Battle for the East - How did Heraclius restore the Byzantine Empire? - Medieval History DOCUMENTARY

TK's Musuem
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137 Video Views·Oct 23, 2022
To some, it's considered the first crusade. To others, the last great war of antiquity.
In 622, after 20 years of war, the Byzantine Empire was on the brink of destruction,
having lost region after region to the Sassanian Persian Empire and its king, Khosrow II.
But over the next six years and four campaigns, the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius would not only
completely reverse these territorial losses, but also trigger the downfall of the Persian king
himself. The final Byzantine-Persian war took place in an increasingly unstable world.
In Constantinople, the cash-strapped Byzantines struggled to meet the demands of mutinous
soldiers. In Ctesiphon, the Persian kings had to fend off a series of noble revolts.
On top of this, migrating peoples were pressing down from the northern steppes.
The Avars and Slavs into the Byzantine Balkans, the Turks along the Persian shores of the Caspian
Sea. In 590 AD, a noble revolt in Persia forced King Khosrow II to flee to the Byzantines.
There, he got the support of Emperor Maurice, who managed to restore Khosrow to the throne.
But Maurice's price was steep. Persia had to cede the highlands of historical
Armenia to the Byzantines, leaving the Sasanian heartlands of Mesopotamia
and western Iran vulnerable to a future invasion. So when Maurice himself was killed by a military
mutiny in 602, Khosrow swiftly took advantage to declare war under the pretext of avenging
his benefactor. With the Byzantine military in political disarray, Persia began to reclaim
not just Armenia, but also the Byzantine forts, shielding Syria from invasion.
In 610, Heraclius became Byzantine emperor after another revolt, and the resulting chaos
opened the floodgates. One by one, the rich cities of Syria and Egypt fell to Persian armies.
Antioch in 610, Jerusalem in 614, Alexandria in 619.
The Byzantines in the east were reduced to two regions, Anatolia and the Balkans,
and even these were being devastated by Persian and Avar Slav invasions, respectively.
Were the Byzantines about to meet the fate of the Western Roman Empire?
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Protect yourself online with NordVPN. Despite the dire situation, the Byzantines still had a few
glimmers of hope. The first lay in the Byzantine army, even in its sharply reduced and demoralized
state. By this time, both Byzantines and Persians fielded similar armies, being built around a core
of professional, composite cavalry, skilled in both horse archery and melee combat. Equipment
and tactics largely followed steppe nomad practice, from the powerful composite bow,
to the emphasis on feigned retreats and long-distance pursuits. Still, the Byzantines
saw their army as slightly better equipped and better drilled than their Persian counterparts,
which gave them the confidence to risk open battle, while the Persians resorted to smaller-scale
ambushes instead. But this advantage didn't mean a lot, given the sheer disparity in resources
between the Byzantines and the Persians. The recent conquests might have taken away a third
of Byzantine revenue, while adding 50% to Persia's. The good news was that whatever the
Byzantines had left, was mostly shielded behind the double walls of Constantinople, or the wooden
wall of its Mediterranean fleets. Heraclius' government squeezed as much as it could out of
this shrunken base, raising taxes and cutting expenses, confiscating local revenue and church
treasure, not to mention debasing the currency. Any one of these policies could generate significant
unrest, so to justify these actions, Heraclius worked closely with the church, recasting the
Persian war as a defense of Christianity against the pagans, where present suffering would be
compensated for by spiritual rewards. This partnership must have been effective,
but despite Heraclius' usurping and disastrous reign so far, he suffered few instances of revolt,
and especially military mutiny. By the year 622, both the Byzantines and the Persians were in a
position to consider their new steps, in what was now a two-decade-long war. In particular,
it's not entirely clear why Persia was still in the war. Khozro certainly intended to keep his
spectacular gains in Syria and Egypt, where his government was already rebuilding the local
administration and extending religious tolerance to local Christians. But it doesn't seem like he
had similar plans to annex Anatolia, which remained a sea-sawing battleground, where Persia
mainly sought to capture and deport local resources. Khozro also seems to not have built
a large Mediterranean fleet, which would have been necessary to capture Constantinople
and establish a secure hold over Anatolia. It's possible that Khozro wanted to preserve a weak
Byzantine remnant as a vassal, but couldn't tolerate or even negotiate with Heraclius,
a person whom Persian propaganda characterized as a bandit. It's also possible that plans for
further conquests were being opposed by the nobles of Persia, who resented the financial
and manpower contributions they had to make, and feared that a stronger Khozro might start
exacting revenge on them. Whatever the reason, Persia was now in the dangerous position of having
a directionless war policy, just as the Byzantines were stabilizing themselves. On the other side,
the Byzantines were forced by circumstance to have a clearer goal in mind – simply end the war.
