Despite the rapid downfall of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime, it had at one point shown much promise. Succeeding his father Reza Khan, Pahlavi enacted sweeping reforms that drastically improved not only Iranian prestige on the global stage, but the status of the average Iranian citizen: per capita income increased 3 fold during the course of his reign and literacy rates jumped from 27% to 80% between 1967 and 1977 alone. But the shadow of his father still loomed over him as an adult - showing this through his propensity for reform, which proved controversial, as did his public self-image as an infallible autocrat. Also inherited from his father was his vindictiveness, seen in his willingness to order military units to meet organized protests and relying heavily on SAVAK secret police to ensure compliance. Pahlavi’s deposition sent major shockwaves across the world that are still felt today. To understand the enigma that is modern Iran, we must begin with its final Shah.
Cairo, 1980. The 60-year-old Mohammad Reza Pahlavi lay dying, his body strength entirely
extinguished after fighting terminal cancer for six years. With him would die a 2,500-year
continuous monarchy in Iran. Despite the rapid downfall of his regime, it had at one point shown
much promise. Succeeding his father Reza Khan, Pahlavi enacted sweeping reforms that drastically
improved not only Iranian prestige on the global stage, but the status of the average Iranian
citizen. Per capita income increased threefold during the course of his reign, and literacy
rates jumped from 27% to 80% between 1967 and 1977 alone. But the shadow of his father still loomed
over him as an adult, showing this through his propensity for reform, which proved controversial,
as did his public self-image as an infallible autocrat. Also inherited from his father was
his vindictiveness, seen in his willingness to order military units to meet organized protests
and relying heavily on the Savak secret police to ensure compliance. Pahlavi's deposition sent
major shockwaves across the world that are still felt today. To understand the enigma that is
Iran, we must begin with its final Shah. 19th century Iran was led by the Qajars,
a Persianized Turkic dynasty who stably united Persia under one banner in 1797. They took over
a nation that had been sharply declining relative to its more powerful Ottoman and Russian neighbors.
The Qajars made some efforts to reverse this backslide, mostly in vain. Most notably,
a reluctant attempt at military modernization saw the creation of the Cossack Brigade by Russian
officers. This was symbolic of Russian domination of Qajar Iran and would directly play a role in
the dynasty's deposition. Iran's holdings in the Middle East and Central Asia were coveted by
British and Russian imperial leaders, often leading to territorial disputes in which the
weaker Persian state was forced into unequal treaties. Iranian sovereignty reached its lowest
point during the Great Game between Russia and Britain as Persia forfeited all oil rights to
Britain in 1901 and was carved into spheres of influence in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.
However, Iran was too weak to repel any incursions and remained nominally independent
only for European convenience. Thus, the Qajar monarchs willingly served as glorified
vassals of imperial powers to secure their own regime. This proved incredibly unpopular,
particularly among the established clerics or mujtahideen, the merchant class, the bazari,
and young Persian notables with western educations, usually the sons of Iranian
politicians or military officers. It was primarily these middle and upper class
factions who sparked the Persian constitutional revolution, ironically both outraged and
intellectually armed by European dominance. Control of the Persian state repeatedly switched
sides between the Qajar shahs and constitutionalists during this tumultuous six-year period.
Only in 1911, supported by 12,000 Russian troops, did the monarchy decisively reassert authority.
The constitutionalists' disunity sank them. The three factions had exceedingly different ideas
of how to square Persia's complicated relations with western powers and whether post-Qajar Iran
should look more secular or pious. Still, it had become abundantly clear that the Qajar regime was
unpopular and relied on European militaries to maintain its slight grasp on power. It was under
these circumstances that Reza Khan rose to power. Reza Khan was born in 1878 and grew up in a
military household. He joined the Cossack brigade by age 16 and collected connections and promotions
over the coming decades, eventually being named the brigadier general. The Cossack brigade,
as mentioned earlier, was a Russian stain on Persian prestige, but Reza would use this to
his advantage. The modern weaponry and training the unit possessed distinguished it as the most
valuable personnel in the Qajar military, and the soldiers' loyalty to individual officers and
foreign powers as opposed to the shah made it possible for Reza to win their loyalty for himself
before turning against the monarchy. His cunning paid off in 1921 when he marched into Tehran as
the head of the Cossack brigade and staged a coup. Quickly consolidating power by leveraging
his dual position as brigade commander and minister of war, Reza Khan was officially
named Shah Reza Pahlavi by an assembly of parliament four years later in December 1925.
