Matthew Quinn will leave the Secret Service on November 7 after returning to the agency in 2025, as questions surrounding counter-drone technology and a 40% increase in threats against protected officials place renewed attention on presidential security.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
The Secret Service is preparing for another leadership change as Deputy Director Matthew Quinn announced his resignation Friday, October 16, amid questions about the agency’s counter-drone operations, previous security failures and a sharp increase in threats against President Donald Trump and other government officials.
Quinn, the agency’s second-highest-ranking official, notified colleagues in an internal email that he would leave his position effective November 7. His departure follows a 23-year career with the Secret Service, a period working for a private counter-drone technology company and his return to government service last year.
According to RealClearPolitics, which first reported the resignation, the announcement came as current and former agents raised questions about the effectiveness of certain drone interception systems and Quinn’s previous employment with a manufacturer of equipment used by the agency.
No official reason for Quinn’s departure has been established, and the reporting does not demonstrate that he violated ethics regulations or that the questions surrounding drone procurement caused his resignation.
The development follows an October 11 interview on CBS News’ 60 Minutes in which Quinn and Secret Service Director Sean Curran described the growing difficulty of protecting senior government officials against evolving threats, particularly unmanned aircraft capable of carrying explosives.
Curran said the agency had experienced an increase of more than 40% in threats involving individuals under full-time Secret Service protection compared with the previous year.
During the CBS interview, Curran described the threat environment as unprecedented in his experience.
“It’s like we’ve never seen before,” Curran said. “The threats on our full-time protectees are up just over 40% since they– than they were last year. That’s a massive increase.”
He also revealed that the agency had handled approximately 10,000 threat cases since January.
Asked what was contributing to the increase, Curran pointed to changes in online communication and the accessibility of personal information.
“I think a lot of it has to do with the internet,” he said. “You know– people are more accessible. Information is more accessible.”
The agency’s growing workload has intensified concerns about staffing, training and the technologies available to protect officials at public appearances, major events and government facilities.
One area of particular concern involves attacks using multiple drones simultaneously, a capability that has become increasingly prominent in modern warfare.
Quinn acknowledged during the interview that the Secret Service had not fully developed the ability to neutralize coordinated drone attacks.
“Swarms are a huge problem and a big threat,” he said. “I’d love to tell you the swarm problem is solved. It’s not. I will tell you that at the White House, White House is the safest place on Earth.”
The discussion included a demonstration at the agency’s James J. Rowley Training Center in Maryland, where personnel displayed technology designed to identify and intercept potentially hostile unmanned aircraft.
Among the systems featured was DroneHunter, a radar-guided aircraft manufactured by Fortem Technologies. The equipment is designed to track other drones, capture them with a net and transport them to a designated location.
Quinn explained the system during the demonstration as a DroneHunter aircraft approached and captured a target drone.
“What you see is the drone hanging from the drone hunter,” he said. “So, the bad guy drone is now captured. It’s gonna take it to a predetermined safe area.”
The demonstration drew additional scrutiny because Quinn previously worked for Fortem Technologies after retiring from the Secret Service in 2021.
He served as a senior vice president at the company for approximately three years before returning to the agency in 2025 at Curran’s request.
His private-sector employment raised questions among some current and former agents about whether he should have been involved in procurement decisions concerning equipment produced by his former employer.
RealClearPolitics reported that it submitted questions to the Secret Service about the company’s technology, its operational performance, whether equipment purchases were competitively awarded and what safeguards were used to address potential conflicts of interest.
The agency did not respond to those questions before the report was published.
The CBS segment also described a previously undisclosed drone interception during the December 2025 Army-Navy football game in Baltimore, which Trump and several members of Congress attended.
According to the broadcast, Secret Service personnel used electronic jamming equipment to disable a drone during the event.
However, RealClearPolitics subsequently cited agency sources who questioned whether the intercepted aircraft had actually presented a hostile threat.
Those sources alleged that Secret Service personnel may have mistakenly disabled one of the agency’s own surveillance drones after failing to coordinate adequately with other units.
The reported incident has not been independently established as an operational error, and officials have not publicly released a complete account of the interception.
The questions surrounding that event illustrate the difficulties of distinguishing friendly surveillance equipment from potentially hostile aircraft in crowded or highly secured environments.
Such concerns have become more pressing as military forces in Ukraine and other conflict zones increasingly employ relatively inexpensive drones for surveillance and attacks.
The Secret Service has been studying developments from the war in Ukraine to evaluate how similar technologies might threaten government facilities, public gatherings and presidential appearances.
In a separate CBS report on the agency’s drone defenses, Quinn said the agency expected technologies developed overseas to become available to individuals capable of using them inside the United States.
“We know that technology is going to hit the homeland at some point,” Quinn said. “So we’re using lessons learned there to build our program and make sure we’re ahead of it before it gets here.”
Beyond drone security, the Secret Service continues addressing deficiencies exposed during the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt against Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania.
During the campaign rally, gunman Thomas Matthew Crooks fired from a nearby rooftop, wounding Trump, killing firefighter Corey Comperatore and injuring two other attendees.
A Department of Homeland Security inspector general report issued July 1, 2026 identified multiple failures that prevented agents from detecting, responding to or disrupting the attack.
Investigators determined that the agency failed to detect a drone flight conducted by Crooks before the shooting because of inadequate operator training and equipment problems.
The report also found that the Secret Service did not establish an effective joint communications center with local law enforcement, contributing to failures to relay warnings about suspicious activity and the gunman’s movements.
Additional shortcomings involved intelligence sharing, security perimeter planning and the failure to prevent a direct line of fire toward Trump from a nearby building.
The findings reinforced earlier concerns about coordination between federal agents and local officers responsible for securing areas surrounding presidential events.
Trump subsequently survived another assassination attempt at his Florida golf course in September 2024, when an armed suspect was discovered near the property.
A further security breach occurred during the White House Correspondents’ Association dinner in April 2026, when an armed individual penetrated a security perimeter, prompting Trump’s evacuation along with other senior officials.
Those incidents have kept the agency’s protective procedures under scrutiny while Curran implements changes intended to strengthen security operations.
Staffing has been another significant concern.
The Secret Service has experienced shortages in several specialized units, including teams responsible for counter-sniper operations and other protective assignments.
A Homeland Security inspector general assessment found that counter-sniper staffing was substantially below the level required to meet the agency’s protective responsibilities.
During the CBS interview, Quinn said approximately 942 candidates were undergoing training, compared with roughly 200 during the previous year.
Curran has also emphasized improved coordination with local law enforcement and expanded training designed to prevent the types of failures identified after the Butler shooting.
Quinn’s departure creates a vacancy in senior leadership while those changes remain underway.
The incoming deputy director will inherit responsibilities involving protective operations, personnel development and the continued integration of technologies intended to address both conventional threats and emerging methods of attack.
The agency has not publicly announced a successor or provided a detailed explanation of Quinn’s decision to leave.
His resignation follows an unusually challenging period for the Secret Service, during which the agency has confronted assassination attempts, critical oversight findings and a changing technological environment.
As the November 3 midterm elections approach and Trump continues public appearances, the agency remains responsible for protecting the president, vice president, their families and other designated officials.
The reported increase in threat cases and unresolved questions about drone interception capabilities underscore the operational demands facing the Secret Service as it prepares for the leadership transition.
Quinn is scheduled to leave November 7, with scrutiny continuing over how effectively the agency is adapting its protective operations and whether existing safeguards are sufficient to address increasingly sophisticated threats.
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