039: Agathocles of Syracuse - Tyrant & King

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Hi there.
You're listening to the Hellenistic Age Podcast, Episode 39, Agathocles of Syracuse, Tyrant
and King.
After almost 40 episodes of the Hellenistic Age Podcast, it's quite surprising that I
have yet to discuss the island of Sicily and the tyrants who dominated the Greek city of
Syracuse.
While I did make reference to the adventures of Pyrrhus of Epirus in his attempts to conquer
Sicily in between his campaigns against the Roman Republic, for the most part, we have
stuck largely to the events of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Though Hellenistic kings and queens have been the focus of our narrative, in Sicily, there
was the tradition of the tyrants, and during the early period of Hellenistic history, no
tyrant was more ambitious than Agathocles, known also as Agathocles of Syracuse, who
acted as tyrant and king of Sicily for almost 30 years as he would bow to the likes of Carthage
in an attempt to make himself the Alexander of the West.
In the first of many episodes focusing on the affairs of the Central and Western Mediterranean
during the Hellenistic period, I wish to give more background detail on the island of Sicily
and the Greeks of Syracuse, which would play an incredibly important role in the histories
of the Roman Republic and Carthage alike.
In order to better understand Agathocles' career, we need to better understand the geopolitical
situation that was Sicily in the 4th century BC.
Since the 8th century, the largest island in the Mediterranean at the very southernmost
point of the boot of Italy had been subject to considerable Greek colonization efforts,
attracted to the prodigious natural fertility of the land itself that would make it one
of the few breadbaskets of the Mediterranean world, along with Egypt and the Black Sea.
Its position made it a natural stopping point for trade routes from both Africa and Europe,
oftentimes acting as a stepping stone between the two continents.
The foremost Greek city was known as Syracuse, originally a Corinthian colony that soon became
the center of all maritime and economic activity thanks to its suitable location for defense
and trading, and it was easily among the wealthiest cities in the Greek-speaking world, second
only to classical Athens in terms of its population.
In lieu of democratic or oligarchic institutions, the predominant political structure of Syracuse
and the other Greek-Sicilian cities was centered around the tyrant.
This is a word that needs some clarification, as the modern English connotation for tyrant
is generally negative and reserved for despotic and cruel regimes headed by a single figure.
The Greek word tyrannos means rule of one, a system of government created by some sort
of strongman, usually a demagogue nobleman, someone with access to a large body of private
troops, or some combination in between.
These tyrants would capitalize on a failing government and overthrow it with either peaceful
measures or by force, with or without the consent of the city's citizens.
But for the most part, these tyrants were a response to the conflict between the classes,
generally between the entrenched aristocracy and the up-and-coming wealthy.
Tyrants like Kypsilus of Corinth and Peisistratus of Athens were respected for their moderation
of rule and expansion of political enfranchisement, but others such as Apollodorus of Concentria
were reviled for their despotism, selfishness, and cruelty, so it's understandable why there
would be such a confusion as to the meaning of tyranny.
In the 7th and 6th centuries, tyrants became increasingly prevalent throughout the Greek-speaking
world as the rise of the upper-middle class and wealthy hoplite farmers led to such conflicts.
But in the case of Syracuse, tyrants became the entrenched form of government for numerous
reasons.
Firstly, like the dictator in the Roman Republic, handing the control of the government to one
person provides a great opportunity for political reform and a sense of direction during times
of crisis.
Second, Syracuse was always on the alert for military action, because the Greeks weren't
the only kids on the Sicilian bloc, so to speak.
There were also the native inhabitants of Sicily, chief among them referred to by the
Greeks as the Siculs or Siculoi, hence where this name Sicily is derived from.
The Siculs and the various other indigenous groups were largely assimilated into Magna
Graecia and the Greek colonies by the 4th century via conquest and cultural exchange.
The far more dangerous and greater rival would be the likes of the Phoenician city-state
of Carthage.
Since the 8th century, Carthaginian trading and colonial ventures would prosper on the
western portion of the island, understandable given that it's the part closest to North
Africa.
Though trade would be commonplace, competition would inevitably lead to conflict and outright
declarations of war between the Carthaginians and Greeks with explosive results.
In approximately 483 BC, Carthage would be brought into the struggle between the Ionian
and Doric-speaking Greeks, the latter becoming the dominant force in Sicily thanks to aggressive
colonization efforts by Corinth, and one of the Doric tyrants tried calling his Carthaginian
guest friends to intervene, though to no success.
At what would be called the Battle of Himera in 480, the Greek force led by the tyrant
of Syracuse, Gilan, utterly destroyed the Carthaginian army, coincidentally on the same
day as the Battle of Salamis between Athens and Persia, at least according to tradition.
The Carthaginians were kowtowed into paying huge indemnities and giving up significant
territorial claims, greatly enriching the coffers of Syracuse, who scored a huge propaganda
boost by pushing the narrative of a Carthaginian-Persian conspiracy to their fellow Greeks.
The defeat at Himera didn't entirely remove the Carthaginian presence from the island,
and over the next 70 years they recovered before the aggressive Magonid family dominated
Carthage's foreign policy, and continuous wars would be fought between the Greeks of
Syracuse and Carthaginians for the next 50 years.
At this point, I am just blazing through details of a lot of wars and events, so if you're
interested in the Greco-Punic wars, I recommend author Geoffrey Champion's two-volume work
on the tyrants of Syracuse, which I have used extensively in my research.
But the important point is that tyranny remained so attractive and ingrained in Greek Sicily
because of this ever-present threat of the Carthaginians and by other Greeks, whether
they were from Magna Graecia, aka Greater Greece in Sicily and Southern Italy, or from
the mainland, as was the case during the Athenian invasion of Sicily during the Peloponnesian
War.
This attraction to despotism was not universal, however.
Attempts to turn the tyranny into a monarchy did not prove to be totally successful, as
the dynasty of the tyrant Dionysius only spanned two generations, even with the successes against
the Carthaginians that bolted the power of Syracuse.
One nobleman in particular named Timoleon of Corinth was renowned as a stalwart defender
against the abuses of power during the middle of the 4th century, even going so far as to
kill his own brother who had set himself up as a despot in Corinth.
