Enhancing pilot skills in a dynamic environment - Communication
Sep 20, 2024
Welcome to the 2018-2019 AvSafety Seminar Series.
This seminar, we've entitled Enhancing Pilot Skills in a Dynamic Environment.
The reason why we've used the word dynamic is because when we go flying, things rarely
stay the same for very long.
Things are constantly changing and as a result, our human factors need to keep up with the
operation that we're undertaking.
So today in our presentation, the information that we're going to give you is applicable
to you no matter what you fly.
You could be flying an RPT turboprop, you could be flying an IFR twin, you could be
into sport aviation like gliding or parachuting.
It doesn't matter what you fly.
The human factors concepts that we're going to explore today are applicable all the way
across the board.
There's three things that we're going to look at in our presentation today.
The first is communication.
Why communication?
Well because the way we communicate when we're in the air has significant challenges, significant
challenges for us to overcome and the way we communicate in the air is often very different
to the way we communicate when we're on the ground just chatting to people face to face.
The second thing we're going to look at is situational awareness.
Now situational awareness by itself is a huge, huge area of study.
People go to university for many years and study all the ins and outs of situational
awareness.
First of all what it is and secondly to perhaps identify some of the red flags that you might
be able to recognise in your own flying that might be clues to the fact that you might
be losing situational awareness.
And the third thing that we're going to look at today is a concept called threat and error
management.
Threat and error management has been around in the aviation industry now for a couple
of decades and it's becoming more and more important in the way we go flying.
So let's have a look at communication.
As I said at the outset the way we communicate in the air is often significantly different
and has a host of different challenges to the way we normally communicate when we're
on the ground.
And ATSB research bears out the fact that communication is an important factor when
we go flying.
Non-towered aerodromes, which is the focus of our presentation today, they're a central
component of the Australian airspace system.
And when we go through the ATSB accident database they've identified issues to do with communication,
situational awareness and threat and error management as being contributing factors to
a whole host of different incidents and accidents in this realm.
The ATSB research also indicates that problems with communication and situational awareness
in particular do lead or do have the potential to lead to accidents.
Not only insufficient communication but also communication that is inaccurate or even too
much communication in the circuit area where the CTAF frequency gets certainly very busy
and that in itself presents us with challenges to maintain the safety of flight.
Let's perhaps start with a bit of a case study.
This case study was an incident that occurred at Port Macquarie Airport.
This incident occurred about 12 years ago back in 2007.
Port Macquarie of course is a regional aerodrome on the mid-north coast of New South Wales.
It's a reasonably busy airport, has a large flying school and it also has an RPT service
that comes up from Sydney.
There are two runways, a sealed runway and a small cross strip.
And as you can see from the photograph the suburbs of Port Macquarie are now starting
to encroach into the boundaries of this airport.
We have nothing against Port Macquarie but this example is a classic case of where breakdowns
in communication have the potential for serious safety implications.
So let's set the scene with regards to the four players or the four actors if you like
in our scenario.
Now we've identified these four aircraft in the vicinity of Port Macquarie Airport.
These aircraft aren't exactly where they might be depicted in the picture but they at least
give you a relative direction from the airport to help build our mental picture.
So let's start the process.
The first aircraft that we're going to look at is a Dash 8.
The Dash 8 as you know, as many people know, is a twin turboprop commuter aircraft.
This Dash 8 was doing a regular public transport flight.
It was coming inbound from the south from Sydney, inbound to Port Macquarie.
This Dash 8 was an IFR aircraft and it was inbound for runway 03 which is the sealed
runway there at Port Macquarie.
The second actor in our scenario is a Beechcraft Baron.
This aircraft was a twin engine machine often used for personal transport but in this instance
it was an IFR training exercise.
This aircraft was inbound from the southwest and they were performing a GNSS approach onto
runway 03.
The Baron and also the Dash 8, they were both IFR aircraft.
So the chances are that they knew of each other's existence, they would have been given
traffic on each other by Melbourne Centre and they certainly would have been chatting
to each other on the Port Macquarie CTAF frequency.
Let's have a look at the third aircraft in our scenario.
The third aircraft in our scenario was a Cessna 152.
They were also using runway 03 and they were departing to the north on a navigation exercise.
