【生肉長篇】酋長老爺說二戰前夕德國裝甲部隊發展(截止1939)
迅雷不及掩耳之势如破竹
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25 次觀看·2025年10月28日
大家好,我是Chieftain
有些人可能不認識我,我是Wargaming.net的員工
他們製作《戰爭世界》和《戰爭機器人》的影片
我已經做了幾年了
很多影片都是關於戰爭機器人的評論
但我還會做一些歷史課
這就是我的主要目的
由於現在正在討論的主題是
在世界大戰2頻道的79年前的事件
我打算先做一個小系列的影片
是關於如何不同的國家
在世界大戰2的開始時
使用了自己的戰爭機器人
一般來說,我會先從英國開始
因為英國是在國際戰爭期間
被承認為軍事領袖的領袖
但是79年前
是德國的戰爭機器人
在波蘭做了一些奇妙的事情
至少如果你聽過他們的宣傳片
所以我會先從
79年前的世界大戰機器人開始
也就是德國的戰爭機器人
德國的戰爭機器人的經驗
是在1916年10月開始
當他們收到一些資訊後
他們決定要去研究這個技術
並建造一些
但是在2017年4月
他們改變了主意
因為當他們不再擔心
這些東西對他們的影響
是不好的
因為他們很慢
他們很不可靠
他們其實很容易被擊敗
只要你把心思放進去
而抵抗戰爭機器人
戰爭部件
心思
是一個大洞
有很多不同的方式
與戰爭機器人交易
所以他們決定
將這方面的優先權
除此之外
克里克森海洋公司就說
我們在這裡建造新的船
我們可以阻礙英國
所以在這和戰爭機器人之間
他們再次改變主意
在1918年8月
他們有黑天
德國軍隊的一週不太好
其中一個問題是
英國和法國
開始研究正確使用戰爭機器
德國正在收集
他們決定他們犯了錯誤
他們真的需要很多戰爭機器
大約4000艘戰爭機器
我們會請他們
在1919年1月
非常感謝
當然他們從來沒有
收集過這些戰爭機器
但是他們已經收集了
正如我們預期
德國戰爭機器
在世界大戰結束時
幾乎是
他們打敗了我們
他們肯定是對的
他們的想法是什麼
所以他們看了法國
法國人的結論
可能不太合理
真正的現代戰爭
是關於火力
火力在防禦上
因為他們可以坐在
你身後的陷阱
你的機器
你的武器
你的彈藥
如果你想要
取得防禦
唯一有機會
做到的
就是用
大量的火力
這就是
德國軍隊
大約兩年
直到總部
萊恩哈爾特
被替代為
德國隊長
或是部隊長
有些細節
技術上
他們的名字
但是我們就
我用一個
普通的詞彙
現在
他的替代人
是一個人
名叫
船長
Hans von Sicht
如果有一個人
最負責任的
對德國的
偉大的成就
在二次世界大戰的初期
就是這個人
幾乎沒有人
聽過他
這是一點羞愧
他有一兩點
優勢
對於
一些
其他國家的總部
一個是
他是
俄羅斯總部的
俄羅斯軍隊
有一個
傳統的文化
就是
自我評估
和改善
Hans von Sicht
沒有改變
所以他做了什麼
一旦上任
他就開始了
一系列的研究
1921年
1922年
400名軍官
德國總部
參與了這些研究
他們基本上
就是
根據他們的想法
根據其他人的想法
我們來做我們的
評估
什麼是
現代戰爭
他們的結果
可能是
令人驚訝的
結論
你知道嗎
我們說得對
成功的戰爭
從1870年代開始
這都關乎
操作
這都關乎
位置
Beregenskrieg
德國人叫
基本上
翻譯成
操作戰爭
現在
德國人
還有一點優勢
在於
德國人
和法國人
在世界大戰一年
基本上
坐在陷阱
和機械人
一起來
打他們
那是
德國人
在西部
的經驗
但是
德國人
也有在
西部
對抗
俄羅斯人
那是
更流暢
所以
那裡
學到一些
戰爭
不是純粹
依賴
陷阱戰爭
德國人
當然
也有
在
西部
的經驗
法國人
在
西部
的經驗
中
有
更多
經驗
在
西部
的經驗
中
有
更多
法國人
在
西部
的經驗
中
有
西部
的經驗
Internal debate was encouraged.
