Regional Power: Iran

Army Analysis
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This film examines the current status of the Iranian military. Subject matter experts discuss Iranian history, current affairs, and Iranian military doctrine. Topics include the rise of the Ayatollahs, the relationship between the IRGC and the Artesh, and Iran’s defense strategy. “Regional Power: Iran” is the third film in a four-part series exploring America’s global competitors.
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In my personal opinion, I still don't understand why we are approaching one size for all feed
towards China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.
It's clearly driving them towards each other, right?
And that's a profound challenge would be, potentially, for our national security interests.
Can we fight China and Russia at the same time?
Or even Russia and Iran, if I was the king of the day, I would make sure that those adversaries
are split.
The country as we know today, Iran, that's how it's pronounced because I've heard many
different pronunciations.
I've heard Iran, Iran, but the correct pronunciation is Iran.
And then, oftentimes, also there's a confusion between Iran and Persia.
Until 1935, the country was called Persia, but during the previous kingdom, Pahlavi's
kingdom, the Shah's father, Reza Shah, changed the country's name to Iran, which has a historical
significance back to the Persian, the first three Persian empires, Achaemenid, during
the Ardashir kingdom that the name Iran was used.
So that's where the name coming from, which means a land of Aryans.
It's important for the U.S. Army, for the people, the members of the U.S. Army to be
aware of the background of Persia or Iran because the Iranians are, they have a very
ancient civilization going back into the sort of prehistoric times.
And most Iranians, whether they think in terms of their historical legacy or not, they live
that historical legacy.
The importance of their Persian cultural heritage is more towards their, or it's geared more
towards how they see themselves within the region, specifically they have historical
legitimacy within the region, and that's really where they fall back on that Persian heritage.
Now that has gone back and forth.
Empires have risen and fallen since then, with the introduction of Islam, and specifically
Shia Islam, and then their Shia revolution, they see themselves more as Muslims than,
you know, if you go back and look at their Persian heritage, but that is important for
them to validate how they see themselves working within the region.
Iranians under some relatively ineffective rulers, the last of the pre-Pahlavi, the Qajars,
did their best to modernize the country, were not having very much success.
The Qajars invited the Russians, the Tsarist Russians, to help them with their military
and their security situation in a way sort of like a country inviting the U.S. to send
in trainers.
And the Russians sent in essentially a bunch of Cossacks, became the Cossack Brigade, which
provided security for Iran.
Over time, the Cossack Brigade began to bring Iranians in as junior officers, one of whom
became a colonel in the brigade.
His name was Reza Khan Pahlavi.
He eventually overthrew the last of the Qajar Shahs, wanted to declare himself president
of the Republic of Iran in the model of Ataturk, but the clerics pushed back, and the clerics
pushed back, and the clerics had enough authority, influence, that he decided it was much better
for him politically to declare himself Shah, and he became Reza Shah Pahlavi.
After that, I would emphasize a major significant highlight, is that World War II, World War
II, because there was a suspicion that Iran could be part of the Axis.
The Russians, the Soviets at that time, were very much interested in maintaining the lifeline
that was the north-south rail and road corridor from the northern end of the Persian Gulf
up through Azerbaijan.
The British and the Russians decided that in order to ensure that this lifeline for
lend-lease stuff, coming from the United States primarily, may be maintained, they needed
to control the terrain.
So the British invaded primarily from Iraq.
The Russians invaded from the north and essentially seized this land corridor from the Persian
Gulf northward.
American engineers provided engineering assistance to rebuild the port facilities, rebuild the
roads, the rails, and maintain this lifeline to the Soviet Union from 1941 through the
end of the war.
Reza Shah Pahlavi, feeling that this was an infringement on Iranian sovereignty, was
let's just say politely asked to abdicate in favor of Mohammad Reza, who was his son,
which he did.
So Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became the Shah in 1941 and maintained this relationship with
the British and the Russians until the end of the war.
The war in Europe ends with the Allies victorious.
The Americans, the engineers, and the British almost immediately evacuated the areas that
they had controlled.
The Russians did not.
The Russians attempted to set up an independent, quasi-independent, let's say, republic in
the northern part of Iran.