So now we come to the final actor in our scenario.
The final piece of the puzzle was an RAOZ Foxbat aircraft and they were taxiing for
circuits on runway 21.
Now that's the first perhaps little chink in the armour that we can see here.
We have three aircraft that have nominated and are using runway 03 but unfortunately
our fourth aircraft, for reasons which we'll discuss later in the presentation, has decided
to use runway 21.
So let's keep building the scenario and building that mental picture as we go.
The Cessna 152 broadcasts its departure call as it leaves runway 03 but unfortunately is
over transmitted by the Foxbat.
Over transmission, which essentially means that there are two radio calls in at once
from different stations, has a potential to be an instant breakdown in situational
awareness and presents enormous problems for communication.
Calls can't be understood, calls can't be deciphered or heard properly when there's
two stations over transmitting each other.
Instant loss of situational awareness.
Upon hearing this over transmission, the Dash 8 pilots, what they do is they jump on the
CTAF frequency and they ask for a repeat of both of these broadcasts from the pilots.
But in actual fact, it's only the Cessna 152 that repeats its broadcast.
There's no repeat broadcast from the Foxbat.
The Dash 8 is overflying for runway 03 but lo and behold sees the Foxbat actually rolling
for takeoff head to head on runway 21.
As you can see, this has enormous safety implications.
The first thing that the Dash 8 does is jump on the CTAF frequency and advise the Beechcraft
Baron that they are head to head with an aircraft taking off towards them.
The Baron, upon hearing this, does a very wise thing and exits stage left and conducts
a go around from short final.
It resolves this conflict by getting out of the immediate area.
But we still have the situation whereby we have a Dash 8 in the vicinity of the circuit
for 03 with unfortunately a Foxbat coming straight at them.
The scenario develops even further and we find that the Foxbat actually takes off on
runway 21.
As you can see, a very dangerous or the potential for an air proximity event is rapidly occurring.
So what the Dash 8 has to do is modify their circuit entry to maintain separation with
the Foxbat.
Please be aware that Dash 8 aircraft and larger turboprop aircraft, the larger aircraft and
faster aircraft, they usually give their first inbound call at about 30 miles from
the airport.
As they come down through about 10,000 feet, they're moving down the slope at about 4 miles
a minute.
So they'll be in the circuit area in about 7 minutes or so from about 30 miles.
The workload in the cockpit of the Dash 8 is usually quite high and the visibility outside
the cockpit is often quite poor.
So the last thing they want to be doing, if at all possible, is doing manoeuvring in the
circuit, which involves often significant angles of bank, changes of power, changes
of configuration.
So at the last minute, as you can see from our diagram, the Dash 8 has to modify its
circuit entry to maintain separation with the Foxbat.
But as you'll see from the next slide that I'm going to put up, things don't resolve
themselves immediately.
What happens is that further in the circuit, the Dash 8 has to do a go around when the
Foxbat cuts in front of that Dash 8 on short final.
This is not a good state of events.
Now this Dash 8 might have anywhere between 50 and 70 people on board and we're flying
around and overhead the suburbs of Port Macquarie.
Not a good state of affairs.
The go around actually by the Dash 8 when the Foxbat pilot was interviewed after this
event was in fact the very first time that that Foxbat pilot became aware that there
was any other aircraft in the circuit.
Now certainly we're not here to lay blame or to pass judgement on the Foxbat pilot because
here but for the grace of God go you and I.
We've all made mistakes in these types of environments.
But as you can see from the scenario that we've described, breakdowns in communication
can have serious ramifications in the air safety space.
So what happened then?
The Foxbat then made probably a good decision and actually departed the circuit to troubleshoot
what they thought was a radio problem.
This was a good decision by the Foxbat pilot because it got the Foxbat away from other
aircraft.
Many pilots have had to troubleshoot issues when they're in the air.
These issues might be problems with electrics, problems with the flap, engine problems.
Two pieces of advice that I often provide when I run this seminar to pilots if they
do have a problem when they're airborne, many of us have had this, is to perhaps think about
doing two things if we do have a problem in the air.
The first thing is to get away from other aircraft and the second thing is to get away
from the ground.
The last thing we want to be doing is trying to troubleshoot an issue with our aircraft
while we're mixing it in the circuit in close proximity to other aircraft.
