Putin Doubles Down & Bridge Strikes - Why Russia Won’t Cut Ukraine in Half | Ukraine Update

PWE News
9 followers
22 Video Views·Nov 16, 2026
G'day Legends,
I hope you're doing well,
Today we talk about the war in Ukraine, and the upcoming battle for Kramatorsk, which could prove to be the final for this war.
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis video analyzes the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lenses of military attrition, geopolitical strategy, and sociology. The speaker examines casualty estimation methods, the strategic role of bridge strikes, and Russia's long-term goals regarding NATO. Additionally, it explores the rise of identity politics as a replacement for religion and Europe's precarious position among global hyperpowers.
G'day legends, happy Saturday.
I hope that you are having a fantastic weekend and if anyone who
is watching is interested, yes,
I have classified documentation for artificial intelligence
and research into microchips and processors.
But in all seriousness though, Jensen,
there is zero evidence that this is actually a Chinese honeypot.
To me, looking at this surface level,
it does appear to be an insider hit job to actually
move the ownership of the company.
Maybe that's something we'll speak about later on,
and I'll reach out to some people and
see their opinions on this.
Today, though, we do have a lot to talk about.
So in the beginning, I actually need to make
a correction on something I did yesterday.
As the video was going up, I thought, ah,
I've sort of forgotten something pretty obvious.
Humans have
So if you've had 100,000 amputations,
obviously that's not 100,000 people.
Now the majority.
Who lose a limb in war is a single amputee, but we will correct that.
We'll re-look at the numbers.
We're going to speak about a bridge campaign.
What Zelensky has said a few days ago about Russia's trying
to divide the country in two.
And where we have seen increased bridge strikes,
but I have, and I've reported on this over time,
I don't think this is to divide the country into two,
it's to create choke points.
But the main meat of the video today
is going to be about negotiations and...
We have seen there has been trilateral meetings,
discussions, potentially negotiation.
Negotiation is hard because a negotiation is when you have
then sides who have realized
and actualized their power.
And this is why over
the last years, I've said
that the majority of this
has been yelling demands into a void
or discussions rather than actually a
But we'll talk about that because there's
a very important meeting coming up in Shenzhen
next Thursday, which is on the Pearl River Delta in China between Xi,
Putin and Trump.
Right, I need to make this video short
because my mate is opening a bar today, which could
be the best thing that's ever happened to me.
And as you may be aware,
I went to see Professor Richard Dawkins last night, and I was able
to ask a question as well.
Now, what I'll say about Dawkins is it's not a don't meet your heroes,
but it's difficult
when a lot of what you've seen of an individual has been,
you know, 10, 15, 20 years ago.
And since that, of course,
Dawkins is now an 85-year-old man who had a stroke in 2016.
So definitely not as sharp as maybe back in the day.
And I found that he was very dismissive.
Actually, not to my question.
I think he actually enlightened my question the most,
but pretty dismissive to a lot of
other people.
But great guy.
Pretty good event.
Now, if you're wondering what my question was,
it was, I'll just read off my phone here.
As we've seen religious belief and participation decline
over much of the West,
we've seen a rise of identity politics
and increasing political and social polarisation.
Firstly, do you think that there is a relationship
between these trends?
And is then this identity politics filling a void
or a vacuum left by the lowering of...
religion, as far as the psychological
or social roles that were occupied by religion,
as such as where religion had provided belonging,
moral certainty, and a shared sense of purpose.
Now, what I'll say is this was late
in the night. He'd been speaking for about
three hours, and he's an old man.
I could see he was getting tired of it.
And of course, the answer to this is pretty clearly,
yes, there is a correlation here.
But something that I did find very interesting
that he added to his extended answer to myself
was unlike religion or cultural identities of the past,
what was still fairly geographically
isolated.
So in this area is Christians,
in this area is Muslims, to a most degree.
Of course, you've got mixing pot areas, but still fairly geographic.
These...
Identity, culture, social change with the internet can cross borders
at the speed of light and can influence
so many more people in traditional different cultures.