This was easier said than done, since, as mentioned, Khozro refused to talk to Heraclius.
The old Roman Empire had a way to force peace under these circumstances, namely, by launching
invasions deep into Persian Mesopotamia and threatening its capital of Ctesiphon. Their
preferred route down the Euphrates was by now too well fortified for this, not to mention that all
the Byzantine forts and staging areas were currently in Persian hands. Instead, Heraclius
chose historical Armenia and Transcaucasia as his route to threaten the Persian heartlands.
This was a far less direct method, and the highlands and river valleys could easily trap
an attacking army, especially when winter snows blocked the mountain passes, but at least the
man-made fortifications could be bypassed, and the local pastureland would relieve some
of the Byzantine cavalry's logistical burden. Furthermore, Heraclius' family had military
experience to the region, if not blood ties, granting him a potential intelligence and
political edge over his Persian counterparts. And lastly, directly across the Caucasus to the
north lay the nomadic confederation of the Turks, long-standing enemies of the Persians,
whose military help Heraclius was already looking to enlist.
A few adjustments had to be made before the campaigns could begin. First, in order to
reliably outmaneuver the Persian cavalry, the Byzantine army had to be made even faster,
and that meant dropping much of the baggage train and accepting the possibility that they
wouldn't be able to communicate with Constantinople for months on end. Secondly, given the stakes,
Heraclius would have to lead the army himself, something no emperor had done for two centuries,
and trust that the government could manage without his presence.
And lastly, the Byzantines would have to make peace in the Balkans, even if it meant paying a
tribute to the Avars and accepting the loss of extensive territory to the Slavs.
And with those things done, Heraclius and his army could finally set out on campaign.
In spring 622, Heraclius left Constantinople and rendezvoused with his army in central Anatolia,
which had spent the past several years training and making up for previous losses.
The emperor probably had 15 to 20 thousand soldiers under his command, while the Persians
likely had 100 thousand split across Syria, historical Armenia, and in garrisons. Heraclius'
arrival coincided with another Persian invasion from Armenia. Similar to what they had done in
the past, Persian vanguards penetrated deep into Anatolia to observe and distract Byzantine
defenders, while the main body began sieging down cities in the rear, this time in the eastern Black
Sea coast. Heraclius refused to be distracted by either effort. Instead, he rushed east into
Armenia, beelining towards Persian territories in eastern Iran and Azerbaijan. Now, instead of
forcing Heraclius to react to them, the Persians were forced to react to Heraclius, pulling out
of Anatolia to chase the emperor and hopefully trap him in the Armenian valleys. In the process,
the Byzantine army feigned a retreat in true nomadic fashion, luring the Persians out in
pursuit, before wheeling around to defeat them. With this victory, the arduous Byzantine effort
to raise, maintain and train Heraclius' army was at least partially vindicated. And so,
with winter coming on, the emperor decided to call it a day and withdraw back to Anatolia,
ending his first campaign. There was also an urgent reason for Heraclius to return.
The Avars had broken the peace in the Balkans, which had to be restored before any further
offensive against Persia could begin. Despite nearly being kidnapped by the Avars, and despite
having to pay even more tribute, Heraclius achieved this by spring 624, at which point
he returned to the army in central Anatolia. Heraclius' second campaign had two overarching
goals. First, the Byzantines had earlier sent an embassy to the Turks, proposing a joint attack
on Persia. The Turks were likely going to agree, and Azerbaijan was likely going to be the target.
So the Byzantines needed to go there for better communication, or even a rendezvous.
