Why Sparta Beat Athens - The Fall Of The Empire - Peloponnesian War

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AI GeneratedThis analysis examines the Peloponnesian War to determine why Sparta defeated Athens. It concludes that while Athens possessed significant naval and economic power, its downfall was caused by a combination of imperial overextension, internal political volatility, and Sparta's strategic ability to secure Persian funding and maintain a more stable alliance structure.
One of the foundational case studies of geopolitics is the Peloponnesian Wars,
the 431-404 BCE conflict between the Greek city-states of Athens, Sparta, and their allies
over the entirety of Hellas and the Eastern Mediterranean. The account of the wars by the
Greek historian Thucydides has given scholars and statesmen much to ponder, internal politics,
foreign interference, military strategy, but one question above all others has captivated
classicists and political scientists alike. Why did Athens lose and why did Sparta win?
The answer touches on alliances, economics, geopolitics, and the fragility of democracies
under pressure. Welcome to our video on the Peloponnesian War.
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Get started via the link in the description! The first factor which seems to have tipped
the balance in the Peloponnesian Wars is that of alliances. Both Sparta and Athens had their
own alliances of city-states and colonies who fought in the wars. Sparta had the Peloponnesian
League, while Athens had the Delian League. In Sparta's case, while they were the leaders of the
Peloponnesians, they were not the only ones monopolizing its institutions. Another powerful
city was Corinth, who in 432 BCE had come into conflict with Athens over Potidaea, one of their
colonies that Athens sought to bring under tighter control. It was this battle that caused Corinth to
demand Sparta declare war on Athens, which ended up happening after a fierce debate in the Laconic
city. Athens, for its part, was the main power of the Delian League and was often rather overbearing
towards its allies. The Athenians had initially founded the League as a means to liberate Ionian
cities from Persia in Asia Minor after the Graeco-Persian Wars and had slowly taken over
its finances for personal aggrandizement. Thus, an inequality emerges in the two alliances.
One was multipolar and the other was unipolar. Sparta and its Corinthian allies had combined
powers which complemented each other militarily. Sparta was, at least at the start of the Peloponnesian
Wars, better at land warfare, whereas Corinth was better in naval battles. Athens' allies were
usually smaller cities and more of them were island polis. Thus, Athens only really dominated
in naval warfare, with the exception of a few allies who could help them in land battles.
In addition, there were some issues in the animosity within alliances. Both the Peloponnesian
and Delian Leagues had dissident members, or members who had changed their forms of government
between oligarchies and democracies. These political and opinion changes were key in changing
the coherence of the alliances. However, Athens had more issues within its alliance throughout
the war. As Thucydides notes when describing the start of the war, while Sparta had officially
launched the war, many cities in Hellas were sympathetic to its complaints that Athens was
becoming overbearing and imperialist towards other Greeks. As a result, there were many people,
even in Athenian-allied states, who thought Athens was more trouble than it was worth.
The main way for Athens to influence and destabilize the Peloponnesian League
was through sponsoring pro-democracy movements in cities run by oligarchs.
They tried to do this in 424 BCE, when the Spartan ally of Megara had become democratic
and wished to break off from Spartan influence. However, the Spartans and the Peloponnesians
found many more instances where they could use Athenian brutality as propaganda against them.
The failed expedition in Sicily in 415-413 BCE or the sack of Melos in 416 BCE were examples of
Athenian chaos that Spartans could point to in order to discredit the city of Athena.
This was not always successful as a strategy, but it is certainly the case that Athenian arrogance
caused them many alliance problems. No betrayal or campaign, not even the Sicilian expedition,
were nails in the coffin for Athenian imperialism, but they certainly undermined the alliance and the
prestige that Athens had held as liberators of Asia Minor. Another factor which likely determined
the outcome of the Peloponnesian Wars was that of economics. Wars are more often than not won
on the budget papers rather than the battlefields, with logistics and the ability to sustain oneself
and replenish losses being key for opening the lock of victory. In this instance, Athens'
economic might was sort of a double-edged sword. One typical strategy the Peloponnesians used during
the war was to raid Attica, the part of Hellas where Athens is located, almost every year. They
then pillaged and burned the fields surrounding the city in order to starve them out. The reason
why Athens lasted so long was that it had the economic might to sustain logistical strains like
this. The Athenian Empire, which was essentially what the Delian League was, included regions that
could sustain the Athenian people and their army for decades, like the region of Thrace. There,
a variety of colonies and mines provided much-needed revenue for purchasing grain.
The Athenians also had continuous access to the Straits of the Bosporus, where grain imports from
the Scythians of the Black Sea supplied their war effort. The Athenians thus could manage to
survive immense blows, like the Sicilian Expedition, thanks to this economic capacity.
The Spartans tried twice to cut off Athenian control over this region.
Once, in the campaign of the Spartan general Brasidas, who captured Amphipolis in 424 BCE,
a blow that contributed to the Peace of Nicaeus in 421 BCE, ending the Arcadamian phase of the war.