And of course, the extent on that would be,
and I didn't have this opportunity, but if you would have
an hour long argument discussion would be, well, is this for the best?
Is it better now that that has taken over
or before when it was this identity given
by religion, regardless of maybe the scientific aspect
of the reality of a man in the clouds
or not, but discussion for another day,
but I know a lot of people were interested in
that.
So correction on yesterday's video.
Now I put a pinned comment,
but then I realized that pinned comment was actually incorrect
as well.
So what we're looking at is a study from February
that was released under the National
Institute of Health, the National Library of Medicine,
that spoke about 100,000 amputations
in the Ukrainian forces.
Now, that is correct.
And adjusted, given a constant rate by 13th of November,
would be about 118,000 to 119,000.
We take into account 10% civilian amputations.
We drop that down to about 106,000.
But of course, not everyone, well, loses one limb.
Some lose two, three, four.
So.
What we need to look at is, well, what is the share of this in war?
Now, typically, it's about 85%, one limb, 13,
two, and then down to fill out that 100%.
But of course, we can't just take into account the 85% because,
well, it's half of the, or
half of two, a third of, you understand this.
We take into account that they've actually still lost
this amount of limbs, so it would
bring us down to, given this baseline of about 90,300,
we apply historical US death to amputation
ratios.
If it's Iraq, you're speaking 387,000.
Afghan, 578, close enough.
Vietnam, you're nearing on a million.
And as I've said, this is by no means a verifiable.
But it is a methodology based on these studies,
based on historical death to amputee ratios.
Now, what we see in this is it's actually
a very similar range to the adjusted Russian
losses given the leaks and releases,
which is interesting too, because the baseline given
by someone like Montaz at the very base is...
In the mid 300s, but his guess is more like to the 450s
and potentially some will say
around that six, which lines up pretty similar to this,
which we've spoken of the ratio is
probably pretty close to one to one given Russia
is attacking mostly heavily defended
areas, but does have superiority
in almost all sectors of the battlefield, especially
in fires.
So interesting to look at.
Is it a methodology?
Yes.
My issue is this, is the death per amputee,
because serving myself in Afghanistan,
not only as an advanced medical trauma platoon-level medic,
but serving in Afghan
and knowing the medevac process
and then looking at this war and what's going on there,
I...
So the medevac, the amputations, again,
this is going to be something in time that we tell, but it's hard
to think that that is going to be better here than in Afghanistan
or Iraq with complete superiority in every single sector,
roll one to four, build hospital facilities that never have.
Never, I should not say that, rarely have any mass casualty scenarios
because the battles were, at least in Afghanistan, far more skirmish.
So they'd have one or two casualties, not 50 into a sort and sieve
or triage process where it's not occurring and even if Medivac.
Again, we will see in time.
Okay, let's continue.
Bridges.
Let's talk about bridges.
Well, this is something we've discussed for a long time.
The Dnieper River essentially runs north to south Ukraine.
So from Belarus here through Kiev down and,
of course, out into the Black Sea.
And what we've spoken of is there's a number of bridges across this.
And I have been increasingly surprised ever since 2022,
there hasn't been really any...
It's a systematic effort to actually take down some of these bridges
and at least restrict,
but we have seen in the past weeks more Russian drone
and missile strikes against this.
Now, there is a difficulty in taking down bridges as well,
but Mr. Flash, one of Ukraine's
best electro drone experts, released this a few days ago.
The enemy has very accurately targeting bridges.
Now, is this possible?
Under conditions of complete navigation
suppression, so EW, electronic warfare,
across the country during air raid alerts,
it's difficult for a SCANDIS to hit a target at
metre level accuracy. The inertial system alone cannot provide
that level of precision. However,
our enemy wants to hit its targets.
Therefore, Iskander missiles use optical guidance heads
or expensive radar guided heads.
During the descent of the warhead, the radar scan of the
area takes place every few seconds
and the correction is entered into the missile's guidance system
So.
These systems are far more,
some are actually immune to jamming
using optical or radar guidance.
