The Untold Story Behind Xi's Visit to North Korea ---- The Dominoes Are Falling

After vanishing from public view for 10 days, she has finally appeared in North Korea. But the visit raises more questions than answers. Was that really she? And while attention is focused on Pyongyang, Beijing is quietly sending another message. Something significant has already changed behind the scenes. Welcome back to Final War with Catherine Hu. This week, one story has dominated discussions among China watchers around the world. The Xi Kim summit in North Korea. One detail drew particular attention. For nearly two years, China's first lady, Peng Liyuan, had not accompanied Xi on any overseas trip. Yet this time, the two appeared together on a foreign visit, immediately sparking speculation and curiosity. At first glance, the trip looked highly successful. Television screens were filled with images of cheering crowds, synchronized slogans, and carefully staged scenes of welcome from North Korean citizens. But a closer look tells a different story. Compared with Xi's 2019 visit, the reception was noticeably scaled back. The massive street-lined welcome crowds were gone. The giant mass gymnastics performances involving tens of thousands of participants were absent. Even the official welcoming ceremony was moved to Kim Il-sung Square, rather than being held at the more prestigious Kumsusan Palace of the Sun. There must be some inside story behind this that mainstream media cannot report. For example, was it really Xi who visited North Korea this time? And what major changes may be hidden behind the recent wave of personnel reshuffles in Beijing? That's what we're going to investigate today. Let's begin with a single image. What you're looking at is a screenshot from a CCTV television report covering the meeting between Kim and Xi. Take a closer look at Kim's expression. During the meeting, Kim seemed to be looking at Xi with a mixture of disdain and even ridicule. And this was not an isolated moment. Similar expressions surfaced repeatedly throughout Xi's visit to North Korea. Compare that with the look on Kim's face when he met Xi during the September 2025 military parade. The contrast is striking. And it naturally raises a question about the true identity of the Xi who appeared in North Korea during this visit. Now let's look at another clip. At a large evening performance in North Korea, Xi appears to be thoroughly enjoying himself. Smiling throughout the event. But take a closer look. What we see on the screen is a cheerful, easygoing elderly man who seems to be under very little pressure. Yet the Xi we have seen in the past has usually projected a very different image. Marked by a mixture of authority and gloom. He also appears roughly 10 years older than the man seen here. This photograph was published by the Korean Central News Agency. It shows Xi wearing glasses while watching the performance. That detail may seem insignificant at first. But in mainland China's official propaganda system, images like this have never been made public. For Xi, appearance is carefully managed. Photos of this kind are simply not supposed to be released. What makes this even more unusual is that North Korean state media has traditionally been careful to follow the same reporting conventions observed by Chinese official media. This time, however, those conventions appear to have been ignored. So what are we supposed to make of that? And take another look at the face in this photograph. Does it really match the image of Xi that you have in mind? How should those differences be explained? There is another puzzle that remains unexplained. Xi's seemingly elastic height. This was Xi's meeting with Trump at Mar-a-Lago in 2017. And this was Trump standing alongside Xi during his visit to China in May of this year. Has Xi somehow become taller in his 70s? Then, how does one explain what appears to be a difference of nearly 20 centimeters? The same question arises when comparing Xi and Kim Jong-un. According to official figures, Kim is 175 centimeters tall and Xi is 178 centimeters tall. Their height difference should be only 3 centimeters. So why does the gap in these photographs appear to be at least 10 centimeters? How should that be explained? On June 5th, Xi met with Laos President Thonglone Sisulid in Beijing. Thonglone's official height is 173 centimeters. Xi's is 178. The difference should be only 5 centimeters. So why does the gap in this photograph appear to be at least 15 centimeters? Perhaps these otherwise unexplained details help explain why Kim's attitude towards Xi during this visit appeared noticeably less deferential than in the past. Meanwhile, information emerging from Beijing's senior leadership circles is sending another signal. This visit to North Korea may well have been a farewell appearance by Xi and Peng. At the end of May, during the Politburo meeting that was not made public, the Central Party decision-making and coordination body had already forced a showdown with Xi's faction. Major changes are now taking place at the very top of Beijing's power structure. In early June, Tsai Chi assumed the position of president of the Central Party School without any official announcement, replacing Chen Xi, one of Xi's key political allies. This development provides an important window into the changing power structure within Xi's political camp. The change took place very suddenly. As recently as May 15th, Chen Xi was still attending events as president of the Central Party School. Just two weeks later, Tsai Chi had taken over the position. No public appointment or removal notice was issued throughout the process, breaking with established CCP practice. The Central Party School is the CCP's highest institution for training senior party and government officials. Its president has traditionally been a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, with Chen Xi being the only exception. Chen Xi, who was just removed from the position, was Xi's bunkmate at Tsinghua University and one of Xi's earliest political allies. He was deeply trusted by Xi. He served as head of the organization department for 10 years, helping build the backbone of Xi's political network. He promoted large numbers of officials from the Fujian province and Zhejiang factions and played a key role in Xi's personnel arrangements. He was the