The Untold Story Of America's Defeat In Vietnam | Our History

The Untold Stories
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When President Kennedy first sent Americans to Vietnam in 1961,
he did so with the conviction that America was the natural leader of the free world.
Inspired by their charismatic young president, many ordinary Americans, too,
felt it was their duty to champion democracy around the world.
I guess we all just pretty much believed in what we were doing. I wanted to go to
in 1961, about bearing any burden and supporting any friend. And to me,
it was just an extension of what he had talked about.
So with unshakable confidence in the righteousness of their cause, America went to war.
Their objective? To stop what they saw as the dangerous spread of world communism.
All communists in the world were working together. And their job was, in the end,
to overthrow the United States. And that the way to defeat those communists,
or at least to hold the line against them, was containment.
Vietnam was a divided country. The mission of U.S. forces was to support the government
of the South by containing the communist North. This was far from straightforward.
The Americans had to fight the regular North Vietnamese army.
But they also faced communist-supported guerrillas inside South Vietnam, the Viet Cong.
By 1968, there were nearly half a million American soldiers in South Vietnam.
The battle had already been long and bloody,
but U.S. commanders were now confident that victory was almost at hand.
It was the eve of the Tet Lunar New Year, and the streets of the South Vietnamese capital,
Saigon, were busy with holiday traffic. Then, suddenly, everything changed.
All over Saigon, Viet Cong fighters launched surprise attacks on American and South Vietnamese
posts. And the significance of the attack wasn't just that all of a sudden here was an attack,
it's where the attack occurred, which is now the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese
insurgents were attacking the cities. It wasn't just Saigon. There were
hundreds of attacks in every major town and city in the country.
The Viet Cong were trying to provoke a popular uprising to overturn the South Vietnamese regime.
The Tet Offensive of 1968 did prove to be the turning point of the Vietnam War,
just not in the way the Viet Cong planned. This was a new kind of war. It was the first
to come directly into people's living rooms. Historian Scott Lucas is convinced that
television could be one reason why America lost in Vietnam.
He's looking for the evidence in the thousands of cans of TV footage of the war.
Vietnam is not the first media-saturated war, but Vietnam in degree is a different war.
Now you have television as well as film and as well as radio.
The newsreels reflect the optimism, at first, of those who went to fight Kennedy's war.
I believe in what we're fighting for. We're fighting for freedom, something that we all value,
and I think we're doing the right thing in this.
The American media was not opposed to US intervention in Vietnam from 1964 with the
use of air power in 1965 with the use of ground troops. Most of American news and American
documentaries were very supportive of the government effort. It was clear to them for
the first time just how vulnerable American forces actually were. When you see enemy troops
in Saigon opposite the street from your hotel, when you see them in the US embassy, that safe
haven for all Americans, then something serious has occurred. The new medium of television wasn't
the only problem for America. Andrew Priest is a British historian who studied the Tet Offensive.
He's come to Vietnam with a new purpose, not to trawl through the archives,
but to meet eyewitnesses and to search for clues to America's failure on the ground.
Tet caught US forces completely off guard, yet the attacks had been prepared right under their noses.
Their problem lay in knowing just who the enemy was.
That idea of the guerrillas and the civilians being together mixed was always a great problem.
We were aware of the fact that, you know, if these civilians were liable to be the people
who were putting out the mines and booby traps. They were probably carrying messages for the VC,
such things. We were aware of that. We never developed any means at all of distinguishing
one from another. It couldn't be done. American commanders never appreciated how far the Viet Cong
had infiltrated South Vietnam cities. Ngo Tai's noodle bar was popular with American and South
Vietnamese soldiers. It was also HQ for the most important Viet Cong cell in Saigon.
Even one of South Vietnam's top men, General Nguyen Cao Khi, stopped by my restaurant to enjoy the
food. He had no idea this was a key meeting place for the Liberation Army. It was in this room
that the Tet offensive was planned. Yet as this planning went on upstairs,
To Ai served noodles to American soldiers downstairs. This is almost a shrine to the
Tet offensive. It really makes you aware of how significant Tet was to the whole war.