So the Foxbat pilot went away from the airport, tried to troubleshoot their problem.
So what happened?
The pilot couldn't determine the problem with their radio while they were airborne, but
upon landing back again at Port Macquarie and shutting down, another pilot found that
the entire issue had a causal factor, which was basically that the pilot had neglected
to turn the volume up on their radio.
It's quite telling, isn't it, that something as small as forgetting to turn the volume
up can have potentially serious ramifications for aviation safety.
And it was only due to the fact that communication was hindered because volume wasn't turned
up.
Again, no one's immune to this.
I'm sure many of us have been flying where we've either had the volume turned up or we've
been on the wrong frequency.
But what this does show us is that if we have breakdown in communication or the ability
to communicate over the radio is somewhat hindered, the ramifications for safety further
down the track can potentially be massive.
The pilot was aware that Port Macquarie had what we call an aerodrome frequency response
unit or an AFRU.
Essentially, this is a small piece of kit that confirms to the pilot in command that
their radio is on the correct frequency.
If there's been no communication on that CTAF in the last five minutes, the pilot will hear
back in their headset an automatic voice, in this instance saying Port Macquarie CTAF.
It provides the pilot with confirmation that their radio is on the right frequency and
the volume is appropriate.
If there's been no transmission on the CTAF within the last five minutes, they'll just
get a short tone in their headset.
Now in discussions with the FOXPAT pilot subsequent to this event, it turned out that the FOXPAT
pilot, as they were taxiing, saw or noticed a helicopter depart about five minutes before.
So it could reasonably be concluded that the FOXPAT pilot came to the decision that that
helicopter was the only other aircraft that they had to worry about.
Of course, that doesn't preclude pilots from looking out and using alerted see and avoid,
but we'll discuss some of that later.
The FOXPAT pilot's intention, therefore, was to gain all their traffic information just
from radio calls from other aircraft.
We take away the radio call or the ability to make a radio call with the volume turned
down and all of a sudden we're essentially flying in a deaf environment where we can't
hear what's going on.
All the other aircraft have, however, they were quite successfully using the Port Macquarie
CTAF frequency to arrange their own mutual separation.
And that's what the CTAF frequency is for.
We've spoken about communication in the aviation environment.
It begs the question, doesn't it, how do we as human beings communicate in the non-aviation
environment?
Now, there's been many studies at universities around the world in the human factors associated
with communication.
What studies do show is that the vast majority of the way we communicate as people is in
the non-verbal space rather than the verbal space.
In fact, some studies show up to 93% of our communication as humans occurs in a non-verbal
way.
First of all, there's the acoustic way we communicate, not only just with our voice,
but even the tone of our voice or even using expression in our voice.
Things like the appropriate use of pauses, OK, or even sounds.
Another big way we communicate is by optical or visual means.
In the Aviation Safety Advisor role, we see thousands of pilots all over Australia every
year in hundreds of seminars.
And one of the biggest ways we can communicate or the audience communicates to us is through
essentially body language.
We can tell a lot about how people are feeling or what their mood is just by body language.
How they hold their arms, how they hold their face, even things like facial expressions,
even things like the clothes that people are wearing.
I was at an airport once, I remember two pilots getting out of an aircraft at the fuel bowser.
These pilots had wrinkled shirts on, food stains, their shirts were untucked, their
shoes weren't polished.
These pilots looked disgusting.
I therefore came, rightly or wrongly, to the conclusion that these pilots were unsafe.
Because I've also seen pilots at airports that have had nice uniforms that have been
ironed, their shoes are polished, they're wearing a tie.
Instantly I come to the conclusion that these pilots are somehow safe.
That might be a wrong or a right conclusion, I'm not sure.
But that's how people do communicate, even by the clothes we wear.
If I go out into an outback cattle station to talk to mustering pilots, I'm not going
to wear a suit and tie, I'm going to wear something appropriate.
We communicate a lot, even just with the clothes that we wear.
The other way we also communicate is in a tactile sense, putting your arm around someone
or putting a hand on the shoulder.
Again, it's a non-verbal way of communicating to other individuals.
And finally, we can communicate with what the scientists call the olfactory sense, which
is things like smells or odours.
