STALINGRAD PROPAGANDA! Was Hitler really “obsessed” with taking the city

"...was Hitler really obsessed with taking Stalingrad? When reading the books or watching many of the documentaries on this battle, the authors would say yes." "...Hitler was obsessed with the symbolism of Stalingrad, explained one of Paulus's staff officers. The cause of 6th Army's destruction at Stalingrad is obviously to be found in Hitler's refusal, doubtless mainly for reasons of prestige, to give up Withdrawal was the sensible option, but Hitler would not hear of it. The capture of the city was necessary not just for operational, but for psychological reasons, to show the world the strength of German arms and to boost the morale of the Axis allies." "...fear of loss of face had taken over from military reasoning. Hitler's all-too-public statements in the Sportspalast and then to his Gauleiter had meant that taking Stalingrad had become a matter of prestige. And, though he claimed the fact that the city bore Stalin's name was of no significance, retreat from precisely this city would clearly compound the loss of prestige." "...and the German official history writes… Why then, if it was not for operational reasons, did Hitler insist on the continuation of the struggle for Stalingrad? Was it ultimately a matter of prestige, as time and again suggested in the post-war literature? Had Stalingrad become the area of a no longer rationally based personal squaring of accounts between two dictators? Hitler was certainly aware of the symbolic value of a city bearing the name of his ideological arch-enemy. Meanwhile, and this may have been a major factor in his subsequent decision to continue the Stalingrad offensive, Hitler was on the way to becoming a prisoner of his own prestige mentality." We'd be here all day if I was to quote all the books saying this, so you get the picture. The consensus is that Hitler was obsessed with taking the city that bore Stalin's name, and insisted that the fighting in the city continue because it was a matter of personal prestige. In other words, if he withdrew out of the city, as some of his generals were proposing at the time, then he would lose face, the Germans would be seen as failures, and German morale would sink. The argument is therefore that it was Hitler's obsession that kept them in Stalingrad, as they took divisions from the flanks to send them into the city, weakening the flanks, and allowing the Red Army to launch their counter-offensive to encircle and destroy them. So, it's all Madman Hitler's fault as usual. And this is all well and good, except, we should always ask the question, but is this really the case? Because here's the thing, none of the books provide evidence to support the claim that Hitler was obsessed with the city. They all just state it as if it's fact. There's no details, no examples, no quotes of Hitler saying how obsessed he was with Stalingrad, just the statement that he was. And that makes me suspicious, especially since we actually have evidence of Hitler saying that he wasn't so interested in Stalingrad just because it was named after Stalin. "...the objective was an area between the bend of the Don and the Volga, and the town of Stalingrad, not because the town bears Stalin's name, which is unimportant, but exclusively because it is a strategically important area." Now, in the same speech, he does say, "...and you can rest assured that no human being can remove us from this place." But this hardly shows an obsession. Wanting to take and hold Stalingrad as a military objective doesn't necessarily mean an obsession or a prestige issue. And these statements make it clear that he wasn't interested in Stalingrad due to the name of the city. So I would argue that this is evidence against the idea of an obsession. I've also argued in the Battlestorm Stalingrad series that Hitler was concerned about the Don flank, unlike what a lot of the sources claim. I won't bog this video down here, so check that series out for more information, specifically episode 18. But the point is that he can't be super obsessed with the city if he's also concerned by the flanks. That's a contradiction. And, in addition to the lack of evidence from the historians, many of the primary sources I have don't talk about the obsession either. Worse, they actually appear to show the opposite that the Germans, yes not just Hitler, weren't obsessed at all. Goebbels' diary entries for the period between the 23rd of May and the 7th of December 1942 are missing in the English sources, providing no clue there. Halder's diaries also don't mention an obsession. In fact, his argument on the 30th of July 1942 was centered around the fact that too many units were moving south, and that 4th Panzer Army should have been sent towards Stalingrad. Hitler had wanted most of his units to go south, yet Halder and others now wanted units to go towards Stalingrad. There are also numerous entries where he says that Hitler was concerned about the Don flank. So this is the opposite of an obsession. And Friedrich Kellner doesn't mention Stalingrad at all until the 28th of November 1942, after Operation Uranus and the encirclement of the 6th Army. You'd think that if Stalingrad was being broadcasted so much to the German people, that it would appear in his diaries before this point. Yet it's not mentioned until the late November period, suggesting that there wasn't an obsession, as is often claimed. Thus, at least when