Middle Eastern crude exports outside Iran have recovered to pre-war levels despite Tehran’s threats to restrict shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, while U.S. sanctions and a naval blockade continue to sharply limit Iranian oil sales.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
WASHINGTON — Iran’s government is insisting that it retains control of the Strait of Hormuz and can prevent oil shipments from passing through the strategic waterway, but maritime tracking data show that neighboring Gulf producers have restored their combined crude exports to pre-war levels by expanding alternative routes and adapting their tanker operations.
The recovery has created a sharp contrast between Iran’s position and that of other Middle Eastern oil exporters. While Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other regional producers have rebuilt much of their shipping capacity, Iranian crude exports have fallen to nearly zero under the U.S. naval blockade imposed after negotiations between Washington and Tehran collapsed during the summer.
According to an analysis by maritime intelligence company Kpler, at least 16.5 million barrels of crude oil per day left the Middle East Gulf region during the first 28 days of September, excluding Iran. That matched the region’s pre-war average for those producers and represented an increase of approximately 10.5 million barrels per day compared with March, when the conflict severely disrupted commercial shipping.
The figures demonstrate that Gulf exporters have restored much of their ability to deliver crude oil to international markets, although they do not establish that shipping through the Strait of Hormuz itself has fully returned to normal. A substantial portion of the recovered exports now travels through pipelines and ports that bypass the waterway, while vessels continuing to use the strait face security threats, higher operating costs and disruptions from attacks.
The distinction has become particularly important following a renewed increase in attacks on commercial vessels this week. Reuters reported Thursday that tanker movements through Hormuz had fallen to their lowest levels in more than two months, with crude shipments through the waterway declining to approximately 10.1 million barrels per day, or about 74% of pre-war levels.
The latest figures show that Iran’s efforts to threaten maritime traffic have not prevented neighboring producers from maintaining their overall export volumes, but the danger to vessels crossing the strait remains substantial. The continuing attacks have also complicated efforts by the United States and regional governments to restore predictable commercial navigation.
Iranian officials rejected suggestions that the recovery demonstrates a loss of control over the waterway. Mohammadreza Naqdi, an adviser to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, declared Wednesday that the strait remains closed and warned that Iranian forces could further restrict maritime routes being used to transport oil.
Naqdi said the “armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran have full control over it,” describing Tehran’s position in remarks reported by Just the News.
He maintained that the situation would continue “until Iran’s legitimate demands are met,” indicating that Tehran intends to use the waterway as leverage in its negotiations with Washington.
The Revolutionary Guard adviser also threatened additional action against routes Iranian officials characterize as unauthorized channels for transporting oil. The warning followed a series of attacks on commercial shipping that raised concerns about the ability of international naval forces to protect vessels and maintain reliable access through the Gulf.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio offered a sharply different assessment Wednesday, arguing that Iran’s military and economic position has deteriorated while other countries have succeeded in maintaining their oil exports.
“The Straits of Hormuz are open. There is almost as much oil flowing out now as there was before this conflict began,” Rubio told reporters during remarks on the conflict. “So they’ve lost complete control of the straits and their economy. And […] not only are they in free fall, now the Iranian economy is about to reach a place that few countries in the world have been in terms of how bad it’s going to get.”
Rubio’s comments emphasized the effectiveness of the American economic blockade and the regional shipping industry’s recovery. However, the latest maritime data indicate that Iran still retains the capacity to threaten commercial vessels and disrupt traffic, even though it has been unable to prevent the broader recovery in non-Iranian crude exports.
President Donald Trump reinforced the administration’s position Thursday, saying Washington and Tehran were engaged in diplomatic discussions while making clear that the U.S. blockade would remain in place. He also announced that American forces would not conduct new attacks against Iran before the Nov. 3 congressional elections.
“I want to make it clear to everybody that, while Iran is in very bad condition, both economically and militarily, and while the Blockade will remain in full force and effect, with oil flowing in Record Numbers of Barrels through the Hormuz Strait (22 Million Barrels, last night alone, with not one barrel coming from, or going to, Iran!), we will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd,” Trump wrote in a Truth Social statement.
