Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items: Managing Supply Chain Risks (Module 3 though 6)

U.S. Department of Energy
60 followers
Nov 2, 2023
The virtual training was created to address supply chain risks related to counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items (CFSIs) as used in terminology by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency. DOE uses the terminology S/CIs or Suspect/Counterfeit Items. The training is divided into two main videos:
Video 1: Module 1 and 2
Video 2: Module 3 though 6
Section 3. In this section, we will discuss the process used to analyze and rate risks.
Attendees will learn about the risk analysis process and rating the risks.
We learned in the previous sections that you will analyze risks by the impact of the risk
to the likelihood of the occurrence. Impact may include any of these items,
but impact is ultimately the estimate of the harm that could be caused by an event.
Impact may be rated from low to high, based on the estimated amount of harm that could
occur to the environment, safety, health, security, mission, cost, or various other
business factors. Likelihood is the probability that an event will occur.
Some items are more likely to be counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect,
since they have been historically and continue to be targeted by counterfeiters.
These include obsolete components, difficult to procure items, items where lead times are critical,
items where multiple versions are available, items where there is a high volume but low price
or vice versa, and common commercial items, items of strategic value, etc.
An organization can approach analyzing risks in different ways, and it should be tailored
to the organization's specific needs. This chart is an example of a methodology for counterfeit
risk analysis. Once risks are rated and understood, it is often easier to propose and identify
controls. As an example, if you had an item that you determined to have a high impact to your
organization and a high likelihood as a risk rating, you may be able to determine specific
measures or controls for this rating. What might create a higher likelihood for an item to be
counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect? You can pause the video to discuss as a team or continue.
Answers might include obsolescence, supplier choice, multiple versions, volume, cost, strategic value.
Blank is the estimate of harm that could be caused by an event. Again, pause to gather any answers
from a team or for yourself. Impact is the answer to number two. And number three, blank, is the
probability that an event will occur. Again, pause the video to gather any answers. Likelihood is the
answer to number three, is the probability. Continuing with section four, assess the risks,
processes, and controls. In this section, we will discuss what the gap and risk assessment
processes are. And attendees will learn about these processes and how they may be used.
Performing a gap analysis and risk assessment helps organizations to understand and correct
disparities between desired levels and actual levels of performance. Identify inadequate controls
such as inadequate or missing procedures, processes, or policies. This could also be
inadequate training or physical controls used in systems to prevent human error. Identifying trends
that require additional controls. This is analyzed by someone who has the capability to understand
the data sets and evaluate the data to determine if there are any overarching issues that should
be addressed in policy or even with the addition of a physical control. A physical control could be
adding a stop in a procurement system that will not allow purchasers to proceed without adding
a counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect items clause to a contract. This mistake proofs the process
so that it is always added when it needs to be. Physical controls should be assessed frequently
and on a defined schedule to verify that they are working correctly. Continually improving
processes is very important, even if all trends are pointing towards everything is looking good.
It is always good to assess processes and verify that they are working properly.
Interview workers and see if processes that are being used are followed the way that they are
supposed to or if adjustments need to be made based on their feedback. There is always room
to improve processes and controls. A gap analysis, which may also be referred to as
a needs analysis, is important for any type of organizational performance. It allows companies
to determine where they are today and where they want to be in the future. Companies can re-examine
their goals through a gap analysis to figure out whether they are on the right track to
accomplishing them. Ultimately, the goal of any gap analysis is to identify areas of improvement
and potential risks that may affect operations. The main purpose of a risk assessment is to
eliminate or reduce operational risks, like threats and vulnerabilities, and improve the
overall safety of the workplace. A risk assessment is used to identify and prioritize risks so
actions can be taken to mitigate them. It is important to perform and renew risk assessments
when starting a new project, introducing new processes or steps into workflows,
changing existing processes, and when new hazards are identified or arise due to other changes.
The risk assessment process may also review policies and management decisions on risks
and communication efforts, such as how information is exchanged involving risks.
What do you think is the main difference between a gap analysis and a risk assessment?
You can pause the video to gather any answers. A potential answer here is the goal of the gap
analysis is to identify areas of improvement and potential risks that could influence or
negatively impact operations, whereas a risk assessment aims to identify and prioritize risks
so actions can be taken to mitigate them. So why perform a gap and risk analysis?
A gap and risk assessment can help you identify gaps in your policies, procedures, or compliance
controls and evaluate remediation your organization will need to employ in order to mitigate newly
identified internal and external risks. These two really work well together. A blank analysis
evaluates the current state against the future desired state. Pause to gather any answers to
the question. The answer to number one is gap, a gap analysis. Number two, a blank assessment
identifies hazards. Pause again to gather any answers. The answer to number two is risk,
or a risk assessment identifies hazards. All right, on to section five, which is mitigate.