Second, Heraclius had obtained intelligence indicating that Khosrow II himself was at the
palace-temple complex of Adur-Gushnasp in western Iran, personally supervising the training of a new
army. This might have been for a new invasion of Anatolia, or perhaps defensive preparations
against the impending Byzantine-Turk alliance. Either way, Khosrow had placed himself within
range of the Byzantine army, and a successful capture or humiliation of the Persian king
might well end the war in a single stroke. March 624 came and Heraclius again sped into
Armenia, bypassing rather than sieging local and Persian defences. By June,
he had crossed the region and was entering western Iran. Khosrow was taken entirely by surprise.
All he could do was muster a hasty defence out of his second-rate troops,
and when that was defeated, flee south to Mesopotamia. Heraclius desecrated and destroyed
Adur-Gushnasp, an act which not only was revenge for the Persian capture of Jerusalem, but also
one designed to maximally discredit Khosrow, especially amongst the nobility of western
and northern Iran, who had driven previous revolts against the king. Winter was now
setting in and it was time to execute the other half of Heraclius' strategy, which was to head
back north, raiding and pillaging all the while, until the army reached Azerbaijan,
where they would winter, replenish losses by recruiting from the regional population,
and hopefully meet up with the Turks by spring. Instead, what spring 625 brought was news of
three Persian armies converging on Azerbaijan, ordered by an enraged Khosrow to destroy Heraclius
once and for all. To the south, a newly raised force was moving north from western Iran.
To the northeast, another force under the conquering general Shah Baraz blocked the
route to the Black Sea, and to the west, another force was moving across Armenia,
to deal the killing blow. Heraclius' army basically mutinied at the news,
with some recent recruits deserting, while the rest demanded the emperor head directly back to
Anatolia. That idea ended quickly, once the army realized that Shah Baraz' force was in the way,
and Heraclius quickly regained his freedom to command. Moving away from Anatolia,
the emperor quickly dispersed the inexperienced southern army and re-entered western Iran,
prompting Shah Baraz in the northeast to pursue, for fear of letting the Byzantines pillage the
region again. In his haste, the general let himself be drawn into open battle with the
Byzantine army, which resulted in another defeat, after which Heraclius engaged the western army,
and routed it as well. With Persian defenses in disarray, the Byzantines were once again
free to devastate western Iran, before returning to Azerbaijan, and then withdrawing to Armenia
for the winter. The reformed Persian army under Shah Baraz followed at a respectful distance,
but that didn't stop Heraclius from inflicting one last defeat on it, before the campaign ended.
Over the winter, Heraclius finally received the news he had waited so long for.
The Turks were going to invade Persia next year, but two can play at this game of nomadic chess,
and whatever relief came from this was soon overshadowed by the news that the Avars had
again ended their peace with the Byzantines, probably due to Persian efforts, and were
amassing their largest force yet to assault Constantinople. Whatever plans Heraclius had
for 626 had to be shelved to deal with the Avars, if only to prevent the Byzantine capital falling
into panic and political chaos. As spring 626 dawned, Heraclius made for
central Anatolia, but not through the direct eastern route, instead, he went southeast
through northern Syria, likely to observe and disrupt any Persian attempts to militarily
support the Avars. Shah Baraz once again gave chase, but was ultimately repelled by Heraclius.
Now back in friendly territory, the emperor had a choice to make, he could go back to
Constantinople like in 623, or he could stay with the army to confront any Persian advance.
Heraclius decided to stay, only sending a small contingent back to support his capital.
This reflected his confidence in the upcoming siege.
While the Avars were well versed in city warfare, Constantinople's size and defenses were on a
completely different level, and even though the Avar army was unprecedented, their rudimentary
logistics meant that they only had a brief window to capture the capital, before their own supplies
ran out. Moreover, as the Persians still had not built a fleet to challenge Byzantine control of
the eastern Mediterranean, there was no way their armies could cross into Europe to help the Avar
assault. In other words, the emperor's leadership and inspirational presence would be much more
impactful in battle against the Persians, than it was in resisting the Avar siege.
Events validated Heraclius' decision. The Avars arrived outside Constantinople in late July,
but after a week of hard fighting, they had to retreat due to a lack of supplies.
A Persian force under Shah Baraz indeed appeared on the coast opposite the Avars,
but they were of little significance, as the Byzantine fleet prevented any attempt by the
two armies to link up, and eventually the Persians too withdrew back to Syria.
