
In his masterful 1925 poem The Hollow Men, T.S. Eliot famously predicted that the world would
end not with a bang, but with a whimper. It is a haunting line that has provoked self-reflection
for nearly a century, but if taken literally, it's clear that these foreboding verses don't
apply to the end of the Roman Republic. For, ironically enough, the event that most modern
historians view as the formal end-date of the Republican era occurred in 27 BCE,
with Augustus' somewhat ironic announcement that he was turning power back over to the Senate
and reinstating the Republic. The Republic's death, then, coincided with its triumphant
rebirth, and its end would be intertwined with an event meant to show that it was an eternal ideal.
Today, this declaration of restoration looks like little more than the self-serving pronouncement
of a ten-pot dictator, so entrenched that he is capable of declaring that 2 plus 2 equals 5
without fear of pushback. But the reality is that Augustus' reinstatement of the Republic
was indicative of the relative weakness of his position, and a fear that he would end up like
Caesar, assassinated by nobles that were upset at how one man had ended the long-standing culture
of competition among the aristocracy and absorbed all the honors of the state. For in this still
early stage of his reign, Augustus was not quite as secure as many now believe, and he knew that
there was every possibility that his new regime could be snuffed out in the blink of an eye.
To avoid this, he would masterfully walk an incredibly thin tightrope between offering
the nobles just enough trappings of republicanism to keep them sated, while steadily strengthening
his own position as the undisputed head of the Roman state. To do so, he exploited pre-existing
political norms, such as aristocratic rivalry and republican institutions, to engineer a fundamentally
new political order, albeit one that was cloaked in the deceptive yet comforting veneer of traditional
restoration. Pulling this off should have been nearly impossible, but in his approach Augustus
would display sagacity, vision, and a talent for political maneuvering that even Caesar himself
lacked. Augustus's ostensible restoration of the republic after the decade plus of civil wars
following the death of Caesar in 44, unsurprisingly came with a few strings attached.
Augustus proudly declared that he would restore the elections that were central to republican
identity and Roman political thought, but in so doing he would defang the office of consul,
reducing the prestige and authority of this post so that it could never serve as an independent
center of power, capable of challenging his new position in the state. The actions that Augustus
took in the wake of Antony's defeat in 31 seem so clearly defined in retrospect as methods to
consolidate power and influence within his person, and then later his family, that we can overlook
just how nebulous and murky this process really was. Though the establishment of the principate
at this point represented a fundamental shift in the Roman political landscape,
Augustus did not accompany his new regime with the open dismantling of existing republican
institutions and practices. These would persevere in name and theory, though the language of the
republic would be adopted to suit the emerging regime. For in his public persona, Augustus was
nothing if not a traditionalist, and it would be under the cloak of a return to Rome's hallowed
tradition that he introduced a truly radical reshaping of Roman government. As moderns,
we institute a firm break at 27 to signal the birth of something entirely new, but the erosion
of the republic and dawn of the empire occurred in steady increments that would have disguised
the new status quo, and this continuity between the republic and the empire sheds light on how
Augustus's approach to consolidating power hinged greatly on maintaining a facade of republican
legitimacy. An analysis of his steady chipping away at the foundations of the republic could fill
an entire book, so in lieu of boring you all to death with the minutiae of politics in the early
prince of it, we will today look at how Augustus managed to curtail the independence of the consuls,
using this to gain insight into his approach for managing relationships with the Roman aristocracy,
as well as a window into his strategy for maintaining the Julian clan's strong history of
support among the very people who elected these magistrates. For whereas Sulla had assembled a
constituency built on the aristocracy and Caesar had always appealed to the people, Augustus
expertly managed to unite these constituencies and their remarkably disparate interests under
his leadership. Two classes that for a century had been at odds were now largely reconciled
under his personal aegis, with the implicit understanding that his absence at the head of
the state would likely result in another round of bloody civil wars. This broad coalition was
the key to his long rule and the subsequent strength of the Julio-Claudian dynasty,
even though no subsequent emperor would prove to be even a fraction as capable as Augustus.
The return of consular elections accompanied the proclaimed restoration of the republic,
and Augustus would easily win office during the first five years of this new system.
Augustus had been consul uninterrupted since 31, so that meant by the time he relinquished the
office after 23, he had served nine consecutive terms, five of them elected. This was highly
unconventional, but his election, as well as that of his co-consul beginning in 28,
actually appears to have been a legally free and open process. This meant that a spot at the apex
of Roman politics was open to aristocrats who wanted to fulfill their family legacy by winning
the top job. We can see here that he learned from Caesar's key mistake. The nobility thrived on
competition, honor, and dignity, meaning that winning high office was of paramount importance.
By opening up one consular slot, Augustus would allow them to compete for the high honors they
desired, but he would also maintain his position to keep the colleague in check. However, before
we progress further, it is important to clarify the nature of these elections. Yes, they were free
and fair in the strictly legal sense, but in reality, Augustus's position as the preeminent
citizen, to whom the bulk of Roman society felt personally indebted, meant that his election was
guaranteed, and also that his favored candidates would always win. The fact that his first colleague
in office after elections were restored was his right-hand man Agrippa, who had also served as
consul for the previous year, is confirmation of the broad popularity enjoyed by Augustus,
and the near universal support he enjoyed at every level of Roman society. The largesse he had
displayed in gifts to citizens, as well as the personal role he played in restoring peace to Rome,
meant that he had unparalleled influence over the voting public. His position also meant that in the
unlikely event that an outside candidate secured election, they would never advance an agenda that
he opposed, and that even if they did, he was invested with tribunician powers despite his
patrician lineage, giving him a veto on all proceedings. If you're enjoying this video,
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Thank you for all of your support. An understanding of Roman patronage makes it clear that at this
point, Augustus's position was not maintained through force like a modern military dictator.