The president described ongoing contacts with Iran as productive but did not announce a new agreement or indicate that the blockade would be relaxed. His assertion that 22 million barrels passed through Hormuz overnight was not independently established by the published tanker data, which track shipments using different measurement periods and distinguish oil passing through the strait from exports traveling along alternative routes.
The administration’s position comes amid continuing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, American sanctions and the terms under which shipping restrictions might be removed. Tehran has insisted that it will not accept limitations it considers incompatible with its national interests, while Washington has maintained pressure intended to secure changes to Iran’s policies.
The dispute has become increasingly tied to the economic consequences of the war, which began in late February and disrupted one of the world’s most important energy transportation corridors. The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, making it a principal route for crude oil and petroleum products produced by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Iran.
Before the conflict, the waterway handled approximately one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption, according to historical estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Interruptions to traffic therefore have implications extending well beyond the Middle East, affecting global crude prices, shipping insurance, refinery operations and the cost of transporting fuel.
Iran attempted to exploit that dependence by threatening vessels and restricting access to the strait, seeking to increase economic pressure on the United States and its regional partners. The strategy initially produced major disruption, with oil shipments falling sharply after fighting began Feb. 28.
Kpler’s analysis found that the seven-day average of non-Iranian crude exports from the region dropped approximately 72% within 10 days of the conflict’s outbreak, reaching about 4.5 million barrels per day. Commercial shipping companies faced the prospect of attacks, uncertain transit procedures and sharply elevated risks in one of the world’s busiest maritime energy corridors.
The collapse in traffic prompted Gulf producers to expand routes that do not require tankers to pass through Hormuz. Saudi Arabia increased the use of its East-West pipeline to move crude toward Red Sea export terminals, while the United Arab Emirates relied more heavily on infrastructure connecting its oil-producing regions to ports on the Gulf of Oman.
Those routes reduced the amount of oil exposed to attacks within the strait and provided alternative access to international buyers. Producers also began using specialized tanker arrangements to move crude through the remaining accessible corridors, transferring cargoes outside the Gulf for onward shipment.
By September, the combination of bypass pipelines, alternative ports and revised tanker operations had allowed non-Iranian crude exports to return to their previous aggregate levels.
The recovery did not restore the old transportation system. Instead, it produced a more complicated network in which a much larger share of exports avoids the Strait of Hormuz altogether.
Before the war, approximately 83% of the region’s crude exports passed through Hormuz. In September, that share had declined to about 60%, with the remaining 40% moving through alternative routes.
Kpler estimated that approximately 9.9 million barrels per day crossed the strait during September, while 23% of regional exports were loaded at ports along the Gulf of Oman and another 17% departed through the Red Sea.
That shift illustrates why overall exports can recover even when the strait remains dangerous and traffic through it is below pre-war levels. The same volume of oil can reach international markets through a different combination of routes, ports and vessels.
The adjustment has required substantial changes in tanker scheduling, cargo handling and shipping logistics. Some vessels now make repeated trips through Hormuz before transferring their cargoes to other tankers outside the strait, allowing larger shipments to continue toward customers without requiring every vessel to enter the most dangerous waters.
Kpler found that more than 70% of the crude crossing Hormuz during August was subsequently transferred to another tanker offshore, primarily near Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates or Sohar in Oman.
The transfers allow commercial operators to divide transportation responsibilities between ships entering the Gulf and those carrying crude across longer international routes. However, the system requires additional vessels, coordination and handling capacity, creating costs and potential bottlenecks.
Tracking these shipments has also become more difficult because many tankers temporarily disable their Automatic Identification System transmitters while operating in dangerous areas. The practice can limit the visibility of ships to conventional maritime tracking services, although it does not necessarily mean a vessel has stopped moving.
Kpler combines satellite imagery, vessel positioning information, cargo loading records, changes in ship displacement and destination data to reconstruct movements that may not appear in ordinary tracking records.
The resulting estimates provide a broader picture of oil exports than a simple count of vessels publicly visible on tracking websites, but they are still subject to revision as additional information becomes available.
The distinction is important when comparing competing claims about the strait’s status. A low number of visible ship movements does not establish that no oil is crossing, while recovering export volumes do not prove that the passage is safe or operating under normal conditions.