Meanwhile, Heraclius' army repelled a Persian attempt to invade western Anatolia,
and the Turks erupted into Azerbaijan and western Iran, devastating those territories
for the third time in three years. 626 is sometimes seen as the climax of the Byzantine-Persian war,
and a near-death experience for the Byzantines. In reality, it seems more like a desperate gamble
by Khosrow to keep Heraclius away from Persia for a few years, perhaps even force some sort
of panicked coup against him. The king failed on these two counts, and now faced not just
formidable foes across multiple fronts, but also the increasing anger of war-weary nobles,
who were sick of the annual ravaging of their estates and the punishments hurled at them for
failing to defeat Heraclius. General Shah Baraz, in particular, would keep his army curiously
inactive in Syria for the rest of the war, refusing to act even when his intervention
would've saved his king from what Heraclius had planned for the next year. With the Avars defeated,
the Persians withdrawing, and the Turks in the war, the time had finally come for Heraclius
to force peace upon the Persians. For 627, the Turks and Byzantines would jointly conquer
Transcaucasia, breaking through the natural and man-made defenses that shielded the heartlands
of Mesopotamia and western Iran from the Steppe nomads. Presumably, the two allies would then
thoroughly devastate the latter, until the government at Ctesiphon agreed to peace.
The beginning of the campaign went smoothly. The Byzantines took the Black Sea coast,
while the Turks again broke into Azerbaijan. Only the vassal fortress of Tiflis kept the
two allies apart, but remarkably, it held out against their combined efforts for the
rest of the campaign season. By September, the Turks had to withdraw back north,
before the Caucasus passes snowed over, leaving Heraclius with the prospect of a wasted year,
where the Persians could rest and recover. At this point, either as a bold gamble,
or with the knowledge that key Persian forces, most notably Shabaraz's army in Syria,
were neutralized, Heraclius decided to finally go for the jugular. Not long after the Turks,
the Byzantine army also began retreating from Tiflis, seemingly ready to head through Armenia
and back home. But then Heraclius unexpectedly moved south, entering western Iran and prompting
the local Persian army to pursue. By mid-October, the Byzantines had crossed the mountains separating
Iran from Mesopotamia, and now the emperor was in the Sasanian heartland, the center of Khozro
II's government and prestige. An urgent Persian attack on the Byzantine army near Nineveh was
dispersed in November, using the familiar tactic of feigned retreat. Only second-rate forces and
palace garrisons now stood between Heraclius and Khozro, and at this point the Persian government
fell into a panic. Khozro fled to Ctesiphone, ordered a purge of disloyal nobles, and began
seizing whatever was within his grasp to defend the capital. All the while Heraclius was moving
south, pillaging the noble estates, destroying the royal palaces, and publicly threatening to
do it all over again next year, with the Turks alongside him. That said, the irrigated terrain
of Mesopotamia was not ideal for Byzantine cavalry, and Ctesiphone, even in its current state,
was a bit too formidable for Heraclius' liking. So in January 628, the Byzantines turned and made
a long trek back north. This was of no help to Khozro. A group of nobles would overthrow and
execute him the next month, beginning a period of political chaos that would see 11 kings crowned
over the next six years. Taking advantage of Persia's instability, Heraclius would reverse
all of Khozro's conquests by 630, restoring Syria and Egypt to the Byzantines, just as a new threat
loomed from the Arabian desert. Heraclius' campaigns are an example of an indirect
approach to war strategy. In the quest to defend Byzantine Anatolia and obtain peace with the
conquering Persian Empire, Heraclius did not set out to destroy Persian armies, nor to retake
captured cities, which were not fights he could win, given the disparity between Byzantine and
Persian resources. Instead, by threatening and pillaging core Persian territories, Heraclius
repeatedly engineered the withdrawal of invading Persian armies and promoted war weariness amongst
its nobility. This eventually led to political chaos within Persia's government, which in turn
allowed the Byzantines to reclaim Syria and Egypt without having to fight in those territories.
And although Heraclius' gains would be swiftly lost, the method by which they were achieved
would remain a point of pride in Byzantine military history, and influence their strategy
in their wars against the Muslim Arabs.
As always, thank you for watching!
