Shōkaku and Cavalla, a Confrontation of the WWII Pacific Theater

Candel and Culture
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6 Video Views·Oct 21, 2022
On June 19th 1944, one of the largest, most important, and most veteran ships in the Imperial
Japanese Navy encountered a US submarine 1 16th its size on its very first war patrol. That
encounter, which represented a contest between two of the key naval technologies that defined
the war in the Pacific, also represented the shifting fortunes of the two navies in that war,
and was part of a significant turning point in that war. The sinking of the Japanese aircraft
carrier Shokaku by the USS Cavala is history that deserves to be remembered. By June of 1944 the US
was on the offensive, having taken the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. The US strategy of island
hopping had moved to the Mariana Islands. The 71,000 men of the US 5th Amphibious Corps under
Marine Corps Lieutenant General Holland, Howlin' Mad Smith, had invaded the strategically important
island of Saipan, the capture which would place the Japanese home islands within range of US
bombers. The Japanese recognized the strategic importance of Saipan and committed a significant
portion of their fleet to an attack. The Imperial Japanese Navy was much depleted by 1944 and had
most suffered from losses of air crews, but the fleet was still significant and was capable of
mounting a large carrier action. While the Americans assumed that the strategic objective
was to attack the Saipan invasion fleet, in fact the Japanese goal was to provoke a decisive naval
engagement. They hoped to inflict a significant enough loss on the US Navy that America would be
forced to negotiate for peace. The first mobile fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Giusuro
Ozawa, had five fleet carriers including the fleet carrier Taiyo, the largest and newest carrier in
the Japanese fleet. The Shokaku and the Zuikaku, veterans of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the
so-called old fleet carriers Junyo and Hiyo, as well as four light carriers. The nine carriers
were supported by a substantial battle fleet that included five battleships, ten heavy cruisers,
two light cruisers, and thirty-four destroyers. While he was well outnumbered by the US Fifth
Fleet under the command of Admiral Raymond Spruance, which included 15 aircraft carriers
and roughly twice as many carrier-borne aircraft, Ozawa saw an advantage. The Japanese could count
more than 500 aircraft operating from Japanese-controlled land bases at Guam, Yap, and
Rota. Not only would the land-based aircraft even the numbers, but they had better range than carrier
aircraft, offering the possibility of attacking the US fleet while the US planes would be out
of range to strike back. The Imperial Japanese Navy might never have a better opportunity. The
stage was set for what would be the last major carrier-on-carrier action of the Pacific War.
But Ozawa's plan had a serious flaw. Earlier in the war, the Japanese had had the advantage of
better training and equipment, but by 1944 the Americans had not just made up numbers,
but had substantially improved their equipment, training, and tactics. Meanwhile, the Japanese
fleet air arm had struggled to make good the losses of the previous battles, and their equipment had
failed to keep pace. While Ozawa's assumptions about being able to attack from a greater range
did serve him in the battle, the air duel was lopsided. In air attacks the first day,
the Japanese lost more than 350 planes to an American loss of less than 30. The air battle
was so lopsided that it became known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. But while the air battle is
reasonably well known, in fact the battle was largely won under the ocean. The US had a number
of submarines in the battle, and they played a critical role in finding and tracking Ozawa's
fleet. Among them was the USS Cabala, on just its first patrol. The Cabala was a Gato class
submarine. The Gato class were diesel-electric, and the first mass-produced US submarine class
of the war. 77 Gato class submarines were produced between 1940 and 1944. USS Cabala
was laid down in March of 1943, the 32nd Gato class boat to be built. Launched in November
and commissioned at the end of February 1944, the Cabala sailed from Connecticut to Pearl Harbor,
and on May 31st set sail on its first patrol, heading for the eastern Philippines. Cabala
was under the command of Lieutenant Commander Herman Kossler, a 1934 graduate of the US Naval
Academy, who had been awarded two silver stars for a service as executive officer aboard the
USS Guardfish. 311 foot 9 inches long, with a surface displacement of 1,525 long tons,
the Cabala's main armament was its 10 21 inch torpedo tubes, 6 forward and 4 aft. En route to
its patrol area in the eastern Philippines, Cabala happened to be well placed as the two fleets
approached each other. The night of June 17th, Cabala was tracking a small convoy when its radar
registered a ship contact. As Cabala approached, the contact turned into several contacts. Kossler
and Cabala had discovered a part of Hozawa's task force. While Cabala had easy targets,
submarines were under orders to report contacts first. Kossler made the difficult decision to
break off contact and report the sighting. Kossler spent the next day trying to regain contact. It
was dangerous work as the task force had ample air cover and escorts designed to kill submarines.