US intelligence failed to detect Viet Cong planning for the Tet. But the offensive also
needed troops and supplies. Both had to come hundreds of miles from North Vietnam. Yet
American intelligence failed to pick up this activity too. To understand why, Andrew Priest
is piecing together the evidence, trying to find traces of the Communists' legendary supply route,
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I really did want to get out and see for myself whether there was anything
left of the trail and also perhaps more importantly the kind of countryside that it went through.
The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a 1,000 mile lifeline for the North Vietnamese cause.
We call the Ho Chi Minh Trail Miracle Road.
A miracle that high-tech surveillance and intensive bombing still couldn't stop.
After almost a week of heavy fighting, the Americans have regained control of Saigon.
But elsewhere, the Communist Viet Cong are holding out,
fueled by supplies and reinforcements from the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The Ho Chi Minh Trail was absolutely crucial to the Tet offensive, to the preparation for it.
It was absolutely necessary to get as much materiel but also as many men down into the
South in order for the Tet offensive to be successful. Andrew Priest has traveled to
Quang Luc province in central Vietnam to search for traces that remain of the legendary 1,000 mile
long trail. Beginning in the north around the Mu Gia and Ben Karai passes, the trail wound
through eastern Laos and Cambodia before crossing the border into South Vietnam.
The very beginning of the war, Ho Chi Minh Trail is rudimentary. It is literally walking trails
through the jungle and soldiers go through great hardship to make it down that trail.
It's very difficult to move logistic support down that trail.
North Vietnamese photographs and U.S. aerial reconnaissance material
together begin to create a picture of how the trail worked.
Sophisticated simplicity was the key. The most obvious way to transport things along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail was by foot but also bicycles for example were vitally important.
This gave them the advantage of great maneuverability and mobility. Early on in the war
the North Vietnamese could transport only around 400 tons of supplies a day.
But by 1968 the trail could carry more than 10,000 trucks at any one time.
The Americans were desperate to halt activity on the trail
so they turned to cutting-edge surveillance technology to help them. At Hanoi's War
Museum there are relics of this U.S. surveillance effort. ADCID was an air-delivered seismic
intrusion detector. Adapted from technology designed to locate Soviet submarines,
thousands were dropped over Vietnam.
What we have here is an actual piece of American equipment. This is an American remote sensor.
It would have been dropped from an aircraft and it was coming through the jungle canopy,
would have been going incredible speed, rotating. The idea was that most of this would have been
buried under the soil. What this was designed to do was to give the Americans information
on the movement of the Viet Cong. The ADCID could pick up the vibrations
and even the body heat of passing soldiers. These signals would be relayed back to American bases.
A pattern of increased activity would draw immediate bombing. Thousands of these were
dropped in the region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Yet American bombing still failed to hit the target.
For every technological advance there is in war, there's a dumb solution. And the Vietnamese were
very, very good at coming up with solutions to American technological advances.
Rather than simply disabling the ADCIDs, mockingly nicknamed tropical trees,
the North Vietnamese turned U.S. technology to their own advantage.
Very, very carefully, we'd take the tropical tree to a pre-arranged open area.
Then we'd set an engine or a small generator running next to it. This would create a large
amount of noise that the tropical tree would pick up and this would deceive and confuse the enemy.
And American bombing would be drawn away from the real target.
As much high explosive was dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail alone
as was dropped on Germany in the whole of World War II.
Though they may have been deceived about the center of activity,
the trail itself was clearly visible on U.S. aerial surveillance photographs.
Though we put great pressure on that trail, we never close it down. It's never ineffective.