When the threat of Carthaginian invasion and the quasi-civil war between the Syracuseans
and the deposed tyrant Dionysius II had troubled Greek Sicily, Timoleon was the man who answered
the call when the Sicilian Greeks begged for aid from their mother city.
In 344 BC, with a hand-raised army of about 700 mercenaries, Timoleon managed to drive
up the Carthaginians, who believed that the instability of the region made it susceptible
for reconquest.
But Timoleon proved to be more competent than they were looking for, and for four years
the two powers went back and forth before the Greeks managed to smash the Carthaginian
army to great effect, and the treaty signed in 338 effectively bisected the island into
western and eastern portions, the former belonging to the Carthaginians and the latter
belonging to the Greeks.
For the moment, Timoleon's domination of Sicilian politics had altogether eliminated
the autocracy of the tyrants in the vast majority of the cities.
While scholars would be tempted to say Timoleon reintroduced a strict democracy back into
Syracuse, it probably would be more accurate to say that the political enfranchisement
of the Sicilian Greeks had expanded under a more tempered oligarchy with democratic
elements and a brand new constitution.
This new enfranchisement and the offer of citizenship to new Greek immigrants attracted
tens of thousands of settlers, providing a measure of peace and revitalization of the
Sicilian economy that would allow for the flourishing of Syracuse and its peoples.
Timoleon would die a hero in roughly 336-335 BC, but lingering problems still remained.
The decades of non-stop Greco-Punic warfare had essentially amounted to what Professor
Richard Miles refers to as a bloody status quo.
Neither the Carthaginians nor the Greeks were able to decisively push one or the other out
of Sicily, and the leading powers of both sides and the mercenaries who flocked from
across the Mediterranean were enriched by the plunder and counter-plundering of the
wealthy cities.
In addition, serious social stratification between the rich and poor remained a major
issue, despite Timoleon's attempts to provide greater enfranchisement, and though the tyrants
were seemingly out of the picture, this very stratification could provide an excellent
opportunity for any power-hungry official to re-establish another tyranny.
It just so happens that while Alexander the Great was out conquering the Persian Empire
and died the most heroic figure in the Greek world, in Sicily, a young man had been nursing
his ambition to not only take over Sicily, but to create his own Mediterranean kingdom.
Hello everyone, my name is Daniel Healy, and I'm the host of the Mare Nostrum podcast.
In the Mare Nostrum podcast, we are following the history of Ancient Rome, from its very
humble mythical origins, to its dominance of the entire Mediterranean Sea and beyond,
right through to the collapse of the Western Empire.
If you'd like to join us on this journey, you can find us on a number of platforms,
including iTunes and Spotify.
Of course, I'd be delighted if you joined us on our journey.
And with that said, I'll now hand you over to Derek for your regular episode of the Hellenistic
Age podcast.
The sources on Agathocles of Syracuse vary dramatically in their interpretation.
Our best account comes from Diodorus' Library of History, which chronicled both Agathocles'
life and Sicilian history as a whole, probably because Diodorus was a native of Sicily, hence
his full name, Diodorus Siculus, or Diodorus of Sicily.
Diodorus' account was based upon memoirs and histories penned by Agathocles' contemporaries,
and most of them were positively inclined, unsurprising considering that one of the writers
was Agathocles' brother.
In contrast, Diodorus also relied on one particularly negative writer named Timaeus, a disgruntled
Syracusan historian who was notorious for his smear campaigns of anyone he didn't particularly
care for, and allegedly sought to ruin Agathocles' reputation due to the man exiling him from
the city.
Deciphering through some of the blatant propaganda of the pro-Agathoclean writers and the smearing
of Timaeus makes it challenging to piece together the man's early origins, but there is a general
account we can follow.
According to both, Agathocles was born in the year 361 in the city of Thermae in northern
Sicily, a son of a potter named Carcinus, and an unknown woman of either Carthaginian
or native Sicilian descent.
Carcinus was an exile of Regium, having moved to Thermae in the middle of the no-man's land
that frequently passed back and forth between Greek and Carthaginian hands.
According to Diodorus, Carcinus was uneasy about his wife's pregnancy, and later abandoned
the newly born Agathocles to die after a prophecy foretold of the terrible consequences that
his son's career would have on the whole of Sicily.
Secretly rescued by his mother and placed in the care of a maternal uncle, Agathocles
grew up as the handsomest, bravest, and strongest of all the youths in the area, compelling
Carcinus to learn of his son's survival and reclaim him as his own.
This whole story is very stereotypical, as prophecies leading to abandoned children who
grew up poor while still oozing noble characteristics is part and parcel of many historical recountings,
such as Herodotus' tale of Cyrus the Great and Livy's story of Romulus and Remus.
Much of Agathocles' youth would be spent in Thermae apparently learning the pottery trade,
but more than likely what was meant was his father owned some sort of pottery production
facility because, as many authors point out, the family's increased wealth would explain
much of Agathocles' easy mobility among the upper classes and his smooth entrance into
Syracusian politics that would not otherwise be available to a simple pot maker.
The mere potter explanation was most likely a propaganda tool used to illustrate how successful
Agathocles was, as later in life, he allegedly would like to show off to young men by placing
a clay goblet next to a golden one, claiming that while he used to make the former, through
his personal valor and hard work, he now created the latter.
By the age of 18, the family moved to Syracuse due to Timoleon's victory over the Carthaginians
and the generous offer of citizenship to all that apply.
Though Carcinus would soon pass away, Agathocles would begin to make his way up the social
ladder by attracting the amorous attentions of one Thomas, a nobleman who began to lavish
Agathocles with gifts and money.
Based on Diodorus' account, Agathocles was engaged in a sexual relationship between an
older man and a youth that was not uncommon in the Greek world, but the epitome of just
inclines that he was no better than a prostitute, eager and willing to become the sugar baby
of any willing nobleman who so much as feigned interest.
Once Thomas died, Agathocles would marry his former lover's widow, thus inheriting the
wealth that Thomas left behind, and he soon became among the wealthiest men in all of Syracuse.
