Was the F2 "Blue Circle" Radar a Myth? | Rick Peacock-Edwards (Clip)
4 Video Views·Nov 28, 2024
The second thing was obviously on the radar. We had radar problems right from the start.
Yeah, that was that was the big problem.
Well, the Blue Circle, let me put that right, that is, it's very unfortunate that the aircraft got
the nickname as the Blue Circle aircraft, which really followed it through, because by the time
that aircraft went out of service, it was hugely capable, hugely capable, and all the problems had
gone. Now, we only ever had five aircraft that had, quote, concrete in the nose,
and they only had concrete in the nose. We came back from our course at Wharton with radars in
the aircraft. So there were radars in the aircraft from the start. So it's a bit of a myth then?
It's a myth. There were radars in the aircraft. The reason why radars, because we had so many
problems with the radar, they had to be taken out of the aircraft and sent back to GC
to be modified. That's why we had holes in the nose, as it were, for a while.
It was because of the radar problems, not because we didn't have it right from the start. We did.
It didn't work very well. I mean, and the big problem was, we, you know, we, as people have
probably told you, we, it was just full of just multi-targets everywhere, trying to identify the
actual target was the real problem. We got there in the end, and if I just talk about the radar,
since we're on it, sort of, because we went through that, we built up, and it was, and everybody
commented on it, they didn't like it. Nobody liked it. And it was a bit cumbersome to even operate,
quite frankly, with the keyboards and what have you. But, you know, I remember, sort of, in 1986,
it was, you know, because we weren't going to declare without a radar that could do something.
And I took a team from the Operation Conversion Unit down to Strike Command in 1986 to give a
presentation to the then Commander-in-Chief of Strike Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding,
on the state of the radar. And I didn't mince my words at all. Told him exactly what the problems
were, and he listened. Suffice to say, we then, we then, we got a wadge of money, and an emergency,
sort of, trial took place, called Trial Bunbury, when we had, when we went through a whole series of
exercises, the trials, to have a look at the radar and identify, sort of, in detail,
the deficiencies. And then fixes were, sort of, very quickly put in. So that, all I'll say at
this stage, is that by the time, we didn't have the final radar in any way. But we, by the time
we got declared, I forget which was, which one it was, our Stage, Stage 1 or Stage 2 radars.
But we'd gone through, sort of, all sorts of lists, W lists, X lists, Y lists, things like that.
So it continually, sort of, being upgraded as we went through. It still was pretty punk,
quite frankly, when we got declared. But it was just, just acceptable. And we did get declared.
So we made it. And then, but that wasn't the end of the game. By this stage, we'd established the
Operational Evaluation Unit. And a lot of their work was spent in detail, studying the radar.
And what they did, led to further development of the radar. And as I say, by the time that aircraft
went out of service, the radar, as far as I'm aware, because I wasn't flying it by that stage,
had, was, was, was, well, you wouldn't recognise it from what the radar that came in, in the first
place. Night and day. Night and day, yeah. I think, in summary, you could say that, sort of,
we had, yes, we had major problems with the radar, which we didn't hide from.
There are those who said you should have never have taken the aircraft into service.
But the aircraft was taken. I am not opponent of that, in fact. And I did get involved in
discussions. And the reason why I think it should have been brought into aircraft, because
I knew, you see it with every aircraft that comes into service, that, I can tell the children are
there. You could tell by, every aircraft comes into service, when the RAF gets its hands on,
on the kit, then they, they are the best people to put it right. And that's, quite frankly,
is exactly what happened. Yeah, it's, it's the user. I'd seen it with, seen it with the aircraft
before, particularly the Jaguar. The Jaguar used, they used, they had responsibility for developing
their own, own kit. So, that's why I think it was the right decision to bring it into service,
so we could get our hands on it, because it was going to come. We could get our hands on it,
and we could, we could fix it. And that's, that's what happened. Yes, it took time,
but that is what, that's what the RAF did.