The other time was in the Battle of Agospitome in 405 BCE, in which the general Lysander defeated
the Athenians and cut off their grain supply. Thus, only when Athenian food supplies were
disrupted did the Thessalocracy buckle into defeat. The Spartans also had their own economic
capacities upon which they relied for victory. Unlike the Athenians, who often took bold military
and budgetary measures during the war, the Spartans were more conservative in their tactics.
Only a few generals undertook bold economic enterprises like the outfitting of a new
Spartan fleet under Lysander. In addition, their league included mostly Peloponnesian city-states
which were close to it. Thus, they had more food and economic security than the Athenians.
The Spartan economy was also relatively secure, as it was in the southern parts of the Peloponnese.
Athens managed to threaten the Spartan heartland, and thus its resources, only at times,
like when they occupied the island of Cythera in the 420s BCE. But for the most part,
Sparta had more secure logistics and deployed them more conservatively. The Lacedaemonians
also had another assistance, the might of the Achaemenid Persian Empire. A massive realm spanning
from the valleys of the Indus to the sands of Egypt, it had bottomless resources that no Greek
could match. The Achaemenids, particularly the Satraps of Asia Minor, saw Athens as a threat,
and in the 410s were eager to get involved in the war. The wealth of the empire proved
to be of vital importance to the Spartans, who managed to outfit their navy. They were thus
finally able to match the Athenians in the naval theatre. When combined, Persian resources and
Spartan strategic logistical blows gave the Peloponnesians the eventual upper hand and thus
victory in the war. There is also the geopolitical factor which impacted the scales of the conflict.
This variable lies beyond the mere topic of alliances, but also includes aspects of foreign
entanglement and imperialism. One aspect that we have already mentioned is the Persian gambit of
Sparta in the 410s BCE. There is more to this geopolitical process than mere economic issues,
for Persia itself enabled a multi-front war in the 400s BCE. Besides funding the Spartan fleet,
local Persian Satraps such as Ctesiphenes began incursions into Ionian cities allied with the
Athenians, that they once controlled as part of the empire in 412 BCE. This succeeded briefly
until the Athenian statesman Alcibiades got another Satrap, Pharnabazos, to reassert a policy
of neutrality. However, the Persians would soon change their minds once again and in 408 BCE
they would rejoin Sparta. This time it was Prince Cyrus the Younger who supported this policy,
and his contacts with the Spartans promised him help in trying to take the throne from his brother
Artaxerxes II. This was an instrumental element in Sparta's success. Athens was now stretched too
thin and was more vulnerable to surgical strikes like the one that would happen in Agospitome in
405 BCE. The decisive factor here was not just economic but geopolitical. The alliance of Sparta
and Persia was capable of disorienting Athens in the war and made it unable to commit its resources
to a decisive blow against Sparta. Thus, they were less able to sustain continued warfare,
especially when pitted against two very strong and economically secure allies.
On the Athenian front, geopolitics was decisive due to some of the most reckless adventurism
the polis undertook. Athens had an expansive and aggressive foreign policy, particularly at sea.
Such a strategy was often successful in several instances, such as in the battles of Pelos and
Sphacteria in 425 BCE, when the Athenian fleet managed to strike very risky victories that
humiliated Sparta in the Peloponnese itself. However, this boldness often led to disastrous
consequences. The most noteworthy example is that of the Sicilian expedition of 415 to 413 BCE.
During this ill-fated campaign, the Athenian navy tried to assist the city of Segesta in Sicily
by launching a campaign against the local superpower of Syracuse. After two years of
being bogged down, the Athenians ended up losing almost everyone who embarked on the expedition,
with all survivors being enslaved. Part of Athens' failure in this instance was that it was led on by
overly ambitious demagoguery. The populist politician Alcibiades was a major instigator
of the campaign, even abandoning the campaign when he was accused of sacrilege in Athens.
But personalist analyses are not enough in this instance. When looked at more systematically,
Athens was simply overextending itself. In its attempt to expand its sphere of influence,
the Athenians had simply wasted too many resources in the Sicilian expedition,
setting them back for the rest of the Peloponnesian Wars. While the expedition is not the
sole cause of Athenian defeat, it did reveal long-term trends in their geopolitical overextension.
The Spartans were more cautious and eventually gained the fabled Persian gold,
thus surviving what had become a war of attrition. Another often-discussed factor
which determined the outcome of the Peloponnesian War was that of internal politics. In any conflict,
the stability of a belligerent or its allies is essential for victory. One cannot win a war if
they are fighting a civil war. Both Athens and Sparta saw either themselves or their allies
fall to political instability throughout the war's duration. Sparta often was very cautious
about its military campaigns, on account of the fear of revolts of its underclass of slaves,
known as helots. However, the record winner for intrapolis politicking was evidently Athens.