In this section, we will review concepts to mitigate counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect
items, and hopefully attendees will understand this process better after reviewing this section.
In the previous sections, we have discussed risk planning, which address in detail risk
identification, risk rating, and risk assessment. In this next section, we will be reviewing and
depth the risk plan of action, which is where we mitigate the risks we have identified,
rated, and assessed. Risk mitigation is the action you take to reduce threats
and ensure resiliency. When you mitigate risk, you are taking steps to reduce adverse effects.
It is important to remember that mitigating risk is not just about fixing vulnerabilities,
it's about reducing the impact of any potential threats. When developing a mitigation strategy,
it is important to consider how your organization will react if something bad happens, as well as
how you can prevent negative events from happening now and in the future. When mitigating risk,
develop a strategy that closely relates to and matches your organization's profile. This is
very crucial. A proper mitigation strategy will define how you manage risks. We discussed in the
previous sections a risk planning process and strategy that may be used. There are five main
risk mitigation strategies that are commonly used in business, which include risk acceptance,
avoidance, reduction, transference, and sharing. Risk acceptance does not reduce any effects,
however, it is still considered a risk strategy. The strategy is a common option when the cost of
other risk management options, such as avoidance or limitation such as reduction, outweigh the cost
of the risk itself. A company that doesn't want to spend a lot of money on avoiding risks that
do not have a high possibility or impact in occurring will use the risk acceptance strategy.
An example of risk acceptance could be that the organization creates a holistic process
for reporting counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items, but there really isn't any
explicit prevention or detection being performed or processes for these types of actions.
Risk avoidance is the opposite of risk acceptance. It is the action that avoids any exposure to the
risk whatsoever. It's important to note that risk avoidance is usually the most expensive of all
risk mitigation options. An example of this is the organization may avoid the risk of counterfeit,
fraudulent, and suspect items by refraining from using certain technologies that are vulnerable
to being counterfeit or minimizing its usage. Additionally, it could be avoiding the use of
specific suppliers or manufacturers and only buying from specific manufacturers or authorized
distributors. Risk reduction is the most common risk management strategy used by most businesses.
The strategy reduces a company's exposure to risk by taking actions. It is a strategy employing a bit
of risk acceptance along with a bit of risk avoidance or an average of both. An example of
risk reduction would be a company accepting that a disk drive may fail and then avoiding a long
period of failure by having backups. Another risk reduction example could be that an organization may
invest in inspections and tests for items. Inspectors may be trained on counterfeit, fraudulent, and
suspect item identification and acquisition personnel may also be trained on prevention and
use of prevention methods during the acquisition process. All of these things will reduce the
likelihood of counterfeits and fraudulent and suspect items. Therefore, exposure to that risk
is reduced. Risk transference is handing risk over to a willing third party. This is often completed
by means of a contract. Why might an organization transfer risk? There's maybe a
couple of different reasons, but it could be to transfer liability to that third party, to transfer
risk in areas where the organization may not be an expert. Maybe they're not an expert in payroll
or other services, to transfer operations or processes that may aid in continuity of operations
in the event of a natural disaster or other supply chain risks such as what occurred during the
pandemic. An example of risk transference is an organization may choose to transfer some of the
risks of counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items by having a third party conduct audits of a supplier
for counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items or having them conduct inspections or tests or
acquisition operations in which that company may not be a subject matter expert in. So, what are
some examples of risk transference? Additional examples. These include contract clauses
for counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items, insurance policies, which may not be applicable
always in this case, but definitely extended warranties, other things that could be.
Risk sharing occurs when responsibility for risk assumed by one organization can be shared with
another. Although this method may not eliminate the risk, it may reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
Organizations with different risk tolerance levels may be able to use risk sharing to align
responsibility for different types of risk with the commensurate risk tolerance levels and to
assign responsibility for specific types of risk to organizations with the appropriate expertise
or resources to address them. So, what's the difference between risk sharing and risk transference?
Is that risk transference is the strategy of financing your risk by shifting the responsibility
and loss to another person or organization for a price, usually conducted through a contract of
some sort, whereas risk sharing is dividing risks between two or more individuals or organizations.
So, what's an example of risk sharing? These could include agreements to share resources
or expertise, such as during a design phase of a project. This could be sharing policies,
procedures, processes for counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect item prevention and detection.
Good risk sharing approaches normally will combine agreements for cost sharing on preventative and
deterrent measures. The policies allow for inclusion of costs and budgets and the contribution
agreements themselves and agreements on how to deal with residual accepted risks, should they
materialize. Agreements on organizations' responses to identifying, reporting, and potentially
disposing of counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items. So, just as a review, we went through
identifying the risk, rating by likelihood and impact, assessing risks, and then mitigating risks.
