When China joined the WTO in 2001, most experts in the West expected that China would become more democratic and a responsible global player as its economy develops. But the experts made the wrong bet. 20 years later, China today is becoming more authoritarian and mercantilist. Why were they all wrong? What is the real intent of the Chinese Communist Party? How can the challenges and risks posed by the CCP’s growing power be confronted?
In this interview, Mr. Clyde Prestowitz argues that the Chinese Communist Party has effectively been acting as if it were at war with the U.S, and the U.S. must respond accordingly. Mr. Prestowitz was a leader of the first U.S. trade mission to China in 1982 and has served as an advisor to Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama.
Hi, welcome to Focus Talk.
In this episode, we invite Mr. Clyde Prestowitz to have a conversation with us about U.S.-China
relationship.
Mr. Prestowitz was the leader of the first U.S. trade mission to China in 1982 and has
served as an advisor to Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton and Obama.
He is regarded as a leading writer and strategist on globalization and competitiveness.
He is also author of the book, The World Turned Upside Down, America, China and the Struggle
for Global Leadership.
Welcome Clyde.
Thank you for coming on to our show.
It's my pleasure.
Thank you for having me.
So Clyde, I have your book here, The World Turned Upside Down.
And on the preface of your book, the first paragraph reads like this.
I'll just quickly read it.
When China joined the WTO in 2001, most experts expected the WTO rules and procedures to liberalize
China and make it a responsible stakeholder in the liberal world order.
But the experts made the wrong bet.
China today is liberalizing neither economically nor politically, but if anything, becoming
more authoritarian and mercantilist.
So tell us, why were they all wrong?
For two or three reasons.
One reason they were wrong is because American leaders, both in the Republican and the Democratic
Party, widely throughout the intelligentsia of the United States, were deeply convinced
that market economies, free trade, would inevitably lead to democratization, to more liberal political
rule and eventually to democratization.
Secondly, you may remember that the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
And people said widely that that was the end of the Cold War.
And Francis Fukuyama, a well-known professor in the United States, wrote a book entitled
The End of History.
And what he meant with that title was that in Marxist, Leninist, communist theory, the
evolution of society comes to an ultimate close.
And Fukuyama was saying we're there, and it turns out that the end of history is not communism,
but it's freedom and democracy.
And people wanted to believe that, and they didn't believe that.
And then a third reason was because business leaders in the United States and around the
world, of course, were very interested in trying to get into the Chinese market, trying
to make money in China.
And so they wanted to believe that China was liberalizing and opening up not only economically
but also politically, because if it was, then they could justify investing in China and
making money in China.
And so for those three reasons, the policy of the United States and the rest of the free
world shifted to what was called engagement.
And it's important to identify the timing here because in 1992, Bill Clinton ran to
become president of the U.S.
And during the campaign, Clinton took a very strong line.
He said that he, if he were elected, that he would not coddle dictators from Baghdad
to Beijing.
And of course, in Baghdad, we had the Iraqi dictator, and in Beijing, we had the Communist
Party.
And Clinton said very strongly in his campaign that he would not coddle them.
It was going to be tough.
But soon after he was elected, he changed his tone, and he said that we needed to have
a policy of positive engagement with China.
And so positive engagement meant that we would try to negotiate market opening and investment
and try to build a closer economic relationship, which it was thought by American and free
world leaders would eventually lead to not just the economic liberalization, but the
political liberalization of China as well.
And that policy of positive engagement was pursued by Clinton and then by George W.
Bush and then by Barack Obama.
And it wasn't until Trump was elected in 2016 that the policy began to change.
A critical moment came in 2018.
The Economist magazine, which was founded in the 1840s by Richard Cobden, who was a
champion of free trade.
And ever since that time, so for the past 170 years, the Economist magazine has been
like the high priest of market economics and of free trade.
And the Economist magazine had been a major supporter and promoter of engagement with
China, bringing China into the World Trade Organization and promoting free trade with
China.
But on March 1st, 2018, the cover story of the Economist said the West had made the wrong
bet on China, meaning that engagement wasn't working and that economic liberalization was
not proceeding, number one.
And number two, that economic liberalization was not leading to political liberalization.
In fact, political liberalization was going in reverse.
So it sounds like, if I understand it correctly, that the political elites, the political leaders
in the West, were willingly deceived by the CCP.
I would say that they deceived themselves.
