Latvian foreign minister: "Ukraine can still win the war" | Conflict Zone

As the war in Ukraine grinds on, the neighbouring Baltic states watch anxiously from their ringside seats, pressing the West to increase aid to Kiev and make sure Russia doesn't win. My guest this week is Latvia's Foreign Minister, Hristianis Karinc. And he's clear NATO has to up its game. The difficulty and the frustration that I feel is that as we are going step by step, Russia is going full throttle forward. So how ready is NATO to take on an expansionist Russia? Why are some rich European states still unwilling to meet the Alliance's defence spending targets? And was President Macron really calling his allies cowards? Hristianis Karinc, welcome to Conflict Zone. Thank you very much. Great to be here. Your Prime Minister was just in the US recently trying to persuade Congress to unblock the military assistance that the White House had promised to Ukraine. She made the point several times, Russia must not be allowed to win this war. If Russia does win the war, it will be down to the hesitation and refusal of the West to give it the weapons it needs to win it, won't it? Has that idea sunk in yet in the West? Well, I think it is. And if we look not on the other side of the Atlantic, but on what is happening in Europe. So in Europe, when the war was starting, there was just a small handful of countries that were providing arms to Ukraine. The Baltics, Poland, others were in the beginning more hesitant. Now we see that there is a full-throated support for Ukraine. We just, in the European Union, voted 50 billion and agreed 50 billion over four years. That will support their government. We have the Czech initiative to get ammunition also outside of the European Union. We have seen that, for example, Germany has gone almost 180 degrees from a very pacifist stance for obvious historical reasons to actually being the largest supporter of Ukraine now. And now we see the French president coming with an initiative. You can read it many ways. But as a Latvian foreign minister, I read it rather simply that the French also understand that not only Ukraine has to win, but Russia has to lose the war. Otherwise, it's a big security threat for all of Europe. And what if Russia does win? What I think... What if this assistance is all too late, too little and too late? Well, I think right now we have to focus on what we can do so that does not happen. Because if they were to win, they would have learned the lesson that might makes right. They will have assumed that the West is somehow weak or divided or unwilling to stand up against him. And that aggression will continue in one direction or another. So in order for that aggression not to go on, because the problem won't go away, Russia will be aggressive at the end of the war, even if they lose the war. Because Putin just secured another six years for himself. That means their policies will remain unchanged. And I think this is a big wake-up call for all of us. And in a sense, the lack of the vote in US Congress for the $60 billion support package for Ukraine is a wake-up call to us here in Europe that we have to get our military industry up to par. We have to make sure that we are investing in our own defense. And we have to make sure that we have large enough and capable enough armies and militaries to stand up to any threat so that that threat never materializes. And that is called deterrence. That is what NATO is all about. And within NATO, there's the United States, but there are also 31 other countries, including all of us here in Europe. And we have to do our share as well. Yes, some of the countries, of course, haven't been doing their share. And I want to come on to that in a minute. You talked about Germany turning 180 degrees from its previous stance. What do you think of Germany's refusal to provide long-range tourist missiles to Ukraine? Of course, as a Latvian politician, I agree with those that it would be certainly beneficial to the Ukrainian efforts if they had these missiles. At the same time, I have to say that, unfortunately, the discussion about the tourist missiles clouds over the sheer fact of the volume of aid that Germany is actually giving. And it's rather unfortunate that because of the debate over one part of the aid, it's overshadowing everything that Germany is doing. So from a public relations point of view, it's too bad that this is distracting from actually the big story of Germany's support. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but hasn't Germany and the West as well been far too scared about Moscow's rhetoric, talking about its nuclear arsenal? Do you worry that the alliance looks weak to Russia? Well, the alliance is growing. Thanks to Russia, we have now Finland and Sweden in the alliance. Thanks to Russia's aggression in Europe, as we see in Germany and elsewhere, governments are actually quite massively stepping up investments in their own defense. Thanks to Russia's war in Ukraine, our defense industry, although slow, is making the investments now. And we are behind the Russian curve because they knew they were going to war. They're on a war footing. We're getting there. Are you saying that NATO is on a war footing or should be on a war footing? It is moving in that direction. Now, we in the Baltics and in Latvia, for two years, even before this outright war started, we were arguing that Russia is a real security