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The Department of Homeland Security will require states receiving federal election-security funding to conduct manual audits of at least 5% of ballots and adopt other safeguards, as Secretary Markwayne Mullin warns that Chinese-made components used in major U.S. voting systems could create supply-chain and cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom.
The Department of Homeland Security is moving to require paper-ballot audits and other election-security measures as federal officials renew scrutiny of foreign-made components used inside U.S. voting systems.
The action comes as Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin warns that Chinese-manufactured parts used in widely deployed election equipment could create cybersecurity vulnerabilities before machines ever reach polling places.
According to Just the News, Mullin outlined those concerns in a letter sent earlier this week to the White House Transparency Task Force.
“Voting machines with components manufactured by foreign adversaries introduce significant security risks,” Mullin wrote. “These vulnerabilities mean that malicious actors could potentially compromise election infrastructure at any stage of the supply chain, even before the machines are assembled or deployed.”
Mullin said a compromised component could provide an avenue for cyber intrusion across multiple election systems.
“If a component is tampered with during manufacturing, it could serve as a point-of-entry for hackers, allowing for the possibility of synchronized attacks across multiple machines and jurisdictions,” he wrote.
The department’s response includes a requirement that states conduct manual reviews of paper ballots during upcoming elections.
DHS first announced in July that states receiving Homeland Security Grant Program money would be expected to implement several election-security standards.
Among those requirements, states must conduct a manual audit of at least 5% of ballots cast.
They must also submit plans for moving away from electronic voting systems that use bar codes or QR codes to tabulate votes, reconcile the number of voters with the number of ballots cast and use the department’s SAVE system to verify voter citizenship.
The administration says those requirements are intended to ensure that electronic results can be independently checked against physical ballots and that states maintain verifiable records of voter eligibility and turnout.
The renewed focus on voting-machine supply chains follows years of bipartisan concern about the manufacture of election equipment.
Three companies — Election Systems & Software, Hart InterCivic and Dominion — account for more than 80% of voting systems used in the United States, according to the information cited by DHS.
All three have previously acknowledged that some components used in their machines are manufactured in China.
Company representatives have said in past testimony that some parts cannot currently be sourced from American manufacturers.
The issue drew congressional scrutiny before the 2020 election.
Four Democratic lawmakers sent a letter in December 2019 to private equity firms connected to voting-machine manufacturers, seeking information about ownership, finances and election-security practices.
Democratic senators had also questioned the three major vendors about their cybersecurity procedures in 2017.
In December 2019, NBC News interviewed ES&S CEO Tom Burt about the company’s use of components manufactured in China.
Burt said ES&S facilities in China and the Philippines were “very secure” and stressed that final assembly took place in the United States.
In a separate statement to NBC News, ES&S said its components “are trusted, tested and free of malware.”
The issue received additional congressional attention in 2020 when executives from ES&S, Hart InterCivic and Dominion testified before the House Administration Committee.
All three acknowledged that some components were manufactured in China.
Dominion’s then-president and CEO told lawmakers the company relied on Chinese suppliers because “in some cases, there are simply no alternative suppliers.”
Mullin’s warning focuses on the possibility that vulnerabilities could be introduced into equipment before the systems are assembled in the United States.
The administration has pointed to broader intelligence assessments involving Chinese cyber capabilities in arguing that those risks deserve additional attention.
A 2024 U.S. intelligence assessment identified China as “the most active and persistent cyber threat” facing the United States.
Another intelligence assessment concluded that China, Iran and Russia possess “the technical capability to access some U.S. election-related networks and systems.”
Those assessments established the existence of foreign cyber capabilities; they did not by themselves establish that Chinese-manufactured voting-machine components had been compromised.
The Trump administration has taken similar supply-chain actions in other technology sectors.
Earlier this year, federal officials moved to prohibit imported internet routers manufactured abroad, citing concerns that Chinese hackers could exploit equipment connected to critical U.S. networks.