Through studying its ingenious design,
Andrew Priest begins to understand the key to the success of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
In order to keep the supplies running, there was no point in having just one single trail. So in
fact, they had to have a series of trails that could be used on any particular given day at
any particular time. This meant that if the Americans bombed one particular trail, they
had another one available. Or of course, they could build one very, very quickly because this
was very important to them. Rather than just one main routeway, the trail was actually a network
of camouflaged paths and roads that zigzagged south inside a corridor up to 30 miles wide.
Connecting these parallel main routes were hundreds of communicating roads and tracks.
So if one route was bombed, traffic could easily be switched to an alternative.
This photo really encapsulates what the Ho Chi Minh Trail was all about. The
Americans have bombed this bridge here. But in fact, the Vietnamese have not been deterred by
this. And in fact, they built two further bridges with two further tracks. I think this really
encapsulates the American dilemma. No matter what they do, the Vietnamese will always find a way
through. They'll always find a way to keep their supplies running. Andrew Priest's research has
drawn together a comprehensive picture of how the Ho Chi Minh Trail worked.
Actually seeing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, you realize what the Americans were up against.
And you start to realize how, I suppose, misguided they really were about the whole effort. They saw
it very much in Western terms. And yet they came up against these people who were absolutely
single-minded in their efforts and in their determination to achieve their final ends.
The ingenious design of the trail meant Viet Cong fighters in the South
were kept supplied throughout the Tet Offensive.
But when they met American troops in combat, the odds were still stacked heavily against them.
One item of military hardware epitomizes American superiority in Vietnam.
The helicopter. It was crucial to the predominant U.S. strategy, search and destroy.
Strategy search and destroy is actually very simple. To go into an enemy held area,
search for that enemy. What you hope to do is pin large enemy forces in place and destroy them.
For this new concept in warfare, the U.S. Army created an entire new division.
The 1st Air Cavalry. On paper, this air mobility gave American forces a huge advantage.
Yet once again, conditions on the ground told a very different story.
You don't move a battalion into an enemy area and have the enemy not know about it.
You move large, ponderous units into an area where the enemy knows the terrain.
The enemy probably lives there and the enemy's built for speed and wants to get away. That
enemy will, in fact, get away. In many ways, you're trying to strike a gnat with a sledgehammer.
And in the long run, the apparent futility of these raids began to undermine the morale of
American troops. Month in and month out, we couldn't see that we were making any progress.
We went to the same places over and over. We'd leave, we'd go back, and we'd fight again.
And leave and go back and fight again. There was absolutely no awareness that we were making any
headway at all. If there's no progress being made in the war, then why am I losing all these men
around me? Why am I losing so many friends? One particular place was the target of constant
search and destroy raids throughout the war. Just 30 miles from Saigon, it was a key communist
stronghold known as the Iron Triangle. This area was very important for both sides.
The enemy knew if they couldn't destroy or take control here, then they might lose Saigon.
We knew, too, that we had to hold on to this area. Otherwise, we wouldn't have any influence on Saigon.
On the edge of the Iron Triangle was Cu Chi, one of the most heavily bombed districts in the whole
of South Vietnam. People who visit Cu Chi now and see all the trees cannot imagine what it was
like during the war. There was so much shelling and bombing by the Americans, as well as the toxic
chemicals that they sprayed over the land. It was relentless every single day. It seemed nothing
could survive, not even an insect. To move underground. In just a few months, thousands of
fighters and their families dug an extraordinary complex of tunnels. This warren of interconnecting
tunnels, three levels deep, would become their world for the next 10 years. Anthropologist
Simone Clifford Jaeger has come to Vietnam to find out more about the tunnels and the people
who built them. The network stretched for 250 kilometers. The Americans never discovered its
true extent. An entire American division even established its fortified base, not realizing
the ground beneath was honeycombed with Viet Cong fighting tunnels. Despite the apparently unlikely
surroundings, geology was in fact on the Viet Cong side. The geology around Cu Chi was very
special because the soil around here is predominantly laterite clay with a ferric binder.