Yes, they were willingly deceived.
They didn't believe that they were being deceived.
They wanted to believe that China was liberalizing both economically and politically.
They wanted desperately to believe that.
The business leaders wanted to believe that because that was the basis on which they could
justify doing business in China.
Interestingly, the Chinese Communist Party, I think that it didn't really work too hard
to deceive them.
For example, there was a moment in about 2009 when Zhu Rongji was in Washington, and he
had dinner with then former President George H.W. Bush.
And during the dinner, Bush said to Zhu, how are you doing with dismantling and doing away
with the state-owned enterprises?
And Zhu said, no, no, no.
He said, we're not doing away with the state-owned enterprises.
And Bush smiled and said, knowingly, we know what you're doing.
Actually, Bush didn't know what Zhu was doing.
Zhu wasn't getting rid of the state-owned enterprises.
He was reorganizing them.
But Bush was convinced that Zhu was doing away with the state-owned enterprises.
Why was he convinced?
And I mean, I knew him.
I worked for him.
But he was convinced because in his mind, an economy couldn't work with state-owned enterprises.
So therefore, it was just logical that China would do away with state-owned enterprises.
And so he thought that Zhu was not telling him the whole truth, when in fact Zhu was
telling him the truth, and he didn't recognize it.
And I think that same attitude permeated not just George H.W. Bush, but most of our leaders
in the West.
Yeah, I think you gave a very interesting example.
So Clyde, you have many years of experience in trade negotiations with China, with Asian
countries, basically, right?
So you also deal with China a lot.
So can you share with us what has been your experience dealing with China and the CCP,
and how has your understanding of them evolved?
Well, I would say two things.
One is that before I became involved in China, I spent a lot of time in Japan.
So then when I became more engaged with China, I came quickly to understand that China had
studied Japan very carefully.
Not only had China studied Japan, it had also studied South Korea, and Taiwan, and Singapore,
and Germany very carefully.
And all of those countries are countries which have pursued export-led growth, have pursued
industrial policies, and which have pursued mercantilist trade policies.
And all of them have succeeded in rapid growth and in achieving high levels of technological
capacity.
So I quickly understood that the Chinese had been studying Germany, and Japan, and South
Korea, and Taiwan, and Singapore, and had learned a lot from them.
So I realized, okay, this is going to be essentially the same kind of negotiation that we had with
Japan, except it's going to be more difficult.
In the case of China, we have very little influence.
And so the negotiation between the U.S. and China for the U.S. is a much more difficult
negotiation than with Japan.
Okay.
So how did those negotiations experience, and your experience of dealing with CCP leaders,
how have those experiences helped you to understand the nature of the CCP regime, or the
nature of the government?
Well, I understood that China was aiming, I mean, that was in the early 1990s, I understood
that China's objective was similar to that of Japan, Korea, which was to become a leader
in important technologies, a major producer of manufactured goods, and a developer of
leading-edge technology.
And it was not going to pursue a development path like India, or Pakistan, or Brazil, or
Mexico.
It was going to follow what the East Asian countries before it had done.
That was the first thing.
Second thing is that I became also involved with a number of American companies who were
doing business in China.
And in the course of traveling with their leaders and meeting with Chinese business
leaders and Chinese business officials, I quickly came to realize that the Chinese business
leaders were very much closely tied to the political leaders and to the Communist Party
officials.
And I also came to realize that in China, the method of persuading people to do things
was not so much in a formal series of steps, but it was more informal pressure.
And so I came to realize that in China, if a top Communist Party official gave instructions,
that it was not going to be easy to counter those instructions or to oppose those.
And I realized that the discipline could be exercised informally.
You know, in the US, if a company has done something that the government doesn't like,
the government has to publicly accuse the company of doing something.
And then the government has to initiate a law case and go to court and ask for a judgment.
And the court may rule against the government.
I quickly realized that in China, that's not the way it happens.
The people don't go to court.
The government doesn't take companies to court.
It just tells them what to do.
So, very different environment.
Yeah.
So after 40 years of engagement policy, CCP still refused.
Basically, I refer to them as the Chinese Communist Party because they run the country.
So they still refuse to fit in to the rule-based world order.
What do you think is the real intention of the Chinese Communist Party?
I think they want to build a Chinese value-based world order.
And what would that be?
Well, let's put it this way.