Routers form a basic part of the digital infrastructure connecting computers, mobile devices and other systems to the internet.
According to DHS, Chinese cyber actors have exploited weaknesses in Chinese-manufactured technology while penetrating U.S. critical infrastructure networks involving communications, energy, transportation and water systems.
The election-security initiative has also been informed by intelligence material recently declassified by President Donald Trump.
The administration has released multiple sets of documents through the White House Transparency Task Force in support of its broader campaign to strengthen election systems before the midterms.
Those releases include intelligence and investigative material concerning foreign cyber capabilities, voter-registration data and vulnerabilities in election infrastructure.
One set of material states that China obtained approximately 220 million American voter-registration files through purchasing, theft or hacking, including some information not ordinarily available to the public.
Administration intelligence officials later characterized the collection of those records as “election interference”.
Other intelligence assessments dating to 2020 concluded that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela possessed technical capabilities that could potentially be used against voting machines.
The documents also describe Homeland Security findings involving large numbers of individuals suspected of being noncitizens appearing on voter rolls, with federal officials estimating that the national total could be higher than the individual state findings.
Another declassified set of records concerns an FBI investigation into a breach of voter-registration information in Arizona’s largest county shortly before the 2020 election.
According to those documents, an individual describing himself as a hacker obtained approximately 633,000 voter-registration files.
The Biden Justice Department and local prosecutors ultimately declined to prosecute the case, according to the information released by the administration.
The administration has also cited historical intelligence concerning Venezuela.
Declassified material indicates that U.S. intelligence agencies began examining potential vulnerabilities in electronic voting systems as early as 2004 after detecting alleged Venezuelan government plans to manipulate voting technology in that country.
According to material released this year, Venezuelan officials allegedly sought to electronically alter election results by inserting false votes.
The intelligence prompted concern by 2006 that similar capabilities could theoretically be used to “undermine confidence in, or manipulate the electoral process in, the United States.”
A June 2026 CIA summary described those earlier concerns.
By 2020, U.S. intelligence had obtained reporting alleging that Venezuelan officials sought to manipulate electronic voting systems in a way designed to make fraudulent votes appear legitimate while leaving no obvious trace of the changes.
The administration has cited the episode as an example of why election technology must be designed to withstand both cyber intrusion and supply-chain manipulation.
Those intelligence reports concern alleged foreign capabilities and plans and do not establish that similar manipulation occurred in U.S. elections.
DHS is nevertheless using the broader threat environment to justify its emphasis on independently auditable paper ballots.
Under the department’s current approach, manual audits would provide a physical record against which electronic tabulation could be checked.
The requirement to reconcile the number of voters with ballots cast is intended to provide another verification layer.
The department’s SAVE citizenship-verification requirement adds a separate eligibility check.
And states using bar-code or QR-code-based electronic systems will be expected to develop plans for transitioning away from equipment DHS considers insufficiently secure.
The administration argues that those requirements are particularly important because the dominant U.S. voting-machine companies still depend on foreign components.
Election-system manufacturers have previously maintained that imported parts undergo security checks and that equipment is tested before deployment.
Mullin, however, argues that the risk begins earlier in the manufacturing chain, where malicious code or compromised hardware could theoretically be introduced before domestic testing and assembly.
The new safeguards therefore represent an effort to reduce dependence on electronic systems alone rather than a finding that specific machines currently in use have been manipulated.
For DHS, the central issue is whether American election infrastructure should rely on foreign-made components supplied by countries that U.S. intelligence agencies identify as capable cyber adversaries.
The department’s answer is to add physical verification, citizenship checks, voter-to-ballot reconciliation and plans to replace electronic systems it considers vulnerable.
With the midterms approaching, random paper-ballot audits will now become part of that broader security strategy as the administration seeks to ensure that electronic election results can be independently verified even if vulnerabilities emerge elsewhere in the voting-system supply chain.
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