In this scenario, scenario number one, we have identified a risk on our risk list in which the
part is obsolete and is no longer available from the manufacturer or their distributors.
You'll be performing the risk rating on this item and consider how likely is it that your
organization will receive a counterfeit, fraudulent, suspect item since the part is obsolete and no
longer available from the manufacturer and what might be the impact. When performing a risk
assessment, you determined that there is a current obsolescence management process in place for your
organization, but not for this specific project. Typically, your organization requires a design
refresh and replace parts that are obsolete or end-of-life every 10 years, but this is out of
cycle and it has only been five years since the original design was released. The project staff
will have decided to move forward with procuring the obsolete and end-of-life products from sources
that may still have them in stock since the items were recently discontinued in the last year.
100% inspection will be required to be performed, including tests specific to identify counterfeit,
fraudulent, and suspect items issues on the items. For the risk plan of action, do you think that
the risks are being accepted, avoided, reduced, transferred, or shared and do you think that this
is enough? You can pause here to discuss with the team as needed. In this analysis, we have
determined that the risk has a high likelihood and moderate impact. Mitigations that are suggested for
this likelihood and impact are to transfer, share, and reduce the risks. So, what is a method we might
use to transfer risk? And pause here to discuss with your team if doing training as a team. A
potential answer is that contracts are used to transfer risk to third parties. This might include
a counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect item clause, which also includes an indemnity clause.
What is a method we might use to share risk? Again, pause to discuss as a team. A potential
answer is to remember sharing risk is different than transferring risk in that it is more of an
agreement than a paid contractual obligation between the organizations. Some risk sharing
techniques could include having a common set of standards or processes for your counterfeit,
fraudulent, and suspect item prevention, detection, reporting, disposition, etc. This is especially
useful if multiple agencies or organizations will be performing work on the same project.
What is a method we might use to reduce risk? Again, pause the video to discuss if taking
training as a team. A potential answer is that inspections and tests may be used to reduce the
risk of using or installing a counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect item. Additionally,
supplier audits and assessments may be performed to determine if the supplier has processes to
prevent counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items at their facility. Scenario number two.
An individual is planning to procure an item that has no associated environment, safety, health,
or security risks. The item is also low cost and would have minimal impact operations if it were
to fail. This could be listed as little to no risk. For the risk rating, you will consider
how likely is it that your organization will receive a counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect item?
Has there been any previous issues with supplier or part, other reports, etc.? What might be the
impact? Will the item pose a hazard to the environment, safety of workers, or public health?
Will the item pose a significant impact to operations, reputation, or project success?
For the risk planning actions, you will consider if the risks will be accepted, avoided, reduced,
transferred, or shared. Since we identified in this scenario that the item was low cost and had
no identified risks to environment, safety, health, or security, it would likely be considered low
impact. For likelihood, we might consider the supply source and if any non-conformance,
substandard, or counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect item issues had been experienced before
with the source. This could raise the likelihood of receiving a counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect
item from low to moderate or high. In this case, let's assume the supply source is directly from
a manufacturer or their authorized distributor and that the source has been reliable in the past.
So, we will score this at low likelihood. For the risk mitigation, we will accept the risks because
the risks are low. What does it mean to accept the risks? Go ahead and pause the video if
conducting training as a team. A potential answer is accepting the risks means that the organization
may not be able to perform or may choose not to perform preventative or detection actions,
but there may still be a process in place to address counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect items
that are identified during the course of regular work processes by staff.
This could be a reporting process. Now, we are starting off at Section 6. In this section,
we will review planning concepts that will aid in counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect item
prevention. Hopefully, after this section, attendees will understand how to perform planning to aid
in better prevention processes. Upfront planning prevents counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items,
including software. Planning may start at the project planning stage using a defined,
graded approach and should consider what major procurements will be conducted during the project,
will critical items be procured, and what steps, if any, should be included to reduce potential risks
of counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items. A key component of planning is to understand the
risks and their controls. The integrity of systems and information is a critical component of managing
supply chain and cybersecurity risks. Prior to procurement, processes such as project planning
or design processes should consider the bill of materials, how items will be used,
criticality of items, and their associated risks, tests that may be needed, and customer-defined
specifications. It is vital at the procurement step that requirements are well understood
and communicated to suppliers and that contracts properly document requirements.
This is especially true when procuring items that will be used in a more critical capacity.
When preventing counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items, it is incredibly important we
create processes to understand and mitigate the risks of counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items.