And this is what a Javelin missile essentially does,
is a Jav has, qualified on a Javelin system,
has a, used to be at least, a camera in the head.
It takes essentially a photo of what you're trying to hit
when you press it on the clue,
the clue's like the box thing.
The missile goes up and it's optically guided down.
It's not a laser, so the tank you're looking at,
it doesn't know you're actually just looking at it,
you're not lasering it with something.
And far less jammable.
There are systems which can affect it, but in a different way.
Remember a few years ago,
I had a PhD of electronics and robotics on this channel
because he sent me a photograph of a chip out of an Iskander.
And we did speak about how this could be adapted
and possibly was being adapted to a laser designator.
Being that you have a drone in the air.
High up in the air, viewing a target,
it's observing something, it lasers it with a laser
to it, and it talks much closer to the Iskander
or another system in the air to strike.
Remember, Geran 2s are put as a loitering, Geran 2?
Geran 2, apologies, is seen as a loitering munition,
not a one-way attack drone.
I'm not saying the Iskander is going to be loitering.
But it can get final corrections once it enters that zone of EW
from a much shorter web of surveillance drones,
which we'll see an increase in all of this as...
inevitably, the air defences run Winchester, will run out.
Now, Zelensky said this. This is
from Meduza, that the Russian forces are, quote,
trying to divide Ukraine along the Dnipro River.
Financial Times reported Zelensky told
the Vonderline that Russia was trying to destroy
bridges across the Dnipro to divide it, that,
of course, this ships equipment and ammunition across
to the front lines.
In October, Russia began heavily striking bridges across the Dnipro.
The strikes have caused closures and hour-long traffic jams.
Now, I see this, and I'll show you why,
as disruption of the bridges to create logistical bottlenecks
rather than a physical cut
and division of East and West.
But if we did see that division of East or West,
depending on whether it's Russian missiles
or theoretically, if there was a breakthrough Ukrainian blowing
the bridges, again, theoretically,
that tells us a lot about the status of the war.
And this is something of which I've shared before.
What is clear is they, the Russians,
do have the capability to at least sever the bridges.
So they choose not to.
Why? Well, we need to take a step back
and remember Russia's stated war goals.
The main ones all boil down to the same thing. Now.
In a few minutes, we're going to discuss negotiations,
but this is helpful to look at of the stated goals here
because this lines up.
So the goals boil down to one thing,
neutralising Ukraine, not joining NATO,
no foreign troops or missiles in Ukraine,
and no powerful Ukrainian forces with the political power
or weapons for the Ukrainian nationals.
All of this is about removing Ukraine as a potential danger to Russia.
So that's what it all boils down to.
is destroying then the ability for the state to project power.
We've spoken about this is what
attritional warfare does.
You both lose more slowly, but you're trying to destroy the potential
of the other state. Attritional war is a war of potential.
Whether one thinks it ever was or ever
could have been is beside the point.
So the argument of it isn't a threat, it is a threat,
that's beside the point. What matters is it's what Russia believes.
You could even argue that securing
the four oblasts is about making sure Ukraine
can never try anything in Crimea.
It has made it more difficult to get there, given this.
What would destroying bridges actually achieve?
Ukraine might be forced to withdraw west of the Dnieper, but what then?
It would have most of its military.
It would still want to join NATO and host NATO troops
and weapons on its soil for protection.
The nationalists, which Russia is against,
would also be around, and they'd still clamour
for the 1991 borders.
The Russians would have their four oblasts,
except for bits across the river.
But then a bit more, sure, but their main objectives would not be met.
And if that occurred, Ukraine had to fall back and couldn't,
well, that Western part
would have the majority of the military.
There's no then stopping that, I guess, joining other alliances, etc.
Okay, so we need to look at what the goal is here,
more so than just the tactical elements
of this.
We need to look at a war as a whole,
not individual cogs within that machine.
To meet these goals, they must destroy the Ukrainian military
and force Kiev to capitulate
to Russia's demands.
So to meet this, they must then,
through an attritional strategy, destroy the potential.
To do this, they must be actually able
to meet the Ukrainian military in battle.