Western influences on Reza Shah were clearly visible over his near 20-year reign of Iran.
The nation went into a significantly more secular direction as seen through his decisions
to shut down many Islamic madrasas and Christian missionary schools, and his royal decree
prohibiting women from wearing the traditional Islamic chador. Societal views of gender were
particularly uprooted. Academic institutions became required to admit female students,
and women were expected to be visible in public settings as opposed to remaining domestic and
bashful that was preferred previously. However, Reza Shah was also a thorough and ruthless strong
man. He firmly believed that history was made by great men like himself, and grew furious at any
obstacle to efficient execution of his ideas. His assertion to foreign powers to refer to his
nation as Iran, rather than Persia, in order to reflect the historical name of the region,
remains a source of pride for many Iranians today and was critical in legitimizing Iranian
nationalism at the time. But the wording deliberately conflated Persians with other
Iranian ethnic groups and was used as justification for sweeping forced assimilations,
bolstering Persian culture while neglecting the rest. Modernizing autocrats in this period viewed
the homogenization of their state as a key principle of nation building. Reza Shah's reign
ended abruptly with the allied occupation of Iran in 1941 as he was forced to abdicate to his son.
Reza Shah, the beloved and feared father of modern Iran, died in exile in Johannesburg in 1944.
At that point, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, then only 24 years old and deeply anxious and insecure,
was the last living Persian Shah. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was born on the 26th of October 1919
and grew up with material comfort in his pocket and lofty expectations on his shoulders.
As the eldest son of Reza Khan and his second wife, Taj al-Muluk, he assumed center stage of
the family dynamic from the moment he was born. His mother assured him from the beginning he was
preordained for greatness and his twin sister later referred to him as always the center of
her existence. His dynamic with his father was also supportive, though far more complicated.
Mohammad Reza wrote during his reign that his father was one of the most frightening men he
had ever known, citing his unyielding resolve and his ability to instantly command respect from
anyone. Reza Shah also often showered praise upon his son and expressed confidence in Mohammad
Reza's ability as the future Iranian sovereign. Indeed, Mohammad Reza was perhaps the only person
who could speak as frankly and intimately to Reza Shah without consequence. But as the heir
presumptive to the Persian throne, paternal sentimentality could not come at the expense
of rigid learning and discipline for Mohammad Reza. Upon officially being named crown prince
aged six, he was stripped from his domestic life with his mother and sisters and sent to
military academies his father established for the specific purpose of educating him.
And though they spoke with more candor privately, the two men usually referred to each other by the
formal Shomar as opposed to the less formal Tu. Mohammad Reza's own personal assessment of his
father frequently oscillated during his lifetime. At age 11, Mohammad Reza was sent by his father
to Le Rose Institute in Switzerland. Nervous and excited to finally go west for the first time,
especially without parental supervision, Mohammad Reza struggled balancing himself at Le Rose.
Differing accounts even exist as to whether Mohammad Reza independently and awkwardly
forced himself into fistfights to garner attention, or if he had to be convinced
altogether to stick up for himself, but we do know his shyness was apparent.
Perhaps this shyness endeared him to Ernest Peron, son of the school's gardener, over 10 years
Mohammad Reza's senior and the crown prince's best friend. Peron, often bullied for being gay,
sparked Mohammad Reza's interest in French poetry and literature, the future Shah falling deeper in
love with western culture in the process. They were so close in fact that Mohammad Reza brought
him on his return to Iran in 1936, much to the chagrin of Reza Shah. Mohammad Reza inherited
his father's admiration of the west, but not his temper or decisiveness. The chronically tense
relations between Reza Shah's Iran and Europe reached a breaking point during World War II,
as Reza Shah's adamant stance of neutrality coupled with Iran's strategic value in the
Caucasus and Middle East triggered an occupation of Pahlavi land by the United Kingdom and Soviet
Union, an existential threat for Iran. So well known was the crown prince's passiveness relative
to his father, that Iranian generals met privately with Mohammad Reza to ask his permission to
surrender to the encroaching Soviet army. Prior to his abdication, when Reza Shah found out one of
his generals had gone behind his back, he beat and nearly executed the general on the spot upon
learning of this, only agreeing to instead court-martial the man at the pleas of Mohammad Reza.
