Bamako a été ciblée mardi par deux attaques revendiquées par les djihadistes du JNIM (groupe de soutien à l'islam et aux musulmans). Étaient visés une école de gendarmerie et une base militaire située à l’aéroport Modibo Keita. Comment les assaillants ont-ils pu pénétrer dans des sites militaires sécurisés ? Les assaillants ont-ils pu bénéficier de complicités au sein de l’armée malienne ? #mali#bamako#terroristes 🔔 Abonnez-vous à notre chaîne : https://rfi.my/YTfr 🔴 Suivez RFI en DIRECT vidéo ici : https://rfi.my/YTliveFR 🌍 L’actualité du monde et de l’Afrique en direct : https://www.rfi.fr/fr/ Rejoignez-nous sur Facebook : https://rfi.my/FBfr Suivez-nous sur X (Twitter) : https://rfi.my/Xfr Découvrez l’actu en images sur Instagram : https://rfi.my/IGfr Recevez les dernières infos sur Telegram : https://rfi.my/TGfr
Alseni, good morning.
Good morning to you, Mr Gomerzi, and good morning to the whole team of the National Police.
I would like to point out that you are in Monrovia, in Liberia.
The telephone line is not very good, and for good reason.
It is raining a lot right now in the capital of Liberia.
So we are going to listen to you.
You have questions after the two jihadist attacks that hit the Malian capital on Tuesday.
Yes, indeed.
How could such an attack have taken place on such a secured military base?
We suspect complicity within the Malian army.
Yes, I remind you that a gendarmerie school and a military base located at the international airport Modibo-Qaïda
were targeted by the jihadists.
Good morning, Wassim Nasr.
Good morning.
Journalist at France 24, specialist in jihadist movements.
The support group for Islam and Muslims linked to Al-Qaïda.
I understand the question of Al-Seni.
How could these attackers enter military sites that are supposed to be ultra-secured?
It was a surprise.
Because they were not expected in these places.
They were rather expected in the north of the capital, Al-Qaïda,
where they had already attacked in 2022.
So they were not expected in these places.
So the surprise effect worked.
Because they also attacked, as your audience says,
very hard targets, if we speak in military jargon,
because they were very secure targets.
So the gendarmerie school and the airport.
And precisely this military base, the military base 101,
which is located at the Bamako airport,
it is also said that in this base there are Russian suppliers of the Wagner group.
I don't know if you confirm this information.
In any case, it is said that it is one of the places with the most secure presidential palace in Bamako.
Absolutely.
There are suppliers of Wagner.
We saw them.
There are pictures of them in combat,
with jihadists killed in the airport.
So they were in combat.
The jihadists themselves said that they had confronted Wagner.
And again, it's the surprise effect.
No one expected the jihadists in these places,
knowing that the jihadists were a dozen.
We are not talking about dozens and dozens of jihadists.
Between 10 and 15 jihadists.
But the fact is that they were there, ready to die.
And so they did these huge damages,
whether at the gendarmerie school or at base 101.
So every time we are surprised.
The soldiers were surprised.
So it's the surprise effect that played,
knowing that the Armenian soldiers were expecting attacks in Bamako.
And there were often, quite periodically,
arrests on the outskirts of the capital, in the capital.
Not to mention that the jihadists in Jnim are not very far from the capital.
There were attacks this summer 40 km from the capital.
We will come back to this in a moment.
Wassim Nasr asks us this question, which seems so relevant to me.
Can we suspect complicity within the Malian army?
No, I don't think there was any complicity.
Because for this kind of attack, there is no need to have complicity.
These are attacks with teams, once again, ready to die,
in urban areas.
We had some in Paris.
So there is not necessarily complicity.
Obviously, the question arises because it is unexpected.
But no, they managed to enter the capital.
This is not new.
They have logistics in the capital that is prior to the coup d'état.
This is not new.
I remind you that they kidnapped a priest in November 2022 in the heart of Bamako.
They sent him north.
So the logistics of Al-Qaeda in the capital
is well rooted, even before the coup d'état.
So it was up to Al-Qaeda to make the decision
to activate this logistics to commit an attack or not.
There, they did it by choosing the date,
the day after the anniversary of Greece
and the day of the anniversary of the American gendarmerie.