Hello everyone, I'm Mark. Welcome back to Mark Time.
Today is the 66th anniversary of the 823 battle.
I want to talk briefly about this shocking battle.
Around 6 p.m. on August 23, 1958,
the Communist Party of China suddenly fired a fierce cannon
on the small Jinmen Island in the east of Xiamen, China.
It triggered a few months of national-communist artillery fire,
causing the death of tens of thousands of people.
The cannon incident was called the second Taiwan Strait crisis.
In Taiwan, it was called the 823 Taiwan Strait crisis.
In the CCP, it was called the second cannon attack on Jinmen.
Although we often talk about the 823 battle,
in fact, this battle also includes the naval battle and the air battle.
The fiercest artillery fire occurred between August 23, 1958 and October 5,
and then the artillery fire continued until December 25, 1978.
Around 5.30 p.m. on August 23, 1958,
the Communist Army concentrated about 600 artillery guns in Xiamen, Tiantun Mountain, Liandeng, Weitou, etc.
They launched a surprise attack on the main military target of Jinmen Island.
At the same time, the whole island was engulfed in a blaze of fire.
The command post of the Jinmen Defense Command,
the artillery field, the observation post, and the airport were severely attacked.
More than 40,000 bombs were dropped within two hours.
More than 570,000 bombs were dropped on the same day.
All activities of the Jinmen Garrison were interrupted.
The communication between the command posts and the units was completely interrupted.
At the same time, Jinmen was in a mess.
At that time, the Jinmen Defense Command was gathering at Cuigu Water Restaurant in Taiwushan to prepare for dinner.
Suddenly, he was attacked by a dense bomb, and he was seriously injured.
It also caused the death of three deputy commanders of the Jinmen Defense Command.
Originally, Hu Lian, the commander of the Jinmen Defense Command,
was also going to attend the dinner at Cuigu Water Restaurant.
But that day, Minister of National Defense Yu Dawei visited Jinmen Island.
At ten o'clock in the evening,
Hu Lian, Chief of Staff Liu Mingkui, and the US military advisory group,
the Jinmen team, gathered in another restaurant.
Although they were also attacked,
it was not as fatal as the Cuigu Water Restaurant.
Everyone was saved.
The Jinmen Defense Command is the main target of the Communist Army.
The Communist Army used a total of six artillery battalions of 72 guns
to attack the command post.
More than 6,000 bombs were dropped.
Originally, Hu Lian ordered
that all units should not shoot at the other side
before receiving the order from the Jinmen Defense Command.
But the Communist Army's artillery was extremely fierce.
The commanders of the artillery battalions were in a state of emergency.
And the communication with the superiors was completely interrupted.
So a small number of artillery battalions began to fire back.
For example, the 692nd Battalion of the Communist Army,
Commander Lu Fengshan,
ordered to strike back immediately.
Use M-2 type E-5 cannon
and M-36 type 90mm anti-tank gun to counterattack.
The Communist Army's large-scale artillery
lasted for about two and a half hours on the 23rd.
According to the statistics of the Communist Army,
the Communist Army fired a total of 57,533 bombs.
The Communist Army fired back 3,633 bombs.
The record of the U.S. military is
that the Communist Army fired 40,000 bombs
and the Communist Army fired back 5,200 bombs.
The number of deaths caused by artillery
has always been a mystery.
For political propaganda and propaganda,
the official data on the death of the Communist Party
has a lot of input.
The truth is still unclear.
Former President Ma Ying-jeou said
at the 80th anniversary of the Battle of 823
that 618 people died.
General Hao Bochun mentioned
that more than 4,000 people died
in the 823 artillery attack on Kinmen.
But some scholars believe
that more than 10,000 people died in the national army.
This does not include the number of casualties
in the air force and navy
and the number of civilian casualties.
The next day, the Communist Army fired at Kinmen
at about 6 p.m.
As a result of the painful lesson
the Communist Army was well prepared.
The Defense Department has set up
an anti-artillery plan.
Nine battalions and a company
of anti-artillery units
will conduct a counterattack
with a total of 112 cannons.
The strategy is to use
heavy artillery,
such as M1-15,
M2-15,
etc.
The anti-artillery plan
is to use heavy artillery
against the Communist Army
in Xiamen and other places.
Before the 823 artillery attack,
Kinmen had completed
a comprehensive undergroundization
of all military bases on the island.
Although the artillery attack
began very suddenly and violently,
the remaining forces of Kinmen's garrison
were saved and large-scale
artillery counterattacks
were carried out on the day of the 823
The Communist Army continued
to attack Kinmen,
but the size of the shooting
was significantly reduced.
