Why Washington Misunderstands Every Deal With China

Global Risk Profile
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20 Video Views·Oct 12, 2026
Why Washington Misunderstands Every Deal With China
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThe video examines the fundamental disconnect between Western diplomacy, which seeks permanent \"settlements,\" and authoritarian approaches, which treat agreements as tactical \"instruments\" to buy time and accumulate power. It argues that Western failures stem from assuming cooperation leads to convergence, whereas adversaries view cooperation as a tool within a permanent struggle.
President Donald Trump's bilateral summit with Xi Jinping
in Washington wrapped up with familiar fanfare.
And bilateral trade boards, reciprocal tariff reductions,
and joint pledges to stabilize great power competition.
It fits a familiar second-term pattern.
We've seen trade frameworks negotiated across Europe,
peace declarations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Thailand and Cambodia,
and an Arctic security pact in Greenland just the other day.
Whatever one thinks of Donald Trump's politics or methods,
his foreign policy is anchored in commercial bargaining.
Locate the other side's interests, build leverage.
Put an offer on the table both sides could live with, and make the deal. Yet.
The summit highlights a recurring issue.
In Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran, as well as with China.
The administration's initiatives have repeatedly struggled
to resolve the underlying confrontations.
Why.
Welcome to Global Risk Profile, where we break down the headlines that matter.
And the ones that should, simple explanations deserve their due.
Maybe some files are inherently harder.
A tariff negotiations with Japan,
is not an existential contest over Ukraine's borders or Iran nuclear's program.
Also.
Above great powers, there is no international sheriff to compel compliance.
Incentives shift, and tax can fray.
Washington has also historically sometimes misread what
its bargains actually achieved.
2020 Phase One Trade Pact with China, delivered technical agricultural reforms,
but missed purchase targets by nearly 200 billion,
leaving China's state-directed economic system entirely intact.
Nor does the United States maintain every pact indefinitely.
In 2018, Washington abandoned.
A nuclear deal with Iran because the bargain was deemed ineffective,
at the long-term banning.
Of the Iranian regime from obtaining nuclear weapons,
so the question isn't simply who keeps the deal and who breaks it.
A real question is whether both parties intend to resolve a conflict.
Or merely manage it, until the balance of power shifts.
At the negotiating table, those two efforts can look identical.
Strategically, however, they are completely different animals.
In the West, our intuitive model of diplomacy is settlement.
Two parties find compatible interests, compromise,
close the gap, and establish a new baseline, like
a business acquisition negotiated between 120 million and 80 million to 100 million.
The contract is inked, the transaction is closed,
and neither party keeps a secret residual claim on the difference.
The compromise becomes the new reality.
Now let's look at the exact same transaction through an entirely different lens.
A deal as an instrument.
Suppose an actor pursues an existential long-term objective,
and you stand in the way.
But the present balance of power doesn't allow them to take what they want.
So they sign an agreement.
Not to end the fight, but to lift sanctions, gain capital,
secure technology, or buy five years of breathing room.
They honor every single clause. Why wouldn't they?
The arrangement is actively helping them accumulate strength.
But they haven't accepted your idea of a settlement.
They've accepted an arrangement that is useful right now.
Democratic governments do this too;
they buy time, use sanctions relief as leverage, and sign interim pacts.
That is also part of statecraft. The disaster begins
when two sides sign the same paper with incompatible operating models.
One side hears a permanent resolution.
The other secured tactical positioning.
Imagine a ten-year agreement honored by both sides.
Trade rises, tensions fall.
To the settlement-minded government, that decade looks like genuine reconciliation,
justifying thinner defenses and deeper economic integration.
To the instrumental power, that exact same decade represents critical accumulation,
growth secured, industrial capabilities scaled, and an opposing coalition delayed.
One side's proof of peace, is the other side's proof,
of a successful staging ground. For example, in two thousand and twelve,
senior Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzuk stated explicitly,
that even a signed deal with Israel, would remain a hudna,
a tactical truce rather than a permanent recognition.
If two enemies agree to pause fighting, that isn't necessarily fraudulent or bad.
But as October seventh demonstrated,
if one side treats a temporary pause as a permanent baseline,
The misunderstanding is catastrophic.
