Soviet War-Winning Tanks in 1941 The Role of Tanks on the Eastern Front WW2

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Soviet War-Winning Tanks in 1941 The Role of Tanks on the Eastern Front WW2
People often say that, right from the beginning, the Soviets have superior tanks to the Germans
in World War Two. They say, again, right from the beginning of the war, the Soviets have
T-34s and KVs. And these, of course, are war-winning tanks. You often hear how the German shells
bounced off the armour of these tanks, and it is often used as a way of showing how great
the Germans must have been in order to deal with these impossibly powerful machines.
But I think this graph alone speaks volumes. This is the number of tanks the Soviets have
on the 22nd of June 1941. This is all of them. Not just the ones deployed against the Germans.
All of them. 22,600 tanks. The blue bar, and I know it's hard to see, but there is a
blue bar, that is the number of Soviet heavy tanks. 500 heavy tanks. This includes the
five-turreted T-35s as well as other heavies. So it's not just 500 KVs. The red bar is
the number of medium tanks, including T-34s. That's 900 medium tanks, not just T-34s.
Again, throughout the whole of the Soviet Union, less than 900 T-34s. But these numbers
pale in comparison to the number of light tanks the Soviets have. 21,200 light tanks.
Some of these are good light tanks, but most are not. Most wouldn't be able to go toe-to-toe
with a Panzer II. And these light tanks are the tanks that the Germans are facing in 1941.
Now it is very tempting to say that the Germans didn't have a lot of tanks, so the Germans
are going to be overwhelmed with numbers. This new graph shows this to be the case.
The Germans have approximately 6,052 panzers, and they deploy 3,903 tanks on the Eastern
Front on June 22nd, 1941. This again suggests that the Germans must have been really great
in order to take on this many tanks with their own tanks. Well, there's a slight problem
with this idea, and that is this. The Germans weren't using tanks to hunt enemy tanks.
Even Rommel in North Africa doesn't do this. As I showed in my Battleaxe documentary, Rommel's
tactic was to draw the British towards his men by retreating his own tanks, and then
hit them with 37mm and 50mm PAK guns. These would finish off the lighter tanks, and then
the 88's would take out the heavier tanks at a distance. This ploy would become the
standard Axis tactic for the remainder of the war in North Africa.
And the best part is, in the first weeks of Barbarossa, it's not the German panzers
doing the bulk of the work, it is the German infantry formations. Take a look at this graph.
These are the German divisions on the Eastern Front on the 22nd of June 1941. 19 panzer
divisions, 13 motorised, the rest infantry. Well, actually one of them is a cavalry division,
but I didn't want to create a whole new column just for that, so I actually included
that in with the infantry. But you get the idea. The vast majority of the German divisions
are not panzer divisions. But, while their tanks are outnumbered, their infantry are
not. The Germans outnumber the Soviets on the first day of the war. The red bar shows
the number of Red Army troops on the Eastern Front, versus the blue bar for the Axis. The
Germans alone outnumber the Soviets, but obviously I had to include all the Axis here, otherwise
the Soviets can't ignore the other Axis, so they're spread out. The other two bars
are the number of men in both their armed forces. And I've included that to show you
that not all of the troops are on the Eastern Front at this time.
The bulk of the German divisions are infantry divisions. And it is these guys that do a
lot of the work in the early weeks of Barbarossa. Unlike in later battles, such as Kursk, the
infantry are the ones doing the bulk of the work. And by that, what I mean is, once the
panzers have broken through the lines, and encircled or exploited through the gaps, it
is the infantry doing the clearing up. This also means taking out the Soviet tanks. The
best way that I can illustrate this is to take a look at the biggest tank engagement
of the entire war. And no, it's not Kursk. It is in fact the Battle of Dubno, 1941.
728 German tanks of Army Group South, specifically Panzergruppe 1, face off against, by my recent
calculations, 4,798 Soviet tanks. Here you can see the German tank numbers, the blue
bar, versus the red heavy tanks, the yellow medium tanks, and the green light tanks of
the Soviets engaged at Dubno. On paper, at least, this looks like an unfair fight. The
291 Soviet heavy tanks, plus the 411 Soviet medium tanks, which equals 702 tanks alone,
is almost equal to the German tank numbers. Even without the light tanks. Even without
the picture, it does not tell the full story. And this, by the way, is the problem when
comparing statistics of various tank numbers, or even tank designs. They can only really
get you so far. You have to then go and dig a little bit further to get the real picture.
The first problem is that 2,000 of these Soviet tanks do not even make it to the battlefield.