The seriousness with which the people all over the world, as well as the people of Iran,
regard this state of affairs is testimony to the fact that delay in the settlement of
this dispute is a threat to world peace.
And they were there until 1946, when the UN finally got around to saying, hey, bug off,
which they did.
So there is no love lost culturally, historically, between the Iranian and the Russian people.
In 1951, Iranian parliament voted to nationalize Iranian oil and natural gas industry.
Abadan, the world's largest oil refinery, which British enterprise and money built,
may pass out of British control if Persia carries out the vote for nationalization passed
by their parliament.
At that time, the so-called Anglo-Iranian oil company was controlling the oil industry.
And, of course, that led to the frustration by the Britain that they could lose their
investments and control of the industry.
Mr. Ambassador, this interesting old gentleman, Mr. Mossadegh, is now a visitor in the United
States.
Do you know him personally, sir?
Yes, extremely well.
Is he an able and responsible statesman?
He's extremely able.
He's a patriot.
I think he's misguided in the way he's carrying out the nationalization program.
I've told him that a number of times.
And I've told him that as a friend of Iran, because I think the failure of this program
of his may be very harmful to his country.
And a failure to make some kind of an agreement with some responsible management company to
operate.
Because I doubt that the Iranians themselves can operate this industry.
Just how important this matter is to the American people.
Now, what is the oil potential in the Middle East, for instance?
How can you illustrate the importance of this for Americans?
Iran itself produces about 6% of the world production of oil products.
It has reserves, in terms of world reserves, of about 17%.
The rest of the area around the Persian Gulf has reserves of about 50% of the world's known
reserve.
In other words, almost half of the world's known reserve is in this area.
Yes.
And consequently, it's of vital importance for the future.
In any terms you may think of.
Industrialization, warfare, whatever you may...
But in the public mind, Ambassador Grady, it seems to me that the biggest fear that
we have in this country is the intrusion of Russia into this picture.
As a result, there were other factors, other reasons.
But that was one of the main factors why it's known widely that the U.S. and British intelligence
staged a coup and the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown.
The relationship between the U.S. and the Shah of Iran was a positive relationship in
the U.S. eyes.
They were a backstop during that time the Cold War was going on.
Having influence with regional power that we saw at that point, and oil-rich power as
well, having that influence with them in order to mitigate any sort of Soviet influence at
the time was very important to us.
You look back, if you Google pictures of the Shah, he is almost always in a military uniform.
He's got his ribbons, his sash, the whole thing.
He's always decked out in his military uniform.
The Shah loved his military.
It was a focal point of his westernization, modernization effort.
Now, looking at it as dispassionately as possible, I think Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had the
best, what he saw as the best interests of his country at heart.
He wanted to improve the economy.
He wanted to improve the education for people outside of the cities.
He wanted to incorporate the best that he saw of western technology.
He established what came to be called the White Revolution in order to achieve this.
But it was top-down driven.
It didn't look at what people at the bottom of the economic heap really needed or wanted,
but it did say, hey, we know what's best for you, very paternalistic.
We're going to do this for you.
He, of course, from the popular perspective, came across as very heavy-handed.
And one of the challenges, at least from my perspective, was that these multiple clerics
throughout the country were not brought in to help make decisions, locally or nationally.
The influence of these clerics at the lower levels began to develop a, call it a counterlash,
if you wish, which, moving us forward into the latter years of the 60s, is where Ayatollah
Khomeini began to develop a following.
He was a charismatic leader, a very effective speaker, and began to amass a following of
folks who would listen to his sermons.
And when he said, the Shah is undermining our traditions, the Shah is not being a good
Iranian Muslim, began to get a lot of attention.
So much so that the Shah eventually had him expelled from the country.
So there was a clash between the two tendencies in these traditional Muslim countries, the
so-called traditionalists or conservatives, and liberals or reformists.
Comes the 1970s, and the Shah is facing this unrest, this lower-level unrest.
He is, does his, he did his best throughout the early 70s to maintain control.
But when, late, in the late 1970s, I think it was about 1976, it became apparent that
he was not physically well.
Turns out he had cancer, which eventually led to the situation when the Shah essentially
gave up, fled the country.
Khomeini returns to, returned to Tehran in 1979 to great acclaim.
