🔘 1. Basic Judgment on the Zhang Youxia Incident.
The incident was not an ordinary organizational handling or disciplinary investigation.
The operation to seize Zhang Youxia took place within the Beijing area rather than elsewhere.
The process was not peaceful; there were indeed substantive armed confrontations.
Xi Jinping had already left the Jingxi Hotel in advance, and his current whereabouts remain unknown.
Zhang Youxia himself was not at the Jingxi Hotel conflict site.
This was a high-risk internal coercive action, not a normal procedure as claimed externally. Zhang Youxia was also not arrested during a meeting or at the Central Military Commission building, as some have claimed.
🔘II. The Military Is Highly Tense; Xi Is Guarding Against Internal Mutiny
Repeated keywords: Xi Jinping is preventing mutiny.
In the Beijing area, more than 5,000 people have already been detained in connection with this matter.
Zhang Youxia has extensive connections within the military and possesses systematic influence.
Xi fears triggering a military mutiny and has imposed strict restrictions on the movement and travel of theater command officials and personnel living in the military's family compounds.
There is heightened vigilance against coordination among mid- and high-level cadres related to this incident.
Some theater commands temporarily imposed centralized control over the communication devices of senior officers.
🔘III. Xi Jinping and the Military Have Long Lacked Mutual Trust
One assessment: Xi Jinping has never truly gained control of the military.
His authority mainly relies on purges and fear rather than prestige.
Recognition of Xi’s personal ability and legitimacy within the military is limited.
In private settings, there are discussions questioning Xi’s lack of military background and military competence.
Xi’s years of continuous purges have instead intensified insecurity.
The current situation is an eruption under extreme mutual distrust, followed by forced control.
This already resembles the characteristics seen in the late stages of historical extreme personal rulers.
🔘IV. The Hereditary Succession Issue Is the True Root of the Conflict
Some within the top levels of the Chinese Communist Party and the military leadership are aware of Xi Jinping’s plan for hereditary succession of power.
Xi has an (illegitimate) son who is currently being trained and cultivated in Ningxia.
This intention faces enormous resistance within the military system.
Zhang Youxia is regarded as one of the most significant obstacles to Xi Jinping realizing this plan.
Those in the know believe that the essence of the current conflict is not factional struggle.
Whether to allow hereditary succession of power is the core issue.
🔘V. At Present, Aside from Xi Jinping, Zhang Shengmin Is the Most Fearful
At present, Zhang Shengmin is the only one remaining alongside Xi Jinping within the Central Military Commission.
Xi Jinping may abolish the Central Military Commission system.
Zhang Shengmin is widely unpopular, and no one truly accepts his authority.
Zhang Shengmin has long served in the political and disciplinary systems of the Chinese Communist Party military and is Xi Jinping’s key figure in charge of political security, disciplinary control, and the inspection system within the military.
Zhang Shengmin comes from the military political work and discipline inspection system and is not a frontline combat-type commander.
In his early years, he worked for a long time within the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army. His career path has been closely tied to military organization, personnel, and inspection work.
After the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017, he became a member of the Central Military Commission and Secretary of the Central Military Commission Discipline Inspection Commission, making him one of the direct operators of the military’s anti-corruption and internal purge mechanisms.
During Xi Jinping’s comprehensive strengthening of personal control over the military, Zhang Shengmin’s role has been extremely critical:
He is responsible for supervising whether the military remains loyal to the supreme leader;
The downfall, investigation, and marginalization of a large number of senior military generals have almost all involved the Military Commission Discipline Inspection system.
From an institutional perspective, Zhang Shengmin is more like a spy planted by Xi Jinping within the military.
Unlike Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, and other traditional field-army system generals, Zhang Shengmin does not represent any military branch or combat group. Instead, he answers directly to the highest authority.
This leaves him without mobilizing power within the military, yet grants him strong institutional deterrent power.
🔘VI. No Capability for War in the Taiwan Strait in the Short Term
Regarding widespread online claims that divisions arose over the Taiwan Strait issue, informed sources clearly deny this.
Their assessment is that the Taiwan Strait issue is being used as a tool to divert attention.
Under the current state of extreme military tension and lack of mutual trust, launching a war against Taiwan is not feasible in reality. Xi Jinping’s primary goal at present is to “stabilize the internal situation,” not to take external risks.
🔘VII. Consensus on Xi Jinping’s Personal Situation
Xi Jinping lacks a secure exit mechanism.
The more concentrated power becomes, the higher the personal risk.
The military and some party elders hold strongly confrontational attitudes toward both the situation and Xi himself.
If Xi succeeds in suppressing the situation, he will only become more dictatorial and centralized.
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The above points summarize the key content of a phone conversation between Canada-based author Sheng Xue and an informed source.
The original Chinese text was published at:
https://x.com/ShengXue_ca/status/2015681513455579637?s=20
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