In the early morning of the 19th, a plane flew so low over the submerged Cabala that the crew
could hear the plane's engine roaring. Around 1030 the next morning, Kossler saw low-flying
aircraft circling in the distance through the periscope. As Cabala approached, they found
themselves in the midst of one of Hozawa's task groups, the so-called A-Force. In front of him
was a large aircraft carrier steaming a steady course into the southeast wind, raising large
bow waves. Kossler could see the carrier was recovering planes, a position that made it even
more vulnerable. Kossler, along with his executive officer and gunnery officer, identified the carrier
as a Shokaku class carrier. The Cabala had also detected a destroyer nearby, although it did not
appear to have detected the Cabala. Attacking the carrier would place the Cabala at risk.
The carrier sighted was in fact the Shokaku itself. Laid down in December of 1937, the Shokaku was the
Japanese carrier built without the restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty, which had expired
in December of 1936. 844 feet long with a displacement of 26,675 long tons, the Shokaku
deplaced 10,000 tons more than the lighter and smaller carriers built during the treaty period,
and was 20 percent larger than a pre-war U.S. carrier. Shokaku, which meant soaring crane,
had been one of the six carriers to participate in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
along with her sister ship Zuikaku, and had been a central fleet element in most of the
important battles of the Pacific War. Her planes have played a critical role in the Japanese
victory at the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea, sinking the carrier USS Lexington. Her
damage control teams had saved the ship when it was damaged in the battle. The damage had kept
Shokaku out of the Battle of Midway, and it is still a matter of conjecture whether Shokaku's
presence would have shifted the balance in that battle. Her planes had heavily damaged the carrier
Enterprise at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and helped to sink the carrier Hornet at the
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. It was one of the largest, most modern, and most veteran ships
in the Imperial Japanese Navy, and it represented a butcher's bill that the Americans were eager to
repay. Just 20 days into its first patrol, Cavalla found itself facing one of the most important
targets in the Imperial Japanese Navy. The Cavalla's position on the carrier was so good
that Costler only had to use the periscope three times as it moved to attack. Costler decided to
focus on the carrier and worry about the destroyer after. At 1118 a.m., he looked at the target
through the periscope, now approximately 1,500 yards away, and pushed the button on the right
handle. The boat's Torpedo Data Computer, or TDC, then determined a firing solution.
The simple analog computer worked through the complex trigonometry needed to properly set the
torpedo's gyros, angling the torpedo to meet the target at the anticipated intercept point,
given the torpedo and target's speeds. To generate a fire control solution, the TDC used inputs on
the submarine's course and speed obtained from the gyro compass and the pitometer log, a device
that measures about speed relative to the water, and estimated the target course, speed, and range
using data from the submarine's periscope, radar, and sonar. The TDC then performed the trigonomic
calculations required to compute a target intercept course for the torpedo and use an
electromechanical interface to set the course while the torpedoes were in the tubes ready to
be fired. Kossler ordered a salvo of six torpedoes. Firing multiple torpedoes at once gave a better
chance of a hit, and with a target as large as the Shokaku, multiple hits would likely be necessary
to sink the ship. He ordered that the torpedoes be set for a depth of 15 feet. Knowing that the
torpedoes might be sighted and give away his location, Kossler had the Kavala dive even as
it fired. The six torpedoes fired at eight-second intervals, begging for a 40-second firing sequence.
At 11 20 a.m. lookouts aboard the Shokaku sighted the oncoming torpedoes.
They had been scanning the sky for airplanes and so may have been preoccupied as they noticed
their torpedoes after it was too late to avoid them. The captain tried to turn the ship but
there wasn't enough time. Sound equipment aboard the Kavala heard the sound of an explosion 50
seconds after the first torpedo was launched, followed by two others at eight-second intervals.
When there were no more explosions, Kossler assumed the other three torpedoes had missed.