threat. Russia is a challenge to all of us. And for many years, we were told by many of our good friends and colleagues and allies that maybe we're a little bit alarmist. It turns out, unfortunately, that we were right. I wish I was wrong in this regard. So in the Baltics, we never had any doubts about this. So we reacted very quickly. And in some other societies, the reaction has been slower. The reaction has been tinged with a certain fear of Russia. And we in the Baltics have continually said, there's nothing to fear, in a sense, but fear itself. Russia understands power. If we are strong, Russia will never attack. If we are not strong, Russia will lose in Ukraine as well. You said in January, Russia will not stop. Russia can only be stopped. Stopping in Russia does not mean that it's over. It simply means we will have to continue. Are you saying that you have evidence Russia intends to invade and seize other sovereign states, other sovereign countries in Europe? No. But if we read in the public sphere everything that Putin has been saying, the speeches, the philosophies, the doctrines, they are on an aggressive, imperialistic direction. And this will not change because of Ukraine, although the success of that is what we have to change. But even after the end of this war, what I'm arguing is that we in NATO will have to have a many-year, I would say, in order to understand the scope, a 20-year containment and deterrence effort to make sure that Russia's aggression never materializes. That is, their internal wishes to somehow expand or intimidate neighbors, Europe being a neighbor, simply could never materialize because we are so visibly strong. And we are getting there. We have now in NATO the EFP, the Enhanced Forward Presence, also the German presence in Lithuania, the Canadians in Latvia, the Brits in Estonia, and many other allies as well. We already have a much more robust presence today than we did two years ago. Yes, but Minister, you say that, but we talked about the 60 billion USAID package that hasn't come through for Ukraine. I would ask whether Europe can rectify that enormous shortfall in its own defense spending. NATO's European members need to stomp up another 56 billion euros a year just to meet the Alliance's defense spending targets, their current defense spending targets, and there's no sign that they're going to do that, is there? Italy, Spain, Belgium, they're nowhere near the target of 2% of GDP, are they, that NATO requires. Fact is, if the West is serious about Ukraine wanting to win, then it's time the West upped its game, isn't it? I agree, it is time for the West to up its game, and it is happening. From a Latvian perspective, I think from a Ukrainian perspective, it's happening rather slow, but it is happening. This is why we are continuing not only to argue, but we put our money where our mouths are. We are moving up to 3% of GDP on defense spending, we've reintroduced the draft, we're buying new defensive weapons systems, and we are continuing to provide aid on a regular basis to Ukraine. We're participating in the Czech initiative to buy abroad ammunition, so we are doing everything that we think all allies could do. And it looks like, according to estimates that I have seen, that for NATO, or for Europe, I should say, to be able to fully, or mostly, to fund its own defensive needs within NATO, the number would not be 2% of GDP, it would be closer to 3% of GDP if we all spent this, and all of us spent this. Ample supplies for ourselves and for Ukraine. That's a big if, isn't it? Because polls conducted by NATO show pretty low levels of support for increasing defense spending. And that's in some of the member countries with the biggest shortfalls, like Italy. Only 28% of people in that country want to spend more on defense. If you don't get the money for this, none of these grand plans and none of the promises that were initially made to Ukraine are going to be met, are they? Well, I agree that not everyone is there, but if we turn back the clock two years, the number of countries not meeting 2% was much greater. That number is decreasing, and if we also look at the countries that you've mentioned, defense spending is going up, we want that curve to go up faster. And this is the difference between also various politicians. Politicians can take the stance of looking at public opinion or what I think what is needed at this time are politicians who argue to their electorate what it is that we have to do, what is the right thing to do and to make the policy happen. And the good news is that sense of urgency is expanding in Europe. We see Emmanuel Macron's initiative is actually just in this vein. It needs to go further, but we are certainly much, much further down the road than we were two years ago. NATO is already more capable. It has two additional countries in the alliance. And even in the European Union, it took us a little while to agree on the 50 billion assistance for Ukraine, but we did it. But as things stand, unless that money is forthcoming, NATO and the European Union are going to be guilty once again of over-promising and under-delivering. And that's a bad reputation to have. Let me ask you this. If you were foreign minister of Ukraine at the moment, how satisfied would you be with NATO's and EU contributions over the last couple of years? How satisfied would you be? Well, I meet with my good friend, Mr. Kulib, on a regular basis. And of course, he