While we lack much in the way of information regarding his early career, Agathocles was
proving that he was a talented military officer and commander, notorious for his strength
and the huge weight of his armor while he served as a footman in the armies of Timoleon,
and for his services, he was promoted to the rank of Chiliarch at the head of a thousand
men by Thomas during a campaign against the city of Akragas, modern Aggregentum.
Clearly he had an aptitude for command and a good degree of charisma, but it wasn't
a straight shot from exile to tyrant.
Complications had emerged after Timoleon's death in the mid-330s, as the systems he had
set up turned from a pseudo-democracy to a hardline oligarchy known as the 600, a body
of 600 noblemen who dominated Syracusan and Sicilian politics in general, commanded by
the unscrupulous pair known as Sestratus and Heraclitus.
Agathocles may have been involved with the 600, either as a full-fledged member or a
supporter, but the relationship between he and Sestratus in particular would be completely
severed when a cry for help arrived from the Greek city of Croton in southern Italy.
Under pressure from the Italian Brutii tribe, the people of Croton sought military assistance
and so an expedition was sent with Agathocles in tow.
Sestratus and Heraclitus were given command in addition to a junior position to Agathocles'
brother, Antandrus.
Despite his bravery and success leading against the barbarians, his pride was severely wounded
by the fact he was never given the position of a general that he believed he deserved,
and in Agathocles' eyes, Sestratus was the main culprit behind it.
This bitter resentment would lead Agathocles to switch his allegiance to the democratic
movement in Syracuse, openly accusing Sestratus of attempting to overthrow the constitution
of Timoleon.
Whether born out of spite or not, the accusation would prove to be true and cost Agathocles'
dearly.
In a typical display of Syracusan politics, Sestratus managed to drive Agathocles into
self-exile to Italy while they proceeded to formally exile his friends and companions
on dubious charges while butchering those who remained, thus setting up the 600 as the
masters of Syracuse.
At perhaps the lowest point of his life, in roughly 330-329, Agathocles remained on the
Italian mainland, biding his time to return to Sicily and reap his revenge.
In the meanwhile, he had to content himself by mingling among the democratic crowds among
the cities of Magna Graecia, serving as a mercenary commander or attempting to overthrow
the tyrannies of a number of Italian cities.
At one point, he abandoned an army to thwart another of Sestratus' military ventures,
though Justin claims that he was merely acting as a brigand or a pirate and raided his own
countrymen.
But his aid in the defeat of Sestratus had resulted in the destabilization of the political
authority of the 600, and by 322, these oligarchs were driven out of Syracuse, the democratic
party once again managing to take power.
Agathocles' reputation as a firebrand democrat, both at home and abroad, had convinced the
citizens to recall him from exile, though some would suggest that his championing of
democracy was merely a facade hiding demagoguery.
At the moment, such concerns needed to be laid to rest, as the 600 had allied themselves
with the Carthaginians to kickstart Syracuse into a full-scale civil war.
Agathocles would serve valiantly as both a common soldier and a commander, at one point
nearly dying from several wounds he received while rescuing about 700 soldiers in a boxed
attack on the city of Gila, but during most of the war, we don't have any indication
that he was granted a high-ranking command position like a general.
Syracuse was struggling to hold it together, as the extreme democrats whom Agathocles had
associated himself with were demanding legislature that would call for the redistribution of
land to the common people, which naturally infuriated any remaining wealthy Syracuseans
who allied with the democrats.
Like with Timoleon, Syracuse called for a backup arbitrator from Corinth, a man known
as Acasterides, who immediately seemed not to get along with Agathocles.
Getting along might be an understatement, as Acasterides launched a full-blown investigation
under the belief that Agathocles had attempted a coup, going so far as to torture his closest
associates in order to extract a confession, and only their steadfast loyalty prevented
Agathocles from being put to the sword.
We know very little about this alleged coup, but based upon his later behavior, it would
not be surprising if Agathocles was involved in some sort of plot with the extreme democrats,
but nothing is certain.
Still, he was exiled from Syracuse once again on Acasterides' orders, as to facilitate
a peace accord between the oligarchs and the moderate democrats, and, according to Diodorus,
in order to make sure that there were no loose ends left behind when he returned to Corinth,
Acasterides attempted to have Agathocles assassinated on the road, and would have succeeded had
not Agathocles been cunning enough to dress up his slave who bore an unfortunate resemblance
to him in order to take the hit.
Either revealing his true colors, or deciding that he might as well become what people already
accused him being, Agathocles sought to take power in Syracuse by force.
His natural charisma and past success as a mercenary commander had attracted a band of
followers to some degree, but Agathocles opened the court of the native Sicilians, who had
long felt oppressed by both the Greeks and the Carthaginians, and sought greater enfranchisement
themselves by joining his armies.
His stay at Morgantia in central Sicily allowed him to build up his power base, capturing
the city of Leontini, and eventually even attacking Syracuse outright.
The Carthaginians immediately sent a relief force headed by their commander, Hamilcar,
to deal with the threat to the oligarchs in the city.
But in the display of political and diplomatic genius, Agathocles reputedly opened secret
negotiations with Hamilcar, and according to Justin, the Carthaginian commander would
allow Agathocles to continue his trek to take the city unmolested, and even offered
5,000 additional African mercenaries to assist him.
While it seems mystifying how, coming from a weaker position, Agathocles could manage
to get such extremely generous terms, it is clear that Agathocles was aware of the disunity
of Carthage's military forces and its home government, a topic which will be discussed
on our upcoming episode on Carthage itself.
Part of the deal was that, in return for support in Syracuse, Agathocles would aid Hamilcar
should he decide to enact his own takeover in Carthage, or any of the other Carthaginian-controlled
cities.
Whether Agathocles would have upheld his end of the bargain or not is unknown, as Hamilcar
would die only a few years later, but given Agathocles' later willingness to renege
on his promises, it's highly doubtful.
My sources are conflicted on the exact timeline of events, some claiming that this negotiation
took place later, while some dismisses an outright fabrication of Justin's, but for
the sake of the narrative, we're just going to assume that it took place here.
Agathocles' entrance into the city in 319 was agreed to on the grounds that he would
make a sacred vow to uphold a democracy, and not attempt to install himself into power.