The best intelligence collection cannot automatically tell you how
the other side understands their relationship.
You can have perfect data, and the completely wrong model.
Former FBI lead international kidnapping negotiator
Chris Voss defines tactical empathy not as agreement,
but as describing an adversary's worldview so accurately that they respond with,
"That's right." Could an American delegation describe Beijing's, Moscow's,
or Tehran's own strategic picture so sharply that their leaders would say,
"That's right," not what they want in this quarter's trade talks.
But how they view time, struggle, and leverage.
Voss also warns against an obsession with getting to yes.
Someone can say yes to pocket relief to end an exhausting conversation.
Or without any viable way to implement the promise,
diplomacy celebrates the handshake.
But the fatal surprise is rarely a hidden clause.
It's a concealed assumption. Washington sometimes assumes that a sufficiently
beneficial deal makes cooperation more attractive than confrontation.
The adversary assumes the confrontation is permanent,
and cooperation is simply an instrument to improve their position inside it.
That is why China, is the consequential case.
Knowing what Beijing wants now isn't enough.
The decisive question is how the party understands struggle,
compromise, cooperation, and time.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
came to power through alternating cycles of alliance and struggle.
Partnering with the nationalist Kuomintang, fighting them,
partnering against Japan, and resuming the civil war the moment Japan was defeated.
In party doctrine, cooperation does not mean conflict has ended.
Cooperation frequently takes place inside the struggle. For example.
Following Mao, Deng Xiaoping directed the nation toward capital and markets.
Counseling cadres to observe calmly, build capabilities,
and avoid claiming global leadership.
Western capitals interpreted this era through the lens of political convergence.
The party treated that exact same integration,
as vital accumulation to preserve and entrench its rule.
Under Xi Jinping, this ethos turned explicit.
She demands cadres maintain a fighting spirit to defend socialism,
even while championing so-called win-win multilateralism.
In Leninist practice, these are not contradictory.
You cooperate where useful, bide your time while the balance shifts,
and honor accords until they collide with core imperatives.
Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau argue that all states act this way.
They pursue power, honor treaties while advantageous,
and revise commitments when the balance shifts.
Washington, for example, allied with Stalin against Hitler.
And abandoned the JCPOA. If that's all we are seeing.
Analyzing party culture would be superfluous.
Standard realpolitik, however, misses a crucial distinction. Over twenty years ago,
the book Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party articulated it.
Inside China, economic models, alliances, rhetoric,
and treated language can constantly shift, because they remain strictly subordinate
to the invariant core, the absolute monopoly and preservation of the party.
That is classical Leninism,
as Richard McGregor analyzed in his seminal book, *The Party*.
Vladimir Lenin himself defended tactical compromise in left-wing communism,
emphasizing that alliances and retreats are temporary devices
to navigate shifting power dynamics, not permanent reconciliations.
Tactical flexibility is easy when external deals are expendable.
The party apparatus is existential, and here we must add that in such a system,
the so-called national interest is the party's interest,
even if in reality the two actually diverge.
So the contrast isn't that democracies negotiate always in good faith,
while autocracies always cheat.
The operative distinction is what each system treats
as negotiable versus existential.
If our description here is accurate, it should also apply to an ascendant,
wealthy China inside the modern global system.
Let's take the WTO accession,
the largest strategic bet Washington made in that era.
The economic argument was straightforward,
but around it sat a massive political assumption.
The Clinton administration argued that global market integration would
force political reform and erode the foundations of the one-party rule.
China never promised democracy; those were Western hopes.
And indeed, trade exploded, Western firms profited.
To Washington, engagement seemed to be working.
But from Beijing's perspective, China gained markets, capital,
and advanced technology, while the party systematically entrenched its power.
Still today, the USTR reports a state-directed economy fundamentally
at odds with core WTO norms. China's accession to the WTO
was thus simultaneously a failed Western political strategy.
A successful economic agreement and a brilliant Chinese development strategy,
religion has proved an even sharper test of that Western hope.
Since when China joined the WTO?
Western leaders argued, integration would foster religious tolerance.
Faith represents an independent source of belief
that does not originate with the party.