feels, and very rightly so, that we need to step up the effort. And we in Latvia fully agree with him. And we are not only arguing, how should we say that you should do it, not us. We are trying to also lead by example. More than 1% of GDP has gone out to aid to Ukraine so far. We're continuing the effort. Of course, they need weapons and ammunition. They don't need promises. And it's very concrete what they need. And we have a very concrete initiative now, headed by the Czechs. They have found the ammunition. Now, it's up to the rest of us to help fund and pay the money to buy the ammunition and to physically deliver it to Ukraine. Let's talk about NATO strategy and NATO plans. Just two years ago, your neighbour, Estonia, complained bitterly that NATO's plan for its defence was wholly inadequate, because it involved allowing a potential Russian advance into their country with the aim of pushing it back six months later. Under those plans, the Prime Minister said, Estonia would be wiped off the map and the historic centre of the capital raised to the ground. Is that the kind of plan NATO devised for Latvia as well? Let's look at the plans that we adopted last summer in Vilnius. These are new plans. They are now being implemented also in terms of training. The largest NATO military exercise to date, which is under... But this old plan wasn't fit for purpose, was it? The old plan was based on a different world, which is a world where there is not war in Ukraine. The new plan is based on the reality that Russia is not only a theoretical threat, but a very real threat, and the plans have been adapted. But NATO was supposed to prepare for war. It wasn't supposed... It's not there for peacetime. It's not there for decoration, is it? No, it's not. And if we remember, it was just a few years ago that the French president even said that NATO was brain-dead. I think that was the term that he used. But things change. And the change, who has brought about the change, is Mr. Putin and the Russian war machine. And the difficulty... I could spend all of my time as a Latvian foreign minister complaining about what we have not done. But I also have to acknowledge that an incredible amount has been done. We simply need to continue and to do more. And the direction is very, very positive. Again, if we take a look at Germany, Germany created the 100 billion euro defence fund, which is now being implemented. As Germany builds up its armed forces, this is very, very good for all of NATO. And this is what we need. So it's the step-by-step pledges and realisation. The difficulty and the frustration that I feel is that as we are going step-by-step, Russia is going full throttle forward. And there is a disbalance between the autocracy of Russia and the democracy of NATO. And what we have to realise is that we need to move it into the next year. We're in second year. We need to get to fourth and then to fifth year. Ukraine can win this war. If it's given the tools to win it, about which it's justified in having its doubts. Minister, there's a lot of talk about NATO's security guaranteed to its members. But these aren't cast-iron guarantees, are they? It doesn't mean that NATO troops will immediately rush into battle against anyone threatening a member country, does it? How safe do you feel? How safe does Latvia feel with this famous Article 5 treaty on the books? We feel very safe. And what has to be remembered is that in Latvia as in the Baltics as in the entire eastern flank, if an attack were to happen, NATO troops wouldn't have to rush in. They're already here. They're here on a daily basis. It's physically impossible. In very small numbers. It's physically impossible to attack any of the Baltic countries without attacking other countries' NATO soldiers at the same time. And that in and of itself is part of the deterrence. And those numbers you say are small, they were much smaller. So the numbers are actually increasing. And the Canadian government, which is heading the NATO efforts in Latvia, has pledged also budgetary money, so very real money, to move up to a full brigade. And you could say, well, there's one brigade, there's ten brigades. This is a question for the military people. I'm a politician. But the ramping up is very, very visible. I would ask you whether you think that the US, as the lead nation in NATO, would go to war, say, for the sake of Albania or North Macedonia or Slovenia? See, it's not going to war for the sake of someone. We are all in the military alliance together. And that is our combined power. The combined power is, for 75 years, where NATO has been working, it has deterred war. And that is its goal. NATO is not formed and is not working in Europe in order to fight a war. NATO is there so that a war would never have to be fought. And the difficulty that Ukraine has is that it is not in NATO. It was not in NATO before the attack. And that, I think, is the reason, what Putin was speculating on. Because it's not in NATO, no one would help it. But look, we're even aiding Ukraine even though we have no formal obligation to do so. And so the NATO alliance is a preventative alliance. It's not supposed to fight a war, although it's fully capable of doing so. It's supposed to prevent a war, which it has done for many years. And right now, we have to increase our capability to stop it in Ukraine. Well, yes. In an ideal world, there won't be a war. But in an ideal world, there