And make a vow he did, but for some reason, Agathocles was granted the independent position
as a general over the areas he had previously conquered, technically legalizing his conquests
and giving him personal command of over 3,000 extremely loyal soldiers, comprised of both
the native Sicilians and the poor who hated the 600.
As expected, clashes between Agathocles and the oligarchs would emerge, as he would openly
court the disenfranchised classes and cover his tracks by associating with the moderate
democrats.
But by 316, Agathocles banded together his forces, under the presumption that they were
going to deal with rebel forces in the nearby city.
Assembling his forces in front of the gymnasium, the leaders of the 600 were invited along
with 40 of their followers so they could discuss the plans of the expedition.
Instead of directing against enemies abroad, Agathocles made his move against his enemies
at home.
In front of his troops, Agathocles accused the 600 of plotting against his life for his
championing of their liberty, driving the onlookers into a heated frenzy, whereupon
they seized the present oligarchs and demanded justice for their crimes.
Ordering their immediate execution, Agathocles unleashed his soldiers upon the remaining
supporters of the oligarchs throughout the city.
For two days, Syracuse was thrown into chaos as the 600 were slaughtered in their homes,
their supporters either brutalized or killed outright, and even their families were shown
no mercy, as daughters and wives were raped and young children dashed against walls, an
event that would leave 4,000 dead and another 6,000 fleeing for their lives.
The savagery of the violence between fellow citizens was likely a culmination of different
reasons, such as the retaliation for the perceived and real oppression of the poor
by the wealthy, or pure greed and bloodlust, and Diodorus comments so eloquently about
the horror of it all.
For men who by day in the streets and throughout the marketplace were bold to butcher those
who had done no harm, need no writer to set forth what they did at night, when by themselves
in the homes, and how they conducted themselves towards orphaned maidens, and toward women
who were bereft of any to defend them, and had fallen to the absolute power of their
direst enemies.
While unmistakably a cruel act, Agathocles had merely demonstrated that he was not above
the systematic purging of political enemies that had so often occurred in Syracusan politics,
and what he himself had been subjected to as a young man during his first exile from
the city.
But by the dawn of the third day, Agathocles recalled his men, and ordered the meeting
of the General Assembly.
In front of them he defended his actions, claiming he had purged the city of those who
sought to destroy the civil liberties of the citizens, and, as a gesture of goodwill, a
move that would become staple of many a dictator, Agathocles unclasped his military cloak and
put on the garb of the common man, claiming he would excuse himself from power.
This played in the hands of those who had themselves been part of the purges, and they
begged him to reconsider and restore order to the now disheveled city.
While initially refusing the offer to hold on to power, he reluctantly agreed, on the
condition that he alone would be in control, so as to not be held accountable for the misdeeds
of fellow administrators or assembly members.
A blatant lie, but one that was immediately swallowed up, and Agathocles would be given
the position of strategos autocrator, a general with supreme power, which his propagandists
like to describe as protector of the peace.
Whether he operated with so blatant a title, or by putting a veil over his position, it
didn't really matter.
Agathocles would now be the uncontested master of Syracuse, marking the beginning of a reign
lasting nearly three decades.
For now, he may have been content with being a tyrant, but, with the threat of Carthage
ever present, Agathocles may have seen the opportunity to move from tyrant to king, and
what is a king without a kingdom, whether in Sicily or abroad in Africa.
Among the first acts of Agathocles as a tyrant was to fulfill his end of the bargain to appease
his supporters.
Taking the now vacant, if bloody, properties of the former oligarchs, he distributed them
among the peoples while also abolishing their debts.
One wonders how those debts would have been claimed anyways, since most of the debtors
might have been killed, but no matter.
The brutality of the purges was attempered by the mildness of his immediate reign, and
the distribution of land was one of the many methods to which Agathocles had masterfully
used to engender himself with the people, thus further securing his rule.
Polybius notes the transformation of Agathocles from a cruel usurper to a mild and gentle
disposition.
His tyranny was remarkably unusual in how he presented himself as merely one of the
common man.
He didn't live lavishly and indulge himself in fineries like silks or gold, and he actually
dispensed with the personal bodyguards that so often rankled Greek citizenry.
His efforts beyond the radical reforms also extended to reinvigorating the economy of
Syracuse by careful observation of the public treasury, but also the expanded production
of arms, armor, and the Syracusan fleet.
Of course, Agathocles' mildness did not necessarily extend to his foreign policy,
and the increased military production was also indicative of a desire to expand his
domination across all of Sicily, but the need to also deal with the remaining threats to
his rule, i.e. the surviving oligarchs and the Carthaginians.
One of his first conflicts erupted between Syracuse and Messini in the northeastern part
of Sicily.
In 315, the Messinians requested that the return of a fort that had previously been
taken by Agathocles, who demanded thirty talents of silver as repayment.
The Messinians did just that, and in return, Agathocles had them surrounded and killed,
one of his many acts as an oathbreaker.
Messini itself was put under siege, since it is very likely that they were hosting many
of the refugee oligarchs, but held out on two separate occasions.
In the meanwhile, Agathocles' camp was visited by Carthaginian envoys, who declared outright
that should he violate any of the treaties laid out by Acasterides, he would have their
full undivided attention, indicative of just how concerned the Carthaginians were of the
tyrant's actions.
Reluctantly, he departed, though he apparently busied himself with the purging of pro-oligarchic
factions in the allied city.
The attacks on Messini had pushed the exiled oligarchs to build an alliance between the
cities of Acragas, Messini, and Gila, and managed to convince an unpopular Spartan prince
named Acrotatus to serve as a general, as had Timoleon before him.
Unfortunately, Acrotatus was no Xanthippus, and instead was one of the many Spartans who
would succumb to their vices once outside of Laconia, and refused to engage with Agathocles.
The Spartan prince even did Agathocles a favor by killing his long-time rival Sostratus,
who was at the head of the oligarchic alliance.
Feeling helpless without Sostratus, the cities turned their fury on Acrotatus and drove him
from Sicily in a hail of stones, while deciding to submit to Agathocles in hope for a bloodless
end to the war.
The resultant treaty, brokered by the Carthaginians, effectively made Agathocles and Syracuse the
official head of the Greek cities east of the modern Platani river, effectively two-thirds
of the entire island.
But anything beyond that would be left to the Carthaginians.