And people think often when I mention this, really, is that true?
But think about the global perfume and aftershave industry.
It's worth billions of dollars.
Why?
Because that's a way people can communicate.
So there's heaps and heaps of different ways that we can communicate in a non-verbal sense.
How does this relate to aviation?
Well, when we're in the cockpit, we don't get the value or we don't get the benefit
of non-verbal communication.
All we are is a voice on the end of a CTAF frequency, for example, appearing through
someone's headset.
And potentially, that can be as little as 10% of the way that humans communicate.
So when we go flying, we are in an environment that is very, very challenging for effective
communication.
And that's why our communication has to be spot on and we have to continually work at
it to be effective, because effective communication gives us the greatest chance of staying alive
out there when we go flying around the CTAF environment.
So, communication in the aviation environment.
Here's an old adage that people have been saying for ages, but we've slightly modified
it.
Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words, words have the potential to kill me.
How is that the case?
Words that are perhaps indecipherable, words that are too many, words that are insufficient
or even the wrong words.
And Air Services Australia, in the AIP, they're very hot on what we call standard phraseology.
Standard phraseology is a vital part of our communication, because when we talk on the
radio to either air traffic control or to other aircraft, the other party has to know
that we know.
And therefore, this standard communication is so important.
I listen to, in my job, radio frequencies all over Australia, and I can tell you it
is often quite rare to hear a stock standard AIP radio call.
Often we hear mish-mashes of all different types of calls all mixed in together.
Student pilots, and especially foreign student pilots who come to Australia to learn to fly,
whose English might be somewhat at a less of a standard than a native Australian-born
English speaker, these pilots sit in the classroom and they go through their AIP, and when they
learn the standard format of phrases, when they go flying, that's what they expect to
actually hear.
Australians as a rule, we do have behaviours on the radio that do have problems for communication
in the aviation environment.
Often Australian pilots we speak to quickly, we often use a lot of slang, and many times
when we communicate on the radio, we start talking maybe half a second before that press
to talk button goes down.
So we can often clip the start of our transmissions.
So we have to just every now and then maybe do a readjust and have a think about how we
ourselves communicate on the radio.
And finally, when we communicate on the radio, think about what we are about to say before
we hit the button.
The press to talk, or the PTT button, is a press to talk button.
It's actually not a press to think button.
Have an idea of what we're about to say, who we are going to address that call to.
Is it a specific broadcast, or is it a call to a specific individual?
Think about our standard phraseology, and when we are in the CTAF environment, one of
the things that we need to consider is that before we make the radio call, is the radio
call that we're about to make likely to increase people's situational awareness, or is it likely
to actually impact or decrease people's situational awareness?
The radio is a very, very powerful tool.
And by thinking about what we're about to say and using standard phraseology, we will
go a long way to helping the safety of flight, especially in the non-towered aerodrome environment.
There are barriers to effective communication.
Communicating in the airborne environment has enormous challenges set before it.
Let's have a look at what some of these challenges might be.
The first thing is the physical conditions.
Now, I know there aren't many open cockpit aircraft flying around the country, but a
lot of aircraft have noisy cockpits.
Many of us perhaps haven't had our headsets serviced in years, or even our radios looked
at.
So think about the quality of our transmission.
High workload environments.
If we are in a high workload environment, taxiing at a complex aerodrome in the middle
of our take-off sequence, if we're manoeuvring around the circle or in our landing phase,
these are high workload environments.
And as a consequence, this can represent a challenge to effective communication if we
are just so busy doing other things at the same time.
Fatigue. Fatigue is an interesting one.
If we are tired, if we are so fatigued, often we exhibit behaviours that can be potentially
hazardous. And one of those is the inability to communicate properly.
What do I mean by this?
Well, let's look at an analogy.
You might have worked a 60-hour week.
You come home on a Friday night and you're absolutely tired.
All you want to do is pour yourself a drink and just sit on the couch and maybe watch
Friday night football.
If you are so tired, if someone walks in the room and wants an in-depth conversation with
you, are you in the mood to actually engage?
Most likely not.
Fatigue is one of those insidious things that can creep up on us, and it affects us in many
different ways, and it affects individuals differently.