The vibrant and agonistic direct democracy could on the one hand be excellent at taking decisions
and demonstrating ideological fervor in combat and diplomacy. On the other hand,
it was prone to bitter class and political struggle within its agora. Even before the war,
men who made the polis beloved of the poets like Themistocles and Pericles had faced political
rivalries that caused them trouble, and this continued well into the war. For instance,
the statesman Alcibiades, whom we mentioned as the mastermind of the Sicilian expedition,
was tried in absentia and had to flee to Sparta. A few years later, in 411 BCE,
he relinquished his democratic, populist branding and helped a faction of oligarchs
instigate a coup in Athens. The newly emerging oligarchy was composed of geopolitical realists
who undermined the Athenian war effort, thinking it was too costly an affair. However, they failed
to achieve even this feat. This was because different factions amongst them had different
viewpoints on how restrictive their new form of government ought to be, and delayed actually
finishing negotiations with Sparta. Eventually, a democratic movement with aid from the loyal
Athenian ally of Samos managed to defeat them and restore the people's rule in Athens.
This time of troubles set Athens back, only a short time after their defeat in Sicily.
While they eventually managed to bounce back, the coup had revealed deep class and policy divisions
in Athens itself. Aristocrats, like those who had created the oligarchy of the 400,
simply did not think that the war was worth fighting. A supporter of the tyrants may even
argue that the restoration of democracy actually stopped an Athenian victory. This is because
Alcibiades was considering an alliance with Persia through negotiations with the subtrap
Tisiphanes that would help them defeat Sparta. Of course, the populist Alcibiades was in a rather
precarious communication with Tisiphanes, so this argument is moot. Athens, in fact,
continued to fight and even achieved victories against a Persia-augmented Spartan navy until
its grain supplies were cut off in 404 BCE. Whether Athens could have secured a better
peace treaty in 411 BCE, or if its doom came after Agospitome in 404 BCE is an almost impossible
question to answer, but what the events do show is that instability in Athens weakened its position
against Sparta. Whether one considers an imperialist working-class rabble to have
overextended Athens, or tyrannical elites to have backstabbed the revolutionary democracy,
it is clear that social upheavals often caused trouble on the warfront. Sparta itself likely
understood this, as in 403 BCE they installed the Thirty Tyrants after Athens' surrender,
a brutal pro-Spartan oligarchy that ruled for 13 months before being overthrown,
to keep Athens politically subordinate. While not the decisive factor in Athens' defeat,
internal strife was a consistent drain on its success.
The last factor one could argue was decisive for the victory of Sparta and the defeat of Athens
was that of public opinion. This is a factor we briefly touched upon when we discussed the role
of alliances, as alliance cohesion and public opinion of the two polis was key in their success
or failure. But there is an important distinction, namely how neutral cities saw either polis.
After all, to join an alliance without coercion, a state must either consider it beneficial to them,
or have some ideological affinity for its declared beliefs. Athens at the start of the 5th century
BCE was a popular polis in Hellas. It had been seminal in the defeat of Persia and was fighting
a war of city-state liberation against Achaemenid imperialism in Asia Minor. Its radical and
innovative form of government, giving power to all free males regardless of background or wealth,
also seemed lucrative to many Greeks, much like Soviet communism seemed to attract many peoples
in the global south in the 20th century. However, much like the Soviet Union, the Athenians lost
much of their credibility through some of their actions. The destruction of Melos and the
enslavement of its people made Athenians seem bloodthirsty, like the crushing of the Prague
Spring in 1968 made the Soviets unpalatable to many. The bogging down in Sicily for Athens made
many Athenians and other Greeks see their foreign policy as erratic and resource-draining, much like
the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan made the Soviets appear as if they only cared about their sphere of
influence. This is why both at the start of and for the duration of the Peloponnesian War, many
tried to leave Athens' alliance or remain neutral. Sparta, on the other hand, was seen as popular at
the start of the 5th century BCE, but too conservative and focused on the Peloponnese
to be seen as a model to follow. Sparta managed to present itself as a force of order,
defending smaller states from Athenian imperialism, a useful image even if it
masks Spartan self-interest. Not all Greeks accepted this framing. Many democratically-minded
Hellenes saw Sparta as a harbinger of oligarchy and feared its alliance as much as Athenian
domination. But Sparta managed to keep its brand and consequently its alliance cohesion,
for longer than Athens kept its image as a democratic vanguard. It only began to be widely
seen as imperialist even by its own Peloponnesian allies in the 4th century BCE, when kings like
Agis tried to expand Spartan power. Thus, the Peloponnesian War was also a war of public opinion
and propaganda, a front that Sparta won due to Athenian bellicosity. So, what can we truly say
about the cause of Spartan victory and Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian Wars? The answer
seems to be that Athens both overextended itself and faced an increasingly wealthy Sparta backed
by Persia. The war was not predetermined, but what did make it difficult for Athens was how
many polis were not positively predisposed towards the state either. Internal disagreements within
Athens also played a role, though depending on the situation, different factions overestimated
or underestimated Spartan bellicosity. Athens managed to bounce back from tremendous setbacks,
such as the Sicilian expedition. But ultimately, this convergence of factors made Athens lose the
Peloponnesian War. Sparta, for its part, was initially cautious and had the favor of many
city-states, eventually gaining Persian patronage. The fates of these two cities often turned
suddenly both during and after the war. This is perhaps the biggest reminder of the wars.
As the tragedian Aeschylus has written,
My friends, anyone with real experience of trouble knows how, when a surge of it comes upon them,
they are apt to fear everything. But when fortune's tide is good,
they trust that the same breeze will blow favorably forever.
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