Castlereagh vs Canning: How Britain Broke the Concert of Europe

if you were to ask British diplomatic historians who the most influential Statesmen of the early 19th century was you'd invariably get two responses Castle Ray and canning who between them guided the country's foreign policy for 15 years both were Irishmen Disciples of pit extremely close ideologically and generally accepted as having been remarkable Statesmen in their own right yet quite apart from despising each other personally their diplomatic styles also differed considerably this video then aims to be a short comparison of the two men how their Styles differed and how they affected British power and relations with the concert of Europe firstly it's important to understand which era these two men grew up in and for this I'm going to rely heavily on Paul Schroeder's conception of the International System Europe before 1813 had been governed by an obsessive focus on the balance of power the doctrine that no one great power should achieve her gemany on the continent in practice the way this worked was that whenever One Nation expanded all of the others either sought to limit their gains or achieve counter gains elsewhere this was the system that produced the Spanish polish Austrian and Bavarian Wars of succession it was the system that tore Germany apart in the Seven Years War saw absolutist France and Spain intervene on the side of the American Rebels and supported three partitions of Poland it was aist where in effect the strong prayed on the weak and most disastrously for Europe it was the system that produced the horrors of the Revolution and bonapart Napoleon's aggressive cynical domineering foreign policy was a direct result of 18th century international relations the European system was taken to its extreme But ultimately logical conclusion by bonapart a significant factor in Napoleon's astonishing success was not just the Machinery of the French Empire or his own Battlefield genius but that Europe continued to try and counter him by playing their old game each power happily leaving the others to rot so long as they could gain some benefit in the short term take for example prussia's preference for annexing Hanover as opposed to joining the third Coalition Britain was no different than any other Nation here for example even as they were trying to Rally Europe against France they would Penny pinch on subsidies 1812 changed this Napoleon's invasion of Russia had ended in disaster and Zar Alexander rather than seeking to make a favorable peace solely for his country's benefit decided instead to push on and liberate Europe the Britain of the previous Century would undoubtedly have botched this opportunity either by demanding too much from potential allies or offering too little by way of subsidy in 1812 though the country had a new foreign secretary when Lord Liverpool formed a government that year he had originally wanted canning at the foreign office but canning overplayed his hand by demanding leadership of the house as well the only other position Castle Ray held which he refused to part with long story short canning ended up with nothing and Castle Ray got both jobs instead that it was this Irishman rather than the other guiding British policy for the next decade was in Schroeder's opinion a result as momentous as Churchill's outmaneuvering of Halifax for the Premiership in 1940 now as I'll discuss later this might be a bit too exag at of a view in respect to canning but there can be no doubt that for the next 3 years Castle rain metan Nick with a diplomatic glue that held the lumbering armies of the Coalition together in War and Peace it's worth asking then why what made the shy handsome and in Artic tster so different from previous foreign secretaries to quote schroer again what set Castle Ray apart from most of his colleagues and countrymen was his uncommon fund of Good Sense his ability and Readiness to see other points of view and his willingness to adapt British policy to the facts and needs of Europe his impact had been felt immediately back in 1812 when with it becoming clear Russia would resist the Napoleonic Onslaught Castle Ray finally roused the power of the British state to provide the type of subsidy it's now remembered for before this with specific exceptions like the peninsula War Britain had usually tried to fund coalitions on the cheap with predictable results Castle Ray ensured that for the first time Europe was supplied to the best of Britain's ability Napoleon's biographer Michael Bros sees this as the key reason for his downfall Castle Ray was determined to engage with the Continental powers on a level no previous foreign secretary had as the Allies fought their way to the Rind he actually crossed the channel and navigated water on Europe to meet with them directly because Castle Ray did not see the defeat of France as the sum of British war aims what he really wanted was to build an entirely new European system for Castle Ray only a United Europe both before and after peace could resist any Revival of the Napoleonic threat in the future the Treaty of Shaman in March 1814 which boundy allies to fight Napoleon to a finish and then commit to upholding the peace for 20 years was his personal Triumph it was Shaman that laid the ground work for European unity and cooperation now I don't want to imply Castle Ray had every European ruler sat around a campfire singing Kum by a that's obviously not true one just has to look at how close the continent came to war again at the Congress of Vienna over various issues but the point is that castle race or european Unity is perhaps the essential War aim in 1814 it was Castle Ray with metonic tand and to an extent Alexander and Hardenburg that built and maintained this new European order as Schroeder argues the old system of competitive balance of power politics ICS was done away with in its place was what he describes as a structure of political equilibrium which he insistent is not the same thing despite how it sounds basically the new structure often called the Congress system revolved around the mutual recognition of states rights underpinned by the law where International problems arose discussion rather than Warfare would be the method of resolution now this inevitably meant different powers were going to have to compromise sometimes even completely FAL go their natural interest to make a system like this work a prospect someone in 1814 would have been forgiven for thinking was not exactly realistic