Why is that? The answer is simply they do not have the support network to sustain themselves
in the field. They're breaking down, and the Soviets are forced to just blow them up
because they don't have sufficient maintenance formations. They run out of fuel because they
haven't got any fuel stockpiled. They haven't stockpiled enough quantities of it, because
why would they? They weren't expecting a fight, nor do they have good logistical foundations
in place to keep these tanks supplied. They run out of ammunition. They run out of fuel.
They break down. And it's a complete disaster. The combat vehicles of the 22nd Mechanized
Corps undoubtedly remained on the roads as a result of a lack of fuel, as well as technical
problems. During the retreat, these tanks became trophies for the Germans.
And why is this the case? Is it because the Soviets are incompetent? No. In 1935, the
entire Soviet military had 930,000 men. In February 1939, they have 1,565,000 men. On
the 22nd of June 1941, the Soviets have 5,700,000 men. Of these, 2,700,000 are deployed on the
Eastern Front. In only 36 months, the Red Army grew by almost 4,000,000 men and 163
divisions and a series of armoured, mechanized and specialist units have been formed from
scratch. As I showed in my Purges video, this is the main reason that the Soviet officer
corps is lacking experience. At Dubno, most of the men and officers in the tank formations
had only been in the military for a year. In fact, the mechanized divisions themselves
had only been created in late 1940. The Purges were a drop in the ocean compared to the expansion
of the Red Army. But this isn't about officers, this is about maintenance and logistical services.
So how does this explain why the Soviet tanks are breaking down? Or why the Soviet tanks
were taken out by, in large numbers, in the first few days of the war? The main point
is this. The Germans are attacking the Soviet Union in the middle of a mobilization effort.
A mobilization effort that is far from finished. So far from finished, that a good portion
of the Soviet tank divisions haven't got enough trucks for their riflemen. Neither
the 37th Tank Division, 15th Mechanized Corps, nor the 39th Tank Division, 16th Mechanized
Corps, nor the 41st Tank Division, 22nd Mechanized Corps, had received their required vehicles
by the outbreak of war, and were only nominally considered mobile formations. The motorized
infantry in these regiments advanced on foot, just like standard infantry.
The motorized divisions were even worse off. They didn't receive any vehicles at all.
In fact, regular rifle divisions were more mobile than the motorized divisions, because
they at least were equipped with horses to pull their artillery. The reason for this
was because the Soviet High Command had realized that tanks were important, and wanted to create
new tank divisions, tank corps, tank armies. So they created new formations and new doctrines
from September 1940 onwards. And because of the strategic situation changing, and the
Soviets believing that if Hitler was ever to attack in the future, he would concentrate
against the Ukraine and the Caucasus, which is where he actually did want to attack, but
Halder decided otherwise, they were busy concentrating their forces in the south.
Thus, just as the German attack caught the Soviets in transition to new organizations,
leaders, equipment, and doctrine, it also found them shifting troop concentrations.
At Dubno, the Soviet tank forces are defeated, not by the German tanks, but mostly by the
German infantry formations, either as part of the panzer divisions, or the regular infantry
divisions. What happens is this, the Soviet tanks go ahead onto the battlefield alone,
and then get chewed up. Why? Because the Soviet motorized and mechanized formations aren't
equipped with enough trucks or tractors. Their infantry and artillery can't keep up with
the tanks. And even if they could, there's not enough of them. 22nd Mechanized Corps
has 786 tanks and only 100 artillery pieces for all three of its divisions. That simply
isn't enough. German artillery prevents what little infantry the Soviet tanks might
have from keeping up with the tanks. The tanks are then isolated, and then defeated by the
German infantry, or by artillery and anti-tank guns. German tanks, on the other hand, face
very little Soviet artillery. So they can rely on their own infantry and artillery
for support. Now, of course there are tank-on-tank engagements,
but the large tank number superiority that the Soviets seem to have on paper on the 22nd
of June 1941, is simply not there. Most of these tanks are light tanks, and the standard
German infantry anti-tank guns can take them out. It is these that do the bulk of the work
as the Combat Journal of the 48th Corps for the 23rd of June 1941 states,
"...what we did not anticipate in this battle was the fanatical fighting spirit of the Russian
tank crews. Despite our obvious advantage in terms of strength of numbers and in anti-tank
weapons, the enemy light tanks continued to attack, despite their losses. Even when they
were in a hopeless situation, with their engines smashed and their caterpillar tracks ripped,
they would fire until they had no ammunition left, or would start fighting afresh once
our tanks had passed them."
The light tanks were clearly no match for the German anti-tank guns. Note though that
the German mentions an obvious advantage in strength of numbers for the Germans, and also
in anti-tank weaponry. It does not mention its own tank forces attacking Soviet tanks.