We have won the revolution, says all, say all the people chanting at the airport.
I remember those images from the TV screens when the millions of Iranians were greeting
him with tears in their eyes, with crying, et cetera.
It was a kind of natural emotion at the time, at the time, in that geopolitical situation.
Shortly after that, the referendum was conducted, and constitution was adopted, a poor, the
Sharia and Islamic law fiqh.
Now, the government structures were established.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the very first supreme leader, the so-called kind of
highest political leader who essentially controls everything.
After the revolution, the regime was also successful to bring the Shia, I guess, ideology
back to the countries.
Khomeini solidified his control in a variety of ways, sort of in some ways very bloodily
because any of the royalist officers from the military, any of the politicians who were
perceived to be royalists at heart, well, they found themselves to be in, let's say,
dire straits.
Some were imprisoned, some were exiled, and many were probably executed.
Beginning of revolution, my dad was a hematologist and an artist.
He was a political prisoner for almost five years in Evin prison and Qezel Hesar prison,
tortured, things like that, and I used to go visit him there.
A few family members were executed.
The government was established, and over the first few months, the Iranian central government
did what it could to mend relationships with Western countries to the extent that the foreign
minister was entering into discussions with the United States government, for example,
to reopen the U.S. embassy.
Some of the more radical members of the revolutionary organizations did not take too kindly to this.
The activists seized the U.S. embassy, which began the hostage crisis.
Iran, 1979.
Demonstrators invaded the American embassy in Tehran.
Demanding the return of the Shah, they took embassy personnel as hostages in violation
of international law.
Treaties signed by the United States and Iran state that both countries will observe the
principle of diplomatic immunity, a principle which protects foreign representatives and
embassy property.
All appeals to free the hostages were denied by the government of Iran.
The refusal constituted an unprecedented breach of the rules of normal diplomatic behavior.
Most of the Iranians who were working in the embassy were just told to go home.
Americans were held hostage for over a year, 444 days to be more exact.
The American military launched a not well organized rescue attempt.
Late yesterday, I canceled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to position
our rescue team for a later withdrawal of American hostages who have been held captive
there since November 4th.
Equipment failure in the rescue helicopters made it necessary to end the mission.
As our team was withdrawing after my order to do so, two of our American aircraft collided
on the ground following a refueling operation in a remote desert location in Iran.
From an Iranian perspective, the fact that Americans could bring in aircraft and personnel
land in Iran and launch this rescue attempt meant from their perspective that there's
got to be American sympathizers still here in Tehran, still here in the military.
And the government used this as evidence to do another purge of the economic, social,
and political leadership in which another group of moderates ended up losing their livelihoods
if not their lives.
Upshot of this whole thing is that the neighbor to the west, Saddam Hussein, decided that
this time was right for him to launch an incursion to his east to seize Iranian terrain abutting
the Shat al-Arab, which is the waterway that comes from the Persian Gulf and leads up to
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.
So this is the beginning in 1980 of the Iran-Iraq War, which is another topic altogether.
And oh, by the way, if you really want to get a little bit of a perspective on the devastation
of the Iran-Iraq War, there are sources that would say that they lost half a million casualties
or more in the early years of the war, but they overwhelmed the mechanized armored forces
of Iraq just in sheer numbers.
After 1991, the Gulf War, they really started changing their outlook when they saw what
a technologically advanced military could be possible of doing, especially to one of
their countries right next door.
So Iran's government, it's a theocracy, so you have a supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei,
right now. He is the commander-in-chief, he's the head of government, he controls everything
and he has the final say.
Of course, after supreme leader, the highest executive role is played by the president.
Currently, the president is Ebrahim Raisi.
The ideals of the Iranian Revolution, the way the government was set up, echo very strongly
of Western democratic traditions. There is an elected president. There is a parliament
elected by the vote of the people. There is a government set of ministries that take
care of the kinds of things that you would expect the government to do. There is a tradition
of consultation that would lead you to think that this is moving into a more democratic
view.
The challenge, however, is that overlying this whole thing is the set of guardians,
the guardian council, the consultative council, whoever the current supreme leader is, that
are so deeply steeped in this revolutionary ideology as proclaimed by Ayatollah Khamenei,
that there is, call it if you wish, this gulf between what it appears the population would
like to see and what this guardian level is willing to accommodate.