it comes to the English translated sources, neither the primary nor secondary sources provide evidence for this supposed obsession with Stalingrad, either from Hitler's point of view, or from the German people's point of view. The sources only state that there was one without backing it up. So, with only the statements by historians who had failed to provide evidence to support their claim, my initial conclusion was that something wasn't right here. I began to wonder whether the historians had just failed to provide evidence to back up their claim, or if it was something else. I wondered if the German propaganda ministry had got obsessed with the taking of Stalingrad, and whether this was the source of the Hitler's obsession with the city idea. Maybe the historians had seen all the propaganda, and then believed that Hitler was behind it all. But then I realized that this couldn't be the case, because the primary sources I have don't suggest that German propaganda was focused on Stalingrad. I also began to wonder if this was, somehow, a mix-up with what the Soviets thought about the battle. You see, the Battle of Stalingrad was seen as a great turning point of the war, with the Soviets making a big deal about the battle and the destruction of the 6th Army. So I wondered if it was they who had claimed that Hitler was obsessed with taking the city, and then the historians had picked up on that, and then come to a false conclusion. And I'm not saying that any of this was the case, only that I began to consider these as potential explanations. So I thought, okay, I'm going to have to figure this out. I'm going to have to look into the German propaganda for the Battle of Stalingrad, and see if there's any hint of an obsession, or if things had been blown way out of proportion. And then I realized that I was in no position to actually figure this out. I have all the English books on this battle, and none of them talk about the propaganda. Military History Visualized has done a video on German propaganda, but it's focused on the propaganda that came after the encirclement of the 6th Army, not before it. And since Hitler's or Germany's obsession with Stalingrad is meant to have taken place before the encirclement, this doesn't help either. Thus, I needed to dive into the German sources. Which I couldn't do, because I can't read German. Therefore, I gave up. End of video. No! Instead of giving up, for the first time in the history of this channel, I decided to ask somebody else to do the majority of the research I needed. Lukas König, a history student, now graduated, I believe, from Austria, who had translated some sources for the Stalingrad series, took up the call to arms. And so, thanks to him, much of the information I'm about to give you has not been heard before in the English-speaking world. So this is all brand new. And if it's all wrong, or if I get accused of being biased and agendered this time, I can just blame it all on him. Thank you Lukas! Right, so here's the history of German propaganda relating to the Battle of Stalingrad. First off, Stalingrad wasn't mentioned as an objective for Fall Blau, and it was only from mid-July 1942 that it even started to appear in the newspapers. On the 15th of July, the name of the city of Stalingrad appeared on the very eastern edge of a map in the Volkischer Biobakter. Then, on the 18th of July, the word Stalingrad was written in the text of a newspaper for the first time. The newspaper Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung said that German troops had crossed the railway line leading from Rostov to Stalingrad. And that was it. On the 21st, the same newspaper mentioned that German troops were 80 kilometers from the city. And on the 22nd, the Volkischer Biobakter mentioned the city again. Really, at no point in July 1942 can it be said that there was any obsession over the city, from either Hitler or from the newspapers. However, on the 3rd of August, a Dresden newspaper headlined with a sentence stating that Stalingrad was the most fateful battle of the war. Which is interesting, because Goebbels himself only writes on the 7th of August that the Battle of Stalingrad had begun. So it's almost as if the newspapers had jumped ahead a bit. Then on the 9th of August, the newspapers all printed a Wehrmacht report that stated Stalingrad's strategic importance. The Wehrmacht said that Stalingrad was a railway hub, and that the Volga was also important. And from this moment onwards, the propaganda started to mention Stalingrad more often, with phrases like, "...strikes southwest of Stalingrad", making it into the text every few days. On the 24th of August, the Volkischer Biobakter called the battle in the area the decisive battle of this campaign. And on the 25th of August, the first mention of the attack on the city itself was written. But again, at no point in the August period could it really be said that there was an obsession with the taking of Stalingrad in the German newspapers, or with Hitler. The newspapers were just reporting the progress of the campaign, and were saying that Stalingrad was an important place, which it was, and that a turning point in the campaign might happen if the city was taken. I mean, all of that is true, and none of it could really be classed as an obsession. One thing to note though, is that, even at this point, the population was disappointed by the slow progress of the campaign, and were anxious by the casualties. By