Well, a treaty has never stopped Agathocles, and between 314 and 311 he proceeded to conquer
the still hostile Mycenae and purge Gela of his political enemies in another bloodbath.
Between that, cries for help from any remaining oligarchs, and Agathocles' previously underhanded
dealings with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian government decided to beef up their efforts against the
Syracusan threat by sending a military expedition to the island under Hamilcar, son of Gizgo.
Near the modern city of Lakata, Hamilcar seized the position of one of the local hills and
hunkered down, while Agathocles, concerned about the threat of the Carthaginians on
both his territory and the morale and loyalty of allied cities, who might feel inclined
to desert, decided to push for an attack.
Hamilcar's forces numbered somewhere around 40,000, comprised of various African and Greek
mercenaries, whereas Agathocles' army was smaller, at around 30,000, separated from
each other by a large river known as the Himera, that served as a site for many a battle between
the Greeks and Carthaginians.
Neither side would commit to crossing the river in earnest, though raiding parties certainly
took their chances, and in one instance, Agathocles set up an ambush.
Initially succeeding, he was overeager in pursuing the fleeing Carthaginians, and pushed
forward with his entire army, locked in a bloody struggle for control of one of the
Carthaginian fortifications.
Faced with defeat, Hamilcar took the initiative and sent an entire division of slingers from
the Balearic Islands to thrash the unaware Greeks.
In the hail of stones and the resulting broken bones and smashed teeth, Agathocles' army
began to panic, and when a ship of Libyan reinforcements showed up out of the blue,
they panicked and retreated nearly five miles, giving the Carthaginians the day and leaving
over 7,000 dead Syracusans in their wake.
In his defeat, Agathocles holed up in the city of Gila, while Hamilcar decided to avoid
a protected siege by working his way into the heart of Greek territory, taking a number
of cities by sword and submission, before Agathocles finally gave up and returned back
to Syracuse in 310, licking his wounds, with the Carthaginians outright besieging the city
with a naval blockade.
Clearly the Carthaginians were not going to let up on Agathocles, at least not while he
was still in Sicily.
Hamilcar was an experienced commander, and his mercenaries were experienced fighters,
but Agathocles realized that to win, he was going to have to leave the island and unleash
a daring campaign against Africa and strike at the city of Carthage itself, the first
time any European army would step in the region.
The Carthaginian peoples were not required to serve in the army except during times of
crisis, and even then, they would be woefully unprepared and unexperienced.
Agathocles could achieve success by conquering Carthage outright and taking enough plunder
and captives to pay for his war from the wealthy territories of North Africa, or, barring that,
it could force the Carthaginian assembly to withdraw Hamilcar from Syracuse and ease the
pressure on the Greek cities.
For such an ambitious operation, Agathocles was going to need funds and troops, doubly
difficult after the disaster at the Himera, and thankfully for him, he was already an
experienced man at squeezing blood from a stone.
First, he collected the funds by executing political rivals and assuming their estates,
along with the lifting of treasure from religious temples and forced loans from unlucky merchants.
Using this wealth, he provided the means to pay for a large army of mercenaries from all
over the Greek world, Etruscans, Celts, Italians, Greeks, and even freed slaves, enough for
about 13,500 men, along with his two sons, Archagathus and Heraclitus.
On the home front, he put his brother Antander and a mercenary captain named Ariminian in
charge, and to ensure the loyalty of the Syracusans, about 3,500 of the forces were taken from
the citizens to act as both soldiers and as hostages, lest anyone get any funny ideas
about capitulating to Hamilcar.
All of this was done in secret, and on August 14th of 310 BC, Agathocles' fleet of 60
vessels broke through the Carthaginian blockade.
We narrowed it down to such a specific date because the day afterwards, an eclipse occurred
which terrified the Greek sailors, believing the eclipse to be a portent of doom.
Naturally, like any good commander, Agathocles was able to rationalize it by claiming it
would have only been a bad omen if it occurred on the day they departed, and so it was actually
in their favor because it meant doom for the Carthaginians.
In about six days, the fleet reached the coast of ancient Libya, narrowly skirting a Carthaginian
vessel that was minutes from boarding their ships.
Having landed somewhere in Cape Bon in northeastern Tunisia, the distance between Agathocles and
Carthage was something around 110 kilometers or 70 miles, but on hand he only had with
them 50 talents, roughly two weeks worth of pay for an army his size.
Agathocles' plan was banking on the desperation of the soldiers to push forward and live off
the plundered Carthaginian settlements for supplies and booty, and while 13,000 men was
nothing to balk at, they were going to need extra troops to deal with Carthage's armies
and from attrition.
The native peoples that were either allied with or dominated by the Carthaginians, those
such as the Libyans and Numidians, could potentially be taken into Agathocles' service and bolster
his own army.
So, like Alexander the Great at the Dardanelles, Agathocles torched the boats he came across
in, symbolically dedicating them to the goddess Demeter and Cor as an offering, while also
pragmatically forcing his men to either fight or die.
There would be no retreat.
Bolstered by necessity and through the promise of treasure, the Syracusan army pushed through
and pillaged a number of wealthy cities, including that of Tunis, which was only 20 kilometers
away from Carthage.
The Carthaginian citizens were absolutely petrified, unaccustomed to being threatened
on such a scale, and believing that the presence of the Greeks meant that Hamilcar and his
army were dead.
Summoning a vast army of conscripts, mercenaries, and allies, roughly 35,000 in number, the
Carthaginian forces were led by two figures named Hanno and Baumalkar, which wasn't
the wisest decision in hindsight since both were rivals in the Carthaginian assembly,
but nevertheless they sought to confront Agathocles near Tunis.
Despite outnumbering Agathocles over 2 to 1, they were untested, and the line was divided
where Baumalkar controlled the left wing, and Hanno on the right, with the Carthaginian
sacred band, the most experienced forces of their army.
To compensate for his lack of manpower, Agathocles made up for it in psychological warfare, secretly
releasing owls among his own army to give them the belief that Athene was on their side,
and to fool the Carthaginians, he took the rowers and sailors into his force, armed them
with sticks and shield covers to give the illusion of a larger force.