Amid the non-stop protests, on Monday, the Iranian police resumed its warnings that women
must wear mandatory headscarves in public, even in their cars. Meanwhile, British media
reports say that London might soon declare the Iran Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist
group. This after it arrested seven people who were linked to the UK over anti-government
protests. As per the Telegraph, the move will be announced in the coming weeks. If the Revolutionary
Guard gets prescribed as a terror group, then it would become a criminal offense to belong
to the group, attend its meetings, or carry its logo in public.
Iran is continually looking for ways to exert its influence on a broader scale than just
in the particular area of the gulf.
The government of Iran submitted an application for BRICS membership. The Iranian foreign
minister Zayed Qadizabdeg informed that with their entry into the group, they will create
an economic and commercial alliance of nations together with Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa.
I think their intention to become part of this conglomerate we call BRIC is part of
that. If they can, if the Iranian government can be recognized as being a contributing
member of this group of second level governments and economies, then it's all to their benefit.
I would agree with that. Probably that could be called like the club of sanctioned. So
the several countries increasingly partner, getting closer as partners, which historically
be unfriendly to each other. But now they're getting closer to each other because your
adversary is my adversary and that's why we're friends.
Ibrahim Raisi was welcomed to Beijing with a grand ceremony at the Great Hall of the
People. It's the Iranian president's first visit to China and his second meeting with
Chinese leader Xi Jinping since September. Xi says Iran is an old friend of China. Both
sides are working to deepen ties in the face of growing tensions with the United States,
although Beijing denies this is the reason for the visit.
China is Iran's biggest trading partner and the only customer of its heavily sanctioned
oil exports. U.S.-led sanctions have left Iran in its toughest economic situation in
more than 40 years. Beijing has condemned the sanctions and Washington's withdrawal
from a 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and several world powers. Xi Jinping says China will continue
to take part in negotiations to get the agreement reinstated.
I think we have to recognize that Iran, like every other country, doesn't do things that
don't seem to support their national interests. So what is Iran's interest in joining BRIC?
Diplomatic authority, economic connections, ability to evade some of the most egregious
pieces of the sanctions perhaps. Having a larger group speak in support of Iran's positions,
all would be diplomatically beneficial, I think.
They don't like the fact that the current American government maintains sanctions that
have devastated the Iranian economy. But they may do.
National security strategy currently doesn't portray Iran as a near-peer competitor. Not
somewhere where we are going to focus our national efforts, our instruments of national
power, compared to the threat that we see with China as being a near-peer competitor
or even Russia as maybe not as much of a near-peer competitor as China, but definitely a threat.
So I think the importance of seeing Iran as a threat versus a near-peer is due to the
instability that could cause to the region as a whole.
If Iran were attacked from the outside, the Iranian army would stand fast, defend Iran
to its last bullet, its last breath, probably very effectively. They proved that in the
Iran-Iraq war. It took them eight years to go from being overwhelmed to being able to
push the Iraqi army back into Iraq.
I would argue that the Iranian military is the first and probably best example of what
we now call hybrid warfare. This is something that goes straight back to the aftermath of
the revolution. When they were fighting the Iraqi military, which was a very powerful
and well-equipped conventional force, the Iranians had to come up with new solutions
to fighting this much more capable conventional force.
And the result is what we now call hybrid warfare.
Essentially, the Iranian military is made up of two major elements. The artesh, which
is the Iranian word for army, is the, call them the conventional forces, which would
be the Iranian land forces, the Iranian naval forces, the Iranian air forces, the Iranian
rocket forces. These are the armor, the mechanized infantry folks whose focus is national defense.
If Russia invaded, it would be the artesh that would be fighting against the advancing
Russian military forces.
The second group, known as the pastoran, or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, is
almost a mirror image, smaller, more ideologically focused than the artesh. But the pastoran,
or the IRGC, has a land force, a maritime force, an aerospace component, and the quds
force, which is their special forces.
You know, you have artesh on one side, IRGC on the other. They both report to a single
entity called the Armed Forces General Staff, which is the senior military element in Iran.
That's the equivalent of their joint chiefs, basically.
