BY EMMANUEL OGBONNA
As American forces expand their presence across the Middle East, Iran finds itself confronting the possibility of sweeping strikes by the world’s most formidable military power — operations that could target its political leadership, military command structure, nuclear infrastructure and critical economic assets.
The United States has deployed additional naval and air assets to the region, including the positioning of a second aircraft carrier, signaling both deterrence and readiness. In contrast, Iran’s conventional capabilities remain significantly outmatched. The imbalance has been further compounded by the aftermath of last year’s 12-day conflict initiated by Israel and by sustained anti-government protests that exposed domestic vulnerabilities within the Islamic Republic.
Yet despite these pressures, Iranian officials and outside analysts caution against underestimating Tehran’s residual capacity to retaliate. Should the regime perceive its survival to be at risk, it retains the ability — and potentially the incentive — to inflict damage on U.S. personnel and allied states throughout the region.
According to Israeli military assessments, Iran continues to possess hundreds of medium-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel. In addition, Tehran maintains a substantially larger inventory of shorter-range missiles that can strike U.S. bases across the Gulf, including installations in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. Tens of thousands of American troops are stationed in those countries, and offshore U.S. naval forces could also be within range.
Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s traded oil transits. Iranian officials claimed to have partially restricted traffic during military exercises last week, a move widely interpreted as a warning to global markets and Western governments.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has publicly warned that Iranian forces could sink American warships in the Gulf. Tehran’s ambassador to the United Nations, Amir Saeid Iravani, has stated that “all bases, facilities and assets of the hostile force in the region” would be considered legitimate targets in the event of an attack. Iranian leaders have repeatedly cautioned that U.S. military action would ignite a broader regional war.
The shadow of last year’s conflict still looms large. During the June hostilities, Israel conducted extensive strikes on Iran’s long-range missile stockpiles, senior military leadership and key nuclear facilities. The United States also carried out direct attacks on major nuclear sites, with President Donald Trump declaring at the time that the facilities had been “obliterated.”
However, the full extent of the destruction remains uncertain. Satellite imagery and intelligence assessments have offered only partial insight into how much damage was sustained and how much has since been repaired. Notably, Iran continued to launch missile and drone strikes against Israel until the ceasefire took hold, occasionally penetrating sophisticated air defense systems.
Analysts say Israel’s campaign focused heavily on longer-range systems, leaving much of Iran’s shorter-range missile arsenal intact. Danny Citrinowicz, an Iran specialist at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, has argued that this reality may increase the likelihood of Iranian retaliation against American positions rather than direct confrontation with Israel.
“Iran may be weakened,” wrote Nate Swanson, who leads the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council, in a recent Foreign Affairs essay. “But it still has ways to inflict real pain on the United States — and much more incentive to try than it did before.” He suggested that Iranian officials may believe a calibrated show of force is necessary to deter future attacks and avoid appearing vulnerable.
Iran’s past responses illustrate this pattern. In 2020, following the U.S. killing of a senior Iranian general, Tehran launched ballistic missiles at an American base in Iraq. More recently, near the end of last year’s war, Iran targeted a U.S. base in Qatar. Both attacks were widely viewed as pre-signaled, enabling early warning systems and missile defenses to minimize casualties. While infrastructure damage was reported, no fatalities occurred.
In a further sign of strategic recalibration, Iranian officials have reportedly engaged in quiet discussions with Chinese counterparts about acquiring advanced anti-ship weaponry. According to officials familiar with the talks, Tehran has negotiated for a version of China’s YJ-12 sea-skimming missile, a system designed to threaten naval vessels and disrupt maritime transit routes. While the framework of a potential agreement was said to have been outlined after last year’s conflict, no deliveries have been confirmed.
The Israeli strikes of last year exposed significant vulnerabilities within Iran’s command structure. Several senior generals and nuclear scientists were killed, raising questions about internal security and operational secrecy. At one point, Trump publicly asserted that the United States knew the location of Khamenei, describing him as an “easy target” — remarks that underscored the perceived reach of American intelligence.
Speculation has since grown over whether Washington might consider “decapitation” strikes aimed at destabilizing or removing Iran’s leadership. Trump recently suggested that regime change “would be the best thing that could happen,” though no official policy of that nature has been announced.
Experts caution that the death of the 86-year-old Khamenei would not necessarily bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s political system contains mechanisms for continuity, and contingency planning is believed to include the temporary transfer of authority to a small leadership council during crises. Over the longer term, power could consolidate within the Revolutionary Guard or pass to another senior figure within the ruling establishment.
Regional governments are watching developments with apprehension. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned that any Iranian strike on Israel would trigger a severe response. Meanwhile, Arab Gulf states — long wary of Tehran but reluctant to be drawn into open war — have emphasized their desire to avoid escalation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both hosts to substantial U.S. military contingents, have indicated they would not permit their airspace to be used for offensive operations.
Diplomatic efforts to defuse tensions continue behind closed doors. Regional officials have engaged both Washington and Tehran in quiet exchanges aimed at averting a wider confrontation, mindful that renewed conflict could send oil prices sharply higher and destabilize global markets.
Iran retains a network of allied groups across the region, including the Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, Houthi rebels in Yemen and armed factions in Iraq. However, this so-called “Axis of Resistance” sustained considerable losses in the broader wave of violence that followed Hamas’ October 2023 attack on Israel, limiting but not eliminating its operational capacity.
Beyond the region, Iran has faced allegations of orchestrating or supporting plots against dissidents, Israeli interests and Jewish targets abroad, often through intermediaries such as criminal networks or affiliated groups.
At the heart of the standoff remains the nuclear question. After initially linking potential military action to Iran’s crackdown on domestic protests, Trump has shifted focus squarely to Tehran’s atomic program, warning that “bad things” will occur if a new agreement is not reached. Indirect talks between U.S. and Iranian representatives are scheduled to resume in Geneva.
Iran insists its nuclear activities are peaceful. The United States and European powers contend that Tehran’s past actions and enrichment levels suggest at least a latent weapons capability. Since Washington withdrew from the 2015 nuclear accord, Iran has accumulated a stockpile of uranium enriched to levels just below weapons-grade.
While major facilities suffered visible damage during last year’s strikes, uncertainty persists over whether enriched material was relocated or shielded underground before the attacks. Tehran has acknowledged it has not resumed enrichment but has also restricted access for international inspectors, further clouding the picture.
Most intelligence assessments conclude that Iran remains some distance from producing a deployable nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, experts warn that widespread strikes on nuclear sites could release radioactive material, posing environmental and humanitarian risks even if the facilities are not fully operational.
For now, diplomacy proceeds under the shadow of deterrence. With military forces repositioned and rhetoric sharpened on both sides, the balance between negotiation and escalation remains precarious, and the consequences of miscalculation could reverberate far beyond Iran’s borders.
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