The latest escalation demonstrates the limitations of the recovery. On Tuesday, Oct. 6, only seven commodity vessels were recorded transiting the strait in Kpler’s data, the lowest count since July 23. The number increased to 10 on Wednesday but remained substantially below levels observed earlier in the week.
Meanwhile, crude exports through routes outside Hormuz increased to approximately 6.7 million barrels per day, helping compensate for the renewed disruption in the waterway itself.
The data suggest that Iran’s ability to threaten vessels has not disappeared, even though alternative routes have reduced the broader economic impact of those threats.
Recent attacks reinforce that assessment. According to Reuters reporting on the heightened danger to shipping, Iranian threats to disrupt alternative maritime routes have coincided with an increase in attacks on vessels operating in and around the Gulf. One incident involved a chemical tanker struck by projectiles near Qatar, raising additional concerns about the geographic reach of the threat.
The deterioration in maritime security has contributed to renewed volatility in oil markets, with traders weighing the recovery in export capacity against the possibility that additional attacks could interrupt shipments or damage infrastructure. The United States has increased naval operations intended to protect commercial traffic, but military escorts have not eliminated the danger to individual vessels.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf has maintained that Tehran will not agree to restore unrestricted navigation until its demands are satisfied. During a recent United Nations appearance, he outlined conditions for reopening the waterway that reportedly reflected disagreements remaining after earlier negotiations with Washington.
The Iranian conditions described in reporting on the diplomatic dispute involve seven demands associated with the memorandum of understanding previously negotiated between the countries. Iranian officials have presented those requirements as necessary to secure a lasting agreement, while the Trump administration has refused to abandon its principal economic restrictions without acceptable concessions.
The negotiations followed a temporary agreement reached during the summer. That arrangement subsequently collapsed, and the United States reinstated its naval blockade of Iranian ports in July as fighting and disagreements over shipping access resumed.
The blockade has had a markedly different effect on Iran than on its neighbors. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf exporters have restored shipping volumes through alternative arrangements, but Iranian producers remain largely unable to deliver crude oil to international markets.
A previous Just the News examination of the regional export recovery described how the restoration of shipments by neighboring producers has reduced Tehran’s leverage while leaving its own oil sector under severe pressure.
The United States reimposed the naval blockade after the collapse of the ceasefire arrangements, targeting Iranian maritime exports and intensifying the pressure on the country’s principal sources of foreign revenue.
Iran’s oil sector is particularly important to its economy because crude exports generate foreign currency needed to finance imports and support government operations. Restricting those shipments can intensify financial pressure even when oil production facilities remain capable of operating.
On Thursday, the U.S. Treasury Department announced additional sanctions targeting individuals, financial networks and vessels allegedly involved in transporting Iranian oil and petroleum products. The measures are part of the administration’s broader campaign to prevent Tehran from using international shipping networks to evade restrictions.
The latest Treasury sanctions, reported by Reuters, included 17 vessels associated with Iranian energy shipments. American officials said the restrictions were intended to disrupt revenue supporting Iran’s military activities and other government operations.
Fred Fleitz, who served as chief of staff of the National Security Council during Trump’s first administration, said he believes Tehran is attempting to obtain relief from American economic pressure without offering concessions substantial enough to satisfy Washington.
“They’re not planning on making any significant deal there. They want concessions from Trump up front. He’s never going to agree to that. If they really wanted to make a sincere deal right now, I think Trump and his people would listen, but they don’t. And I think these radicals in this government, the IRGC, they’ll burn the country down before they’ll give a win to Trump,” Fleitz told the John Solomon Reports podcast.
His assessment reflects the view that Iran’s leadership regards maintaining its negotiating position as more important than obtaining immediate economic relief. Whether Tehran ultimately accepts an agreement will depend on the terms offered, the pressure on its economy and decisions made by Iranian officials.
Fleitz argued that the United States should maintain the blockade because restrictions on physical oil shipments have produced greater economic pressure than financial sanctions alone.
“I think we have to carry out this economic strangulation strategy, which is more than sanctions. We’re not just saying you can’t trade with Iran, you can’t do banking with Iran. We’ve stopped them from exporting oil. It’s an extraordinary amount of economic pressure,” he added.