In the U.S., there was, for a while, this idea that we want China to become a responsible
stakeholder in the liberal global rules-based order.
I think that it was a fantasy to believe that China would ever want to become a member of
somebody else's order.
China wants its own order.
China wants to set the rules itself.
And so I think what China has been aiming for is a resurrection of the old imperial
Chinese system in modern clothing, of course, but essentially a resurrection of the old system in
China is number one, and China sets rules and other countries are vassals or dependent
or exceed to China's direction.
So what would be a CCP-dominated world order like?
Well, I think that if we look at what's happening today between Australia and China,
that gives you an idea of what it would be like.
Or let me even go back further.
You may recall a few years back that South Korea erected a radar station in South Korea
that had the ability to observe the skies in China.
The Chinese Communist Party really strongly objected to that radar station in South Korea.
The radar station in South Korea was constructed on land owned by a South Korean company
named Lotte.
Lotte also had a lot of stores and business in China.
As soon as the radar station was erected on Lotte's land in South Korea,
business in China stopped.
No official order was given, but it had been made clear to the Chinese people
who were dealing with Lotte in China that they should stop dealing with Lotte.
And so Lotte's business in China just disappeared and went to zero very quickly.
I had a conversation with another Southeast Asian leader in the course of writing my book.
I met with the Prime Minister of one of the major Southeast Asian countries.
And he said to me, he said,
Clyde, look, you know that we here in our country are very sympathetic to America.
But I have to tell you that our biggest export is tourism.
And most of the tourists are Chinese.
And we know that Beijing can weaponize the tourists.
We know Beijing can stop the tourists from coming.
He said our second largest export is education.
And the students who come here come from China.
And we know that the students can also be weaponized.
So, you know, we're friendly to you.
We like your values and we want you to remain in support of us here in Southeast Asia.
But you have to understand that we need to take into consideration this big power
that has a big influence on our economy and our daily life.
And then I look at Australia.
And the Australian Prime Minister called for an open investigation of
the origin of the COVID virus.
Chinese Communist Party does not want an investigation
and does not want Australia asking for an investigation.
And so they launched a series of informal attacks.
They didn't issue any new law.
They didn't make a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization.
They just stopped buying Australian coal and Australian wine
and Australian barley and other products.
And then they sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Australia.
And they told the 14 points in the letter.
And they told the Australians to carefully consider and contemplate these points
in order to reform their behavior,
in order to get back into the good graces, the good will of the CCP.
So I think a world order headed by China is going to feel like that.
So basically, in the past 30 or 40 years,
the U.S. and the West have been feeding the beast, so to speak.
And today, China has grown to be the world's number two economy.
So back in summer of 2020, then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
gave a speech at the Nixon Library,
and he announced that the engagement policy with the CCP was over.
So he also stated that the CCP was the biggest threat to U.S. and to the world.
What's your thought on that?
I agree with him on both counts.
The engagement is over, and that's been confirmed by President Biden.
And so I think that era is done.
We're not anymore in the engagement era.
When you say China is the biggest threat,
of course, there are many threats.
The COVID virus is a threat, and global warming is a threat.
But in terms of national cooperation, and in terms of national values,
I understand what Pompeo was saying.
And I mean, I think that it's not surprising.
You may be aware of Document No. 9 from the Communist Party Congress,
I think it was in 2013, on the ethical, intellectual sphere.
And Document No. 9 says clearly, it's a statement by the Chinese Communist Party.
And it says the Chinese Communist Party opposes Western constitutional democracy.
It says that the Chinese Communist Party opposes universal values.
It says that the Chinese Communist Party opposes free speech.
Well, those are the fundamental values of the United States, of most of Europe,
of most of Latin America.
And Document No. 9 essentially says that the Chinese Communist Party is at war with those values.
And so clearly, there's a huge contradiction between the two sides.
And because China has become very strong, economically, militarily,
and also in terms of propaganda.
You certainly know very well the work of the United Front
Working Department of the Chinese Communist Party.
You know, here in Washington, D.C., every morning, I have newspapers delivered to my door.
Typically, I have four newspapers, the Washington Post, the New York Times,
the Wall Street Journal, and the Financial Times.
About a year ago, I picked up my Washington Post one morning and I opened it.
And in the middle of my Washington Post is a copy of the China Daily.
I didn't ask for it.
They just gave it to me.
And I complained.