Before the 823 artillery attack,
in order to cover up the intention
of the artillery attack,
the Communist Army's artillery troops
took all the roads
that Kinmen's garrison
could observe,
retreated heavily during the day
and returned to the position
at night to confuse Kinmen's garrison.
And the front command asked
that all artillery
should not be fired before the artillery attack.
These practices made Kinmen's garrison
think that the Communist Army was exercising,
but did not accurately judge
the real purpose of the Communist Army.
And Jiang Jinshi and his son
secretly inspected Kinmen before the artillery attack.
Under the guidance of Jiang Jinshi,
Chief of Staff Wang Shuming,
and the commander of the 3rd Army,
Jiang Jinshi and his son
secretly went to Kinmen
to inspect Kinmen.
Jiang Jinshi inspected
the important highlights of Kinmen,
the artillery group, the minefield,
the garrison positions,
the logistics security facilities,
the port dock, the camp dormitory,
and so on.
He said he was quite satisfied
with the hard work of Hu Lian
and 100,000 soldiers over the years.
Jiang Jinshi did not stay in Kinmen
for a long time
and left that night
to avoid a fatal artillery attack.
Because of the construction of a large number of underground palaces,
the main strength of the Kinmen National Army is well preserved,
and the Kinmen artillery can still
effectively counterattack.
Seeing that he could not achieve the designated goal,
Mao Zedong had to turn the large-scale military action
against Kinmen into a long-term siege and blockade,
trying to use the siege of the
100,000 troops of the National Army
on Kinmen as a bargaining chip
for political negotiations with the United States
to gain strategic political benefits.
After the 83rd artillery attack,
the 82nd naval battle
and the 92nd naval battle
showed the Communist army's intention
to blockade Kinmen from the sea.
In order to break the CCP's blockade of Kinmen,
the 7th Army of the United States
and the National Army Navy
planned a series of naval joint operations
not only to supply ammunition and supplies to Kinmen,
but also to provide
240mm M1 grenade launchers
to the Communist army,
which caused huge losses to the Communist army.
The lightning project of the US-Taiwan cooperation
began on September 7,
and a total of seven launchers were launched.
The air force used C-46 and C-47 transport aircraft
to load military supplies
and launch air strikes at Kinmen Airport.
The air-to-sea launch operation
broke the Communist army's blockade of Kinmen.
In order to strengthen the anti-aircraft forces
of the Kinmen anti-cannon battalion,
the United States began to provide
240mm M1 grenade launchers to the National Army.
On September 20,
the first batch of three 240mm M1 grenade launchers
was delivered to Kinmen.
On the 26th, the US military
sent a total of 30 such grenades
and achieved considerable results.
As the war progressed to October,
for the Communist army,
this artillery battle had fallen into the hands of the brain.
It was impossible to make a decisive breakthrough
and it could not be drawn immediately.
The air force of the National Army
did not retreat,
and the morale of the Kinmen garrison
remained high.
The position of the United States
in supporting the aid of the People's Republic of China
did not loosen,
and Mao Zedong's plan was completely hollow.
On October 5,
Mao Zedong had no choice but to adjust
the strategic principle of Kinmen,
and it was changed to kill the enemy.
Since then, the Kinmen artillery battle
has lost its true meaning.
The day before yesterday,
Peng Dehuai of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense
published Mao Zedong's letter to his compatriots in Taiwan.
It was a signal that the CCP was ready
to withdraw from the artillery battle.
Since then, the artillery battle
has been dragged on for three weeks.
On October 25,
the Chinese Communist Party published
a letter to its compatriots in Taiwan
and announced that it would implement
a one-hit-two-kill policy from the next day.
It is a signal for the 8.23 war.
The Taiwan Strait war has entered the next stage.
The background of the 8.23 air strike
is that the Chinese Communist Army
began to occupy all the islands
of Yijiangshan Island, Dacheng Island
and Zhejiang coast in 1955.
In 1956,
the Chinese Communist Party
imitated the J-5 test-flight of the Soviet Union.
Mao Zedong invited Peng Dehuai in December 1957
and urged the air force to do their best
to enter Fujian in 1958
and prepare for the attack on Kinmen.
After the first five-year plan,
Mao Zedong's agricultural collective production
did not work.
He was worried about the status of his party
and the challenge of people like Liu Shaoqi.
So he launched the double-hand movement
and the anti-right movement.
He re-established his authority
in political activities.