In fact, it says they passed them. And also note there is no mention of Soviet infantry
or artillery. This, by the way, is the story of Barbarossa. The Germans have more infantry
on the field of battle until December rolls around. They take out large numbers of Soviet
infantry, and the Soviets are sending everything they have to the front. But they take these
out because they outnumber the Soviets. Only in December 1941 does this situation change.
Now what about the T-34s? What about these war-winning tanks? How did the Germans take
these out?
Some very fast, heavy enemy tanks appeared with 76.2mm armament
T-34s that are capable of firing very accurately over long range.
Our tanks clearly concede to them. The 37mm anti-tank armament is hopeless against them.
They can only be hit at close range with an 88mm anti-aircraft gun at higher than average
range.
37mm anti-tank guns are useless against the T-34s, but the 50mm guns and the 88mm guns
can take them out. The point is that this wasn't a tank vs tank war. In fact, this
is the point of Blitzkrieg, or Bewegungskrieg, war of movement. Find the gaps in the enemy
lines and exploit and encircle. German tanks tend to avoid tank battles and try to outflank
and then get past them.
Now the Soviets do have some success at this early stage. The Germans aren't just winning
everywhere. When the German tank formations come across Soviet anti-tank formations, they
take heavy casualties. For example, on the 24th of June 1941, 13th Panzer Division loses
a significant portion of their tanks in just one day. This was a full 38% of the total
tanks they had at the start of the day, lost from the third day of the war. And actually,
the majority of these tanks that were lost were Panzer IIIs. They actually lose 64% of
their Panzer IIIs on the third day of the war. Not through tank vs tank engagements,
but through tank vs anti-tank engagements. What were, for 1941, relatively heavy losses,
can be explained first and foremost by the clash with the 1st Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade.
It's not because they engaged Soviet tanks. The Germans lose relatively few tanks to tank-on-tank
engagements. Now, even though their guns aren't always capable of taking on the heavier
Soviet tanks, the Germans still have ways of taking out the Soviet tanks without resorting
to using their own tanks. And this is mainly due to the lack of Soviet artillery and infantry
support. Our 3.7cm anti-tank gun waits patiently while the tanks come within a suitable firing
range. Then, however, we couldn't believe our eyes. Our anti-tank shells were just bouncing
off the tanks. The enemy tanks kept advancing towards us without stopping, and were firing
at us with all their weapons. Then something unexpected happened. After recovering from
the fright of seeing these steel giants, our infantry began to attack, throwing hand-grenades
at the tanks. Note that this is from the 1st Mountain Division. They do not have tanks.
They only have anti-tank guns and infantry. And without artillery and infantry, the Soviet
tanks are disabled by the German infantry. And this isn't the only example. Their attacks
were not coordinated. Therefore, with the help of artillery and anti-tank crews, a large
number of tanks were destroyed. This is not 1917. The infantry are capable of taking on
tanks. And so, this is not a tank vs tank war. Tanks are important, but their use is
not in engaging other enemy tanks. It is through exploiting through the gaps, encircling and
crippling enemy formations. German tanks are able to do this. Soviet tanks aren't capable
of doing this due to their lack of infantry, artillery, logistics and maintenance units.
For Dubnow, the largest tank engagement of the war, and the largest in 1941, Iseev comes
to this conclusion.
"...in itself the tank is a steel box with a very poor restricted view of the outside
world. If tanks broke through to the enemy positions on their own, they would be fired
upon by heavy artillery and Molotov cocktails would be thrown at them. Therefore, protecting
tanks with thick armor provides little security if they are to move successfully, since their
movements need to be protected by their own infantry. The infantry that are protecting
the tanks are able to do so not just by firing the tanks' machine guns, but by winning
the duel with artillery. Otherwise, the howitzers in masked positions against which tanks are
vulnerable would mow down the infantry or force them to lie low, leaving the tanks exposed."
This is the reason, in 1941, that the Soviet tank forces are defeated. It's because they
don't have infantry or artillery support. Why do they not have infantry and artillery
support? They're in the middle of a mobilization program and a reorganization effort, which
is in reaction to the German successes of the previous year. They are reforming their
tank forces and reforming their motorized and mechanized units, which didn't exist
in this capacity just a few years before. They are caught, completely by surprise, by
the German attack. As a result, they don't have enough trucks or enough artillery to
support these formations. Their infantry can't keep up, and therefore can't protect the
tanks. The little artillery that they do have can't move to the battlefield, and
those that do actually make it, are too little to make a difference. This is why the German
infantry are able to take out as many tanks as they do.
