If you look at any category of weapons system, you will find that Chinese armed forces have more different types of design in development than the rest of the world's arms producers combined. It is particularly true of combat aircraft.
Mainland China has two large fighter aircraft design and production centers in Shenyang and Chengdu. China has an attack aircraft, a cargo lifter and bomber facility in Xi’an. In China's other industrial sites, there are jet trainers and smaller attack aircraft. As a matter of fact, the Chengdu J-20 fighter has been the most visible symbol of China's massive military build-up. The aircraft is a heavy, twin-engine design and can be stealthy, radar can hardly detect it.
Hi, thank you for watching Digging 2 China. I'm Dong Xiong.
If you look at any category of weapons system, you will find that Chinese armed forces have
more different types of design and development than the rest of the world's arms producers
combined. It is particularly true of combat aircraft. Mainland China has two large fighter
aircraft design and production centers in Shen Yun and Chengdu. China has an attack
aircraft, a cargo lifter and bomber facility in Shen Yun. In China's other industrial sites,
there are jet trainers and smaller attack aircraft. As a matter of fact, the Chengdu
J-20 fighter has been the most visible symbol of China's massive military buildup. The aircraft
is a heavy twin-engine design and can be stealthy. Radar can hardly detect it.
Much of what China knows about the building and development of modern weapon systems,
particularly aircraft, comes from the weapons it purchased from Russia since the late 1980s.
In the 1990s, Chinese defense industrialists began to gain insight on how to build their own
high-tech weapons. And since then, weapon sales from Moscow to Beijing boomed. Included in these
purchases were hundreds of Su-27SK fighters, an export version of the base Russian Su-27 design,
two-seat models, engines, radars, and other onboard systems that were essential to their
operation. In 1996, Russia and China agreed to a contract for the licensed production for 200
of Su-27SK models, renamed to J-11 in China Air Force, to be assembled at the Shen Yun plant.
The contract, however, was not completed and never will be. Having assembled 100 J-11 aircraft,
only half of the contracted number they had pledged to build, Shen Yun plant announced
they were truncating production. Why? Because after years of building and studying, Russian
Su-27 fighter jets, Chinese had successfully reverse engineered the aircraft and were ready
to start building their own version called J-11B. Russians call it an illegal pirated design.
Were Chinese engineers smart enough to reverse engineer something as complicated as a jet
engine? Were Chinese technicians lucky to obtain technical know-how about building fighter aircraft?
They had a helper. And the helpers are Ukrainians.
The former Soviet Union had an impressive defense industry. It was dispersed geographically to
support combat operations. It was scattered all over the USSR to reduce vulnerability.
In other words, weapon production could not be destroyed by one airstrike.
This policy was intelligent and strategic. Ukraine was chosen as a repository for production.
Ukraine was also the location of design expertise for some of the major
subsystem components that these advanced weapons systems require. For example, radars,
electronic warfare, numerous aerodynamic weapons systems, air defense networks,
repair and overhaul plants, and numerous other industrial sites were located all over Ukraine.
These capacities were exactly what the People's Liberation Army required to support the many
Russian weapons that they had acquired. Now, they had complete autonomy over the operation
of these same weapons platforms. Their ambition of the Russians was to make sure that the Chinese
would come back to them for even the slightest changes or improvements for any weapon they had
acquired from Moscow. And of course, the price was very steep. It drove the Chinese to move
into Ukraine to find as many partners as possible to develop their own defense sector, a defense
sector built on Russian weapon design which Ukraine knows so well. It was not in Russia's
interest to provide these capabilities to Beijing, but Ukraine was eager to help.
Asia-based military attaché said that Ukraine has long been suspected as a source of some
command and control systems and other technology used in missiles. Ukrainian technicians have
worked on a private basis inside China. Then, Beijing began purchasing Russian
design subsystems produced in Ukraine. Ukrainian companies were also instrumental in supporting
China to establish its own production and design enterprises for many of the same subsystems.
It is not exaggerating to say that Ukraine is behind China's military modernization.
To be sure, the technology China has acquired has already enabled the growth of China's own
indigenous design and manufacturing abilities, making it less reliant on Ukraine than it once
was. Russia remains China's most important source of military technology. However,
Moscow has not always provided its latest technology to China. On the contrary,
China's rival South China Sea claimant Vietnam was able to obtain far more advanced
kilodiesel electric submarines from Russia over the past decade. Ukraine might have filled an
important role for China, supplying products and technology that Russia was less keen to sell.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine changes all that. Ukraine is frustrated over Beijing's growing ties
with Moscow, and uncertainty over the shape of its post-war economy and government could
threaten the relationship. Pressure from Washington has had a significant effect.
The Ukrainian government confirmed last year that it would halt the takeover of
Motor Sich by Chinese aerospace company Skyrizm. Motor Sich is a local aircraft
engine maker. The decision was due to U.S. concerns of forced technology transfers.
For China, Ukraine war broke out in the worst possible time. Just a month ago, Xi Jinping and
Putin signed a declaration that there are no limits to their friendship. Yet, Putin did not
seem to warn his Chinese new best friend an invasion was imminent, because Beijing did not
evacuate its embassy or the Chinese citizens who are now struggling to escape Mr. Putin's tanks
and bombs. Having positioned himself as Mr. Putin's closest friend, Xi Jinping is under
immense pressure from the rest of the world to talk Mr. Putin out of the war. If he can't do so,
it will highlight the limits of last month's strategic alignment. Beijing has refused to
impose financial or other sanctions that it had placed on Russia. But Chinese companies may have
no choice but to comply with Western sanctions anyway. This is especially true of Chinese banks.
They may need to cut off some business with Russian counterparts to maintain their access
to the far more important dollar and euro financial systems. In Europe, Mr. Xi's warm
statement of friendship with Mr. Putin has left him in a crossfire as European leaders
take aim at the Kremlin. The timing couldn't be worse, as the Ukraine conflict now may
dominate a China-European Union summit scheduled for April 1. The summit was supposed to make
progress toward a stalled bilateral investment deal. Many Chinese experts assume that the
Communist Party regime plays a multi-dimensional chess while the rest of the world plays checkers.
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