Then he began to promote the Great Leap Forward
and the People's Commune.
The Great Leap Forward began around the end of 1957.
In 1958, it was at the rising stage.
All over China,
large-scale agricultural satellites
and large-scale steel were built
for the People's Commune.
Mao Zedong's confidence in agriculture
and steel production
quickly surpassed Britain and the United States.
Therefore, he had strong confidence in the liberation of Kinmen.
By the summer of 1958,
the number of troops in Kinmen
had reached 100,000,
one-third of the total number of ground troops in Taiwan at that time.
Mao Zedong hoped that
by bombing and blocking Kinmen,
the U.S. troops would withdraw from Taiwan
and the Chinese troops would retreat from Kinmen
and other coastal islands,
and then occupy Kinmen.
As early as August 6,
President Eisenhower had received accurate information
that the CCP wanted to launch another attack on coastal islands.
On that day, Taiwan announced
a state of emergency in Kinmen.
On August 10,
the U.S. State Department issued
a memorandum of understanding
on the non-recognition of the Communist Party
and issued a warning
to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
On August 8 and August 22,
the U.S. State Department held two meetings
to study the situation in the Taiwan Strait
and make a decision.
First, send more aircraft and fighter jets
to provide Taiwan with landers,
anti-missile missiles, firecrackers and military supplies.
Second, pressurize China
through the U.S. House of Representatives
Chairman Morgan.
Third, authorize Ambassador John Lloyd
to clarify the Sino-U.S. Joint Defense Treaty.
If the People's Republic of China
launches a major offensive on the coast,
it can retaliate,
but be careful not to attack too hard.
From August 17 to August 30,
Mao Zedong held a meeting
with the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee
during which he decided to
launch a missile attack on Kinmen.
This is an explanation
of the 8.23 war.
The CPC's mainstream argument
is that it launched the 8.23 missile attack
In July 1958,
Lebanon was in crisis.
The U.S. military carried out
Lebanese President Kamala Hisham
until the end of Hisham's term.
The U.S. military and the Lebanese government
successfully occupied Beirut Port
and Beirut International Airport.
After the crisis, the U.S. military withdrew.
Mao Zedong pointed out that
demonstrations are one aspect,
but moral support is also needed.
Kinmen Mazu is China's territory.
It is China's internal affairs to
attack Kinmen Mazu and punish the U.S. military.
The enemy can't find an excuse,
but it has a restricting effect on U.S. imperialism.
There are many other explanations in the room.
For example, the CPC's missile attack
is about to expire.
In 44 days,
nearly 480,000 rounds
Under such intensive artillery fire,
how did the Chinese army and the islanders
escape?
Why was the Chinese army still able
to organize a fierce counterattack
The Chinese Communist Party had locked
all the major military targets
on Kinmen Mazu.
On August 23,
all the observatories,
traffic centers,
key points,
and bomb sites on Kinmen Mazu
were surrounded by
the CCP's intensive artillery fire.
However, it did not cause
a major blow to the Chinese army
Judging from the result of the artillery fire,
the CCP still had many blind spots
This kind of artillery fire
did not pose much threat
to Kinmen Mazu's
reinforced concrete underground palace.
On the contrary, the CCP did not build
because they wanted to
suddenly attack
to cover up the secret of the operation.
Therefore,
the construction of Kinmen Mazu's
underground observation group
was mainly guided by
the Japanese military consultant
Bai Hongliang
The most famous consultant
was Genbenbo.
Genbenbo had been stationed in Kinmen for several years.
He commanded the Chinese army
to dig up Mount Taiwu at an altitude of 253 meters
and built a cave defense system
like the Japanese army in Kinmen.
In this way, most of the soldiers and the Chinese army
could hide in the cave and avoid artillery fire.
Genbenbo not only borrowed
the defense system of Kinmen
to consolidate the defense system of Kinmen,
but also used the pocket tactics
of the Chinese army
to help the Chinese army
seize Mount Kuning.
Genbenbo changed the plan
of the Chinese army
to block the Chinese army's landing.
After the Chinese army landed
and entered the pocket,
the Chinese army concentrated its firepower
to destroy the Chinese army.
The battle of Kinmen
shook the American society and the political world.
At that time,
the United States and the CCP
signed a joint defense treaty
in the form of the Cold War.
Since then,
the CCP has never been able to
attack any foreign island in Taiwan.
Since then,
there has been a political-military partition
on both sides for more than 60 years.
Due to time constraints,
I have briefly reviewed the following 823 battles.
Please continue to follow Max Gong.
See you next time.