It was quite possible to argue the accepted line of thinking in the professional journals without killing your career,
as long as it was done in a reasonably polite and respectful manner.
That's not to say there weren't old reactionaries.
The horse cavalry generals in particular were rather wedded to the idea of their horse
and always thought that there was a place for it in the modern battlefield.
Ideas varied from combined horse and tank units
to motorized horse cavalry.
Still, though some officers had great faith in the possibilities of the tank,
there was a small technical hiccup in that the tanks actually weren't all that good.
Now again, the Germans didn't have tanks of their own in the 1920s,
but often went to other countries to see what they were doing.
And although they had grand visions of mass tank units doing sweeping maneuvers to the enemy's rear,
the reality was that even the fastest tanks weren't actually all that fast.
They kept breaking down a lot, and oftentimes they simply ran out of fuel.
And then the horses would just keep going by.
This caused a bit of a split in German army thinking.
Some of the officers said, let's make our doctrine around what we know that tanks can do
when we actually get the tanks.
The other half were going, OK, granted the tanks don't do what we want right now,
but I'm sure they will work out the bugs.
Just look at the airplane.
Between 1914 and now, how much improvement has there been in speed and range and reliability?
Still, even amongst those that had faith in the improvement of the tank,
a lot of them still thought it was just mainly going to be an adjunct to the infantry.
Because here's your problem.
When the tanks become faster and more reliable,
the infantry can still only go so fast,
and the tanks have to stay with the infantry.
Because you can't very well have a combined arms operation
if only one arm is fast enough to actually do it.
There the matter stood until 1926.
Fritz Heigl in his Taschenbuch der Tanks, the Tank Pocketbook,
put forward a rather original and actually kind of obvious in hindsight suggestion.
Instead of holding back the tanks to keep pace with the infantry,
why not make the infantry faster?
And so he proposed that in order to keep up with the high-speed tanks,
the infantry needed to be transported in high-speed tractors of their own.
In 1926 also, the Germans decided that they needed a little bit more practical experience
at this whole tank thing.
And since they weren't allowed to have tanks of their own,
the obvious solution was to go abroad.
And one option was Sweden.
The option they ended up going with was the Soviet Union.
And so they made an agreement that in 1927,
they would open up a tank school at Kazan,
the former Kargopol barracks.
What the Soviets would get is access to German engineering.
It wasn't the only joint effort that they did.
There were also similar places for poison gas and aviation.
Of course, the idea to open the school still required tanks to be there.
So the orders were placed for the first gross tractors in 1927.
This would of course take a little while to build.
So when the school opened,
the entire German contingent seemed to consist merely of a single German officer,
an engineer, whose job it was to keep the buildings running.
In 1928, the Germans had their first exercise with tank units
under their chief of motorized units, Otto von Stolpno.
Now of course, these tanks were merely Hanomag tractors
with tank painted on the side of them.
But it did give them their first taste of combined arms operations.
As an aside, at about this time,
you also started seeing the first tracked fighting vehicles show up again.
In this case, tank destroyers,
known then as tank zerstörer,
such as a 3.7-centimeter TAC gun on a Hanomag chassis.
It was about the 1930s when they changed
from tank abwehrkanone to panzerabwehrkanone.
In the meantime, work on the gross tractors continued,
with two vehicles each being made by Daimler-Benz,
Rheinmetall and Krupp.
They were very obviously built to the same general specifications.
They were about 16 tons, 6.5 meters long.
They had a 7.5-centimeter gun in a rotating turret
and a machine gun in a secondary turret
at the rear of the vehicle.
