Lecture 21

IIT Kanpur July 201
20 followers
Dec 1, 2023
Welcome to this session. In the previous session, we have discussed the basic concept of asymmetric
information. Then we said that how asymmetric information leading to market failure and
selection bias by using the examples of used car market. In this session, we will extend
the discussion. We will see how this kind of market failure, asymmetric information
and market failure would happen in various different types of finance markets.
Let us start with how this would happen in individual insurance market. For the sake
of simplicity, let us take it as individual health insurance market. Consider a situation
where people can purchase individual health insurance policy. In an individual health
insurance market, the problem for insurance companies is that they do not know who has
the highest risk of health expenditure or what are the potential health risk of the
potential purchaser or potential consumers or potential insurer. As compared to insurance
companies, you know that people themselves have an idea whether they are a high risk person or
not. If you just think about yourself, whether you are going to buy a health insurance or not,
if you do not, you know the reason. Because you think that you are healthy and you think
that the probability for or the propensity to consume health care products in the next one
year may be very less. Your forecast is that you may not be needing any hospitalization.
So, why would you simply buy a health insurance product? However, at the same time,
if someone having any health risk or having seen that he or she is having very chronic disease
conditions and also anticipate that he or she is going to get hospitalized and then the person
will be more motivated or incentivized to purchase a health insurance product.
So, why so simply here in this case, what we have seen that between insurance companies
and prospective customers, consumers, we can see that there is asymmetric information about
the health risk. Health risk is the parameter where we can observe that there is asymmetric
information. Because of this asymmetric information, it can lead to market failure
in insurance market. It can lead to poor performance in private insurance market.
So, let us explain, let us discuss how asymmetric information is going to lead,
going to result the poor performance or poor working of private insurance market. So,
we introduced the concept called selection bias in the used car market case where we
discussed the market will be over represented by used car, that poor quality car. That means,
at the end there will be only poor quality car and finally the used car market will collapse.
So, here also the idea here, the selection bias which we discussed there, the proper
definition for selection bias is that actions by insurers and consumers to exploit unpriced
risk heterogeneity, that is the health risk and break pooling arrangement. So,
actually when we talk about insurance, insurance means it is a pool of high risk and risk pool of
people with a different risk, that the high risk, medium risk, low risk. So,
it should be a mix of all kinds of risk involved. Suppose, we see that in a society for example,
in any country for example, with a 1 billion population, 1 billion population. If you know
that actually 1 billion, that the 100 crore, suppose we see that 1 crore is going to need,
crore is going to needing, 1 crore, 1 crore population needing hospitalization in the next
year, then remaining 99 crores would not need any hospitalization. This is based on data about the
hospitalization probability, hospitalization episodes, we come to come up this data for
example. So, that means in this we know that 1 crore is high risk population and 99 crores are
low risk. So, accordingly we know that out of this only 1 percentage of the population is needing
hospitalization. So, how an insurance company will underwrite the policy, it will be based on
this information. That means only 1 percentage is requiring hospitalization and remaining 99,
they do not need. So, if they assume that all the 101 billion population, 1 billion entire
population is joining the insurance, so they need to pay the claim only to this 1 percentage.
So, what they will do? So, they will be calculating the risk premium in a way that what will be the
total expenditure for example, this 1 crore. 1 crore suppose, they will be needing for example,
10 billion dollar. Suppose, 10 billion dollar is the total health expenditure for this 1
crore population. You know that then the remaining for the 99, we already know that
is going to be only in 0 billion. That means 0 expenditure for this 99 percentage.
So, based on this what we can see that when they do the pricing, you know that if their
assumption is that all the 1 billion population will join the policy and accordingly the total
health expenditure is 10 billion only, 10 billion plus 0 billion. So, you know that
is only 10 billion. That means 10 billion divided by the entire population that is 1
billion. So, accordingly you know that the risk premium is going to be 10 dollar only for this
policy. Plus, this is the premium calculated based on the risk profile, risk premium plus
they will add the operating cost plus profit that also include the profit as well.