the beginning of September, they were beginning to believe that something was going wrong. Citizens of the Reich became more reluctant to believe the propaganda as the days dragged on, and the city didn't fall. But on the 11th of September, Hitler had had enough, and stepped in to ask Otto Diedrich from Goebbels' propaganda ministry to rein them in. This action is evidence that Hitler wasn't obsessed with the city at all, and in fact was trying to get the propaganda ministry to reduce its own obsession with Stalingrad, the opposite of what the history books say. On the 12th of September, the Berliner Illustriator painted the Battle of Stalingrad as the climax of the campaign, and the toughest battle of the war. They even went as far to say it was more important than Leningrad or Moscow. On the 16th, the Dresden newspaper said that the battle was in its deciding phase, and on the 17th said it was only a matter of time now before the city fell. But when the city hadn't fallen on the 18th, the newspaper said that the German infantry were fighting a hero's battle in the city, saying that on the 19th, nothing is impossible for the German soldier. The Berliner Illustriator actually went so far as to say that Stalingrad was the most important military decision in history. And it wasn't just the German press either. Regarding Stalingrad, there is constant back and forth in the news according to the completely unresolved situation. The Bolsheviks make calls to the defenders of Stalingrad to keep resisting. They call upon the national strength of resistance and emphasize the tremendous importance of the city that it has to represent. In London they draw similarities between our stalemate with the Napoleonic debacle at Berezina. This comparison was made in the previous year as well, and has barely any effect today. Additionally, they try to inflate our losses massively and use that to conclude that we are now unable to achieve noteworthy successes. The Daily Telegraph declares that Stalingrad will be the deciding battle of the whole war. All the more we have to increase our efforts to win it. It is, in fact, a question of life and death, and our prestige is bound to its outcome, equally as that of the Soviet Union." So, the German press and the foreign press were hyping up the battle. This was why, by the 28th of September, the SD were reporting that everyone in Germany was fixated on what was happening at Stalingrad. Therefore, by September, there was an obsession in Germany over Stalingrad thanks to the propaganda. There hadn't been an obsession in July or August, but the propaganda heightened the battle and made all eyes focus on it by September. This is important because Hitler's speech on the 30th of September actually tried to allay the fears of the German people and walk back some of the obsession over Stalingrad. The result was that, until the middle of October, people became less concerned with Stalingrad. This was the speech I quoted before, and I'll read it again. "...the objective was an area between the bend of the Don and the Volga, and the town of Stalingrad, not because the town bears Stalin's name, which is unimportant, but exclusively because it is a strategically important area." Within this context, it's clear that Hitler was trying to rein in the propaganda and stamp out the rumour that he wanted to take the city because it bore Stalin's name, which was clearly a rumour because otherwise, why would he address it and say that it wasn't the case? So, this suggests that the propaganda was the issue. It was the propaganda that was obsessed over the city, and then convinced the civilians to obsess over the city as well, not Hitler. Then Hitler said, "...and you can rest assured that no human being can remove us from this place." But again, this hardly shows an obsession on the part of Hitler. Wanting to take and hold Stalingrad as a military objective doesn't necessarily mean an obsession. And when we take into account that the speech was a long one, and the fact that Stalingrad is only mentioned a couple of times throughout the whole thing, and I've quoted a good portion of the part where he talks about it, really it's hard to say that Hitler was obsessed about the city, more that he was trying to reduce the hype over Stalingrad that the civilians had. The newspaper obsession about Stalingrad continued throughout October, with the Berliner Illustrierte coming up with the famous phrase, the Rat War in Stalingrad. But, as the fighting bogged down, because Paulus was sat still for several days, see episode 28 of the Stalingrad series, even the propaganda ministry struggled to report on any success at Stalingrad. Therefore, they started to print pictures of the battle instead. On the 16th though, after the beginning of Paulus's 3rd Offensive, the Dresden newspaper once again brought attention to the city, stating that the 1942 offensive was aimed at the city, which it hadn't been, and talked about the significance of the city. By the 29th of October, the SD reported that the people continued to discuss the Battle of Stalingrad, noting that they weren't in as much doubt about the outcome. It seems that people were making comparisons with the Battle of Verdun, or with Napoleon's failed campaign in Russia. Which is why the Volkischer Beobachter wrote a piece titled Verdun and Stalingrad False and Correct Comparisons, where they argued that the comparisons were not correct. This actually seems