From Moscow's point of view,
it's probably convenient that Kiev keeps sending more and
more troops east, where the Russians
can fight them with decent logistics.
If Ukraine retreated behind the river,
Russian forces might have to cross it, and that would
be very hard, especially without any bridges.
So if they did take down the bridges
and still wanted to participate in a war of destroying
for political power, armed forces and missiles,
what are they going to have to do? Well,
they're going to have to have significantly long logistics across
then eastern Ukraine,
and then they're going to get to a body of water
that now has no bridges. But if we do see an effort
to systematically cut Ukraine in two taking down
these bridges by the Russian forces,
It will show us the state of the Russian forces,
basically showing we must.
Slow down this war by doing that.
And this is why I think there's been further choke pointing
on these bridges with drones and missiles,
but a campaign to actually bring all these down?
No, okay?
So you could say the same in an attritional strategy
if the attritional strategy was in
Ukraine's favor if Ukraine got down into Crimea.
There could be an argument of if you're winning
the attritional war and Russia is clamoring for manpower,
well, you'd leave the Kerch Bridge open
if they're continuing to force men into an area
of which you have the upper hand. So the bridge
Bridge strategy you must look at, not just yes.
Tactical pro, you must look at as a war
and the outcomes being then political levers in a war.
Now, this extends into what we're going to speak about now,
which is these negotiations we see.
Let's go by name first, otherwise I'll be in the wrong one.
So this is by New York Times.
In early 22, Russia had a series of far-reaching demands now
to pull its troops back before the
Western Alliance expanded towards Russia's borders.
So let's actually look at some of
these demands back then.
And you see that the last slide about bridges, we basically went over
some of the demands. So this was back in 2021,
that Russia demands that US and its allies halt
military actions in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia that could pose a diplomatic efforts to
to defuse.
Establishing a security agreement here could pose
a challenge to diplomatic efforts to
fuse Russia's growing military threat in Ukraine.
Proposal is immediately dismissed by NATO officials.
So to do this with different agreement,
no military actions, no NATO, it was immediately
dismissed.
It came in a draft treaty suggesting NATO
should offer written guarantees it would not
expand any further east, of course, therefore,
including Ukraine, towards Russia and halt
all military activities in the former Soviet republics,
a vast swath of now independent
states extending from Central Europe to Central Asia.
Now, independent, yes, from the Soviet Union,
independent and sovereign themselves.
Limited. They gave up a lot of that independence
and sovereignty to be part of the EU. Now,
is anything like the Soviet Union?
No. Is it moving ******* rapidly in that direction
of coming down on any sovereign independence that they wish?
Yes. Look at a country like
Poland. They're paying the piper for this at the moment. So yeah,
what you do is by absorbing into a larger institution, the EU,
You've given up some of your independence, same as NATO.
By entering into something like NATO,
you then have some of your independence.
Now, the pro and con may have seen that it is outweighed back then.
I think a lot of people might have been rethinking this,
and I think the EU doesn't have long
left in it.
They represent a starting clarity,
goals sought by Mr Putin, who analysts say is growing
increasingly concerned Ukraine
is drifting irretrievably into Western orbit, posing a
grave threat to Russian security.
Putin's saying he's moving this way.
It's a threat to our security.
Mr. Putin seemed willing to take ever greater risks to force West
to take Russian security concerns seriously
and address historical grievances largely ignored for decades.
And, of course, this was in late 2021.
Of course, two months later, we saw then the invasion.
In closed-door negotiations, this is now to today's article,
President Trump envoys have spoken about how to end the war.
And the Russians have basically revived...
The stance that they said, well, this is still where we are sitting.
And this is in an effort to attain a larger victory after five years.
I wouldn't say a larger victory.
If it's remained the same, it's not larger.
It's the same.
But potentially, demands may actually even grow.
Moscow's unyielding position was laid out in a paper
that the Russian official circulated this week.
New York Times obtained a copy.
The copy is not public.
They said they have clarified the authenticity of this,
and it shows that Putin has scarcely budged on his core objectives
after more than 20 months of diplomacy with the Trump administration.