It was easily workable and it meant that the Viet Cong were able to construct this complex network,
but at the same time at the top it actually dried similar to concrete. So in essence, even though
this ground looks rock hard, if you actually have a dig at it, it's pretty easy to work.
Tunnel trap doors were designed to be strong enough to resist armored vehicles
and were well camouflaged. Where is it? Wow. Such tiny trap doors meant that if discovered,
none but the slightest built American soldier could follow the Viet Cong down inside.
Hands up. It's very easy for you. Okay, get in. Turn right. After that you can see fighting bunker.
So this is a loophole. Viet Cong sentries would have stood watch here and looked for any movement
out in the jungle. This is the ideal height for either a man or a woman to stand and watch guard
with a rifle on their shoulder ready to fire at any intruders to the area. So it would have been
effectively a sniper position and looking at this from outside it would have been incredibly
well camouflaged and the Americans out there wouldn't have known where the shots were coming
from. And these fighting bunkers were just the top layer at Cu Chi. The maze of tunnels is a
reminder of the kind of enemy the Americans faced in Vietnam. Sun Tzu in The Art of War,
written 2,500 years ago, said know your enemy. We didn't know our enemy. To truly understand what
the Viet Cong were prepared to go through, Simone Clifford Yeager wants to experience for herself
what life was like in the now derelict lower level tunnels.
Wow, look at these mushrooms. It just shows how incredibly damp it is down here that mushrooms
are able to grow. It would have been pretty hard to breathe down here at the best of times but with
the dank air and the mushroom spores and everything, it would have taken some getting used to.
Another incredible feature of the tunnel complex is the ventilation system. This is a ventilation
hole and it runs right up to the surface about six or seven meters and fed fresh air down into
the tunnels below. But nevertheless, even though there were these tubes going up to the surface,
the air in here is very close, your lungs would have had to become acclimatized to
the shallow breaths and the dampness and a lot of breathing problems resulted from that.
Yet whole families lived down here for years on end.
There were schools, hospitals, even theatres in the tunnels.
Now going down into the third level of the tunnel complex which is the final level
and we're down about 10 meters below ground. As you can see the composition has changed quite a lot.
It's much much harder, there's more kind of rock formations and it's obviously a lot
damper as well. There's some mole growing here, different kinds of lichens.
It's absolutely tiny, I mean I can hardly go anywhere without being crawling on my hands and knees.
Resistance at Koo Chee continued throughout the Tet Offensive. The tunnel system was never defeated
but as this underground war continued, a hundred miles to the north, the Americans were entangled
in what would be the bloodiest battle of the entire Tet Offensive. It's three weeks into the
Tet Offensive, the Viet Cong's massive unexpected assault on South Vietnam's cities. More than 500
Americans have already been killed or wounded. In the once beautiful university city of Hue,
fighting is still savage. It's here that events will soon take place
to change the course of the Vietnam War.
Guyen Thi Hoai was one of the young women engaged in the bitter street fighting.
The fighting was very very fierce but personally I felt proud and I still feel proud
because I was fighting for independence, fighting for our people.
Why would foreigners come here to kill our people, to kill our children?
Our hearts were filled with hatred.
American TV crews were drawn to the fighting in bloody Hue
and the emotions of Viet Cong fighters like Hoai began to find an echo in America.
Tet exposes psychologically that America may never ever be able to achieve a final victory
over the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese insurgents
because what Tet shows is is that North Vietnam and South Vietnam are willing to stay the course,
are willing to take large numbers of casualties
whereas the Americans that face them may not have that political will.
In Hue, American casualties steadily mounted as they struggled to fight their way out of the
stalemate. It was an infantryman's battle, the Stalingrad of the Vietnam War.
But even when restricted to small arms, US forces still had the technological superiority
of a superpower. In the Tet offensive, the North Vietnamese used a weapon designed almost 20 years
before, the AK-47. By contrast, most US soldiers were issued with the latest M16 rifle.