Assuming that this one is 2 per unit policy, you can see that per person has to pay dollar
12 if you make this calculation to buy this policy given this is the health risk profile
of this population. So, this is the overall scenario. Suppose, actually you know that not
all this 1 billion population is going to join the policy and not that actually this proportion
that the 1 to 99 that the 1 percentage is risky, high risk and this 99 is low risk.
So, this proportion that the 1 percentage 1 to 99 this proportion even if not all the 1
billion is joining even if 1 crore. Suppose, in the total pool if it is going to be 1
percentage is high risk and 99 percentage is low risk then it is fine. Then this calculation which
we came up here that the risk premium 10 and the loading cost or operating cost is 2 then
this calculation hold true. But what is going to happen really in the market?
Really in the market is that actually this would not be the case. We know that those who
thinks that risk because for the insurance company they cannot clearly identify out of
this 1 billion or out of this entire population who are this 1 percentage who is having high risk,
who are this 99 percentage population who are having low risk. That insurance company cannot
directly identify those people. But among this 1 billion you already know that people that 1
percentage they most of them may be knowing that about their health condition that they are higher
risk population. So, this information asymmetry obviously we are going to see that the actions
by insurance and consumers the potential consumers they are going to exploit this
unpriced risk heterogeneity and as a result we are going to see that this is going to result
in break pooling arrangement. That the pooling means actually insurance means this risk pooling,
risk pooling that risk of this low risk and high risk. This pooling together then coming up with
in this way that coming with this insurance this premium and selling the insurance product
underwriting that in selling the insurance product in the market. This is actually a
kind of pooling arrangement, risk pooling. Risk pooling means different types of risk
and however as we discuss here that if but because of this information asymmetry because
this would lead to adverse selection problem that we are going to discuss shortly.
And another case actually insurance if they have some other kind of information if they
do something else to overcome this adverse selection it would also lead to cream selection
problem. Let us see the case of adverse selection issue. So suppose that when the
risk pooling is going to over represented by high risk population. Suppose we saw that
actually in this population we know that 1 percentage is high risk and remaining 99
percentage is low risk but due to the information asymmetry we know that since the joining to
insurance policy buying is a voluntary decision of prospective customers.
So you see that if it is those who are feeling that they need more health care
consumption or they are going to fall sick and needing hospitalization. If they are going to
join more suppose the red color smiley suppose let us call them the high risk. This is the
high risk population, high risk and this light blue color we are going to see this is the low
risk. Ideally it should be say that 1 percentage of high risk and 99 percentage of low risk but
actually what is going to happen that this market is going to be over represented by high risk
people. So in this case what you can see that when an insurance policy is sold in the market
and actually this market will be over represented by high risk population that means high risk
customers. So those who need hospitalization. So in this case because here you can see that
from this the figures here you can see that the smile is over represented by high risk population.
So then the calculation which we made in the beginning that means the premium based on the
if representation is happening then we found that the premium is going to be dollar 12 only right.
But in this case we are going to see that our calculation the premium 12 is not going to hold
true. So because of this you know that because of this one you know that in the next circle when
the insurance company is underwriting the policy they know that this market actually over represented
by high risk population, high risk insurance. So as a result they will be redoing this
calculation and the premium is going to increase. And let us see this before going to that let us
see this scenario what you can see that since individual themselves know much about their health
condition than insurance companies people who insure themselves are those who are increasingly
certain that they will need health insurance and buy more insurance as compared to individuals
who thinks that they do not need insurance. As compared to low risk people with the high
risk people you will get insurance coverage they will buy. So those purchasing insurance
are a non representative portion of the population right. So this lead to a situation of buying of
health insurance by high risk people and thus resulting of over representation of such high
risk people in the pool. Now let us see if this scenario happens what is going to happen in this
market. Now we know that the premium is once this happen the premium is not going to be this 12
dollar at all this is going to increase this is going to for example the new premium may be for
example based on this calculation the new premium for example is going to be 200.