Although they looked a little bit ungainly
with their over-the-top exposed return runs for the tracks,
they could still do a good turn of speed
of about 40 to 45 kilometers an hour.
They were completed in 1929 and shipped off to Kazan,
where they would be in testing for the next four years.
These would be joined by two other tractors,
the Klein tractor, which was basically a derivative
of the Carden-Lloyd carrier, and the Leicht tractor,
which, in the form familiar to all the tank players,
was actually a 3.7-centimeter TAC.
The Leicht tractor turned out to be something of a dead end,
but great things lay in store for the Klein tractor.
In 1933, Krupp was notified
that it would build a series of 150 of these Klein tractors,
known as Landwirtschaftliche Schleppers,
agricultural tractors.
Being non-combat vehicles of the German army,
they would be painted an overall dull gray,
as was standard for that type of vehicle.
We shall return to those.
The next important name to note is Oswald Lux.
He was the inspector of motorized troops
and was the man most responsible for German armor doctrine
at the beginning of the war.
In 1932, he started another series of exercises
to develop his doctrine.
By 1933, he was proclaiming
that the panzer arm should be a branch of service
equal to the infantry or the artillery.
Also around 1932,
the British started a new series of exercises,
and, of course, the Germans sent observers over.
Depending on what branch these observers were,
they came back with varying conclusions.
For example, the infantry branch
concluded that tanks were best used
as an adjunct to the infantry,
and they wanted them big, heavy, well-armored.
The cavalry branch went out,
and they saw, hmm, these could be useful.
If we're going to have to have these things,
they could be useful for reconnaissance.
We want them small and fast and mobile.
A new doctrine was published for the Germans in 1933.
In this, they kind of split the difference.
The tanks weren't going to be subordinated to the infantry.
They weren't going to be tied to the infantry.
But a great deference should be placed
in the use of tanks the infantry needs.
This did not sit well with Lutz,
who was arguing for motorization and mechanization.
He believed that only operational mobility
would give the Germans a chance
against its larger neighbors on both sides.
He proposed the creation of light divisions.
Now, unlike the modern terminology of a light division,
which is basically leg infantry,
his idea was that they would sacrifice men and equipment
in order to get everybody into motorized vehicles
and keep them mobile.
They could make up the difference
by heavy use of automatic weapons.
These light divisions would be able to keep pace
with the tank units.
The alternative proposal was something
to give the tank units to the infantry divisions.
And these would certainly have the advantage
of increasing the fighting power of those divisions,
but still, these are infantry divisions
that's best suited for positional warfare.
Beck, who was in charge of the army at this point,
decided to split the difference.
Some of the motors would go to the infantry divisions
and some of them would go to the light divisions.
Lutz was having none of this.
And indeed, he was arguing for the creation
of what was basically a small panzer division.
Two tank battalions, an infantry battalion,
motorized, motorized artillery, reconnaissance detachment.
In fact, he also went even further.
He decided that instead of the old-fashioned way
of splitting up the army into arms,
instead, they should be divided by mobility.
So if he was going to be the head of the motorized troops,
he would have under his command
motorized infantry, tanks, motorized artillery.
The leg infantry could go to some other department.
Now, of course, this second division
of motorized versus non-motorized never came to pass.
But the first idea, well, that one had a bit of traction.
Indeed, there was one officer that observed
that, well, before World War I,
over half of the army was infantry.
By now, it was down to only a quarter of the army.
If the infantry are only a quarter of the army,
can that still be said to be the backbone of the army?
And should we perhaps be looking at other arms?
An interesting thought.
The British maneuvers of 1934 added a bit more grist to the mill.
And for the German observers, again,
opinions varied often depending on what your preconceptions were.
One cavalry officer reported that the British
were asking too much of their mechanized units.
Beck responded that, well, actually,
he didn't think the British were using the mechanized units enough.
They didn't give them enough free reign.
In the meantime, also in 1934,
an order for series 2 of these agricultural tractors was placed.
These ones, however, will be built of battle steel
and armed with machine guns.
And they would later become known as the Panzer 1A.