Regardless, Iran was now controlled by the allies, who had long considered Reza Shah a burdensome
nuisance. Thus, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah was coronated on the 17th of September, 1941.
But a title alone is not enough to earn respect, and Mohammad Reza Shah repeatedly
proved that he was still the same insecure little boy he was at Le Rose Institute.
He was disrespected by other world leaders, particularly humiliating was the Tehran
Conference in 1943, where Joseph Stalin insisted only the Red Army serve as bodyguards within the
Shah's own home. Internal dissidents also made multiple attempts on his life within the first
decade of his regime. Likewise, Mohammad Reza did not respect the reverence his title carried,
preferring to invest his time into his 25 custom-built cars or writing French poetry with
Peron. He could not shift this blame onto the constitution either, though the 1906 constitution
did call for a parliament in addition to the Shah, it also allowed the Shah to rule directly
if he wanted to, thereby rendering any checks on his power as null. Even after his jealous dismissal
of his rival, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, in 1952, Mosaddegh's popular support forced the
Shah to begrudgingly reinstate him. By 1953, though, Mosaddegh's parliament had repeatedly
aggravated Western interests, particularly after the nationalisation of Iran's oil in 1951,
blocked out British access to Persian oil. Thus, the decision was made by the American
and British governments to replace him. On the 16th of August 1953, at the explicit
request of American and British ambassadors, Mohammad Reza Shah armed and ordered army
officers to execute the coup of Mosaddegh's government, an attempt that failed spectacularly
and forced the Shah to flee first to Baghdad and then to Rome. In the coming days, however,
a series of missteps by Mosaddegh and aggressive plays by CIA operatives placed control of Iran
firmly in the hands of the new Prime Minister Fazlullah Zahidi and of course, Mohammad Reza
Shah. When Mohammad Reza was told of his triumph at home from his Roman hotel room, he emotionally
cried, I knew they loved me, and returned to Tehran on the 22nd of August, three days after
he successfully defended his regime. Cognizant now of the awesome and fragile power he held,
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi started laying the groundwork for his future reforms upon his return,
reforms that would drastically change Iranian identity and prove to be disastrous for his
dynasty. Perhaps grappling with his reputation as a coward among foreign actors, or maybe reminded
of the series of events that brought his father first into power and then into exile, Mohammad
Reza asserted his power with an unseen confidence after the 1953 coup. Taking advantage of public
perception of him as weak, he played the traditional Iranian elites off each other
drastically increased his domestic support by largely adopting Mossadegh's popular left-wing
policies and rhetoric, as well as granting clemency to many of Mossadegh's supporters
convicted after the coup. His moves also paid off on an international stage. Mohammad Reza's
improved position gave him leverage to shift the balance of power in Iran's relations with
western nations. For example, he prohibited American officials from meeting with his
political opponents following an American-assisted failed coup attempt. As the Shah sharpened his
diplomatic abilities, with them increased Iranian prestige. However, so too did Mohammad Reza's
abuses of power. During this period, Mohammad Reza took further discriminatory measures
against the persecuted Bahia religious minority in Iran, and often ordered military forces to
simply fire upon mass protests, a technique he would come to rely heavily on. Mohammad Reza's
persona also shifted strangely during the 1950s. Perhaps reflecting issues from his childhood,
he began to promote a messianic-like cult of personality around himself and Cyrus the Great,
eerily echoing dreams his mother shared with him that envisioned him as an almost prophetic figure.
His lifelong habits in womanizing and acts of infidelity may also have their origins in his
childhood, as his mother and sisters categorically doted upon him, often at their own expense.