So in this example we know that though it is over represented by high risk population we
can also see some low risk population as well here. But if the premium increase if it is premium
because of this adverselation the companies will be their new calculation suggest that the premium
has to be increased accordingly and when the premium increase. Now let us see what is going
to happen. So when the premium increase some people for example they think that is better
you know what is the point of giving 200. So they eventually leave the market may be
when the renewal of this policy at that time those who did not use health insurance coverage
who did not make any claim we know that they are a healthy low risk what they will do they
will think that they will eventually leave the market. When they leave the market gradually
when they leave the market what is going to happen. You see because of the adverselation
the premium has increased and again in the subsequent circle we are going to see that
the market will be over represented by high risk people only. So in this case now if the
insurance companies is going to do the underwriting due to the actuarial calculation they are going
to see that this population actually only represented by this high risk.
And actually the premium will be the average of the total health care expenditure. Suppose
the total health care expenditure here whatever we get actually the premium is going to be almost
that the suppose the total health care expenditure is 10 billion now this will be represented by
only for example 0.1 percent of suppose 1 crore population. So accordingly you now you know that
actually the premium is going to be 1000 right 1000 dollar. So that means 1000 dollar will be
the almost the average of the hospitalization expenses. So in this case the premium is almost
equal to the average of the hospitalization expenditure then what is the point actually
this market is now only with them and what is the point for example the operating cost for
this for each of the policies for example then it is for example 10 then is going to be this
much right this is going to be the new premium. So overall what you can see that this market
this is now more with high risk people and you can see that this is nothing but adverse selection.
So what we are going to see that this kind of market won't exist even this person also will
think that why should I pay 1000 premium because I am not using it I don't I mean I know I don't
need the insurance policy asset I am feeling myself healthy. So this is actually will be
more with unhealthy people that means it is an adverse selection in insurance market right.
So that means this market will collapse this is called a kind of market failure in insurance
market and in order to overcome this you know sometime insurance companies they will give
insurance coverage they will do a cherry picking they will exclude they will make it clear that
those who with previous health histories health problems hospitalization as episodes those who
have been hospitalized earlier those who are having chronic diseases like for example heart
disease or having some chronic risk factors like diabetes hypertension they won't be given.
And moreover not only that and if they say that they are not going to give insurance
coverage to if they deny insurance coverage to older people elderly population and they
only give insurance coverage to for example those with age group of for example 18 to 40 or 45 for
example if they limit it of maybe for example 40 this also suppose with another premium for
example 55. Suppose they give only to lower risk population then you can see that this market will
be they will be cherry picking they actually deny insurance coverage to unhealthy population
and those for example elderly because elderly once you grow old you know that after certain
years your health stock start deteriorating then you need to restore your health you need
more consumption of health care products health care expenditure increase right.
So that means age is a indicator for screening right age is a indicator for screening to identify
that a senior elder population is high risk and similarly those who had earlier health expenditure
hospitalization episodes and with a chronic disease condition and they will be excluded
and this market will be over represented by cream selection. This is another case of market failure
here also actually the purpose is not being served is only with a low risk population.
So the cream selection the definition for this one is the practice of excluding the unhealthy
and sick from the insurance coverage by insurance. So the solution here is actually
compulsory universal coverage that means government come up with the regulation that
there should be compulsory universal coverage. So because of this asymmetric information we
said that the market failure happen actually there are mainly two types of market failure
happen one is the adverse selection which we already discussed this another one is
moral hazard issue which we will discuss in some of the next session. So actually this issue can
be better understood by agency theory which analyzes how asymmetric information problems
affect economic behavior. So the point which we discussed the selection problem or the adverse
selection occurs before a transaction occurs before is a ex-ante outcome.
So before a transaction occurs then that there actually the adverse selection occurs and the
second concept that the another kind of market failure due to asymmetric information that is
arises after the transaction has developed transaction has settled. So after that so
this part as I mentioned we will be discussing in length in the next session. So let us continue
this adverse selection the first part of the market failure problem. Let us now see how adverse
selection influences the financial structure. So if quality cannot be assessed so this adverse
selection let us also call it as Lehman problems that is low quality car example.
So is popularly known as Lehman's problem that is solution problem. If quality cannot be assessed
the quality of for example the quality of bonds the quality of stocks it cannot be assessed the
buyer is willing to pay at a more at a at most a price that reflects the average quality and
sell is so good quality items will not want to sell at the price for average quality right.
