Welcome to Shinshiten News.
China's Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party, is threatening local financial institutions and strengthening regulations.
At the beginning of the year, more than 180 state-owned enterprises withdrew from the U.S. platform.
Over the past 30 days, 45 state-owned enterprises have announced their withdrawal from the same platform.
The risks of local financial institutions in China are enormous,
and experts have made clear the complicated relationship between the local government's fund-sharing platform and the shadow bank.
In addition, the Chinese government has pointed out that it is only extending the expiration date
by postponing the crisis by borrowing new funds to repay old funds without a solution.
The local government in China is under a lot of pressure.
At the end of December 2022, the number announced by the Communist Party of China
exceeded the national financial budget by more than 700 trillion yen,
which is the largest budget in China.
In 2022, the local government's budget was 12.11 billion yuan, or about 22 trillion yen.
The Chinese Communist Party of China admits that it will borrow most of the local government's fund-sharing funds to repay old funds,
but the budget must be repaid with new funds.
As a result, while the local government's budget will be reimbursed more,
the economy will plummet and the budget deficit will increase.
The Chinese Communist Party of China is demanding strict management of the local government's fund-sharing funds,
especially the 65 trillion yuan, which is about 1,300 trillion yuan,
to prevent the financial crisis caused by the hidden local government's funds.
Recently, it has drawn attention that a large number of investment companies
have withdrawn from the government's fund-sharing platform.
According to a report published in China Media's September 8th issue of the 21st Century Economic Report,
the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Industry,
the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Industry, and Tsukiji Investment Company,
have announced that they will withdraw from the government's fund-sharing platform from today.
In other words, they will not receive government-funded funds.
In the first month of mid-August,
at least 45 state-owned enterprises have announced their withdrawal from the local government's fund-sharing platform.
Many of these state-owned enterprises have a background in urban investment and have subsidiaries in urban investment.
For example, the Kuiken Tengen Advertising Group, an urban investment company with five subsidiaries,
has switched to state-owned enterprises that operate market-based thinking without receiving government-funded funds.
In addition, according to the same media,
before the new move to withdraw from this platform,
the Ministry of Trade said that more than 180 state-owned enterprises
from December last year to March this year had expressed their withdrawal from the same platform.
In the past, most of the state-owned investment companies owned the local government's fund-sharing platform.
Normally, these types of funds do not appear directly in the government's budget,
so they were seen as hidden funds.
These funds may come from various promises and guarantees made by the government or companies,
such as pension systems, lease contracts, and government-funded housing loans.
The funds added by the reconstruction issued by the local government,
in other words, the government funds, which are called visible funds,
are included in the budget management.
Hidden funds are loans that the local government has received directly or indirectly
through the loan platform,
such as promises to compensate for the loss of government-funded funds
or to provide shelter to illegal immigrants.
Some research teams in China believe that the reason why state-owned enterprises withdraw from the loan platform
is to avoid loan restrictions and supervisory management,
and to make it easier for state-owned enterprises to re-issue and fund their own funds.
Lin Kuo-shi, who has been working as a short-term investor in Beijing for more than 20 years,
said in an interview with Dai Kigen on September 9,
that the Ministry of Finance is one of the most economically developed ministries in China
and that it has a lot of fund-sharing platforms.
The government is now strictly aware of the debt risk,
and the reorganization of fund-sharing platforms cannot be avoided.
For this reason, the local government has taken measures to discard some unrelated fund-sharing platforms
in order to focus on special or important fund-sharing platforms.
The local government focuses on special and important fund-sharing platforms.
Lin Kuo-shi said the following.
Five or six years ago, the Chinese government conducted research on fund-sharing platforms
and found that they were not guaranteed by the government's capital inflows.
When this was confirmed, the government allowed them to market them
because they did not bear the responsibility for debt-sharing.
Since they are a state-owned enterprise,
they can eventually cooperate with the government to organize land for the government.
In the past, when the economy was good,
the government first borrowed money and then sold the land to fund-sharing.
These platforms depend on the government to fund-share them, so it is easy to fund-share them.
Now that real estate is no longer sold and land sales and revenue are not good,
the government has no choice but to rely on local taxes.
However, if the taxes are bad, there will be a lot of pressure to fund-share in many areas,
making it more difficult to operate the fund-sharing platforms.
Lin Kuo-shi is also familiar with fund-sharing platforms and shadow banking.
In the local fund-sharing platform, the local government is the user of the funds,
and it also manages the use of all funds.
Lin Kuo-shi explained that fund-sharing providers are also relatively complicated,
such as organizations and non-transportation customers.
Currently, there is a limit to the fund-sharing of banks,
so so far, the government has invested in the fund-sharing platform
for the asset management plan of real estate companies and securities companies.
Among them, most of them are real estate companies.
Lin Kuo-shi said the following.
In the past, it seemed that real estate companies and securities companies
were relatively more involved in these government projects and fund management.
These companies generally trusted these projects.
Because there is a guarantee, the financial products of these projects are easier to sell.
The products are bought by banks, insurance companies, investors,
and real estate companies.
It is generally thought that real estate companies are a form of shadow banking,
but Lin Kuo-shi did not deny the question of whether the local fund-sharing platform
is similar to shadow banking.
According to Lin Kuo-shi, real estate companies are still funded by the government.
These real estate companies, which have stated that they trust the government,
are actually all government-funded platforms.
Local fund-sharing platforms are already called the black hole of the Chinese financial system from the outside.
The so-called local and regional funds threaten economic recovery,
and are seen as the biggest financial risk in Asia.
The risk of local and regional funds is mainly concentrated in hidden funds.
One of the areas where the economy is most developed in China
has a lot of local funds.
As of 2022, the reissuance of local funds
and the annual investment of local funds have exceeded 10 trillion yen,
which is about 21.5 trillion yen,
which is the first in China.
From 2019 to 2022,
64.70% to 88.74% of the local funds issued by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
have been used for new loans and past repayments,
and have already exceeded 10% or so of the local funds in other regions across the country.
Since the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has used
nearly 90% of the debt to repay the old debt,
there is very little money to be used for new investments and driving funds.
Most of the local and regional government's annual investment loans
are debt repayments such as the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
Lin pointed out that the Central Bureau of Statistics has its own debt repayment system.
Lin also pointed out the following.
The number of hidden debt shown by the Central Bureau of Statistics
is about 60 trillion to 70 trillion yen,
or about 120 trillion to 140 trillion yen.
However, if you calculate it in detail,
it may reach 100 trillion to about 2,000 trillion yen.
There is no other way than to issue international loans
and use new loans to repay old debts.
The economy of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is developing,
so it is not surprising that there are many debts.
The debt ratio of the ministries that have developed in the south,
such as the Kanto Province and the Sekkō Province,
tends to be high.
However, in undeveloped areas in the northwest and northeast,
where there is little debt,
the economy is too poor,
so the pressure on debt repayment is also high.
The reason why Lin issued a series of proposals
to comprehensively resolve local debt is
to actually change the period.
In other words, to reduce the interest rate,
extend the debt repayment period,
and delay the debt repayment until the economy recovers.
This is to reduce the chain reaction of debt default
to the financial market,
and to avoid the collapse of the local government
and social unrest.
If the bank continues to decline,
the delay in such a large interest rate reduction
will lead to an increase in the negative asset ratio of the commercial bank.
As a result,
the financial risk and the financial risk will cause a surge.
This content has been quoted
from an interview with Dai Kigen Kisha Kaka.
Well, that's it for today.
If you like our program,
please subscribe, like, and share.
Thank you for watching.
またお会いしましょう。