I wrote to the Washington Post.
And I said, listen, you know, not only did I not ask for this, it's propaganda.
I don't want it.
And I don't think you should be spreading it.
And for whatever reason, I don't know if they paid attention to me or somebody else,
but for whatever reason, the Post stopped carrying the China Daily.
However, recently, when I get my Financial Times in the morning,
my Financial Times has the China Daily.
You just can't escape from it, right?
Get away.
So, you know, it's a very, very powerful force.
And we need to be aware of that.
So you also said that in the book,
we must understand that the Chinese Communist Party has effectively been acting
as if it were at war with us.
We must respond accordingly.
So are you saying that the U.S. and China are actually effectively in the Cold War?
And it seems like you're saying that the Cold War was started by China, by the CCP.
Well, I would say it a little bit different way.
I would say that the Cold War actually never ended.
You know, initially, let's say the Cold War began in 1948.
And it was initiated by the Soviet Union.
But also in 1948, the Communist Party took control of mainland China.
The Kuomintang was pushed out to Taiwan.
And the Chinese Communist Party, China under the People's Republic of China,
was allied with the Soviet Union.
And so the Cold War, and then in 1950,
Chinese troops secretly entered the Korean War against America.
So from 1950, China was part of the Cold War.
Then in 1972, of course, President Nixon visited Beijing, met with Mao,
and negotiated a kind of relationships.
Then in 1979, President Carter normalized relations.
So the U.S. recognized Beijing as the capital of China rather than Taipei.
And then in 1982, I went to China with the first American trade mission.
But at that time, in 1978, 1979, 1980, Mao had died.
And Deng Xiaoping was now in control.
And Deng and his fellow Communist Party leaders had many discussions
about what policy to pursue now that Mao was gone.
And in some of those discussions, some of Deng's comrades made the comment
that if we open the windows, flies will come in.
And Deng's response was, yes, if we open the windows,
there will be flies coming in, but we can handle the flies.
We can kill the flies, minimize the flies.
We can squirt anti-fly bug juice at them.
We can handle it.
And so in its external relations, in its diplomatic relations,
China began to, what we say, open up.
And it did allow foreign companies to come in and to invest and so forth.
But if you listen carefully to what Deng Xiaoping was saying,
he effectively was saying, yes, we want these,
we'll open up and we'll let these businessmen come in.
But if they bring any flies with them, you know,
like democracy and rule of law and free speech,
well, we'll have to clamp down.
And so, you know, the Cold War maybe got a little warmer, but it didn't end.
And then you get to June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square.
Yeah, today's, yeah, exactly.
Today, exactly.
And of course, I mean, Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin wanted to negotiate with the students
and Deng said, not going to do that.
He sent in the tanks shooting students, you know.
So that was a war.
That was a shooting war.
That wasn't a Cold War.
That was a war against liberal influences in China.
None.
OK, so that gets passed and the West, America particularly,
is still trying, thinking that if we're nice to these people
and if we trade with them and become linked to them,
they'll become more like us.
And so the US continues to do that.
But you probably are aware in 1993 that China began to build its own GPS locating system.
It could have used the US GPS.
It could have used the European Galileo,
China was going to build its own, just completed it last year.
1997, really, I think a huge moment that people don't pay enough attention to.
The Great Firewall was created in 1997.
That was decoupling.
That was severing the Chinese Internet from the World Wide Web.
And so that was a clear declaration by China.
We're not going to let any flies in.
We're not going to liberalize.
We're not going to let you guys even get on our Internet.
Google, Amazon, Facebook, all banned from getting into China.
And so then you have a constant five-year plans of China,
five-year economic plans.
And every five-year plan has some target of China achieving leadership
or achieving a higher target in developing nuclear weapons or developing machinery
or developing semiconductors or whatever it is.
And then finally in 2015, we get the Made in China 2025.
Made in China 2025 was also a declaration of decoupling.
China was saying, well, no, we're not going to buy your semiconductors.
We're going to make our own.
You know, it seemed to me the Chinese told us many times between 1982 and 2018,
the Chinese told us many times that we're not going, we're still in Cold War.
And we chose to ignore it.
We ignored it.
Yeah.
We ignored it because we didn't want to believe it.
And I think in essence, there seems to be a war between the communism ideology
and the universal values, like you just said,
the fundamental values that the Western world treasures, the free world treasures.
