Will North Korea sell nuclear weapons to Iran? Former National Security Advisor John Bolton warns it could happen within 72 hours — not through development, but through a direct purchase.
In this video, we break down: ▶ Why Iran could bypass decades of nuclear research overnight ▶ The deep military partnership between North Korea and Iran — from Scud missiles to full production lines ▶ The exact flight route a nuclear warhead transfer could take (Pyongyang → China → Tehran) ▶ Why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the critical choke points ▶ How U.S. intelligence monitors North Korea's nuclear arsenal — and whether they'd catch it in time ▶ Would Kim Jong-un actually risk his life for a few billion dollars?
With the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader and the capture of Venezuela's Maduro, the calculus for Kim has changed dramatically. Is a nuclear deal still on the table — or is it Kim's ultimate bargaining chip with Trump?
The world's most dangerous transaction may be closer than you think.
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Korea launched a missile.
New missile launches overnight by North Korea.
The latest in a series of provocations.
It seems there's praise all around in North Korea
after its latest test of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
And do you think being emboldened by this?
And how soon before it poses itself a serious nuclear threat?
Well, I think Iran could be a nuclear threat within about 72 hours.
Former National Security Advisor John Bolton suggests that Iran could bypass years of research
by simply purchasing ready-made warheads from Pyongyang.
The idea of Iran possessing nuclear weapons throws most people into a state of chaos.
Will North Korea sell nuclear weapons to Iran?
Simply wires the appropriate amount of purchase money to the central bank of North Korea in
Pyongyang and get a couple warheads loaded on transports that would fly across China
and deliver them to Iran.
John Bolton has extensive experience and long-standing seniority working deep in the
fields of arms control, non-proliferation, and Middle East-North Korea policy across
four U.S. presidential terms, from President Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump's first term.
Therefore, the words he puts forward carry significant weight,
making it impossible for the U.S. and the rest of the world to ignore.
But does the assessment of a hawk politician reflect the actual reality?
This could happen because countries under Western sanctions
often have a tendency to ally with each other.
There is evidence that these countries provide weapons to each other
and even support technology to produce weapons.
Bruce E. Bechtol states that for many years,
North Korea has been a strategic arms supplier to Iran.
The Iranians got about 250 Scud Cs from North Korea.
They liked them.
So they asked the North Koreans to build a Scud C factory for them.
But the factory still needed North Korean parts
and North Korean engineers and technicians to keep it running.
He asserted that even after the plant was completed,
Iran continued to rely on North Korean engineers and components to maintain operations.
In fact, the liquid-fuel ballistic missile program that Iran utilizes today
is almost entirely of North Korean origin.
Since Iran was able to purchase an entire missile production line from North Korea,
acquiring finished nuclear weapons would simply be the next step in their existing partnership.
However, the barrier for Iran to purchase nuclear weapons is not money,
but how to move a nuclear warhead from Pyongyang to Tehran undetected.
Russian IL-76 aircraft would only take 10 to 12 hours to fly
from Pyongyang through Chinese airspace to Tehran.
According to CIA documents,
an IL-76, when carrying a full load, about 40 to 50 tons,
has a range of approximately 4,400 kilometers.
Therefore, it could stop in China to refuel,
as the distance from Pyongyang to Urumqi, China is only about 3,500 kilometers.
After refueling and resting,
it would fly 3,300 kilometers from Xinjiang to Tehran without needing another refueling stop.
While Chinese airspace is safe,
the flight path must pass through three Central Asian countries,
where the risk of the aircraft being intercepted is very high.
Two of them, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,
participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
If U.S. intelligence catches wind of the deal,
these aircraft could be forced down or intercepted in one of these two Central Asian countries.
Can the U.S. spot such a transaction?
North Korea has long been a major threat to the United States.
One of their top priorities
is to monitor everything regarding this country's nuclear weapons.
We have been able to confirm that there is a rapid increase
in the operation of the Yongbyon 5-megawatt reactor.
All of them point to a very serious increase in the capabilities of TPRK
in the area of nuclear weapons production,
which is estimated at a few dozen warheads.
For instance, consider 38 North,
a prominent civilian organization under the Stimson Center
specializing in North Korea analysis.
How exactly do they monitor the situation?
Joel Witt from 38 North says the latest photos show the Kim regime
has modified the cooling system of a reactor that produces plutonium,
a key nuclear material.
Beyond civilian watchdogs,
U.S. intelligence is, of course, actively engaged in surveillance.
One of their achievements
was uncovering a secret uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon.
With such comprehensive and multi-layered oversight by the United States,
the likelihood of detecting a warhead leaving its storage site is high.
Besides blocking the path of nuclear weapons,
the United States could choose a more radical method,
permanently eliminating the individual who decides to sell the nuclear weapons.
Actual events have shown that the U.S. is fully capable of doing so.
The supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei,
was neutralized right at his top secret hideout.
The U.S. military took only 60 seconds to complete the plan.
One month prior,
the U.S. military also captured Maduro of Venezuela
alive at the most heavily guarded residence of the Venezuelan military.
The time was minutes.
Rocket man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.
The United States is ready, willing, and able.
But hopefully, this will not be necessary.
Would Kim Jong-un risk his life in exchange for a few billion dollars?
The answer is likely no.
According to Dr. Alon Levkowitz of Israel's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,
the fear of being assassinated by Washington has existed since the time of Kim Jong-il.
After the leader of Iran was assassinated, this fear has become more present than ever.
He argued that Kim Jong-un could use the potential sale of nuclear bombs to Iran
as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Trump
in an attempt to convince him to lift the sanctions.
However, putting this issue on the negotiating table is a double-edged sword.
Kim might achieve his goal of having some sanctions removed,
but it could also serve as a pretext for President Trump to conduct a regime change operation.