His elevated status was simply a reflection of honors that the Roman people authentically felt
he deserved. It seems counterintuitive to us, as we are so accustomed to monarchs and despots
governing through forceful coercion, that it is hard to imagine the degree to which Augustus had
cowed the population into accepting his position. While the thought of one citizen elevated to such
a high degree had once been anathema, particularly to the aristocracy, a new consensus had been
reached among the elite and the broader populace alike that the guiding hand of a wise citizen was
needed to steer Rome clear of the chaos, instability, and civil war that had plagued it
in recent decades. True, this assent was likely eased by the fact that so many political opponents
had been eliminated in bloody purges and the wars which had snuffed out many of Rome's most
storied families. Also relevant is the fact that the new elite, which he had elevated,
owed their position to this new regime. But that does not change the fact that Augustus was now
governing with the general consent of all sections of Roman society. But if force had proved necessary,
Augustus was still the only man capable of marshalling the legions to back his claims.
Regardless of his legal position within the state, the overwhelming bulk of the Roman army
was personally loyal to him and would follow his directives in the event that a political opponent
ever challenged him. This loyalty had been earned through military success and lavish gifts that
Augustus bestowed as the commanding officer. For Augustus understood that in this new era,
the only constituency of any importance was the army. Senators may scheme behind his back,
but they were impotent politically, and their only way of striking would be a conspiracy
akin to the Ides of March. The army was now the only societal power center where open revolt
could occur, and Augustus would always prioritize this relationship above all others. It is impossible
not to interpret his decision to reinstate the republic in 27th as anything other than a
declaration of confidence in the unflinching loyalty of the legions. In order to ensure that
the army remained loyal, Augustus had obtained a unique position from the senate. He was granted
pro-consular imperium, meaning that he held sway over consular provinces, which were typically
those on the borders of the empire that contained the greatest military presence. The senate would
in turn oversee the praetorian provinces located within the empire's borders, meaning that roughly
half the empire was apportioned to them, but critically, no areas that housed legions beyond
what was required to keep the peace in the stable interior. Additionally, the critical province of
Egypt was declared the personal fiefdom of Augustus, despite the fact that it was not located
at the borders of the empire. Augustus knew that the wealth of Egypt, as well as its importance
in supplying food to Rome, meant that it was the linchpin of his new regime. As such, it would be
governed by an equestrian in his stead, and senators were forbidden to even visit without
permission. To further sever the bonds between the senate and the actual levers of power,
Augustus would pass a law that prohibited former consuls from governing their provinces until five
years after their term ended, when previously they had typically gone out to serve as governor
the year after their consulship. This kept political power diffuse and made it more difficult
for a man to build clientship networks as consul by promising immediate returns during his
governorship. It was an extremely deft political move because Augustus had severed the consulship
from the actual base of power while allowing it to remain as an instrument of social authority
and distinction. Over the course of his reign, he would take no actions that directly impinged upon
consular authority, but would instead limit his action to tangential aspects of the magistracy
so that he could continue to maintain that it was still an important office in his reconstituted
republic. Augustus allowed the forms of politics to remain, but not their function. Elections were
now simply political theater, and the fierce competition that defined the republic was
sanctioned only because it no longer had the ability to deliver meaningful power to its
participants. But though the lion's share of the blame for this new arrangement must fall on
Augustus, the aristocrats who continued to give the new order legitimacy by actively participating
in elections, despite the lower stakes, cannot be absolved. The consulship retained its appeal
because of its critical role in assigning auctoritas to men who had held the post. Though
the elite may have resigned themselves to the uncomfortable reality that Augustus was the most
prominent man in Rome, there was still fierce competition to achieve the highest possible
distinction under the current order. The consulship had always served this function in Rome's intensely
hierarchical society, and Augustus allowed it to persist so that aristocrats would spend more time
competing with each other for the second rung on the ladder than wondering why the princeps
should permanently occupy the first. He neutralized the only potential figures around
which the army could rally by placating them with cheap honors, while he exercised true dominance
over the state. While nothing I've said here is historically objectionable, there is a common
belief that Augustus's actions in ending the republic were justified because he brought stability
and Rome would prosper during the imperial era. While this is true to an extent, I believe the
claims of stability are overblown, as the imperial era was still beset by civil wars.
Indeed, these conflicts would later be driven by the unique mechanics of the imperial system,
such as Augustus's inability to codify succession, and they were a chief cause for the collapse that
ended the empire in the west. But in addition to pushing back on this false notion of peace,
it is important to recognize that our understanding of these events and the necessity we are prone to
see in Augustus's actions are both shaped by the fact that our histories conform to the official
Augustan propaganda line. For Augustus was an adept propagandist, and the fact that his version
of events is now accepted uncritically as objective history is indicative of just how skilled he was
at shaping public perception and the legacy this has left into the present. Augustus's radical
reframing of republican norms and ideas through a professed return to tradition in fact supported
his own position and undergirded the new regime. The dissonance reminds us that achieving an
accurate understanding of political forces requires us to read the pronouncements of the
powerful with skepticism, a statement that is just as true of the reis gestae as it is of modern
political platforms and campaign ads. Propaganda has always existed and will exist for as long as
the powerful find it necessary to smooth over contradictions and tensions within the status quo
to support systems which are at odds with the common interest. One of the most effective ways
to ensure we don't fall for propaganda today is to recognize where it has been employed
successfully in the past to ensure that we do not become hollow men and that our voices,
when whispered together, are not quiet and meaningless.