Now, at the time that I'm recording this,
my Inside the Hatch video on the Panzer 1A,
which has been filmed, has not yet been released.
So if it's released by the time this is out, fantastic.
Go over, have a look.
If it hasn't been, stand by.
We'll get around to it.
In 1935, the first Panzer Division exercises took place
after the standing up of the first Panzer Division.
The four gross tractors that had been returned from Kazan
partook in these exercises.
The two Daimler-Benz ones
were pretty much out of the picture by this point.
And an insufficient number of Panzer 1s
had as yet been delivered.
So a large number of the tanks were actually ersatz tanks
with the one series agricultural tractors
with their open tops and all that.
Still, an exercise is an exercise.
Although, if anything that was taught to the Germans
by the exercises between 35 and 38,
it was that this whole combined arms idea
is a lot easier to talk about
than it is to put it into practice.
As an aside, the idea of the infantry
keeping up with half tracks
came from a German officer who went to France
and he saw the Kegress half track
and decided it was an idea
that might be worth mentioning to somebody.
Of course, they ran with it.
Also in 1935, orders were placed
for the first of the 100 series agricultural tractors.
These would be armed with 2 cm cannon
and would eventually be evolved into the Panzer II.
Around this time, the Luftwaffe also enters the picture.
Now, unlike situations that were going on
in some other countries at the time,
the German army were actively supportive
of the creation of this independent equal arm.
And for its own part, the Luftwaffe
had no problems whatsoever
in taking German staff officers in
if it felt they needed them.
Compare this to the situation going on
let's say in the US at the time.
Now, the Luftwaffe was not created
to be a strategic air force in the Dewey model
and neither was it developed
to be flying artillery as is often thought.
Instead, its roles were primarily air superiority
and interdiction beyond the range
that the German army could reach.
So, it was quite complementary
in terms of warfare.
It wasn't until the events of the Spanish Civil War
that the idea of flying artillery
or close air support
was put into practice by the Luftwaffe.
The Spanish Civil War was, of course,
the first combat test of the Panzers.
And these were mainly Panzer I's,
a few Panzer II's.
For the German military,
there were 3 major takeaways.
The first one was,
if you're going to be slugging it out,
you need something a bit bigger
than a machine gun.
Although a special cord ammunition
was developed,
which allowed the Panzer I's
to destroy T-26's
at ranges of up to maybe 200 yards,
the problem was that
the T-26 drivers soon figured this out
and they sat 300 meters away
and they blinked away
with the 45-millimeter guns.
Fortunately, though,
this was something that the Germans
had already figured out.
So, they were putting proper cannons
in their next generation's vehicles,
the 2-centimeter on the Panzer II,
the 3.7 on the Panzer III.
The next takeaway they got was that
actually, in terms of proving our doctrine,
this war is completely useless,
because our doctrine is talking about
mass maneuver of mechanized units
and that is not what is happening here.
So, in terms of proving
whether or not our doctrine is correct,
this was a complete and utter waste of time.
The third takeaway was that,
you know, those magnificent men
in the flying machines
actually might be onto something here.
And the experience developed
with close air support
resulted in the development
of the 8th Air Corps.
And this was, shall we say,
the flying artillery
that we came to know of a bit later.
One name you will notice
that I have not yet mentioned
is Guderian.
And this is because
he had a whole hell of a lot less influence
on German tank design
and doctrine development
as he liked to say he did.
However, he did have at least
one significant piece of input.
Now, remember, he was a signal officer
before he joined the tank unit.
In 1936, he proposed
that tank units needed to have radios
everywhere, all the time,
as many radios as you could fit.
This was what you might term
a good call.
The next design of note
was the middle tractor,
the Mittler tractor,
also known as
the Neubaupanzerkampfwagen IV.
The first two vehicles
were not identical,
built of soft steel,
both had a 7.5
and a 3.7 centimeter coaxial,
but in one of them
it was an under-over affair
and in the other
it was side by side.