And then that organization reports directly to the Ayatollah and the Guardian Council.
The Ayatollah and the Guardian Council are the commanders-in-chief, essentially. The
general staff is the senior military staff, and then the two branches, or the two halves
of the military continue to coexist, sometimes not very friendly, like all the way up to
the present day.
The reason for that is, during the revolution, the conventional military, the artesh, was
very, tended to be aligned very closely with the shah. So these parallel efforts are, they
continue, and the Iranian government is okay with this for the most part, because it divides
power, essentially.
Due to that level of mistrust a little bit, or uncertainty, I should say, because there
are very many trusted leaders still within the artesh, and they have proven themselves
over the years, especially if you look back at the Iran-Iraq War during the 80s. However,
in that war, the IRGC was given the lead due to, at the time, wanting to have a force
in charge that the Supreme Leader felt was committed to the cause, so to speak, and in
line with all the concepts and ideologies of the revolution.
When we look at the domestic disturbances, one of the structures of the IRGC is composed
of local militia, referred to as the Basij, and they are volunteers within all the towns
and villages and big cities. They will get activated to help quell any sort of dissidence
that might be ongoing.
But originally the Basij was formed during the Eight Years' War between Iran and Iraq
War, so that the idea of mobilization came in because it was at the beginning of the
revolution. Army was in distress because people left the country after the revolution,
the leaders left the country, or they were executed by the regime. So the Basij, or human
wave, was formed in battlefields to confront Saddam Hussein and his army.
I had the opportunity to speak to an Iraqi officer who had served in the Iran-Iraq War
as an artillery battery commander. In his words, not mine, it made him sick to his stomach
to be slaughtering these pre-teen boys who were running at him in these massive human
wave attacks.
Looking outside of Iran's borders, you have the IRGC Quds Force. They're the ones that
go and help train their partners and allies, other military units, export Iranian ideology,
as well as conduct military operations outside of those borders.
The IRGC, as it's developed, they continue to have the same central role, which is defending,
protecting the revolution. That hasn't really changed. But as they've grown, as they've
expanded, their role in Iran's military doctrine has changed significantly. And primarily,
they've become the chief architect of Iran's regional force projection strategy. It took
a while, and it took significant resources to build them into this new entity that really
isn't like anything else in the world.
The Artesh's mission is a much more conventional military mission. Primarily, their concern
is the defense of Iranian territorial integrity. And they are built for that mission. It's
a ground-heavy force. This is true for both Artesh and the IRGC. Their command structure
is unique. And when you look at it, and I'll talk about the Artesh first, the way they've
gone about it, they've divided Iran into five different what they call operational headquarters.
The IRGC does essentially the same basic idea. They are divided into commands that have essentially
the same mission as the OHQs. The big difference between Artesh operations and IRGC is an IRGC
brigade has a much higher proportion of officers in it as compared to an Artesh brigade. And
that is intentional. The reason for that is the IRGC envisions its brigades as sort
of like shell units. And so the brigade is set up to receive large numbers of militia
units, the Basij militia, that is very localized down to the individual town community level.
So I was born in Iran. I moved to the United States when I was 17. And during my school
years in Iran, there are always Basij in the schools, in local mosques. And so they're
able to recruit these young individuals, try to, I don't want to use the term brainwash,
but introduce them to the Shia ideology and kind of what Nazi Germany was doing. And try
to use them, either offering them some advantages to getting universities or subsidies in getting
monthly stipends and things like that to recruit them. And these Basijs are being used even
right now today in the streets of Iran.
As far as limits on the size of militia units, they are arranged as battalions. And it's
hard, that's pretty opaque for us in the West to see how these are really organized because
a lot of it's kind of informal. It's not like a, what we would think of when we think of
our reserve component, which is basically the same military structure, just as on a
part-time basis. And this is actually reflected in the ATP. I have a diagram of a Basij unit.
I think I say it's anywhere between three and X number of battalions and just have the
dashed lines around the battalions to indicate the Hades may or may not be present in it.
So it's one of the characteristics of the Iranian military as a whole is a lack of what
we would call standardization. The Artesh is the unit's structure is more standardized.
But for example, when it comes to equipment, it's all over the place. Even units within
the same brigade do not necessarily operate the same pieces of equipment. And that's very
strange for someone in the U.S. Army. We have one kind of tank. We have one kind of IFV.