given Russian designs on Poland prussia's demands on Saxony and Austria's plans for Italy Castle Ray's style to mediate this was to avoid bringing Britain into the squabble and instead stand back as an impartial Arbiter he did not for example try to extract extravagant advantages for his country instead he took for Britain only a few slim pickings from the Dutch and French colonial empires he did not use his enormous Prestige to ring favorable trade concessions out of smaller countries as would have been expected all he really wanted was France reduced to her ancient limits and a stable European settlement my purpose here is to illustrate the International System Castle Ray wished to create and how he operated within it but I think it might be worth deviating for a moment to consider how canning would have handled this key per period in European relations Schroeder of course is scathing Britain would still have won the Napoleonic Wars he says had canning become foreign secretary in 1812 but made no real contribution to a durable peace on the other hand canning's greatest biographer from a century ago Tempo his derogatory in the extreme towards Castle Ray diplomacy he has no time for his European system offering the classic wig critique that he was far too friendly with Continental autocracies and effectively tied Britain to the holy Alliance Zar Alexander's bizarre concoction of religious mysticism and monarchical solidarity Tempo argues that Britain having fought Napoleon the longest and poured much of its National wealth into the struggle were nothing for herself at the peace there is of course something to this critique as temply points out what exactly were Britain's substantive gains 13 years on from amen despite having won the most complete victory in her history France's Colonial Empire was largely returned the new Dutch kingdom was given Java consequently stying British trade in the Pacific Britain even actually paid the Dutch for the acquisition of the cape and salon and took on dubious Russian debts to them for little reason other than to smooth over relations Castle Ray had in Temple's words failed to give England an adequate return either in trade or territory for her IMM men's losses and sacrifice is in the common cause here then we already have an emerging picture of the differences between the two men Castle Ray wanted to work closely with the European powers in the new Congress system to pursue moderate goals the most important of which was preventing a Resurgence of French jacobinism canning never set out an alternative Manifesto and it's probably unfair to suggest he would not have properly engaged with the European powers but certainly his policy would have been far less concerned with building a new international system that conciliated the feelings of Continental monarchs and more focused on a ruthless pursuit of goals that enhance British power now I know this has ended up sounding like if they were alive today Castle would spend most of his time Ona Twitter and canning down the pub singing brexit chants but to be clear that's not what I'm trying to say the canning I and wig critique of Castle Ray's policy is that he was forgoing key British interests to appease ental despots to reiterate though canning never actually made this critique of Castle Ray's policy either publicly or privately himself indeed Castle Ray actually thanked him for remaining supportive throughout this time at the foreign office but canning's later decisions do serve as an implicit critique to the extent I think temply has grasped canning's spirit in his arguments against Castle Ray's policy the next seven years constitute what is often described as the Congress system although they did not meet on a regular basis as initially expected the European powers would convene to resolve major International problems Castle Ray was a key part of these talks but in general the issues tended to not be of such importance to Britain that there was any real chance of conflict this changed in 1820 the highly conservative King Ferdinand of Spain's blundering pushed his army stationed at caders into Revol which forced him to restore a liberal Constitution passed in 1812 whilst he had been under house arrest in France this further then spread to Naples where revolutionaries coerced the king into also accepting a Spanish style constitution for the holy Alliance the revolutions were obviously unwelcome but how they were going to respond wasn't exactly clear should they invade to restore the monarchies to their full powers and if so should this be done jointly or by just one country Britain's position to both of these revolutions was complex the general public and Parliament both with a limited grasp of geopolitics applauded them but Castle Ray was wary on the one hand he circulated what became a famous state paper in May arguing against any joint European intervention in Spain this would almost certainly cause more problems than it would solve not least with the country's Colonial Empire which I'll discuss later yet when Austria unilaterally intervened to crush the Italian revolutionaries Castle Ray privately supported the move generally his Hope was that non-intervention would be the modus operandi as far as was possible alternatively as in the case of Naples intervention would be done swiftly and by the power whose sphere of influence the Revolution was in Canning had been brought back into cabinet in 1816 he never publicly or privately opposed Castle R's policy though it's clear he would have preferred to draw a clear a Detachment between Britain and the holy Alliance yet even in 1820 when canning once again left office and the crises in Naples and Spain began he refused to become a focus for opposition to Castle Ray their differences really emerged though over the Spanish question the issue here was that unlike Naples Spain was not in anybody's sphere of influence and any intervention would impact not just Europe but also her enormous Empire in the new world much of which was currently in Revolt the preference was to let Spain sort its own Affairs out and offer mediation on the issue of of its colonies certainly Castle Ray worked to block the Zar proposal to send a Russian army across the continent to put down the revolt and he was preparing to go to the upcoming Congress of Verona himself to discuss the issue when on the 12th of August 1822 overworked and mentally exhausted he committed suicide canning had been about to go to India as governor general