to have had an effect at allaying the fears of the populace, but only for a short time. Doubts were being expressed about the vagueness of the reports in the press. Hitler's speech on the 8th of November also had a negative impact because, even though he had said that the Volga was cut, his statement about the 350,000 casualties suffered was vague. He didn't clarify whether that was the total losses of the war, or just those on the Eastern Front, and this caused the civilians some concerns. The situation in North Africa didn't help much, as El Alamein and Torch diverted people's attention away from the East, and by this point, the newspapers seemed to have tried to sweep Stalingrad under the rug. I will point out though that Hitler again confirms in his speech on the 8th of November that he did not advance on Stalingrad because he was obsessed about it bearing Stalin's name. He also says that this wasn't another Verdun, echoing what the newspaper had said. "...as Mr. Stalin expected us to attack in the center, I did not want to attack in the center, not only because Mr. Stalin perhaps believed this, but also because I did not really care. I wanted to reach the Volga, and reach it at a certain location, in a certain city. By coincidence, the city bore Stalin's name. But you should not think that I marched there for this reason. It could have had any other name. I did it because it is an important place." I just want to remind everyone that Faulblau didn't aim to take Stalingrad at all, so Hitler saying that he wanted to march to Stalingrad was actually incorrect. His aim had been, and still was, the oil of the Caucasus. Stalingrad only ended up becoming important because he also wanted to cut the Volga, which is what he says next. "...you can cut off traffic amounting to thirty million tons there, nearly nine million tons of which are oil. All the wheat from the huge areas of the Ukraine and the Kuban region flows together there, so it can be transported north. Manganese ore is brought there. It is a gigantic trade centre. That centre I wanted to take, and, as you know, we are modest, we have it. There are only a few small pockets left." Now the others say, then why do they not fight more quickly? "...because I do not want a second Verdun. I prefer to do it with very small assault parties. Time makes no difference here. No ship comes up the Volga anymore. That is what is decisive." So, at no point prior to Operation Uranus was Hitler obsessed with taking the city. In fact, it was the newspapers, in late August and September, that were obsessed with the city, which was why Hitler had to ask Otto Diedrich on the 11th of September to rein them in. Coupled with what he said in his speeches, to me, this shows that Hitler wasn't obsessed with the city at all, rather that it was the propaganda ministry and, in turn, the civilians who were obsessed with the city instead. Operation Uranus started on the 18th of November 1942, and the newspapers went silent about Stalingrad. From mid-November onwards, the only information people were getting about Stalingrad was coming from letters from the troops, and these were cryptic due to censorship. On the 25th of November, a doctor from the 6th Army sent this message. "...little cauldron here, little cauldron there, little cauldron every which way." He also said, "...having to give way to a stronger enemy is gloomy." From this moment, rumours started spreading that the 6th Army was encircled. Although, it's worth noting that even at this stage, the people didn't blame Hitler, but blamed the Romanians. Which is interesting because, even though they were going off rumours alone, they still put enough pieces of the puzzle together to know that it had been the Romanian lines that had been shattered. I think that's really interesting because the rumours were right. Then, on the 28th of November, a letter from an Oberleutnant in the 6th Army spoke of Manstein's words to the troops. Stand by, I will get you out. This corresponds with Friedrich Kellner's diaries, who first mentioned Stalingrad on the 28th of November 1942. "...At the moment, the German army is fighting at Stalingrad, the Caucasus, Libya and Tunisia. The Russians have attacked us on the Eastern Front in a place that is quite dangerous, according to my view, northwest of Stalingrad. No one can make any sense out of the German army reports, so it is presently impossible to get a clear picture of the strategic situation. But it is clear our troops in the area of Stalingrad and in the Caucasus are in great danger." Throughout December, the newspapers and the press were receiving criticism from the general population because of their lack of coverage of Stalingrad, and rumours were abound saying that the city was already encircled or cut off. In fact, because of the lack of coverage, people assumed that this was what had happened. People estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 soldiers had been encircled at Stalingrad, which was surprisingly similar to the Soviet estimate of 80,000 to 90,000. But, in fact, there were 284,000 men trapped in the pocket, although not all of them were German. On the 16th of December, the Volkische Beobachter produced an article called The Crime of Stalingrad. In which, they talked about the atrocities that the Soviets had inflicted on their own population in the city. They said that they had deliberately left their civilians in the city as human shields, and claimed