But one of the common things we're seeing with fatigue is that it does impact adversely
on our ability to be effective communicators.
Interruption and distraction.
Probably out of all of these factors, this is probably the main one.
There are lots of potential interruptions and distractions in the aviation environment.
It might be air traffic control.
It might be passengers.
It might be other things that we're doing in the cockpit.
Interruption and distraction has a huge impact on our ability to communicate.
Stress.
If we're flying and we are in a stressful environment, we might be dealing with unfamiliar
airspace.
We might be flying an unfamiliar aircraft, or we could potentially be dealing with an
emergency.
In a stressful situation, we tend to shut down all the periphery and just concentrate
on what we're dealing with at that time.
Again, that has ramifications for our ability to communicate.
And finally, culture.
English language, accents, flying in the vicinity with people whose English is not their first
language, even using colloquialisms or local land features in our communication.
We should always, always, always think about what our intended audience is.
They might not know where Joe's Farm is, for example.
We need to use information that everyone has an understanding of.
So what are some of the hints and techniques that we can use to improve our technique on
the radio?
Here are some that I'd like to present to you just to perhaps have a think about.
The first is, is the volume correctly turned up and am I on the right frequency?
It might seem simple, but I'm sure many of us have been flying when we've been on the
wrong frequency or we've been flying with the volume turned down.
Volume being turned down is often a trap for instructors where they need to perhaps reduce
the distraction of the radio while they're teaching a sequence, and sometimes we get
to turn the volume back up to normal levels afterwards.
The second thing is, think about what information that I'm about to transmit.
Is it to a specific party or is it a general broadcast?
Is it likely to increase people's situational awareness or will it run the risk of reducing
people's situational awareness, especially when there might be a lot of aircraft in the
circuit area?
And listen out before transmitting to prevent over-transmitting or blocking other calls.
A classic case of this is when we're making our inbound call.
For example, don't get to a 10 mile from the airport and then flick across and start transmitting
straight away.
Maybe flick across about 30 seconds beforehand, have a bit of a listen out to find out what
the story is, build your situational awareness, then wait for an appropriate break in the
transmission and then make your own.
Non-ambiguous language.
This goes back to our earlier discussion on standard phraseology, because the other party
needs to know exactly what's required.
So if at all possible, try and avoid using things like slang or local land features.
Try and keep it as much as possible a broader transmission with commonly known features
when describing perhaps where you are.
And the final one, and this is also a big one too.
If you are in the receipt of a transmission that is often spoken very quickly or there
are terms in that transmission that you don't understand, please don't be hesitant to ask
for a repeat from either the pilot that made the transmission or the air traffic control
unit when dealing with air traffic control.
If they give you, for example, an instruction that you can't comply with, it might be due
to things like weather or aircraft equipment or any other host of factors.
Don't try and fudge your way through.
If you can't comply with an instruction from ATC, say that you can't comply and then ATC
will be duty bound to provide you with an alternative.
Sure, it might mean that you might have to wait outside controlled airspace or you might
be vectored somewhere else or there might be a few increased track miles or a slight delay.
But please don't try and fudge your way through if you can't comply with an ATC instruction.
Please tell them and they will be duty bound to provide you with an alternative.
So going back to our scenario that we launched our seminar series with today.
The pilot of the Foxbat assumed that the lack of radio calls therefore meant a lack of other
traffic because the pilot of the Foxbat did see that helicopter depart about five minutes
prior to making their own taxi call.
And it shouldn't have precluded the pilot of the Foxbat from at least visually acquiring
the Dash 8 and the Baron.
Most likely the Dash 8 and the Baron would have been all lit up like a Christmas tree
with their strobes and landing lights on.
So not only is communication in the non-towered airport environment a vital part of our safety,
but so is a disciplined lookout as well using the good old Mark 1 eyeball.
So why didn't perhaps the Foxbat see the other traffic in the circuit area?
There could be a host of reasons.
First of all, visual scanning technique.
Was the pilot just looking out into space or was the pilot actually taking the time
and the discipline to do a judicious lookout across the visual scanning horizon?
Keep our eyes moving.
We're in a dynamic environment, remember, things rarely stay the same.
When we're undertaking a lookout in a CTAF environment, it's very, very important to
keep that visual scanning technique up to scratch.