Tank vs tank engagements do happen. They happen at Dubno. They happen elsewhere. But that
is not what tanks are meant to be doing in a Blitzkrieg, or Bewegungskrieg, a war of
movement. Their task is to exploit gaps in the lines, encircle or cut the enemy's lines
of communications, then let the other formations take out the stragglers. This is why the Germans
do so well in 1941. They use their tanks to get through the enemy lines and fight this
war of movement. This is also why they're not able to repeat the successes of 1941 in
both 1942 or in 1943. It's not because they don't have enough tanks. German tank stocks
increase year on year. It's because they don't outnumber the Soviets anymore. They
no longer have the fuel to fight this exploitation war. Their tanks have fuel to fight locally,
but not to ride off into the sunset, or in this case, the sunrise. They no longer have
sufficient infantry support, because their infantry, despite growing in numbers year
on year, are stretched thin across a massively wide front. Their logistics aren't able
to keep up with supply demands. And the Soviets have learnt their lesson. Take a look at this
chart. Now, I've deliberately not put a key on this chart, because I think it's
better without. The first bar, the blue one, is the number of tanks the Soviets have on
the 22nd of June 1941. The second bar, the red one, is the number of tanks the Soviets
have on the 1st of January 1943. You can see it decreases slightly. This is at a time when
the German tanks are in fact increasing. The Germans have more tanks in 1943 than they
do in 1941. The yellow bar, the third bar, is the number of anti-tank guns the Red Army
has on the 22nd of June 1941. The green bar, the fourth bar, is the number of anti-tank
guns the Red Army has on the 1st of January 1943. Again, slight decrease. This is at a
time when the Germans have more tanks than ever before. The purple bar, the fifth bar,
is the number of artillery pieces the Soviets have on the 22nd of June 1941. The blue bar,
the sixth bar, is the number of artillery pieces the Soviets have at the beginning of
1943. Ok, a slight increase. These are also anti-tank weapons. 76.2mm field guns are great
at taking out any and all German tanks at this stage, except for maybe the Tigers. So
that is an important weapon. But what is the last one? What is that? Do you want to guess?
Take a guess. Pink and green. What are these final two bars? Pink is 22nd of June 1941,
and green is January 1943. A massive increase, bearing in mind that they've already lost
hundreds of thousands of these by this point. No, it's not rifles. The Soviets actually
have more rifles in 1941 than they do in 1943. Is it planes? No. Is it trucks? No. Is it
anti-tank? No. Anti-aircraft guns? Is it anti-aircraft guns? No. This, and you're going to hate
me for this, this is the weapon that the Soviets are relying on to win the war. This is the
war-winning weapon of World War Two. What on earth is it? It is the mortar. Wait a second,
mortars can't take out tanks. No, but they can take out infantry. And what are tanks
without infantry? As we've just found out, they're useless. The thing you have to remember
about the Eastern Front of World War Two is that the Soviets aren't actually facing
many German tanks. The Germans only have 7,505 tanks in July of 1943. They actually peak
in December of 1942 at 7,798 total tanks. But that's every tank in stock everywhere,
not just the Eastern Front. As I showed last week, the Germans do not have the fuel to
put these tanks in the field. The vast majority of the German formations in the field are
not panzer divisions, they are infantry divisions. The Soviets are not facing tanks, they're
facing German infantry. German infantry numbers peak in the July of 1943. In July of 1943,
the Germans have 3,483,000 men on the Eastern Front. This is the most they'll ever have.
They also have other Axis troops as well, meaning that they actually have over 4 million
men on the Eastern Front. And this is in the July of 1943. This idea that the Germans are
running out of infantry, not until after July of 1943. This idea that this was a tank versus
tank war. No. The Soviets are not taking on tanks, they're taking on infantry. And what
takes out infantry? Rifles, artillery, mortars, grenades, Molotov cocktails. Yes, tanks and
anti-tank guns are super important. They can't get to Berlin without tanks and trucks. But
as we can see, they're not engaging that many panzers. They're engaging infantry.
And that is the point. They're using their tanks to help their infantry and artillery
defeat the Germans and the German infantry.
This is why Prokhorovka is a disaster for the Soviets. Stalin is angry at Rotmistrov
for losing 400 out of 500 tanks, charging 200 German panzers. What have you done to
your magnificent tank army? What is the point of Prokhorovka? It's a stupid idea. This
was a head-on-head clash that proved to be mostly pointless. Tanks fighting tanks, especially
head-on, is just a complete waste. Infantry formations could have done the job just as
well. Now, while it isn't as romantic, and it isn't as glorious, and while perhaps
it isn't as cool, the war was actually an infantry war. Tanks are very important,
but they can't win the war alone. You take out the infantry, you take out the tanks.
Tanks cannot win World War Two alone.
Thank you very much to my Patreons for your continuing support. You make these videos
possible because you're awesome. If you haven't seen my Purges video, go check it
out. Stalin's Purge of the Red Army doesn't have the impact you may think it does. Link
on the screen and in the description below. Thank you all for watching, bye for now.
