Zhou Xiaohui: Six unusual features in the communiqué of the Third Plenary Session

Spotlight on China
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42 Video Views·Jul 23, 2024
The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing from July 15 to 18. On the afternoon of the 18th, the official media released the session's communiques. The communiqué reflected the work done since the Second Plenary Session, highlighted successful practices and achievements in comprehensive reforms, and discussed future directions for further comprehensive deepening of reforms, including the ongoing reform of national defense and the army.
The third plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
was held in Beijing from July 15th to the 18th. On the afternoon of the 18th,
the official media released the session's communique. This communique reflected the
work that was done since the second plenary session, highlighting successful practices
and achievements in comprehensive reforms. It also discussed future directions for further
comprehensive deepening of reforms, including the ongoing reform of national defense and the army.
However, when compared with the communiques of the third plenary session of the 19th CPC Central
Committee, as well as the second plenary session of the 20th Central Committee, several unusual
features stood out. One, unusually, the communique did not mention Xi Thought when affirming the work
of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. The communique affirmed the work
of the Political Bureau since the second plenary session of the 20th Central Committee,
without mentioning Marxism, Mao Thought, Deng Theory, or especially Xi Thought. In contrast,
the communique of the second plenary session explicitly mentioned Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era when affirming the work of the Political
Bureau. Similarly, the third plenary session of the 19th Central Committee included all doctrines
and ideologies. This omission suggests dissatisfaction with the Politburo's work
over the past year, given the significant internal and external challenges faced by the CCP.
Two, the communique only mentions the Party Central Committee, with Xi Jinping as the core,
at the end, which is unusual. Unlike previous communiques, which also emphasize this phrase
in the main text, the current communique only includes it at the end. This omission raises
questions about potential changes within the CCP. Three, the communique does not mention Marxism,
Maoism, Deng Theory, etc. when affirming the work, but does mention them when emphasizing
further reforms, when discussing further comprehensively deepening reforms. The
communique includes various doctrines and ideologies. Unlike the previous year's communique,
which solely emphasized that it was guided by Xi Thought, this shift may indicate internal
disagreements on the sufficiency of Xi's Thought in promoting reforms. Four, the communique's
emphasis on the need to uphold the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central
Committee to deepen reforms further comprehensively weakens Xi Jinping's authority. The
current communique emphasizes the centralized leadership of the Party Central Committee,
rather than explicitly focusing on Xi's leadership. Unlike the previous communiques,
this change could suggest a shift towards a more balanced power structure within the CCP.
Five, it is unusual for the communique to mention maintaining the unity and unity of the Party.
While previous communiques emphasized unifying thoughts and actions with the Party Central
Committee's decision, this communique's focus on maintaining Party unity suggests a more direct
acknowledgment of internal disunity. Six, the communique still refers to
Qinggang as comrade, accepts his resignation, removes him from his position as a member of
Central Committee, and does not impose any other punishment. Which is also unusual. The lenient
treatment of Qing, who's still referred to as a comrade, and the lack of further punishment
suggests two possible reasons. Leniency from the top leadership, or Qinggang's death,
possibly after resigning. The latter seems more likely given internal CCP protocols.
These anomalies in the communique of the Third Plenum suggest significant internal events during
the closed-door meeting. Xi's authority may have been seriously challenged,
indicating potential shifts within the CCP.