that the Wehrmacht had taken the civilians in their areas to safety. But beyond this, the other newspapers failed to mention Stalingrad. On the 23rd of December, a private in the 6th Army wrote home to his wife and told her to read between the lines, saying to pay attention to certain remarks in the Wehrmacht reports because they cannot officially admit that they had been surrounded. Kellner mentioned Stalingrad again on New Year's Eve, but still didn't know that the 6th Army had been surrounded. "...in January, however, letters sent home by the troops in Stalingrad confirmed to many the truth of the situation. Many of the soldiers pleaded for bread. I'm standing here in an icy storm in a hopeless position in the city of fate, Stalingrad. Encircled for months, we will tomorrow begin the last fight, man against man." When the foreign press talked about German losses, Goebbels declared that all news from the Soviet Union was lies or misinformation. But it was obvious that the secret could not be kept for much longer. On the 16th of January 1943, the Wehrmacht finally admitted that something was wrong, saying that the troops were in a heroically courageous defensive struggle against the enemy attacking from all sides. Yeah, I think when you're being attacked from all sides, that means you're surrounded. And Kellner criticizes Hitler and the regime over this. "...Hitler does not dare tell the truth to the German nation. That the German army has been encircled is still not being told. This is more than stupid. Someday the truth will come to the light of day. How these Nazis fight for their stay of execution." On the 20th of January, Goebbels records this in his diary. "...For the 30th of January, I present the Führer an emergency program. It is not the time to celebrate glittering parties, not even in the context of war. We have to restrict ourselves to a number of proclamations. As a main point, I think that the Führer himself should decree such a proclamation, which I will read out in the Sportspalast if he is unable to attend. The big subject is, of course, Stalingrad. We have to make ourselves familiar with the thought of informing the German people of the situation there. This should have happened ages ago. The Führer was against it so far. In the end, we cannot take things too far and only tell the German people when everything is over. In Stalingrad, there is about a quarter of a million people trapped. Compared to previous losses in the It is unavoidable to say the truth. The sooner the better. In Stalingrad there are human tragedies of epic character. What our soldiers and officers perform there is beyond all imagination. Soon the situation there will be known to the public without a doubt. To some extent, they are already aware of that. I therefore think it is only right to tell the truth, to help them take the horrible message and be their moral pillar. For us, Stalingrad has to become what Alcazar means for the Spanish struggle for freedom. An epic poem of German soldiership, which could not be more poignant and tragic. I believe that we will be successful in binding the German people even closer to our regime and the tasks of our time with such a depiction of the fall of Stalingrad. In the context of totalizing the war effort, it will be necessary to harden the German people within and from the outside. The war entered a stadium in which we are no longer allowed to talk round something. We have to look the current developments in the eye. The clearer we are about the situation, the more determined our decisions will be. And the more determined our decisions, the greater our successes. So even at this stage, the regime had not told the people about what was happening, even though they knew that the people knew what was happening. And the letters from the troops kept pouring in. Zeitzler and Schmunt show me a number of letters that came from the last courier plane from Stalingrad, not more than three or four days old. They are devastating in diction and content. Simple men writing to their homes. Farewell letters which, in their whole, form a massive epic poem. Imagining how long these people are living like that. How long they haven't eaten. One division, for example, did not receive any provisions for four days. Then their posture is even more admirable. Goebbels therefore urged Hitler to come clean and allow Goebbels to publish the truth about what was happening. Goebbels records that Hitler wanted to come out with the truth, but only when it was clear that everything was lost. It actually appears that Hitler hoped to rescue the situation even at this late stage. He still thought that they could relieve the Stalingrad defenders somehow, or get the supply situation in order. In the end though, he agreed to tell the German people the truth on the 30th of January 1943, to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the National Socialist Revolution. After this, there would be an eight-day rally to celebrate the heroes of Stalingrad, and later a proclamation of a new program, placing Germany on a total war footing. "...we must be picky about the language we use, so it will be appropriate to the historic weight of that heroic battle. We must be clear that even centuries later, the message of the liquidation of Stalingrad is still an example in history. I propose a number of mitigations to alleviate the shock, which will lead to some forms of success. It is obvious that the question