So there's no avoid, you can't avoid this Cold War.
Yeah, absolutely agree with that.
I don't think that, I mean, it's just that the fundamental values
that fire the lives of the Chinese Communist Party
and fire your and my life from the lives of the free world, they're just, they're opposed.
It's not just that they're opposed, but they're at war with each other.
I think of my friend, Jimmy Lai, who's, as you know, now in jail.
Yes, yeah, the Apple Daily.
Why is Jimmy Lai in jail?
He's in jail because he believes in free speech.
And Xi Jinping has said,
basta, there's not going to be any free speech in Hong Kong.
And so Jimmy's in jail.
So, you know, it's just inevitable.
If you're for free speech, you can't really do business with the Chinese Communist Party.
So you said we must respond accordingly.
How should U.S. confront and fight back this growing communist threat?
Right, right.
So that's a really, that is the question.
And it's not an easy question to answer, as I'm sure you well know.
Not easy to answer.
But I think there are some fundamental things that we should keep in mind.
First of all, in much of the world, and certainly here in the U.S.,
but it's also true in Europe and in Australia and other parts of the world,
and it's particularly true of intellectual circles,
people in the universities and the think tanks and in the press,
there's a tendency to think that we need,
that China is somehow cheating or it's violating the rules.
It's in the WTO, but it's not playing by the WTO rules.
And so we need to enforce the rules better.
We need to make China play by these rules.
And a lot of negotiating time in the WTO,
in the high-level strategic dialogues that have taken place over the last 20 years,
a lot of time has been wasted, completely wasted,
in trying to persuade China, threaten China,
force China to, quote, play by the rules.
And I think it's important to understand that China is not going to play by our rules.
China is going to play by Chinese rules, and we should accept that.
And rather than trying to change what they do, we need to change what we do.
And so, you know, I think that
a very important aspect of this is the question of investment
and the question of who represents whom.
So let me give an example.
Recently, I'm sure you're aware that China has agreed to allow
Western financial companies to hold majority
ownership of wealth management companies in China.
OK.
And Goldman Sachs, BlackRock, Blackstone, several other major U.S. financial advising firms
have quickly run to Beijing to establish these wealth management firms.
Now, in the Chinese press, this is presented as China is liberalizing,
as China is opening up to the West.
And isn't this great?
And just what the Western countries have been asking us.
And here in the West, it's been presented that,
wow, this is a win for American companies that China is opening up.
It's liberalizing.
It's allowing these American companies to come in and make money,
helping Chinese, wealthy Chinese, make more money.
Now, I look at this and I say, whoa, whoa, wait a minute.
Superficially, this looks as if Goldman Sachs is buying a Chinese company
and will benefit by doing more business in China.
But actually, what's happening is this.
By becoming deeply invested in China, Goldman Sachs is putting itself under
the increasing control of the Chinese Communist Party.
So when President Biden proposes some legislation, as he recently has,
to limit American investment in China, the heads of these banks in New York,
the head of Goldman Sachs, the head of BlackRock and Blackstone,
they come to Washington and they will go to the president and say,
no, no, don't do that.
So they have become agents of Beijing.
They become part of Beijing's propaganda.
Or let's take Apple.
Apple, as you know, makes most of its products in China.
Now, in America, Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple, is a very powerful guy.
Here in Washington, he spends tens of millions of dollars every year
in political donations, in hiring lawyers and lobbyists.
He has armies of lawyers and lobbyists to influence the Congress
and to influence the White House and the rest of the government.
If he calls the White House and wants to meet with the president,
the president will meet with him.
If he calls a senator and wants to meet the senator,
he has instant entree into all the centers of power in Washington.
In Beijing, does Tim Cook have any political power in Beijing?
Does he have any influence in the Chinese Communist Party?
Zero.
Zero?
Zero.
And let's take an example.
In 2015, the FBI, the U.S. Federal Police,
had a criminal case they were investigating.
And to investigate it, they needed to get information out of an iPhone.
And they went to Apple and said to Apple,
can you help us open this iPhone so we can get the information?
Apple refused.
The FBI filed a suit against Apple and took them to court
to ask the court to force Apple to open the iPhone.
Apple refused.
Fortunately for the FBI,
they found an independent person who could open the iPhone
and they got the information.
But Apple absolutely refused to cooperate with the FBI.
Okay, let's fast forward to 2019.