We have one kind of attack helicopter. The Iranian military, I'm sure they would like
to be standardized, but the results of sanctions, the results of their inability to buy new
weapons on the international market and limitations in their ability to produce stuff indigenously,
it means that their formations have all kinds of different weapons.
So Iran's military is equipped with platforms acquired from multiple areas. Not all, well
most of them, not internally manufactured. If we look at platforms like their tanks,
they are talking with Russia about potentially updating their fleet with the T-90s that Russia
exports as well. Same goes when you look at their air power. They have a mix of airframes
from bombers and fighters, even to the American F-14s that we had agreed to provide them,
80 F-14s prior to the revolution. I think we delivered 79 of those.
They just have to get creative and use what they have on hand to fill out their formations.
In general, readiness is a struggle, as one might imagine. Maintaining a 60-year-old tank
is a significant task, let alone a helicopter or an aircraft. But they seem comfortable
with this hybrid model and these ad hoc unit designs. They sort of have to be because they
don't necessarily have an alternative.
It's mostly reverse engineering of different technology rather than new technology.
They have made modifications to different aspects of their military, such as missile programs
or tanks. Even though their aircrafts are old, they were able to equip them with more
precision-guided missiles. So the carrier might be F-4 Phantom that we have in museums today,
but they were able to modify those so that they can put guided missiles on them.
They have put a lot of effort into extending the reach of their missiles.
They have short-range, long-range ballistic missile capability.
That has evolved now into one of the world's largest ballistic missile fleets.
The unclassified numbers right now, I think, are over 3,000 missiles of all types
in the Iranian inventory. And this is a way that they can affect a kinetic action
hundreds or thousands of kilometers away from Iranian borders without having to send soldiers,
aircraft, ships, the more conventional military forces.
If you look at some of their asymmetric capabilities, if you look at drones, for instance,
those are a lot of things that they're manufacturing themselves and increasingly adding onto
their capability and how they interact. Are they able to swarm?
What sort of payloads are they able to carry? Et cetera.
They're also looking at capabilities, in that matter, if you look at unmanned water drones
or underwater drones as well, versus focusing on, for instance, building an aircraft carrier
or something like that when it comes to their maritime security.
Iranians excelled through their proxies as well as electronic warfare, cyber,
jamming certain signals, et cetera. That's what they excelled.
In 2020, they were successfully able to launch an attack against the Israelis' water infrastructure.
Israel's national cyber chief says the hacking attack against the country's water systems
was aimed at disrupting key national infrastructure and warned of similar threats in the future.
And during this recent election in the U.S., there were also email campaigns targeting certain candidates.
On October 22nd, 2020, FBI and CISA publicly announced the Iranian campaign
to intimidate and influence American voters and otherwise undermine voter confidence
and create discord in the 2020 U.S. election process.
So they are able to use that cyber capabilities and target critical infrastructures,
such as banking systems, and they can use that advantage as they need it.
If they can attack any sort of opponent through the cyber warfare to stop them
or to diminish their capability of impacting Iran, I think they'd see that as a success.
How do I assess the Iranian military capabilities?
More than adequate to defend the nation.
I am 100% guilty of this, so I know that lots of my fellow military community is also.
What I've learned is thinking of Iran as being primitive or unsophisticated
when it comes to their military.
Now, it is absolutely true that their military is not very modern,
that it's relatively poorly equipped, relatively poorly trained, etc.
Those things are all true.
But their military thought is very sophisticated.
It's something that I, in researching the ATP,
I was struck by how consistent their thoughts were on their doctrine
and how realistic they are in assessing their strengths and their weaknesses,
in assessing their opponent's strengths and weaknesses,
and coming up with a coherent strategy that accounts for all of that stuff.
And they have created a thoughtful strategy
and a thoughtful approach to their application of military power
that I think is lost on a lot of Western audiences.
So Iran found ways to defeat a much more highly mechanized and armored military.
Would they be able to do the same thing against a modern American force?
The most important thing that I think the U.S. Army needs to understand about Iran
and any potential conflict that it might be involved in
is to expect or maybe not to expect a conventional confrontation.