of Stalingrad is a hot topic amongst the German people, and that we will have to overcome strong physical obstacles to come clear again." It was all about twisting the truth to suit the regime, and rally the German people to make more sacrifices for their leaders. This is especially true when it comes to the final destruction of the 6th Army. Göring gave a speech on the 30th of January 1943, in which he compared the dying 6th Army to the Spartans at Thermopylae. This funeral-before-death speech was broadcast not only to the civilians, but also to the surviving 6th Army soldiers, who huddled around their radios in their icy hell. Many of the men who listened to Göring's speech felt betrayed. "...it was terrible that we had been given up on by our highest military leadership, that we already no longer existed, that we had been abandoned, we had already been written off as lost. But the fate of the soldiers was, by now, inevitable, and the leadership had to accept the reality of the situation. We are now forced to announce the surrender of Stalingrad to the German people. It is a bitter but necessary decision. We send it as a special announcement in the afternoon. I reconcile every detail with the Führer who affirms my proposal. Even now, though, the propaganda ministry refused to tell the truth. Instead of telling the German public that the Stalingrad defenders had surrendered, they said that they had fought on until the last, and died so that Germany might live. It convinced some, but not others." The women of Nuremberg were among those with many husbands, fathers, sons, or brothers in the 6th Army. As the news broke on 3rd of February, they tore copies of newspapers out of the hands of sellers, shouting and wailing, beside themselves with grief. Men hurled abuse of the Nazi leadership. "'Hitler has lied to us for three months!' people raged. But the outrage was diverted away from the regime as total war was declared and the people were rallied to the call. In order to strengthen and renew the sinking courage and the confidence in victory, the press and the party are putting forth desperate efforts. Planned assemblies, rallies and training sessions are supposed to help to attain final victory." Goebbels then gave a speech on the 18th of February 1943, announcing the official total war program, which Goebbels himself admits went down extremely well. However, the mood of the German people went negative, and they now began to question whether the war could be continued, or if victory was possible. New rumours circulated by the second week of February saying that Paulus and 23 of his generals had been captured, rather than dying in battle as was claimed. By about the 15th of February though, the initial shock appeared to have been overcome, which was no doubt a relief to the regime, who were keen to exploit the event to get the people on side. And this is the key point here, which Wetter points out in his book, Stalingrad Myth and Reality of a Battle. The main objective of German propaganda during the post-Uranus-Stalingrad crisis was to maintain the governing strength and authority of the National Socialist regime, and to prevent any destabilization or weakening of resolve. That's why they kept quiet in the November to January period about the encirclement. They were concealing what was happening in order to keep the regime stable, and maybe rescue the situation. What's interesting though, is that Wetter points out that the regime knew that the population would be suspicious of this silence on Stalingrad, and would therefore turn to rumour, or enemy broadcasts, or field letters. So they knew that this would undermine the people's confidence in the propaganda machine, and yet they still went ahead and kept the information from the public. Lucas was actually confused by this, saying I just can't get my head around this idea. Why would they do something that they themselves know it will defeat their own purposes and undermine their credibility? It doesn't make sense to me in the slightest. It's like shooting yourself in the foot. Was Goebbels and the propaganda machine so helpless that they had no other option than accepting such a blow? It feels like there is more to it than just withholding information about Stalingrad. Or maybe it was their plan from the beginning, so they didn't have to tell the real story themselves. After all, selling a victory is easy. Selling a defeat, and such a massive one, was probably not something the propaganda was overly familiar with at the time. I think that's partly it. It appears that, at first, in the late November to December period, Hitler, after advice from his generals, thought they could rescue the 6th Army, and therefore didn't think they needed to inform the public. If they rescued the 6th Army, then they could sweep the whole thing under the rug, or use it to show how great they were. Then, when Manstein failed to break through to Paulus, the hope still existed that they might still be able to reverse the situation and reach them in the future. At least, that's the impression I get from Goebbels' diary entries, especially the one on the 22nd of January 1943. "...the Bolshevists have penetrated the German lines for six kilometers. Our soldiers are no longer able to resist. Hunger and the cold brought them to their physical end, and they are no longer able for any combat performance." The Führer is deeply shocked by that message. He still believed that we might