Again, if no one's budging, maybe things need to move.
Russia demands that NATO pull back
its forces from the eastern flank of Poland
and the Baltic thrust, thrust the question of European security
into the heart of negotiations over Ukraine.
So now, Putin's demands are that these military forces,
they need to pull back to former 97 borders is what is being reported.
Not that these wouldn't remain in NATO, but the US forces.
And of course, well, this goes into not only this question of Ukraine,
it's now a suggestion
of Eastern Europe.
And they detail the objective behind Putin's public statements.
The Russian leader has continually insisted what he calls
the root causes of the war.
So he insisted this is what you need to look at.
Russia's wide-ranging grievances with both NATO
and Ukraine be addressed before they
stop fighting.
Now, this is to the BBC.
EU's top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, so God ******* help me,
has called Russia's demands
for a new European security architecture a trap
designed to shift attention away from a ceasefire.
The sequencing that she posts on Twitter, sequencing matters.
The priority should be securing
a ceasefire, followed by a peace agreement.
Only then should there be discussions based
on Europe's wider security architecture.
I mean, obviously.
You're laying a ******* trap,
like no ******* ---- that needs to be a ceasefire first and
this and this and this, although that doesn't
really relate to any historical records of
war.
No, like obviously that, again, maybe that'd be great.
I'm all for ceasefire negotiations,
this, that, but remember when Einstein
We don't remember it, but Einstein's whole bit about, you know,
trying the same thing and expecting different results
is the definition of insanity.
How many times, ceasefire, ceasefire, ceasefire,
and it's not even there.
You know why this is not on the table?
It came off the table permanently after what happened in Turkey,
where there was between
Ukraine and Russia an actual agreement,
actual withdrawals, a sector level equivalent ceasefire
and an ending of the war negotiated,
which your people stepped in and then applied levers,
applied maybe carrot and stick to show that, no,
no, no, continue, rip that up and walk away.
And BBC said, well, Europe's problem
is that right now that is not on the table.
And it was, since 22, it has not been on the table.
Moscow has had no desire to give it, give Europe a chair.
And, well, they're working with the US.
But the thing is, if there's not going to be any movement,
well, it's going to go up and over.
And we'll speak about this as well.
But what I will speak to this is, well,
you know, this is a trap and them not wanting
a ceasefire.
If, in fact, there are 70,000,
70 plus thousand Russians dying, wounded per month, which is
the quoted figures at the moment, some say higher,
some say 90,000 killed and wounded
per month, and that you continue to say victory is near
and Russian collapse is near, why
would you push for a ceasefire?
I'd push the war to continue, if that was my analysis.
Back to the New York Times.
The document underscores how economic inducements
that Mr. Trump envoys, Kushner and Witkoff
have offered Mr. Putin.
So Kushner will be there just ******* enriching himself
while probably putting up a whole
bunch of cameras in people's rooms
because I believe he's a ******* insider.
Anyway, offered Putin to have, to secure concessions,
concessions, sorry, from Moscow.
So by basically the carrot of economic,
therefore you'll get some level of concession.
may work, especially around the amount of minerals,
rare earths, et cetera, that the
US could rely on Russia for,
and still does in many sectors, but also what Russia has
obtained in those rare earths and minerals in Ukraine,
like some of the largest lithium
deposits, the largest actually, in Europe.
But if this isn't working, if you're putting,
well, we'll lift sanctions, maybe it tells
It tells us about the effect.
of sanctions and Russia's ability to replace markets
if this isn't securing
these huge concessions from Moscow.
So if Eastnik will lift sanctions,
maybe that tells us about the actual application and use case of these.
Now, next week in Shenzhen,
there is a meeting between Putin, Trump, and Xi.
And I can't tell you how big this actually is.
This was discussed everywhere in China,
that this is huge at that level,
especially being in China.
So this may actually move the needle.
The Russian document, dated on November 10th,
provides new details on the hardline stance
the Kremlin took this week in Abu Dhabi.