Armored vehicles,
three of them were built in 1936,
and since these were
sort of like the land battleship idea
of the time,
you'll see that they have
basically little Panzer I turrets
on the front and the back as well.
To see the real influence
of these vehicles, though,
don't look at their combat record,
because, as I say,
only three were made
and they were sent to Norway
and, well, frankly,
I don't see them done very much.
But look at the shape of the turret.
And then have a look
at the Panzer III and the Panzer IV.
Now, if you want to have a look
at the principles of tank design
that the Germans had in the mid-1930s,
look for a document by Waprouw VI in 1936.
These are the guys
that were basically
the vehicle design bureau
of the German army.
And I'm going to grab my Doyle and Yance,
because I don't want to screw this up
and it's a direct quote.
They're talking about here
the philosophy for the Panzer III.
If the 3.7 centimeter Panzerkampfwagen
is held to the 18 ton weight limit,
thicker armor protection can be achieved
only by a weaker engine,
lower speed, shorter action radius,
fewer crew members
and decreased weapons capability.
This would result in a new design
that would hardly be suitable
for operational employment.
The priority requirements
are good average speed,
maneuverability,
a large radius of action
and division of combat tasks
amongst the crew.
In consideration
of the 8 or 18 ton weight limit,
less value must be placed on armor.
Now, if you're wondering,
the weight limit comes
from the capacity
of the German assault bridges.
Now, it's worth noting
how these priorities
compare to those
that the Germans went up against,
particularly the French
at the beginning of the war.
It's also perhaps worth noting
that by the time
that the Germans changed
these priorities,
they were going up against
allies with vehicles
that were probably closer
to what the Germans thought
was ideal in the 1930s
than the Germans
were getting themselves.
This brings us
to the last two
of the German vehicles
of the era,
the Panzer III
and the Panzer IV
by way of the
Zugführerwagen
and the Begleitwagen,
which are basically
just code names
to cover them up.
You look at the large turret shape
of the Neubau Panzerkampfwagen
I mentioned earlier,
and you can see
how they were applied
to these two tanks
to allow for maximum
crew internal space
and coordination.
The Panzer III, of course,
famously entered service
with only a 3.7-centimeter gun.
Now, it wasn't that
the Germans thought
that this was going to be adequate.
They always wanted
about a 5-centimeter in,
but it wasn't until 1938
that the funds became available
to develop such a gun.
And because, of course,
it takes time
for one of these things
to be developed,
the H model,
which was the first
with a 5-centimeter,
managed to miss
not only the Polish campaign
but also the French one.
The last of the vehicles,
the Panzer IV,
of course,
this was also still
fairly early on
in its development period.
The C model,
which was the latest
available at the time
of the invasion of Poland,
still had its short little 7.5
and, well, frankly,
not a whole hell of a lot
of armor either.
Now, these were both
absolutely fantastic vehicles.
Again, I've recorded
inside the hatches
for both the Panzer III
and the Panzer IV,
albeit later versions.
But you can get
a good idea for them.
Now, just keep an eye out
for when they finally get released.
In fact, I'd go as far
as to say that
at the beginning of the war,
the Panzer III
was arguably the best tank
in the world.
And the fact that the Panzer IV
was still such a viable vehicle
in 1945,
for a pre-war design,
this is pretty much a testament
to how good it was.
When Germany invaded Poland,
they had about 1,000 Panzer I's,
1,100 Panzer II's,
100 Panzer III's
and maybe 200 Panzer IV's
in the force.
This left a little bit of a gap
in terms of medium tanks
to be filled.
And fortunately, in 1938,
a solution had been obtained.
They simply annexed
a neighboring country
that happened to have tanks
and a tank manufacturing capability.
And this brings us
to the Czech Panzer III's.
Compared to the German ones,
the ones by Škoda and CKD
were basically not as good.
By the way,
they would later become known
as the Panzer 35T and Panzer 38T.
But they were available
and they generally worked.
So about 100 of the Škoda tanks
and maybe 60 of the CKD's
were forced into service
with the German military
and they partook
in the invasion as well.