It's not my role here to teach you how to visually scan.
That's something that you can do with your instructor.
But a visual scanning technique when we're flying around or even on the manoeuvring area
of an airport is vital.
Secondly, environmental conditions can be a problem with achieving a good lookout.
Not only things like cloud, but also things like smoke or haze or pollution or rain.
Even flying with a dirty windscreen can be difficult.
OK, try landing into the setting sun, landing towards the west late in the afternoon with
a dirty windscreen.
Very, very difficult to maintain an effective lookout that way.
Task overload.
If we are in a busy environment dealing with the aircraft, dealing with other traffic,
dealing with issues that come up when we go flying, it's very, very difficult to maintain
a good lookout.
It's important that we learn that skill as we go flying to not only manage those aspects
of our flight, but to do so without it compromising our ability to keep our eyes outside the cockpit.
Aircraft structure.
Many aircraft, for example, have window pillars and other bits and pieces.
We have bits and pieces sitting on the combing of the aircraft on the instrument panel that
might block, physically block our ability to look out.
Therefore, we don't just look out by moving our eyes.
Oftentimes we have to look out by craning our head and moving our head.
It is important that we use all of these things to maintain a good lookout.
There's a term here called empty field myopia.
Empty field myopia is essentially what our eye does when there's nothing much to look
at.
If there's nothing much for our eye to focus on, we might be flying through cloud or on
a dark night, we might be flying through haze or an inversion, or we might be flying over
a large body of water.
There might not be a lot for our eye to focus on.
If that's the case, the human eye will often have a resting focal length somewhere between
three and five feet outside the cockpit window.
That's where the eye will rest if we just let it sit there.
Hence, a way of beating this empty field myopia is to keep our eyes moving and to also keep
our head moving.
And finally, the blind spot.
What is the blind spot?
All this is is just a physiological limitation of our eye.
It's where our optic nerve hits the back of the retina.
At that point in each of our eyes, there are no photoreceptors, there are no rods and cones
to provide us with vision.
So if we aren't moving our eye, we can have a blind spot literally outside the cockpit
where we could potentially have another aircraft sitting there and we might not even know it.
It's just a physiological limitation of the eye.
So what I'm going to do now is show you a quick video.
This video, I understand, was a training flight over southern England.
And it gives you an indication as to how easy it is to miss other aircraft and the importance
of maintaining a good lookout.
So we're flying along in southern England and have a look at this video.
See if you can see that other aircraft.
Very, very difficult to see.
But when we zoom in, you can see that that other aircraft was, in fact, a business jet
almost at the same level, blending into the cloud.
So let's play that video once again.
This time, see if you can see the business jet approaching from the top left-hand side
of the screen.
Flying along, and you see the aircraft appear out of the top left.
Very, very difficult to see.
Lots of distractions potentially in that cockpit.
It looked to me like it was an instructional flight.
But we can certainly be surprised when we go flying around, especially the busy airspace
around capital cities and busy CTAF airports.
So, alert and see and avoid, which essentially is the correct use of our radio combined with
a disciplined lookout.
If we use not only our eyesight, but also our radio appropriately, we have, according
to ATSB research, something like an 800 per cent better chance of spotting other traffic
than if we were just using our eyesight alone.
We mandate VHF radio carriage around the vicinity of CTAF environments in Australia.
I don't want to harp too much on the regulation, but it's a good idea just to perhaps review
this.
CAR 166E talks about mandatory VHF radio carriage.
We mandate the carriage of VHF radio when we are at or in the vicinity of any certified,
registered or military aerodrome in Australia or any other aerodrome that we may designate
from time to time.
That might be something like a fly-in or something similar like that.
That's where we mandate the carriage of VHF radio in Australia.
We talk a lot about what do we mean by in the vicinity.
There are really three pillars to this in the vicinity concept.
The first is we are in airspace that is other than controlled airspace.
So essentially we're talking about Class G uncontrolled airspace.
In the vicinity also means within 10 nautical miles of the aerodrome reference point.
Now that doesn't automatically mean that we flick across to the CTAF frequency when we
get to 10 miles.