What are some of the risks that these items pose and how can these risks be mitigated? We should
also work to understand best practices by capturing our internal organization practices,
but also look externally to other organizations for learning. Are there elements that we have not
thought of in our own organization or that we have not experienced? What did they do to prevent an
incident or event from occurring? We should always foster an environment and culture where prevention
is important versus reaction. This one is huge. Organizations may know that prevention is too
difficult, so they rely on inspection to get the job done, and this can be especially true
in counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect item processes. There may be instances where there
is not enough or there is not an option and processes such as commercial dedication,
when we're referring to internationally recognized standards such as American Society of Mechanical
Engineered Nuclear Quality Assurance or NQA 1 were to be used. There's still much effort that
may be utilized to prevent the use of substandard suppliers or manufacturers. We must always also
improve processes continually and verify processes and procedures match our level of work.
Assessment planning. It is important when planning for acquisitions that we determine who will
perform assessments. Often some sort of assessment of the supplier should occur, even if it is
informal. An informal assessment may be conducted by the acquisition office to verify that the
supplier address is valid or that the business itself is valid. Assessments may also include
trending or analyzing supplier past performance data. This could be reviewing information such as
non-conformances, counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect item complaints, on-time delivery, etc.,
which could all point to concerns with using a supplier or potential supplier risks. More
formalized on-site or other types of desk assessments may be conducted by internal auditors
or assessors by using third-party auditors or assessors that are external to your organization.
Formal assessments will be performed using industry or nationally recognized acceptance
standards. Desk assessments may be alternatives to on-site assessments and were more popularized
during the pandemic as another way to assess suppliers and manufacturers when travel was
restricted. This type of assessment may validate processes and procedures but may not fully validate
them against performance of the processes. Third-party assessments may also be performed
by consultants. Assessments may be required or could be ideal by independent organizations or
third parties when there could be conflict of interest concerns, where there could be biases
present, or when there is already a contract in place that may be altered, reduced in funds,
or could be stopped due to counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items issues.
Contract clauses. Understanding and defining when or what contract clauses are applicable is a very
important aspect to prevention and may also be an important aspect if a counterfeit, fraudulent,
or suspect item is identified at your organization. Contract clauses are often what is used during
civil liability cases to determine if funds may be recouped. This could be a huge factor if the
cost of the product is significant, property damage, or injuries were incurred due to the
counterfeit or fraudulent suspect item. Poorly written contract language can also be a get out
of jail free card in many instances. It is always recommended that your organization work closely
with legal counsel to determine the appropriate level of language to include in your clause for
the type of work you do or the products you are procuring. Specifications and requirements.
Specifications and requirements may be added into a contract clause, statement of work, or other
document that will define to the supplier the standards to be followed. Internal processes or
procedures may define who is responsible for defining specifications, requirements on acquisitions,
or at a minimum validating them prior to sending contracts to the supplier. This is the road map
for the supplier to provide the right item. If this is incorrect, then the item is likely going
to be incorrect and it won't be the supplier's fault. I cannot tell you how many times I've had
someone bring me an item that was non-conforming and they wanted to back charge the supplier,
but when I looked at the contract, I found the item met the contractual requirements.
Risk identification. How is risk identified and controlled specifically for the acquisition?
Is this a documented process? Are you using strategies for documenting and mitigating risks
such as what was previously discussed? And acceptance. Is the process of ensuring that
items meet requirements and specifications and that they will be usable for their intended
purpose? What inspection processes will be performed? Are there any special considerations?
Consider inspection processes such as source inspections. Acceptance testing may take place
at the supplier or purchaser's facility. Third-party laboratory testing and inspections.
Acceptance could be performed by a third party such as a laboratory that conducts specialized
testing. And receipt inspections. Your organization may use a defined graded approach
to inspect items or other inspections such as in-process, final, inventory, packaging,
shipping, inspection, etc. And what might be included as verification in your inspections?
Will these be informal or formalized based on a graded approach or risk-based approach
as defined by your organization? This was also previously discussed in the risk mitigation
sections. But what will be included as verification steps? Will these steps use a graded approach?
Is your organization using sampling or 100% verification? And does your organization
consider history of previous counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect item concerns
with the supplier or in general? And risk of the item, safety, and security. And supplier
past performance could include non-performance issues. What are some elements that might be
considered to prevent counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items that we just discussed?
Pause the video to discuss as a team if needed. Some potential answers could be procurement
planning, clauses, supplier assessment and on-site inspection, personnel and supplier training.
This could also be inspection planning. Questions should be directed at the
individual who posted this training or any training coordinators. Thank you very much.
There's also references and resources that were used throughout this training to develop it.