when he heard of the death although his friend Lord Liverpool immediately requested him canning came to the foreign office from a position of weakness as he was opposed by the king because of this but also perhaps out of genuine deference to his predecessor canning did not initially chart a particularly different path in fact he accepted Castle R's memorandum written before his death for how to conduct the negotiations at Verona although it was Wellington who actually attended once established though canning made it clear that foreign policy would be conducted on a different basis for one he quoted press and public support for his policies Castle Ray had never done this and consequently had been hated throughout the country more importantly though canning made it clear he did not intend to be led by the Continental monarchies to the extent Castle Ray was in shod as powerful but perhaps unfair of view canning long celebrated as the liberal opponent of the reactionary holy Alliance was really in a literal sense reactionary and restorationist trying to restore the competitive International politics of the 18th century canning's major crisis and the one I want to focus on as a point of comparison was still Spain in 1823 less than a year after his accession to the foreign office France invaded the country to restore King Ferdinand to his full Powers canning's opposition to such an intervention was no different to Castle Ray's stance as discussed earlier but his actual reaction to it was for most of Europe after all the the fuss the French intervention turned out to really be quite a modest Endeavor Ferdinand was restored but the French did not seriously try to control Spanish policy its colonies or extract concession indeed they quickly became disgusted with ferdinand's reprise ORS upon his enemies the operation was over in a matter of months and French troops remained on for another 5 years only to ensure internal peace French guns hardly settled the internal politics of that troubled country but but for all the waffle and Grand standing about intervention being wrong in reality as far as any power in the Congress system should have been concerned a short sharp action like this was far superior to the possibility of actual revolution in Spain but canning saw visions of a new borbon family compact a France that controlled Spain and by extension the Spanish Colonial Empire in response he gave a stark warning to the French Ambassador that no intervention in Latin America would be tolerated ated in 1824 he defied the European powers to take this a step further and actually recognized the nent Latin republics this provoked anger in most of the Continental courts and the austrians bluntly accused him of supporting revolutionary interests it was the type of charge that would never have been leveled against Castle Ray yet ironically he would almost certainly have recognized the new republics earlier than canning the difference between the two men was that castle Ray would never have done it in a way way that seemed to thumb his nose to the holy Alliance quite deliberately his policy had been to try and draw the European powers along with his recognition not teach them a lesson in Britain's ability to act unilaterally for the likes of schroer this is the clearest indication of how canning was trying to restore the old system of international relations ignoring the need to achieve joint policies with the other great powers and instead striking out to expand British power alone and to an extent Schroeder is Right few historians doubt that canning's ultimate aim was to dissolve the Congress system which he generally equated with the Holy Alliance and thus a threat to British Liberty where Tempo differs is in his analysis of what canning wished to build in its place non- intervention no European police system Every Nation for itself and God for us all balance of power respect for facts not for abstract theories respect for treaty rights but caution in extending them this is how Temple describes canning's system not a return to the 18th century structure of competitive balance of power or more correctly balance of Conquest Politics as Schroeder argues now as one can see from Temple's quote alone there was ultimately a good deal of overlap between Castle Ray and canning's policy in particular the principle of non-intervention and preference for no European police system were both aims of Castle Rays by 1820 adding to this I want to stress that whilst have relied on Schroeder and Tempo to frame this discussion two historians that are fairly violent in their likes and dislikes recent historiography on the whole has tended to emphasize the continuity between Castle Ray and canning in terms of foreign policy yet in regards to the concert of Europe and the holy Alliance the differences between the two men are clear even if he favored non-intervention as a principal Castle Ray still desired active participation in the Congress system and Cooper operation with the Holy Alliance canning in contrast saw both of these apparatuses as threats to Liberty and British power ultimately it was canning's vision of British foreign policy that won out though he would also be dead by late 1827 in paliston and Israeli his philosophy found capable HS the Congress system spluttered on for a few more years arguably did not fully collapse until the Crimean War but as a genuine force it quickly fell apart without Britain's active participation Castle Ray's Vindication took another 60 years with the Ascension of his greatest admirer Lord Solsbury to the Premiership and then Webster's groundbreaking study of his foreign policy in 1922 these days no one doubts either the man's genius in foreign affairs if canning had the more instinctive flare for It cast surprised almost everyone with his ability to grasp the issues of the day whose policy was right in the end remains an open question personally I think it's probably rather obvious I don't share a lot of my countryman's suspicion of the Congress system but I also have my doubts about Schroeder's thesis that canning in his efforts to overthrow it was aiming to restore the 18th century I think that's part of what makes this rivalry so interesting who did bismar or metonic have to contrast their ideals in foreign policy no one would make the case that after them felt politic or Fran Joseph's losses were improvements with Castle Ray and canning though both have their Defenders B on who was actually right the jury will always be out