strategist behind Xi's camp. Party insiders generally speculate that Chen Xi's sudden removal is linked to the Zhang Youxia-Liu Zhenli incident that took place at the Central Party School in January of this year. Since the incident occurred at the Central Party School, Chen Xi, as its president, could hardly avoid responsibility. More importantly, another core figure in Xi's camp, Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong, is reportedly under investigation. However, Wang is known for his strong counterintelligence capabilities. By contrast, Chen Xi is a civilian official with a scholarly background. He is seen as a more likely breakthrough point in the investigation, potentially allowing investigators to trace and further dismantle Xi's broader political network. Perhaps many people will ask another question. Has Xi's power grown even larger? My view is that although Xi's authority appears to have expanded on the surface, this is more likely a transitional arrangement or even a fallback option for Xi himself. In fact, it may be a signal that his power is about to contract, that he could step down as a Politburo, Standing Committee member, and as Director of the General Office at the 5th Plenum later this summer. Because Wei Xiaodong, Xi's closest confidant in Beijing, was officially announced to be under investigation the day after Xi appeared in his new role as president of the Central Party School. In 2017, Xi was transferred to Beijing, where he served first as mayor and later as party secretary. During that period, Wei Xiaodong, another Fujian native, served as Xi's personnel chief in Beijing, holding the positions of Beijing Municipal Party Standing Committee member and head of the organization department. Xi later helped move him into the position of chairman of the Beijing CPPCC. Wei Xiaodong's political identity is clear. A close ally of Cai Qi, a key figure in the Fujian faction, and a member of Xi's inner political circle. When someone with that background is officially taken down, the implications are obvious. Whether it is Wang Xiaohong, Chen Xi, Wei Xiaodong, or the many Fujian-born officials once promoted by Chen Xi, they are falling one after another like dominoes. All of this points to a systematic purge of the Fujian faction. Like a layer-by-layer operation, the pressure appears to be moving steadily upward. Xi's core political power base, the Fujian faction, is undergoing a major political earthquake. Xi may be facing the most dangerous moment of his political career. At the same time, the other side in this ultimate power struggle is signaling, in a remarkably subtle way, that it now holds the reins of power. As we have often said, the key to understanding political developments in Zhongnanhai is often hidden in places that many people overlook. That is where the most important political signals are often found. One example is the appearance of Hu Haifeng, the son of former party leader Hu Jintao, on a prominent People's Daily headline. On June 7th, a seemingly ordinary news report appeared in an unusual position, the lead headline on the homepage of People's Daily Online and the lead story on page 2 of the print edition of the People's Daily. Its title was Bringing Scientific Research Strength to the Front Lines of Production. And the sole focus of the report was the Yangtze River Delta Research Institute of Tsinghua University in Zhejiang, located in Jiaxing, the place where Hu Haifeng's political career began. In the political language of CCP propaganda, this is a direct endorsement of Hu Haifeng. It suggests not only that he could be moved into a more important political role, it also suggests that the political position of Hu Jintao and the broader reformist camp is improving while Xi's faction appears to be in an increasingly unfavorable position in the power struggle. Otherwise, such a signal would never have been released. Another important indicator concerns former heir apparent Hu Chunhua. This signal is equally well-hidden yet highly significant. From June 7th to June 9th, China held its annual National College Entrance Examination. Many people in the West may not realize that this is a nationwide event that attracts enormous public attention. It is not only an examination that determines the future of millions of students, but also an important pillar of social fairness. Each year, the essay questions often draw on current social themes and issues. This year's essay topics contain some particularly intriguing signals. The essay prompt reads, Read the following material and write an essay according to the requirements. The sun and moon never lose their essence. Therefore, though obscured, they shine again. The Yangtze and Han rivers never lose their source. Therefore, though blocked, they flow freely once more. What thoughts and reflections does this material inspire? Write an essay based on the above material. On the surface, this looks like a standard essay prompt about perseverance, using the sun, the moon, and rivers as metaphors. But for Chinese people who follow CCP politics, the meaning behind it is immediately clear. The key passage comes from Feng Su Tong Yi, a work written during the Eastern Han dynasty nearly 2,000 years ago. Its author was a scholar writing in response to a crisis facing the ruling order of his time. But the passage originally contained a third line that does not appear in this year's essay prompt. A sage never loses his virtue. Therefore, though cast aside, he rises again. For politically attentive Chinese observers, the answer to the riddle is already coming into focus. The character Wen in Wen Jiabao's name contains the character for sun. The character Hu in Hu Jintao's name contains the character for moon. Who and when are making a comeback? The deposed heir apparent Hu Chunhua will rise again, symbolizing a return to the succession line. The essay topic is a mirror of its time. It is never just an essay question. Such an obvious political message may suggest that the power struggle inside Zhongnanhai has reached a stage of resolution. And that is the story behind the much discussed Xi Kim summit. Get the real story behind the CCP's shifting power games and see where U.S.-China relations are headed next. Support the vision of a new China without communism. Subscribe now and join us in bringing the truth to light.