While his son Archagathus was given control of the right wing in the cavalry, Agathocles
needed to oversee the left wing and make sure they could break through the sacred band.
The battle began with the Carthaginian chariots being sent out, but like Alexander Gaugamela
and Xenophon Canaxa, chariots were old hat, and the disciplined phalanx simply opened
lanes to let them harmlessly pass by.
The Carthaginian cavalry met a similar fate, and the following attack by the infantry initially
had some promise, with the sacred band performing up to snuff, as expected.
Hanno appears to have become too overconfident and pushed himself too deeply in the Syracusan
line where he met his demise through a flurry of missile and spear wounds.
According to Diodorus, Bamacar had purposefully allowed the right wing to overextend itself
in order to facilitate Hanno's death and dominate the political scene back in Carthage,
and when word spread among the now terrified troops, Bamacar was satisfied and retreated
back to the city.
Agathocles' victory at the Battle of Tunis was a resounding success from both a military
and political perspective.
While the vast majority of Carthaginians managed to escape the battlefield, the fact that Carthage
was defeated so soundly on its home territory would send shockwaves among its allies and
vassal states, who would begin to turn on the normally dominant Phoenicians, and either
join Agathocles or independently raid and pillage Carthaginian holdings.
The Carthaginians, out of despair and the belief that their gods were angry with him,
ritualistically sacrificed 200 children in the hopes of salvation.
Agathocles himself was able to capitalize on the propagandistic value of his victories
and send a number of newly built ships to Syracuse to present the spoils and news of
his conquests in order to bolster the city's resolve against Hamilcar's attacks, while
forcing Hamilcar to send home about 5,000 troops as reinforcements.
However, Agathocles was not remotely finished.
After all, Carthage is one of the most fortified cities in the Mediterranean world, and it
was going to take a lot more than just one victory to dominate Africa, and he was going
to need more men.
Lots of them.
As the winter of 310 rolled into the spring of 309, the situation in Africa had not lent
itself to a final decisive outcome.
Agathocles did not make any progress on besieging the city of Carthage, due to its great fortifications
and control of the sea, and so he had determined that the best way to bring things to a conclusion
was to whittle away their allied support and ravage the countryside further, effectively
choking Carthage by its purse strings.
To limit his success, he managed to convince at least some Libyan tribes to join in his
efforts.
But when a successful Carthaginian counterattack retook some of the cities formerly captured
by Agathocles, one of the Libyan chiefs decided to swap sides, but was soon captured and killed
as the Carthaginians were once again pushed back into their city by Agathocles' counter-counterattack.
The pillaging aspect had certainly taken a toll on Carthage's ability to pay its troops,
and for several years, the gold value of their coinage would plummet, and lesser bronze and
silver coins would take their place, nearly bringing them to financial ruin.
But the pillaging did not seem to aid the financial arrears of the troops under Agathocles
either, and it is likely that he had been purposefully delaying payouts, possibly as
an effort to exert greater control over them.
Unfortunately, this ended up being a mistake, as a mutiny broke out midway through the year
309 at the city of Tunis, after his son, Archagathus, had killed a drunken officer for an insult,
and the soldiers used the unwillingness of Agathocles to punish his own flesh and blood
as an excuse to push their issues regarding back pay, leading them to take the city walls
in order to trap the tyrant inside.
As he had done nearly ten years prior, Agathocles managed to assert control of the situation
by pretending to give up his command as a tyrant, and offered himself for punishment,
though the sight of the humility of their general apparently managed to put their concerns
to rest at least for the time being.
Though dominance of the Carthaginian countryside had allowed Agathocles a degree of flexibility,
the lack of success in retaining native African allies did not bolster his army's numbers
that simple attrition would have taken a major toll on.
He was going to need more troops, and so, in 308, he relayed a message to the east,
in Cyrene, where a man named Ophelous, a former companion of Alexander the Great, had been
serving as a governor-in-name under his commander Ptolemy I of Egypt.
Agathocles managed to broker some sort of military alliance with Ophelous.
In return for 10,000 infantrymen and hundreds of cavalrymen, Agathocles looked to offer
the Macedonian all of his African conquests.
No doubt Ophelous was taking a page out of the old Diadohoi handbook, and he immediately
seized the opportunity to carve out a kingdom in his own name, with Carthage as the crown
jewel.
Once he had arrived, Agathocles fed and housed all of the new soldiers with great generosity,
then promptly seized the opportunity to accuse Ophelous of plotting against him, followed
by a summary execution of the would-be Macedonian king.
As backhanded as this was, it was very likely that Ophelous had his own aims in assisting
Agathocles, and very well could have done the same thing in return.
In any case, the 10,000 soldiers managed to be incredibly valuable to Agathocles' cause,
and Carthage itself, having just dealt with a vicious attempted coup by Bomulkar, who
was shortly thereafter crucified, was now plunged into even further despair.
In 307, the wealthy city Utica was besieged by Agathocles, and in a moment of macabre
creativity, the tyrant had tried to discourage a counterattack on his siege equipment by
tying captured Utican prisoners to the front facades of his siege towers to act as essentially
a human meat shield, forcing their companions to shoot anyways in a vain effort before their
city was taken.
With Utica fallen and a number of outside cities capitulating, Agathocles was nearly
uncontested in his control of Africa.
The same cannot be said for Sicily, however.
Since Agathocles had departed in August of 310, Syracuse had been under pressure from
Hamilcar's talented generalship and clever tactics.
Diodorus recounts how Hamilcar recovered the bronze prows from Agathocles' burned ships,
and tried to get the Greeks to capitulate by showing them as proof of the expedition's
failure, though Agathocles' victory ships after the Battle of Tunis nipped that plan
in the bud.
Tradition says that Agathocles' brother Antander, who was left in charge of the city,
was allegedly not of the same moral constitution as his sibling, and was willing to surrender,
though recently recovered papyrus fragments suggest that this reputation might be undeserved.
Still, Hamilcar was in control of a vast army, and thanks to his generous nature to prisoners
of war and civilians, he was receiving defectors day after day.
But in 309, Hamilcar had attempted an all-out assault on the city itself, under the impression
from an oracle that he would dine in Syracuse.
But the attack went horribly wrong, and the Greek defenders managed to get the jump on
the Carthaginian forces.