I do not have inside hatch videos
of these coming,
I'm sorry to say,
but who knows over time.
Two other developments
in the world of tracked armored vehicles
are probably worth mentioning
for the German army.
And you'll note I am
addressing the reconnaissance forces
and the stories of the 4-wheel,
6-wheel and 8-wheel armored cars
are actually quite interesting
on their own,
but I can only go so far.
One of them is the development
of the Sturmgeschütz.
And this was proposed
in 1936 by von Manstein.
He wanted the infantry
to have armored support guns
to help them out.
However,
the vehicles were not ready
for prime time
by the invasion of Poland.
This may have been
due to the vociferous objections
of the Panzer arm,
particularly Guderian
who wanted no such vehicles to exist
and instead wanted
all the technical capability
to go with the Panzers.
The last thought I would put up
is that of the Panzerjägers,
the tank destroyers.
In 1935,
the Germans came up
with the idea of a doctrine
for these things.
And I would direct you
to my written article
Parallel Evolution.
In this,
they wanted vehicles
that were lightly armored,
open topped,
at least as mobile as a tank,
faster than a tank.
There is a difference.
And they would go around
in massed units
to a point of enemy
armored penetration.
And this is really,
really similar
to what the Americans
came up with 6 years later,
which I guess
I'll talk about
in about 2 years.
There were two
significant differences
with the Americans,
however.
First was in terms
of the size of the units.
The Germans wanted
to go around
in company sized units.
The Americans wanted
to do this movement
to the point of penetration
in nothing smaller
than battalion size.
Hey,
you're American,
go big.
The other difference
was that the Germans
never actually got around
to building
any of these vehicles
for a while.
So,
although they did
muck around
with a couple of prototypes,
the first unit
to have
self-propelled
anti-tank vehicles
didn't get stood up
until 1940.
This meant
that during the
invasion of Poland,
the Panzerjäger-Abteilung
and the tank destroyer units
were generally armed
with towed
3.7 cm guns.
There were a couple
of units
that had towed
8.8 cm guns,
and a single company
of Panzerjäger-Abteilung 8
was equipped
with self-propelled
8.8s on half-tracks.
These would be used
not only for
tank destroying
but also
bunker busting.
Either way,
it puts rather paid
the myth
that's going around
that the idea
of using 8.8 guns
in the anti-tank role
was developed
on the spot
by Rommel
when he was facing
British Matildas.
No,
the Germans
had figured it out
before then.
The story
of the German campaign
in Poland
is probably
best left
either for
another person
or at least
another day.
Suffice to say,
it was a learning experience
for the German army.
And once
the nation
had been conquered,
instead of sitting around
under laurels
high-fiving each other
or whatever it is
the Germans do,
they sat down
in the tradition
of the past few decades
they did a thorough
after-action review
of what went right
and what went wrong.
And good motivation
was not to acknowledge
one of the sustains.
Instead,
what they realized
was the logistics
was perhaps
a little bit weak.
In fact,
the German army
almost ran out of ammunition.
Had the campaign
gone on a little bit longer,
they would have.
Unfortunately,
they still didn't
pay enough attention to it
as events
a couple of years later
would attest.
Other problems
they determined
was their organization
was wrong,
their training was wrong,
their doctrine
probably needed
a bit of work.
And what they did
was over the next
few months
they sat down
and tried to fix it.
And so,
as a result,
the army
that invaded France
eight months later
was substantially
different from that
which invaded Poland.
I'll probably
come back to that
in eight months.
In the meantime,
as I said,
it brings us
to more or less
a conclusion here.
War has started.
We now know
how the Germans
ended up where they were
with their panzer arm.
And over the next
couple of videos,
I'm going to go around
some of the other countries.
I think the UK
will be next.
So,
in the meantime,
again,
if you're new to my channel,
feel free to hop around
and see what's there
of interest for you.
Otherwise,
I hope you found it
interesting and informative.
I'll see you on the next one.