And then the buyers will decide not to buy at all because all that is left in the market is
of is poor quality items that is what we have seen by taking by discussing the examples of
used car. So this problem so we what we can see that in the market it will be whatever is left
in the market this is only going to be the poor quality items. So that means in the market between
buyers and sellers if it happened for example bonds stocks and insurance product which of that
also we have discussed. Then we are going to see that if adverse selection problem is there
because of the asymmetric information that is a reality asymmetric information.
Because of that because of this asymmetric information that is leading to adverse selection
or lemons problem it explains fact number 2 and partially explain fact number 1 which we
discussed. So what is fact number 2 issuing marketable debt and equity securities is not
the primary way in which businesses finance their operations. And fact number 1 is stocks are not
the most important sources of external financing for businesses. So in this case what you can see
for example fact number 2 and fact number 1 look at for example on the supply side of stock or
bonds. So let us for example look at the supply side of stock. So due to asymmetric information
some good companies may be afraid that stock may not get its full economic price. So the
companies with the strong economic fundamentals having a strong good financial project who is
going to see that their project is going to be a great success and going to earn huge profit.
And accordingly they expect that they expect a high IPO the unit price of their share they are
expecting a high amount. But because of the asymmetric information because the prospective
buyers of their stock may not be knowing whether this company is in good financial condition or
they are in a low risk or not the prospective buyers may not be knowing. So as buyers of the
IPO cannot distinguish the quality of the companies. So here clearly what we are going
to see that as the prospective buyers cannot clearly know which firm is of good quality.
Somebody say 2 firms suppose not only too many firms when they are issuing IPO if the buyers
cannot clearly distinguish which company is of good quality which is the peach and which is the
lemon. If they cannot distinguish you know that they are going to pay only the average of quality
price and eventually you also know that here this market will be over represented by low quality
because good quality companies they want a high IPO the high amount of high rate of IPO that
price for their stock but they would not be getting it. Similarly bond also the same issue
there may be the companies who is borrowing from the market those with a good economic fundamentals
and be good business prospects may not be able to they actually expect that when lower the risk we
have discussed in the previous session that those who have low risk that means high quality firms
they should be able to borrow at low interest rate from the market.
But that would not happen because of asymmetric information. So let us see this issue apply this
one in the other market lemons in the stock market and also let us apply this concept in
the bond market as well. So here see this fact we are actually elaborating this fact in the stock
market discuss in the context of stock market and bond market. So in the lemons stock market
what is going to happen. So you know that good firms who have we can call them peach they have
high expected profit and low risk and bad firms that is lemons you know that they have low expected
profit and high risk. So you know that the investors willingness to pay is going to be
the price of the average quality. Then what is going to happen in this market
because of asymmetric information you know that managers of good firms know more about their firm
than the potential investors. So since as the managers of good firms know more about their firm
than investors. So the firm within the good firms they have less willingness to accept the average
price for their stock like the IPOs. They are not willing to accept the average price the price for
the average quality because the investors willingness to pay will be the average of
both that we have already seen in the previous discussion. So what is going to happen at the
same time this is about the managers of good firms that means high quality firms.
How about the low quality firms that means about the lemons you can see that the bad firms they
are in fact happy with the average quality price. You know why because obviously they
are getting more than they actually deserve. So this is the case since that the with all
is happened because of the asymmetric information. Then how about the investors
they do not want to buy stock of bad firms obviously. You know that they want to earn
dividend and they also want to see capital gain in the days in the future. So they do not want
to buy the stock of bad firms. So they end up with actually they do not want to buy the stock
of bad firms. So actually this market it will be over represented by it will be more with the bad
firms. This market is going to be only with the bad firm that is nothing but the point that we
mentioned adverse selection in the stock market. Adverse selection in the equity market is better
to call it as equity market because stock means we already said that transaction in the already
secondary market. So this you can say is the equity market. So in the equity market you can
say that there is only there is going to happen adverse selection is going to happen that means
the collapse of equity market because investors finally because it will be over represented by
bad firms then investors they do not want to buy the IPOs of bad quality firms share.
In the next session we will continue this discussion and at that time we will discuss
also apply the lemons in bond market. Thank you.
Thank you.