And students are demonstrating in Hong Kong for freedom, for democracy.
And Apple has an app in its app store.
It's called Hong Kong Map Live.
And if you had that app, you could look at Hong Kong in real time.
So the students were using it and they could see where the police were
and that allowed them to go where the police weren't.
Well, of course, the Chinese Communist Party didn't like that.
And the China Daily began writing really strong editorials
about how bad Apple was and how dangerous that app was.
And within two days, Tim Cook took that app out of the app store.
Now he says he did it voluntarily.
But is Tim Cook an American CEO or is he a Chinese CEO?
I would say he's a Chinese CEO.
Yeah, Clyde, we've seen this happening again and again and again and again.
We've seen countless cases of this sort.
But what can we do about it?
How can we change the situation?
Well, here's what we can do.
And what I have been proposing is,
so, you know, in any country, a corporation cannot just form itself.
It has to get a license from the government.
And so Apple is incorporated.
I believe it's incorporated in the state of Delaware.
But it has a corporate charter.
Now, in the U.S., the corporate charters are typically issued by states.
So Delaware, California, Maryland, they will all issue corporate charters.
And unfortunately, there has been a competition among the states.
And Delaware is a state that imposes the fewest restrictions on corporations.
And so most of the corporations incorporate in Delaware,
because it's the easiest corporate charter for the corporation.
My idea is, OK, that's fine.
But if a company reaches a certain size, let's say maybe $2 billion in sales,
and maybe it does about 20% of its business outside the United States,
well, then that corporation should have to get a federal charter.
And the federal charter would be issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
And the federal charter would have some rules.
And among those rules would be things that would restrain a Tim Cook
from lobbying for China.
We have a rule in the U.S. already that if an American person is testifying before the Congress,
and if that person is representing a foreign entity,
he or she must tell the Congress beforehand that,
I'm not here in my role as an American citizen.
I'm here representing this foreign interest.
Now, when Tim Cook testifies before Congress,
he always testifies as he's the CEO of Apple.
I think he should be required to testify as a foreign agent.
The head of the Chamber of Commerce, Tom Donahue, until just recently,
he would go to the Congress, he would go before audiences,
and he would call himself the voice of American business.
And I would look at his board of directors,
and all of the companies on his board of directors have big operations in China.
And I would say, no, Tom, you're not the voice of American business.
You're the voice of Chinese business.
You should be required to properly present yourself.
So I think there are rules and regulations that would bear on that.
Now, as you know, just recently, President Biden has imposed further restrictions
on any investment in China that might be related to companies in China making military products.
The U.S. government can increase the prohibition on investment in China.
And I think also that we have the means to force CEOs to face the essence of what they're doing.
So, I mean, you know, we have this, as you know, the situation in Xinjiang.
And some companies are refusing to buy products that are made in Xinjiang.
And I think that the power of the U.S. government to impose restrictions on
buying from entities that are in the Asian genocide or that are engaged in other,
essentially, anti-human policies can be extended.
Yeah. Yeah. So we're running out of time here, Clyde.
But I think these are important issues and discussions.
So basically, we need to build up public pressure, I guess, right?
On these big corporations and entities.
Let me make one other point, which is very, very important.
I don't think we should waste any time negotiating with China.
Trade negotiations, forget.
What we should do is to set our own Made in America 2030.
And we should absolutely determine that in all the leading technologies,
artificial technology, robotics, semiconductors, biotech, all of them,
that the leadership in those industries is going to be either U.S. or free world.
But it's not going to be China. That's essential.
We need to make ourselves more competitive than China.
And we need to, and President Biden is beginning to do this,
we need to bring our allies together with Europeans and the Japanese and the Australians.
We need to have a united free world front.
Yeah, I think you're absolutely right.
Like you said, the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, will not change.
People need to understand the nature and respond accordingly, basically, like you said.
Well, thank you so much, Clive, for this conversation.
I think these discussions should happen every day and on a large scale,
both in the United States and in other countries.
So hopefully we will see a positive change
toward the kind of policies that you just talked about.
Well, I certainly hope so.
I really appreciate talking to you.
And I hope we'll have a chance to speak together again in the future.
Thank you very much.
Thank you. See you.
Bye-bye.
Well, thank you, everyone, for watching Focus Talk.
That was my conversation with Mr. Clive Prestworth.
We'll see you next time.