He ordered the submarine to turn and rig for silent running, hoping to avoid the carrier's
escorts. The first depth charges exploded nearby less than two minutes after the torpedoes had been
fired. Kossler took Kavala deep, though their sound equipment they could hear the screws of
at least three destroyers in pursuit. The crew of Kavala could do little more than stay deep and
stay quiet, trying to avoid sound detection, and wait it out as the destroyers dropped deadly depth
charges. The boat slowly tried to make distance and the explosions slowly were farther and farther
off. According to the log, the Japanese destroyers dropped 108 depth charges in the three hours
following the attack. 56 of those exploded close to the submarine. The Kavala's supersonic
listing gear burned out when water was pushed into the ventilation system, leaving only the JP
sonic listing gear, but the damage did not threaten the boat. As the Kavala slowly made distance, they
heard four large explosions from the direction of the attack. Kossler moved to periscope depth to
see if he could confirm that the carrier was destroyed, but there were rain squalls and he
wasn't able to see anything. Later that night, when it was safe enough for Kavala to surface,
he radioed Pearl Harbor indicating that he had hit a Japanese carrier with three torpedoes,
concluding the report with, believe the baby sunk. The Chicago's detailed action report did not
survive, so the details exactly how many torpedoes hit and where is sketchy, but there were eyewitness
reports to the damage and aftermath. The first torpedo struck amid ships just forward of the
island, rupturing a tank carrying volatile aviation fuel and sending a fireball and burning spray
upward in front of the bridge. Several pilots who'd been relaxing by the island were burned by
flaming fuel. Aircraft were being serviced and armed in the hangar, which was turned into an
inferno as aviation fuel that was running through pipes to fuel the planes caught fire and munitions
and hoists ready to be mounted on the aircraft exploded. The next strikes, the eyewitnesses
differ on whether three or four torpedoes hit, started flooding in a boiler room, causing a
starboard list. The ship lost both power and propulsion and started trimmed towards the bow,
where another torpedo had left a massive hole, possibly having gone clean through.
The torpedoes combined for a particularly damaging blow, not only causing fires and flooding,
but disabling power needed for damage control. With the loss of the boilers, propulsion was lost
and the damage to the bow disabled navigation. The captain ordered counter flooding to address the
list, actually flooding too much and causing a slight list to the port, however that required
flooding another boiler room. Without power, the crew could not operate the pumps that would allow
them to address the flooding and fires burned throughout the hangar. The Shokaku's damage
control crews were veteran and they had saved the ship when it had taken damage during the battles
with Coral Sea and the Santa Cruz Islands. They managed to douse the fire in the fuel tank by
cutting off access to the surrounding spaces, but without power to operate the pumps they could not
address the flooding at the bow and the hangar fires raged. At 1 30, it became clear that they
could not save the ship and the captain ordered abandoned ship. The crew gathered on the deck of
the stern and prepared to abandon ship. The bow was sinking slowly and they had time to proceed
in an orderly manner, searching to not leave anyone behind. Then suddenly at eight minutes
after two, there was a large explosion at the bow. An aerial bomb, possibly caught in the hangar fire
or possibly thrown forward as the bow settled, exploded inside the hangar. Below deck, the ship
had been slowly filling with petrol fumes and the result of ruptured tanks and poor quality fuel.
The bomb ignited the fumes throughout the ship, causing four terrific explosions, the ones that
Costler heard aboard the Cavala. Water poured across the deck and flowed down through the open
elevator into the hangar. This threw the stern where the crew had gathered upward, throwing men
down the deck into the fires. The ship sank almost vertically, going under less than two minutes after
the great explosion. 1,263 of the ship's crew perished, only 557 were rescued. Shikaku was not
the only Japanese loss of the battle. The carrier Taiyo, the newest and largest carrier in the fleet,
had been struck by a single torpedo from the submarine USS Albacore. The Taiyo, well armored,
should have shrugged off a single torpedo hit, but a series of mistakes by its inexperienced
damage control crews led to an internal explosion that sunk the ship. In addition, the fleet carrier
Hiyo was sunk by planes from the USS Bellowoods. Just as important were the air losses, as many of
the planes that weren't shot down were lost with the three carriers sunk. The Japanese lost more
than 400 carrier-based aircraft and 200 land-based aircraft in the battle. The fleet air arm was
devastated, the few remaining carriers made virtually irrelevant for lack of planes and
skilled air crews. Ozawa retreated north, the battle was a turning point that eliminated the
Japanese Navy's ability to conduct large-scale carrier operations. The Kawala went on to finish
its patrol and was awarded a presidential unit citation for sinking Shikaku. It successfully
completed six wartime patrols in the Pacific, sinking the Japanese destroyer Shimatsuki in
November 1944. The Kawala went on to serve after the war and wasn't stricken from the naval roles
clear until 1969, when it was transformed into a museum ship. Today the USS Kawala is on display
at Seawolf Park on Pelican Island in Texas and you can go and visit it. Chisaburo Ozawa finished
the war as the last commander-in-chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy. He was considered one of
Japan's most capable flag officers during the war and was described as being both courageous
and compassionate towards his men. He passed away in 1966 at the age of 80. Herman Kossler served
with the United States Navy for 43 years through the Second World War into Korea and Vietnam.
He retired a rear admiral having been awarded three silver stars, the Navy Cross, the Distinguished
Service Medal and two legions of merit. He passed away in 1988 at the age of 76. I hope you enjoyed
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