The more accurate sophisticated M16 should have given American troops the edge.
Supplied to the North Vietnamese by the USSR and China, the Kalashnikov AK-47 was a simple,
solid weapon. It was an assault rifle designed to deliver large amounts of fire
with a larger bullet than the M16 at a shorter effective range.
I think that for infantry use, the AK-47 was much better than the M16. It was a much more
practical weapon. We even left AK-47s hidden underwater for as long as three months
and when we came back for them, we could still use them. No problem.
The AK-47 was also simple enough for inexperienced volunteers to use.
I was trained to use all kinds of weapons, including rocket launchers and rifles,
but mostly the AK-47. The M16 was very quick firing, but it was flimsy.
The AK-47 is made out of stronger wood and steel. It's much more durable than the M16.
And anyone could use it, an untrained man or even a child. Yet again, a low-tech solution gave the
North Vietnamese a counter for US sophistication. But there was another, even simpler weapon that
John Tullock encountered in Vietnam. The booby trap. In Vietnam, they played a crucial role
in a modern high-tech war. Booby traps were cheap and easy to make. And for the Viet Cong,
making them was even a morale-building exercise.
The kind of traps we used could be prepared anywhere by any person. It was an outstanding
achievement. Local people all became involved, using traditional skills to fight the American
army. Normal, everyday people making simple traps. In some areas, North Vietnamese forces
manufactured barbed steel spikes for their traps. But for the most part, simple bamboo was enough.
Cut into stiletto-like stakes, called panjis. Up ahead, I've made a small trap with
sharpened bamboo stakes in the bottom. It's in that area there. So if I just,
that would, that's the sort of thing I would imagine they would have made, with the stakes
in the bottom. That's absolutely a very simple panji stake trap. The guy treading on that,
he's got 80 pounds on his back, carrying his weapon, his full weight suddenly going through
there. That will go straight through his boot, through his calf muscle, shear that. That's as
good as any anti-personnel mine. Yeah. But how did the Viet Cong avoid falling victim to their
own hidden traps? There were signs. One that was a standard one in Phuc Tu province, a leaf and
a twig going through it, coming through like that, would be laid on the ground,
with all the other rubbish that would be lying there. I, as a VC, would see that lying on the
ground. And this particular twig here is lying to the right of the main membrane of the leaf,
would point to the fact that three to five meters ahead is a trap. And with all such traps and mines,
the injuries they inflict are only part of their effectiveness as a weapon.
The reality of a guerrilla war was very difficult for American soldiers to take,
specifically the use of booby traps and mines. All of these things are,
as far as morale is concerned, very difficult to deal with.
And I had been standing, having a little talk with and sharing a cigarette with one of my men.
And word came back up the file to move out. And I put my hand on his shoulder,
and I said, okay, let's go. And immediately after that, there was a big explosion.
And I hit the ground, and the smoke kind of cleared away, and I got my wits back about it.
And I realized, I looked down, and I was intact. But the man whose shoulder I'd had my hand on
had stepped on the mine, and from just below the knee down, his right leg was just gone.
I've never seen bleeding like that before since. Blood just ran out of the stump of that leg,
like water out of a faucet. Terrible thing to look at. And after a couple of minutes,
he said, my leg's gone, isn't it? I said, well, part of it is. He said, well, then just get me
the hell out of here. So we did. We got him busted off. And when that medevac left, I got down on my
hands and knees, and I vomited. The state of tension that these men must have been living in,
hour after hour, day after day, must have been almost incomprehensible.
Morgan O'Connell is an expert in combat stress. He's worked with veterans from World War II to
the Gulf War. Now he's drawn to the plight of psychiatrically damaged Vietnam veterans.
He believes the particular circumstances of the Vietnam War had dire consequences for the morale
of American soldiers. Being terrified in the context of the Vietnam War, I think it was a
unique experience. You see the consequences of booby traps or the unseen enemy, your mate's
being killed, you can't go in to rescue them. No human being can cope with that indefinitely.