It's a sort of a canary in the coal mine.
So let's see how the situation was before the accession.
House churches were being forced into state control.
Tibetan Buddhism was repressed and managed.
In Xinjiang, the CCP was repressing the Uyghurs, and experimenting
with forced organ harvesting on them, and the campaign against Falun Gong.
Had already begun in 1999. So what happened after the accession?
After China grew wealthy and secure over the next two and a half decades.
Control and persecution intensified dramatically,
and things got a lot worse in all of these fronts.
So actually, economic modernization
and the total elimination of independent civic authority proceeded hand in hand.
The mistake wasn't believing China would change.
China changed enormously.
The mistake was assuming which things would change. Let's look at Hong Kong.
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration,
registered at the United Nations, guaranteed 50 years of autonomy.
In the 1980s, China didn't yet control the territory.
The one country, two systems framework solved the handover
while preserving Hong Kong's economic utility for a couple of decades.
The arrangement served Beijing well.
But once China became wealthy,
and the 2019 protests challenged creeping Beijing control.
The 2020 National Security Law extinguished that autonomy overnight.
Britain declared China is in breach of a binding treaty.
Beijing dismissed the joint declaration
as a historical document with no practical significance.
Fifty years meant fifty years in London, in Beijing, it was an interim arrangement
that expired the moment it felt threatening to the party's monopoly.
Sun Tzu's famous maxim,
"Know the enemy and know yourself," is not just an inventory of weapons and troops.
It's an audit of mental models.
If Washington understood Beijing's demand for markets, while completely
misunderstanding how the party subordinated integration to political control.
The intelligence failure wasn't missing data.
It was a broken analytical model.
Becoming tougher or more accommodating cannot fix a flawed premise.
Adversaries also model us.
Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran study our electoral cycles, allied fatigue,
and with their four-year commitment, can survive an eight-year horizon.
American foreign policy.
Can reverse direction after an election.
This isn't an insult to democracy;
it is structural reality, and capable adversaries price it into every negotiation.
Yet authoritarian regimes have their own blind spot
when you treat agreements as instruments to buy time.
You make an unstated assumption.
That the other side will stay passive.
For decades, Beijing assumed Western commercial appetite would remain permanent,
while China accumulated leverage.
And it was so for a while, but it didn't account for Western agency.
When Washington abruptly woke up, imposing semiconductor export controls,
outbound investment bans, and aggressive reshoring subsidies,
the party's timeline was thrown into disarray.
Because buying time only works if you control the clock.
And nobody controls the clock.
None of this implies that America should walk away
from negotiating with adversaries.
An agreement with a rival can matter far more than an agreement with an ally.
A ceasefire halts bloodshed, arms control lowers the risk of catastrophic war,
a trade mechanism prevents economic friction from turning kinetic.
The danger is asking a signed paper to do work it was never built to do.
None of this requires believing the strategic contest has been settled.
A durable foreign policy begins by assuming it has not.
If you believe a deal is a bridge toward convergence,
then concessions today look like down payments on future trust.
But if you assume the adversarial competition is ongoing,
You run an entirely different audit.
For example, what happens if this arrangement collapses tomorrow?
Have we created dependencies? We cannot quickly unwind.
Have we considered leverage that cannot be rebuilt?
Who will use the interval to accumulate capability faster?
Can we verify compliance without the other side's permission?
If the deal collapses in two years,
are we in a stronger position than the day we signed?
A workable bargain with an adversary doesn't demand trust,
and it doesn't require transforming their domestic system.
It does require continuous verification,
immediate penalties for breach, reversibility, redundancy,
and absolute clarity about the fundamental disputes the agreement leaves untouched.
The most dangerous agreement isn't a temporary one.
It is the agreement that one side signs as an instrument to buy time,
while the other believes they just settled the conflict.
So two leaders can sit at a table, compromise and shake hands.
The cameras flash, markets rise, and both governments announce a breakthrough.
Perhaps it is one, but before we celebrate the handshake.
There remains a final question.
Did they make the same deal? That's it for this episode of Global Risk Profile.
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Remember, the headlines may keep changing, but deeper patterns rarely do.
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