Other national security specialists have drawn a distinction between Iran’s ability to threaten the strait and its ability to exercise comprehensive control over commercial shipping.
Max Meizlish, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former Treasury Department sanctions official, said Iran has retained military capabilities that can endanger vessels even as American naval operations and changes in regional export routes have weakened Tehran’s ability to shut down trade.
“The reality is that Iran neither maintains full control over the Strait of Hormuz, nor is its control entirely gone,” Meizlish told Just the News. “What it controls is its ability to target ships that transit either by way of U.S. escort or otherwise. But even if we discount the fact that oil flows have at least partially returned to pre-war levels, the idea that Iran controls the strait is laughable.”
Meizlish pointed to the collapse in Iranian crude shipments as an indication of the blockade’s effectiveness. He questioned how Tehran could credibly claim control over the waterway while remaining largely unable to export its own oil.
“The regime hasn’t been able to export any crude by sea since the blockade was reinstated. If Iran controls the strait, why have its oil exports plummeted?” he said.
The distinction between military capability and economic control is central to understanding the conflict. Iran can still launch attacks, threaten shipping and impose additional costs on commercial operators, but those capabilities have not prevented its neighbors from rebuilding their overall export volumes. At the same time, the recovery in regional energy shipments does not mean that threats to international navigation have ended.
The continued risk was apparent this week as attacks intensified and transit volumes declined. Reporting on the latest shipping disruptions described sharply increased compensation for crews willing to operate through the strait, reflecting the dangers associated with voyages through the conflict zone.
Higher crew costs, insurance expenses and complex shipping arrangements remain part of the economic burden created by the conflict. These costs can affect the price of transporting petroleum even when producers succeed in maintaining export volumes.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have reduced some of that exposure through existing pipelines, but those systems have physical limits. Additional shipments depend not only on pipeline capacity but also on the ability of export terminals to load tankers and move cargoes efficiently.
For Saudi Arabia, the East-West pipeline connects eastern production areas with facilities on the Red Sea, enabling crude to reach international markets without passing through Hormuz. The UAE operates a separate pipeline connecting inland production facilities with Fujairah, providing access to the Gulf of Oman outside the strait.
The expansion of those routes has changed the regional balance of vulnerability. Gulf exporters remain exposed to attacks on oil infrastructure, ports and commercial shipping, but they are less dependent on a single maritime passage than they were before the war.
Iran, by contrast, faces restrictions specifically targeting its access to international maritime trade. That imbalance has strengthened Washington’s economic position while leaving Tehran with military options for disrupting its neighbors’ commerce.
The prospect of further escalation remains significant. Iran has threatened to attack shipping routes it considers unauthorized, while the United States has maintained its blockade and continued increasing pressure through sanctions.
Trump’s announcement that American forces will not conduct new attacks before the Nov. 3 midterm elections temporarily limits one potential avenue of escalation, but it does not establish a lasting ceasefire or resolve the underlying disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, economic sanctions and maritime access.
Nor does the statement prevent further incidents involving Iranian forces, commercial vessels or other military actors in the region.
The latest shipping data therefore support a more limited conclusion than either government’s public position suggests. Iran has not maintained an effective shutdown of the region’s overall crude exports, but the Strait of Hormuz itself remains dangerous and continues operating below its former capacity.
Kpler’s September figures establish that non-Iranian producers restored aggregate exports to approximately 16.5 million barrels per day by relying more heavily on alternative ports, pipelines and offshore cargo transfers. More recent data show that renewed attacks have reduced traffic through the strait, even as other routes help sustain overall shipments.
The United States has simultaneously restricted Iran’s own crude exports through its naval blockade, placing further pressure on the country’s economy.
For Tehran, that combination presents a difficult strategic problem: neighboring exporters are finding ways to move their oil despite Iranian threats, while Iran faces substantial barriers to selling its own.
Whether those conditions lead to renewed negotiations, additional military escalation or further changes in shipping arrangements remains uncertain. For now, the available trade figures show that Iran’s claims of comprehensive control over the Strait of Hormuz exceed what the recovering regional export data demonstrate, even though the danger posed by its continuing attacks remains considerable.
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