wouldn't be the war that we already have in Europe. You mentioned earlier President Macron's recent suggestion that France could conceivably send troops to Ukraine, not on its own, but as part of a multilateral deployment. Would Latvia, in principle, join such a mission? These are very theoretical issues you're talking about. What Macron's suggestion, I think, the strength of this suggestion, is it starts to create strategic ambiguity for Russia. And Macron does have a point. In NATO, in democracies, we have all the time put down red lines, what we won't do, what we won't do, what we won't do. And forgetting about the fact that Russia looks at this and says, they won't do this, they won't do that, they won't do the third. Macron's suggestion actually creates strategic ambiguity for Russia and sort of blurs the red lines that we have drawn ourselves. So the point is not now to say what we will or what we won't do. What we must do in NATO is increase our spending, increase our defense industry, do all of this in a very visible and transparent manner so that Putin sees we are serious. President Macron also urged his allies not to be cowardly. He said a moment was being approached in our Europe where it will be appropriate not to be a coward. Has NATO been cowardly? Have individual countries been cowardly? I would argue no. NATO has shown no indication of being cowardly. NATO has shown the opposite. As the pressure comes up, NATO ups its game. The only issue at hand is we need to up our game quicker. That's all that's at stake. That's all the discussion that we need to do. Everything that we're doing, we simply need to do it quicker. I want to talk, if I may, in the remaining time that we have about some of the responses your government has made inside Latvia to the war in Ukraine. Notably the decision to phase out Russian language as one of your country's official languages in the media and to check the loyalty of Russian-speaking minorities who account for almost 30% of your population. I wonder, Minister, how this could have been anything but deeply divisive in your country. I have to correct some things that you're saying. They're simply not true. Russian has not been an official language in our country since we regained our independence. We have one official language, that is Latvian. We have an outstanding policy in our educational system to make sure that all people living in Latvia, certainly all citizens, learn our national language so that we can communicate with them and they have the equal opportunities in the job as any Latvian would have. Any country making sure that its citizens speak the national language, I think this is quite common in Europe and certainly we are no exception to that. We have a small minority of Russian nationals among our citizens. People who are not Latvians who have Russian citizenship who permanently reside in Latvia. Of those Russian nationals, a proportion of them are people who used to have either permanent residency status in Latvia or even a Latvian citizenship. Or even a Latvian passport. Who gave that up some years ago for a Russian passport but not to live in Russia, but to live in Latvia. For these small subset of Russian citizens who live in Latvia on a permanent basis who used to have our citizenship or our permanent status, we ask of them, if you wish to continue to reside in Latvia as Russian citizens, please, at least at a minimum level, learn our language. This is not an outlandish thing to ask. That has nothing to do with minorities. These are foreign nationals who reside in Latvia and they are foreign nationals who gave up our status, our citizenship, for Russian citizenship. Last July, your own Central Statistical Bureau showed that all groups that had polled had changed for the worse and a majority of Russian-speaking families now believe that fascism was increasing in the country. That was not the case at the start of the war. That's not quite the outcome you wanted, is it? I don't know what data you're relying on. The data that I was just introduced by in the government we were looking at is that as the war progresses, not looking at what language people speak at home, but the percentage of people supporting Russia has been decreasing. I think it's around 6-7%. That means 93-94% actually do not support Russia regardless of what language they're speaking. There is a rather common misconception about what people in Latvia think or don't think. There are attempts, and this is a narrative that falsely comes from Russia about all of the Russians who are living in Latvia. It's simply not the case. Young people in our country all speak the national language. They're actually quite well integrated. There are no tensions on the street level. There never have been. It's simply a question of what Russia is trying to convey to the world that this country in some sense belongs to Russia. This is simply a false narrative given by an imperialistic power. What we are saying is please come and visit, speak to people, look around. This is a fantastic country. We actually feel quite good and quite safe here. The attitude of the population towards Russia's aggression in Ukraine is quite visible. I think that speaks book loads of attitude of these people. These are not ethnic minorities. These are Russian citizens residing here. All right. We have to leave it there. Thank you very much indeed for being on Conflict Zone. Thank you. Thank you very much.