If you're flying a fast aircraft or if you're flying into a destination that you know there's
a good chance the circuit might be busy, there's certainly nothing stopping you flicking across
to that CTAF frequency at 15 miles or even 20 miles.
The Dash 8 that we saw in our scenario earlier most likely flicked across to the Port Macquarie
CTAF at 30 miles.
What this does, especially if you fly a fast aircraft or you're going into a busy environment,
is it provides you with time to build that mental picture.
So you don't always have to wait to bang on 10 miles before you go across to the CTAF.
Now the third pillar which describes in the vicinity, one concept that often causes some
confusion and debate among pilots, is when we are at a height above the aerodrome reference
point that either conflicts or has the potential to conflict with other traffic.
Now it's not up to us in CASA to tell you what that height is.
That's essentially the decision made by the pilot in command and that can vary depending
on circumstances.
You might fly across the top of a non-towered airport at 2,000 feet at three o'clock in
the morning.
The chances are that you won't be at a height that might conflict with other traffic.
But to fly across the top of that airport at 2,000 feet on a busy Saturday afternoon,
again that's a whole new different ballgame.
Be aware also, when we're talking about the height above a non-towered airport, that CTAF
airports in Australia, they are no longer cylinders of airspace.
There's no defined top to them.
Back in many, many years before, we had things like MVZs and things like that, which had
a defined top, but not anymore.
The height above the aerodrome that you might have the potential to conflict with operations,
that's a decision for the pilot in command and the pilot in command only.
Please also be aware that there is no silver bullet of regulation that will guarantee 100%
risk-free aviation all the time.
The CTAF environment is a very dynamic environment.
What we have done is we've put out, for example, certain recommended radio calls that will
give you the best chance of separating yourself.
One last thing before we look at those radio calls that I just want to mention.
Please also be aware that Air Services Australia do not monitor CTAF frequencies.
Air Services Australia also do not monitor 1267.
So the appropriate frequency selection is very important.
When you are beyond the vicinity of a non-towered airport, it's important to be maintaining
a listening watch on the appropriate frequency, which will be the area frequency.
It's only on the area frequency that you will get assistance.
If your aircraft cabin fills full of smoke or your windscreen is covered in oil and you
have to call a PAN or a MAYDAY, if you call a PAN or a MAYDAY on 1267, or if you call
a PAN or MAYDAY or call for assistance on the CTAF frequency, the chances are that no
one will hear you.
It's the published area frequency that you will get that assistance from Air Services.
So when in the vicinity, people often ask us, what are the mandatory radio calls?
The only thing that we mandate in the regulations is that a pilot must make a broadcast whenever
they, and they alone, believe that it's reasonably necessary to do so to avoid a collision or
the risk of a collision with another aircraft.
As far as mandating calls, that's the only thing we mandate.
But we do go further than that.
What we actually do is we recommend a set of standard calls, and we put that out in
So when in the vicinity of a non-towered aerodrome, what are the recommended calls?
We find that the vast, vast majority of pilots make these calls in a fantastic way.
They're very judicious, they're very disciplined, but there's always room for improvement.
So what are these calls?
A taxing call, entering the runway, inbound by 10 nautical miles, or earlier, remember
our previous discussion, if you're flying a fast aircraft or you're likely to come into
a busy airport, there's nothing wrong with making an inbound call earlier.
Joining the circuit, basic calls that most people do make.
We also recommend that if you are doing something slightly different or something slightly out
of the ordinary, for example, a straight-in approach, or you might be joining on base
leg of the circuit, it's a good idea to let people know that you might be doing something
slightly different.
So we certainly recommend those types of calls.
And finally, if you are just passing the aerodrome in the vicinity of that aerodrome, just make
a call on the CTAF to let people know where you are and what you are doing.
And finally, a small hint that I like to often give to IFR pilots.
If you're an IFR aircraft flying an IFR sortie, especially when there's likely to be VFR aircraft
in the vicinity, please don't use IFR-based terminology.
Think again what we said earlier about your intended audience.
The average VFR pilot might not know what a sector entry is.
They might not know what an initial approach fix is for a GNSS approach.
They don't have to.
Think about your intended audience.
Give a direction from the airport, a distance and a height and your intentions, okay?
Especially for the IFR pilots when there's likely to be VFR aircraft in the vicinity.