be able to hold at least some form of a camp grupper in Stalingrad, which we might even be able to relieve later on. Kershaw comments, "...Hitler still hoped, at least that is what he told Goebbels, that parts of the 6th Army could hold out until they could be relieved. In fact, he knew better than anyone that there was not the slightest chance of it." Maybe it was a delusion, or a false hope. But either way, this could explain why they left it so late to tell the German people. It also makes sense that they had to plan what they were going to tell them, as Goebbels makes clear in his diaries. They had to choose their words carefully, and prepare everything in advance, so it took several days to do that. Plus, the 10th anniversary of the Nazi Revolution was coming up, so they had to work around that. Therefore, it does make sense why they delayed it, even if, in hindsight, it might not have been the best course of action. The German people, and the historians, came to the conclusion that Hitler was obsessed over Stalingrad, and that this was all over the personal prestige of Hitler. Not only does Kershaw say this, but he quotes von Hassel's saying this at the time too. Kellner comes to the same conclusion in his diary entries in January and February 1943, and others do too. But there's a difference between people believing that Hitler's ego got the better of him, and that this was all done for prestige reasons, and it genuinely being about that. Looking at the evidence that I have before me, I'm sceptical. It appears that the propaganda got obsessed with Stalingrad, and that the people did in turn, but Hitler not so much. In fact, he said in his speech in late September that he wasn't interested in Stalingrad because of its name, refuting the idea that he was, and highlighting that the propaganda had gotten out of control. Then, Hitler attempted to rescue the 6th Army, which failed, but him keeping silent wasn't for prestige as much as in the false hope that they could rescue the situation. Perhaps you could argue that the prestige of Hitler and the regime was at stake, but it might equally be argued that this was done for morale reasons. They were fighting a war after all, so telling everyone that they had lost a battle and had an army surrounded wasn't exactly going to boost that morale. So was it prestige, or was it a result of circumstances? Honestly, I don't think we can come to any definite conclusions, but from what I can see, there's no real obsession with Stalingrad on the part of Hitler. He wanted to take the city for practical reasons, but that doesn't automatically mean he was obsessed over it. Yes, Hitler did postpone the planned advance towards Astrakhan, and declared that Army Group B's key objective was Stalingrad. However, he had been advised by Halder and von Weichs that Stalingrad would fall in about ten days, and decided that Stalingrad should be captured first before they dealt with the bridgehead at Serafimovich, or raced off to Astrakhan. He did ask that the Don flank be both strengthened and mined, and had been the one to originally order the 22nd Panzer Division to bolster the flank in August. As we discussed in episode 18 of the Battles from Stalingrad series, because he had been told by Halder that Stalingrad would fall in ten days, he thought that he had plenty of time to sort out the Don flank problem before strong enemy attacks came in the winter. This is also why he said that the resistance at Stalingrad was a purely local affair, because he genuinely believed that the city would fall quickly, based on Halder's assessment. And it wasn't just him alone who had made this decision, but Halder and von Weichs as well. So I don't think that this was a prestige issue. I think that Hitler and his generals genuinely believed that Stalingrad would be captured quickly, or before the Soviets could launch a major counter-offensive. Obviously, that didn't happen in reality, but the decision probably wasn't made for prestige or obsessive reasons. What we can conclude though, is that propaganda is something that we all need to be aware of. The optimistic propaganda, and people just believing it, allowed the regime to do what it wanted, at the expense of the people. And this is the main lesson to take away from this. Do not believe what the media is telling you. They may appear to have different names, but the newspapers are all run by the same lot. You're only being told what the State wants you to believe, and the information you critically need is not being given to you until it suits the regime to tell you, of course. Rumours can sometimes be more accurate than the official narrative. And when there's a burning question, and you're not given an answer, or you're not even allowed to ask the question, or you're dismissed as some sort of heretic or lunatic for doubting the authorities, or the evidence is being suppressed and censored, or the lamestream narrative is consistently inconsistent, or is constantly contradicting itself to the point where people are totally confused to the point where they can't think straight, and there's a blatant and obvious agenda to sustain the outrage as a way to keep you blindly following Big Brother and prevent you from thinking critically about the problem, then you know something is wrong. Thank you again to Lukas for your hard work. Thank you to my Patrons and subscriber stars for making this video possible. And thanks for watching, bye for now.