This must have made 1958 a particularly hard year for the Shah, as he and his second wife Soraya,
his true love to his dying breath, ended their marriage due to Soraya's infertility.
But Mohammad Reza soon faced an even harder challenge, with a person who would perhaps
ultimately become more significant to his life than anyone before or after.
In 1962, the Ayatollah Ruhlah Khomeini sent a letter to the Shah, airing his grievance on a
new law that allowed non-Muslim local elected officials to take the oath of office on holy
books other than the Quran, and asking for it to be struck down. Mohammad Reza wrote back to
Khomeini denying his request, and tauntingly referring to him as Hujat al-Islam, a rank below
Ayatollah. Further pressure from the ulama forced the Shah to reluctantly nullify the law, at least
for the moment. But this was only the first public row between the Ayatollah and Mohammad Reza
a feud that only ended with the deposition of the latter 16 years later.
On January 9th 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi announced his intention to gradually implement
a series of sweeping reforms that he termed the White Revolution, intended to fundamentally change
Iranian societal structure. Most immediately pressing was land reform, followed by the
nationalization of Iranian forests and pasture land, as well as the privatization of government
owned manufacturing and the mandatory profit sharing for industrial laborers employed by
businesses in the private sector. Women's suffrage and the foundation of the literacy
cause within the Iranian army made up the last two points of emphasis of the initial six announced
White Revolution reforms. The reforms were not universally popular, with the penultimate one
particularly sparking unrest amongst the established Shia ulama, as Khomeini escalated his
war of words with Mohammad Reza, directly referring to the Shah as a wretched, miserable man, with
Khomeini even vaguely threatening him that his current path would only lead to him someday being
deposed by the popular will of the people. These words led to Khomeini's arrest two days later
and his exile not long after, as well as an even bigger spike in unrest. As in 1962,
Mohammad Reza underestimated the extent of Khomeini's popularity in his insensitive
handling of these encounters, he never fully grasped this lesson. To many however, Mohammad
Reza's reforms were a welcome change in fortune. From an economic standpoint, the White Revolution
was lucratively successful for both the Iranian government and the average Iranian, as the nation
for a time saw an annual growth rate of 9.8%. Literacy rates soared as levels of per capita
income and the condition of the middle class became unprecedentedly robust. Iranian women
also enjoyed a higher legal status than at any other time in the nation's history before or since,
outraging much of the established ulama. Land reforms were the most critical aspect
of Mohammad Reza's White Revolution and they failed to deliver as hoped. Though roughly 1.1
million Iranian families acquired property for the first time through the reforms, none received more
than 10 hectares, the minimum required to survive in most regions. Furthermore, 700,000 Iranian
families remained landless even after reforms. And though the intended effect of weakening
existing nobles and landlords was met, the biggest winners were 640,000 rural sharecropping families
who already had property rights but could also now gain up to a cool 200 hectares through the reforms.
Urban centres like Tehran won too, as many of the rural poor thought it was better to sell
their stocks and try their luck as urban wage earners. On the whole, a majority of Iranians
did see some benefit from the land reforms, but they were marginal gains for most which
sowed discontent as the gap between the rich and poor widened. Let's not forget,
Mohammad Reza's reforms directly contributed to the Pahlavi family's gains as commercial landowners.
As a result of his obvious pro-western and pro-capital biases, it became abundantly clear
that Mohammad Reza Shah was painfully out of touch with the Iranian people who he was supposed to
lead and protect. The Shah responded to any such criticisms with arbitrary persecution,
going so far as to label any Iranian who was not a believer in monarchy as a traitor,
all the while bolstering his own cult of personality in increasingly delusional and
megalomaniac ways. Mohammad Reza surrounded himself with yes-men at court who regularly
praised him as the equal of great historical leaders he admired. Famously, he celebrated
two and a half thousand years of Persian monarchy in October of 1971 at Persepolis,
which included a parade of soldiers in the garb of warriors from each Persian dynasty,
a bizarre decision not just for its self-grandeur, excess, or lack of necessity in a time of
political unrest, but also because it emphasised the pre-Islamic history of Iran, further enraging
the ulama. On the 1st of May 1974, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi first met with French doctor
Georges Flandrin, who that same day diagnosed him with chronic lymphocytic leukemia.