Hamilcar himself was captured and tortured to death by the citizens of Syracuse, who
then cut off his head and shipped it to Agathocles in Africa, who proudly and prominently displayed
it on a spike for all of the fellow Carthaginians to see.
But Agathocles' rule did not just earn the enmity of Carthage.
A Syracusan named Dinocrates was a supporter of the old oligarchy, and tried recruiting
followers to take advantage of the city's weakness.
Along with Dinocrates was the rival city of Acragas in the south, and under the generalship
of Xenodicus, they too tried asserting their dominance over Greek Sicily.
Though Acragas would quiet down after Xenodicus' defeat by a Syracusan army, the situation
was precarious enough to recall Agathocles from Africa in 307, who was comfortable enough
to leave Archagathus in charge after the victory over Utica.
Dinocrates was easily his greatest threat, gathering a vast army of over 20,000 under
the banner of freedom and liberty from the domination of Agathocles, which forced the
tyrant to withdraw, and build a number of alliances to compensate for his lack of manpower.
At the same time, his commanders managed to once again rout and defeat Xenodicus, forcing
Acragas to submit entirely, and Dinocrates seemed to have not pressed forward.
In order to make sure any funny business wasn't going on, Agathocles also had 500 political
opponents in Syracuse murdered after he invited them to speak their minds once he supplied
them with wine at a banquet designed to weed out any dissidents.
It was good that Agathocles had returned to Africa within the year, because although Archagathus
initially achieved some measure of success within the Midians, Carthage had taken time
to consolidate its forces before launching a campaign of divide and conquer.
Many Syracusan units and fortifications were systematically isolated and wiped out, and
the pressure began to build in the camps as money and supplies were rapidly diminishing
by the day as Agathocles stepped off the boat.
At the moment, he managed to restore some order, but he knew that his time was running
out and a decisive victory must be won.
So confronting the Carthaginians head-on at a numerical and topographical disadvantage,
the exhausted Syracusan army barely managed to hold it together before being pushed back
to their camps, losing 3,000 men in the process.
However, in one of those weird twists of fate, the Carthaginians had apparently decided to
sacrifice their prisoners by burning them alive as tribute to their gods.
As the captives were being led to the large funeral pyre, a gust of wind had scattered
the flames and embers among the tents and reed huts of their camp, torching the entire
area and causing a mass panic among the Carthaginians who burned to death as they tried to secure
their valuables.
This wasn't helped as a large group of deserting Libyans from Agathocles' side approached
the chaos, and the Carthaginians mistook them for a Greek army and caused a complete panic
and massacre among their own troops.
This was doubly odd, as the Greeks saw the orange glow of the now-destroyed Carthaginian
camp, along with a moving body of troops, who turned out to be the same Libyans who
were fleeing back from the Carthaginians, and under the impression that they were the
ones under attack, the army of Agathocles fled for their lives or were caught up in
a great struggle with the Libyans.
By the break of dawn, both sides had now completely spent themselves, no doubt bewildered at the
circumstances they found themselves in.
Even though nearly 5,000 Carthaginians were killed overnight, Agathocles was now totally
unable to continue his war abroad with such a dearth of troops, while Carthage was still
able to recover and would likely subject him to the same fate as the unlucky captives should
he even try to offer terms of surrender.
Ever the opportunist, Agathocles thought his best choice of exit would be to sneak away
in the cover of darkness without the knowledge of his own soldiers.
Diodorus and Justin differ on what exactly happens next, as Diodorus claims that in his
paranoia, Agathocles abandoned Archaganthus and Heraclitus under the pretense that they
plotted against him, but Justin claims that they were lost in the dark and were separated.
Based on the fact that we have little evidence suggesting any prior mistrust towards his
sons and that Agathocles even risked his own death by not punishing Archaganthus earlier,
I tend to lean towards the latter.
Regardless, both sons were murdered by the furious troops who settled their own peace
accords with the Carthaginians by either paying for their freedom, joining the Carthaginian
army to serve as mercenaries, or by crucifixion, should they hold out.
By Agathocles' return to Sicily in 306, the African campaign had achieved its initial
objectives in taking the pressure off Syracuse, though it ended ignominiously after Carthage
proved it was able to recover from their defeats.
Still, the campaign was an unprecedented feat, and a treaty would be made later that year
that would restore the status quo in Sicily, whereby the island would be effectively bisected
by the Halicus River, along with Agathocles receiving a few hundred towns worth of silver
and wheat as an incentive.
While the Carthaginians were no longer putting the pressure on the Syracusans, Agathocles
still would have to deal with the likes of Denocrates back home, and also to ease his
The remaining years of Agathocles' reign after the African campaign are rather poorly
documented compared to his earlier career, unfortunately due to the loss of Diodorus'
chronicles after the Battle of Ipsus in 301.
Upon his return from Africa, Agathocles immediately set forth to ensure that his defeats by the
Carthaginians were not going to be taken advantage of by rebels like Denocrates.
At the city of Segesta, he demanded money and soldiers to replace what was lost, and
when they refused, he put the city to the torch and committed horrific acts of brutality
which are honestly so graphic I don't think there's anything to be gained from repeating
them, but the end result was slavery and plunder taken on a mass scale.
When he learned of his son's deaths at the hands of the soldiers, the families of the
Syracusans who remained in Africa were put to death as punishment.
Such oppressive responses compelled one of his generals to go over to Denocrates' side,
an act that pushed the normally strong-willed Agathocles to even offer a negotiated surrender
of his status as a tyrant, though Denocrates refused outright to grant any sort of leniency
and it was unlikely that Agathocles was actually going to go through with it if it had been
accepted.
It also must be noted that Denocrates never had the intention of going through the effort
to restore democracy or an oligarchy in Syracuse, instead seeking to take the tyranny for himself
by conquering the city.
After finally making peace with Carthage, his full attention could be turned towards
dealing with Denocrates, and in 305, the two clashed at the Battle of Torgium.
Even though his army was numerically inferior, Agathocles' charisma and espionage allowed
him to whittle away at the morale of the rebel forces, and Denocrates was defeated once a
Shockingly, Agathocles was not only merciful, but he actually employed Denocrates in his
service, who would remain loyal until the tyrant's death many years afterwards.