Vietnam veteran John Young is typical of those ex-soldiers Morgan O'Connell has studied.
In 1967, John was a squad leader in the 9th Infantry Division. Though only 21,
he was highly experienced, a competent and reliable veteran. But one battle changed him.
On a single search and destroy mission in the Mekong Delta,
almost two-thirds of his unit were killed or wounded.
After that battle, I was not concerned very much with the military mission.
I mean, I still did what I was told to do, but I was interested in keeping these people alive.
And when I went out on an ambush, I went to where they told me to go, and I set up defensively.
I wasn't out there to look to find somebody and kill them. I set up defensively to protect myself,
and I'd stay there in position for as long as they told me to stay, and then I'd come back.
Losing the people, losing men will do that, and it just changes your outlook. It just became
the idea of surviving. Morale is key to any army's success. The G.I.'s morale was on a downward
spiral. But as the Tet Offensive neared its bloody climax, the resolve of the Viet Cong
showed no sign of weakening. The American army in Vietnam was a conventional force,
trained to fight traditional wars. But in the Viet Cong, they faced a wholly unconventional enemy.
The Viet Cong resistance wasn't just men fighting, it was women fighting,
it was young people fighting, it was old people fighting. It was the whole community.
In Vietnam today, dozens of museums and memorials bear witness to the particular
nature of America's enemy, and what motivated them. The story of Vo Thi Chin is typical.
From Cu Chi, she was a volunteer fighter from the age of 13.
My family was almost completely destroyed by American bombing.
Only my mother escaped when our house was hit.
The house was burnt down by the bomb, and all the rest of my family was killed.
So with such hatred in my heart and in my thoughts, I joined the army.
I was so determined to fight, even though I was a girl.
It was this spirit that the Americans were up against.
Even small places like Cu Chi sent tens of thousands of ordinary people like Chin to fight.
This is the Cu Chi War Memorial Hall commemorating all of the people died during the resistance
struggle against the Americans. There are over 44,000 names inscribed on these walls,
many people still missing in action. The people who died here weren't simply military
combatants, they were whole communities, people just involved in the fighting, men and women,
people young and old. It's quite amazing to think that the number here, 44,000,
is almost the total of American soldiers killed during the whole war.
Four weeks after the Tet Offensive began,
the last pockets of North Vietnamese resistance were isolated in the rubble of Hue.
Four thousand Americans had been killed or injured,
but they had inflicted more than ten times that number on their enemy.
The Tet was an overwhelming American victory. Then something extraordinary happened.
The Americans had won. But across the world, Tet came to be seen as a North Vietnamese victory.
Trawling through the thousands of feet of newsreels,
Scott Lucas has identified the moment Middle America turned against Vietnam.
Watched by millions of people, the broadcast struck an instant chord with average Americans,
who until then had been generally supportive of the war.
What the Cronkite broadcast does is more important as being a symbol,
a symbol of the futility of the war, and futility which is brought to the American
people not by their politicians, but by the news media. Walter Cronkite had gotten on
American television and said Americans should no longer listen to the statements made by their
military that saw silver linings in every cloud. Turn on a little spigot of blood.
Drip, drip, drip. And over 10 years, 12 years, 15 years, that spigot of blood will force that
great world power to eventually question whether or not that war's worth it.
You will not defeat that country in a typical sense, but that country will wind up going home.
In Vietnam, America won every battle, but it lost the war.
State-of-the-art weaponry and a huge military budget proved inadequate to subdue the morale
and inventiveness of the Vietnamese communists. Not for the first time or the last, a great power
underestimated its enemy. In 1973, the last U.S. forces were withdrawn from Vietnam.
The price was over 2 million Vietnamese and Americans dead and wounded. Two years later,
the South Vietnamese government fell, and the country was united under communist rule.
