By Gloria Ogbonna
Although more than 90 percent of Iranian missiles and drones have reportedly been intercepted by the United States, Israel, and allied forces, defense experts are warning that the apparent success masks a deeper and potentially dangerous problem: the soaring cost of defense and the rapid depletion of interceptor stockpiles across the region.
According to a report by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), obtained by Fox News, the vast majority of Iranian projectiles launched during the conflict have been successfully destroyed before reaching their targets.
On the surface, this reflects a highly effective defensive shield. However, analysts caution that focusing solely on interception percentages overlooks a growing strategic imbalance that could shape the next phase of the war.
During a recent press briefing, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt highlighted the scale of the response. “More than 9,000 enemy targets have been struck to date,” she said, adding that Iran’s ballistic missile and drone attacks have declined by roughly 90 percent.
She also noted that U.S. forces have destroyed more than 140 Iranian naval vessels, including nearly 50 mine-laying ships, significantly weakening Iran’s maritime capabilities.
Despite these battlefield achievements, Ari Cicurel, associate director of foreign policy at JINSA and author of the report, cautioned that high interception rates tell only part of the story. He argued that Iran entered the conflict with a calculated plan not merely to land devastating strikes, but to erode the very architecture that makes successful interceptions possible.
“Iran came into this war with a deliberate plan to dismantle the system behind the shield,” Cicurel explained. He noted that Tehran has targeted energy infrastructure to disrupt markets and deployed cluster munitions to increase the likelihood of damage, even when interception systems remain active.
The financial asymmetry at the core of the conflict has become one of the most pressing concerns. Danny Citrinowicz, a Middle East and national security expert at the Institute for National Security Studies, emphasized that the cost imbalance is unsustainable over time. He also serves as a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.
“There needs to be a change in the equation,” Citrinowicz said. “Iran is launching drones that cost around $30,000, while we are firing interceptors worth millions of dollars to bring them down. That gap is a very problematic one.”
He further explained that producing offensive missiles in Iran may cost only a few hundred thousand dollars, while advanced interceptor systems—particularly platforms such as Israel’s Arrow missile defense system—can cost several million dollars per unit.
Compounding the issue is production speed: missiles and drones can be built faster and in greater quantities than interceptors, making it easier for Iran to replenish its arsenal than for allied nations to rebuild theirs.
The JINSA report also highlights mounting pressure on Gulf state defenses. It estimates that Bahrain may have expended as much as 87 percent of its interceptor missiles, while the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have reportedly used around 75 percent of their supplies.
Qatar is believed to have utilized roughly 40 percent of its stockpile. Although Israeli officials have not publicly confirmed their inventory levels, analysts point to signs of rationing and selective interception decisions, particularly regarding cluster-munition threats, as evidence of conservation efforts.
As the conflict stretches into several weeks, experts warn that even limited daily salvos gradually intensify the strain on defensive systems. The issue becomes less about whether defenses can hold today, and more about whether they can be sustained tomorrow.
The global implications are also raising alarms. On Monday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed concern about the broader consequences of the war in Iran, stating he has a “very bad feeling” about what it could mean for Ukraine’s defense prospects.
He fears that Middle Eastern nations rapidly consuming advanced air defense missiles could contribute to a global shortage—one that Ukraine, still defending against Russian aggression, might feel most acutely.
Meanwhile, Iran has reportedly adapted its battlefield tactics, drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine. Rather than relying solely on massive barrages, Tehran has shifted toward smaller, more frequent waves of attacks designed to maintain constant pressure and gradually exhaust defensive resources.
This strategy complicates interception timelines and increases the probability that some projectiles will evade defenses and strike their targets.
Despite these concerns, Cicurel maintains that the defensive framework remains intact. “The defense architecture has held,” he said. “But the trajectory is moving in the wrong direction.” He argued that reversing this trend will require repositioning assets to the most pressured areas, aggressively targeting Iranian launchers and drone production facilities, and ensuring secure maritime convoys through the Gulf.
Ultimately, the JINSA report does not predict imminent defensive collapse. Instead, it describes a system under mounting strain—one whose sustainability hinges on industrial capacity and strategic adaptation. As Citrinowicz put it, the defining question moving forward is clear: “Can Iran produce missiles faster than we can produce interceptors?”
The answer to that question may determine not only the future of this conflict, but also the stability of air defense systems far beyond the Middle East.
Source: Breitbart
Original article
Comments