The cancer would kill him in less than six years time, having outlived his regime.
By 1978, it was clear to the public that Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was unwell,
and that his regime itself was in danger of dying altogether. Though his cancer had not yet
been made public knowledge, he had been uncharacteristically absent from the public
eye since spring. He cancelled his long planned trip to Bulgaria and Hungary in May,
a fact made even more worrying because of the Iranian political climate at the time.
There had been continuous protests in the streets of Iran since October 1977, coinciding with the
death of Mustafa Khomeini, son of the exiled Ayatollah, under suspicious circumstances
related to the Pahlavi Savak. In January the following year, having battled terminal cancer
for four years now, without proper treatment for lengthy periods of that time, and at this point
perhaps on medication that impaired his cognitive ability, Mohammad Reza was incensed by tapes of a
Khomeini sermon in which the Ayatollah accused him of being corrupt. He insisted on publishing
a libelous article in response accusing Khomeini of being a secret operative for the British,
and an Indian posing as an Iranian. Though people close to the Shah considered the decision unwise,
the article was still published on the 7th of January and led to an acute intensification
of anti-Shah protests the following day. Mohammad Reza had taken the bait,
reminiscent of the earliest years of his regime. He was being outsmarted and outplayed.
The Shah's ability to play disparate factions against each other to impose his own will on
a situation was now backfiring spectacularly. As Khomeini gathered support from all divides
within the Persian political spectrum in the hopes of returning from exile and supplanting the Shah,
Mohammad Reza was regressing a real politik. September of 1978 would serve as a coup de
of Pahlavi's rapidly deteriorating physical and cognitive health, as well as his dynasty at large.
On the 8th of September, a military detachment sent by Mohammad Reza
fired upon protesters in Jaleh Square in Tehran, killing at least 64 civilians.
Though it was not remotely the first time the Shah employed callous violence to quell dissent,
the Black Friday massacre was notable both for its brutally high casualty count
and indicative of Mohammad Reza's complete lack of desire to make good faith negotiations with
the protesters. Many contemporary commentators agreed that the Shah's deposition became an
inevitability after Black Friday, but whether out of stubbornness or outright delusion,
the Shah refused to yield and took shockingly desperate measures to maintain power.
On the 2nd of October, he granted clemency to Iranian dissidents living abroad,
including Khomeini, perhaps hoping the decision would echo his pardons of many
of Mossadeq's supporters 25 years earlier. But by this point, the Shah did not have the
leverage for this move to hold any significance and would lose any remaining leverage when a
strike by oil labourers toppled the oil industry later that month, as well as the confirmation in
late December that the military's loyalty was now divided, with many leading generals preferring
Khomeini to Pahlavi. Finally, realizing he was out of options, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi fled
Iran on the 16th of January 1979, giving the unmoved Prime Minister Shapoor Bakhtiar, himself
a former associate of Mossadeq and a political prisoner under the Shah, the keys to his crumbled
state. Bakhtiar allowed Khomeini to return to Iran in the hopes of negotiating preferable terms
in a regime change. But Khomeini categorically rejected any compromise,
replacing Bakhtiar as Prime Minister and formally dissolving the monarchy.
The last remnants of Pahlavi rule in Iran, as well as 2,500 years of Persian monarchy,
were stamped out quickly and giddily on the 11th of February 1979.
Moribund and decaying, Mohammad Reza sought haven in several countries,
but he did not stay anywhere for very long at the behest of his hosts.
Though now only seeking end-of-life care and cancer treatment, the former Shah served to be
a public relations cancer for any government who agreed to house him. He twice received asylum in
Egypt and spent his final four months there. Then, on July 27th, 1980, it was all over.
Thousands of miles removed from Tehran, nearly 40 years removed from the anxious
boy in a military uniform succeeding his father and despised by both his own people
and the western powers he so envied, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi died in exile in Cairo.
Peace