Syracuse, and by extension Greek Sicily, was now under his control.
Compared to Agathocles' relative isolation during his rise to power and the invasion
of Africa, he had begun to involve himself heavily in the Hellenistic world.
It is certain that by 306 BC, Agathocles had now styled himself properly as a king, rather
than just a tyrant.
While he didn't wear a diadem, perhaps preferring a wreath due to his male pattern baldness,
he did wear the royal purple garments that would befit a king while in Africa, and his
soldiers regarded it specifically as a royal garb.
His contact with Ophelos in 308 was his first formal introduction to the Diadohoi, and no
doubt the influence of Antigonus Monophthalmos and the other successors of Alexander officially
declaring themselves as king in 306 compelled Agathocles to do the same.
His coinage is indicative of this change in ideology as well, the earliest specimens under
his rule merely reflecting his status as strategos autocrator, but later specimens demonstrate
the title of basileus, specifically designating him as a king.
Author Ephraim Zembone makes the argument that Agathocles' imagery on his coins, celebrating
his African campaigns, was specifically designed to pay homage to Alexander the Great, based
on the premise that Alexander's hostility to Carthage and the alleged last plans to
conquer North Africa made Agathocles a worthy successor as much as any of the Diadohoi.
Some authors don't necessarily agree with this interpretation, but there is also evidence
that the depiction of a youthful Agathocles with long locks of hair on the face of his
coinage is definitely Alexandrian in nature.
Whether his kingship should be classified as specifically Hellenistic, the likes that
could be seen with the Ptolemies, Seleucids, or the Antigonids, or as a natural progression
of the Sicilian tyrant has been debated for quite some time.
Perhaps it was a natural development of the tyranny that merely aped the imagery of the
other Hellenistic kings once he came into contact with them, so as to be on the same
level of influence.
Part of this development was likely spurred on when Agathocles had thrust himself into
the affairs of the Diadohoi, largely as a byproduct of his attempts to expand his power
into Southern Italy, which he had successfully done by defeating the Italian Brutians.
In the year 300, the people of the island Corsaira in the Adriatic Sea had contacted
the Gathocles to step into their conflict with the current king of Macedon, Cassander
I, and when he scattered the Macedonian fleet, he appears to have taken control of the island
for himself, considering it personal property that he could dispense as part of a dowry
for the marriage of his daughter Lanassa to King Pyrrhus of Epirus.
His insertion of himself into the web of marriage alliances of the Hellenistic dynasties certainly
gives the impression that he considered himself as just one of the guys.
While Ptolemy I gave him the hand of a step-daughter named Theoxena, Demetrius Polyarchetes appears
to have not given him much consideration, as when asked of his opinion of his fellow
kings, the taker of cities merely referred to Agathocles as Lord of the Isles.
But this opinion didn't necessarily stop him from allying with Agathocles and taking
Corsaira after Lanassa had left Pyrrhus sometime around 293 to marry him instead.
Despite the violence and near constant warfare, Syracuse was demonstrating that it could recover
and even prosper under Agathocles' rule.
Archaeological evidence demonstrates that the wealth of the city was bolstered in some
regards.
Agathocles himself constructed a number of temples and buildings that beautified it,
such as the Hall of the Sixty Couches, a luxurious dining center capable of hosting hundreds
of people, though it apparently was struck down by lightning due to its ostentatiousness.
But his vision of empire truly never left.
His projections into Greek Italy and the alliances with Demetrius and Ptolemy had been part of
his plan for another African conquest, but fate had other ideas in mind.
In the late 290s and early 280s, Agathocles began to suffer what is thought to be cancer
of the mouth, painfully rotting away his jaw and putting his health into serious jeopardy.
At the same time, attempts to ensure a dynastic succession by the promotion of one of his
sons, Agathocles the Younger, had ended in failure when Archagathus the Younger, Agathocles'
grandson by way of his son Archagathus, had murdered Agathocles Junior.
Knowing that civil war would tear apart his surviving family, he had sent Theoxena home
to Egypt with his infant sons, and instead of letting Archagathus Junior take the throne,
Agathocles decreed on his deathbed that democracy would be restored to the city, though, like
so many times in Sicilian history, another tyranny soon followed.
Then, in 289 BC, the tyrant turned King of Sicily died at the age of 72, after ruling
Syracuse for 28 years.
The career of Agathocles has led to polarizing opinions of the man between scholars of old
and new.
On the aftermath of his death, several of his statues and monuments were pulled down
by his former subjects, but many authors do not dispute the beauty and prosperity of Syracuse
at the time.
His assumption of kingship, the first Sicilian Greek to do so, would inspire later kings
and would-be rulers of Sicily, like Hero II and Pyrrhus of Epirus.
The man himself was capable of enlightened despotism that resulted in a golden age for
Syracuse after the war with Carthage, yet he was prone to acts of savagery and cruelty
to fuel his ambitions and desires, much to the shock of authors like Diodorus.
The 15th-16th century Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli was impressed by Agathocles's
political astuteness, but was also disturbed by his willingness to commit terrible atrocities
on his own people, and never fully considers him a quote-unquote excellent man as he has
only achieved power, but not glory.
Though the African campaigns of Agathocles did not result in the African empire he may
have hoped for, the legacy of such an ambitious operation would be felt for many decades afterwards.
While Carthage had certainly been defeated in Sicily many times before, never had any
Greek proven that Carthage could be beaten on her own soil, revealing a vulnerability
of the Phoenician empire that would be exploited by later invaders such as Marcus Attilius
Regulus in the First Punic War, and, more successfully, by Scipio Africanus in the Second.
According to Polybius, when asked about whom he believed were the greatest statesmen, Scipio
is said to have responded with Agathocles and Dionysius of Sicily, the men who inspired
him to victory over the likes of Carthage and Hannibal Barca.
So ends our discussion on Agathocles of Syracuse.
I hope you enjoyed this lengthy little episode, though I didn't necessarily plan it to be
that way.
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Next time we meet, we will be discussing the history and society of Carthage, the forgotten
Mediterranean empire.
So, until then, you've been listening to The Hellenistic Age Podcast.