The document represents Russia's opening position
and Russian officials in the talks
signal that Putin could still be flexible.
So, again, willing to make concession
based on, I think, as per Lavrov would say,
the reality of the battlefield.
And historical grievances as well.
So I think there is a heap of wiggle room here.
I just think the starting point is there's an intractable gulf
between how people actually see where power balances are.
But I think the US is a more real, and I am.
No, very few are more critical of the administration than I,
but I think they have a more realistic
view than many.
So the fact that Russia's opening position
on European security this week remained virtually
unchanged from five years ago illustrates
the scale of the challenge finding a compromise
that will get Mr. Putin to end this war.
Well, what if ending the war is the compromise in of itself?
You're trying to get Putin to end the war and make compromise.
Well, I think the compromise may be, look,
we can see that we will take these areas and
achieve this militarily.
So the compromise is that they don't do that.
That's how I see the Russians are saying it, is we'll take the Donbass.
We'll militarily destroy the economy
so you won't enter the EU because the states won't
let you in and you won't enter NATO
because we'll apply too much pressure.
We can do this militarily.
Or we can do it diplomatically.
The compromise for us is not doing it militarily.
Of course, that comes at exceptional cost.
But I see that's where the Russians are sitting in this.
This week's paper, spelling out Russia's position,
carries no letterhead or signature.
It's a non-paper in diplomatic parlance,
meant to lay out one side's views unofficially.
It echoes demands of 2021.
The countries must rule out further expansion of their alliance
and as well as any military activity in Ukraine.
And elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, or Central Asia.
The document shows that if anything,
Putin has doubled down on some of his positions.
Well, yeah, if it's very similar or even further,
well, not only is it sunken cost,
it may show that he believes it's closer also.
The paper shows Russia wants France,
Britain to rule out the possibility that they would
use their nuclear weapons to protect other
European countries, a concept that has been
actively discussed in Europe this past year,
partly because of concerns about Trump's
willingness to come to NATO's aid.
Basically,
Trump's treatment of NATO
and a lot of allied states has really brought NATO into question
in general.
The nuclear question about the use of these,
again, it's still going to just be a piece
of paper.
My argument would always be, well, would you trade,
are you going to trade Brussels for
London?
Like, maybe.
Maybe, but I think like NATO, it has a lot of.
You know, bluster, a lot of words, a lot of articles in it.
But has it ever truly been tested?
Now, there's been a couple of drones going to their airspace,
likely Russian, that nothing happened about.
But if a missile comes from just anywhere and just levels somewhere,
are these nuclear-armed states really going to then sacrifice
their populations in defence?
That's always been the question.
Of, will America actually, when push comes to shove,
not on a piece of paper, not theoretically,
would they actually step into an exchange of that level?
And a lot of people have theorized, no.
But saying that Putin has doubled down on his position.
Again, well, you're asking for further compromise here.
What demands is Europe compromising on?
Like what demand that they have made throughout the war
are they willing to compromise on?
It hasn't been NATO expansion.
It hasn't been entry into the EU.
It hasn't been borders.
It hasn't been sanctions.
So what I'm saying is if you want to get this done,
which I don't think anyone's actually working towards getting it done,
seriously, is there actually has to be compromise made.
To reflect the reality of the battlefield,
or as I say, copied from Mr. Surge, let the
pen sign what the sword has carved,
but we also need then realists to actually analyze
the battlefield with all of the facts laid in front of them.
The paper seeks to choke off aid to Ukraine
for seeing an end to the supply of Western
weapons and military equipment.
Russia would only approve of Ukraine joining
the European Union, it says, and Ukraine does
not participate in the bloc's common defence policy.
So no worries with them entering the EU,
Russia's saying, but the amount of weapon systems
delivery, again, Ukraine following this,
I know they speak of a million-man army and
600, 800, that's going to be unless Ukraine becomes
a proxy military arm of Europe.
It is in no way, shape or form in any world
going to be able to hold a standing military of that size
if it is modernised at all.
Australia and Ukraine have similar-ish populations now, say.
Probably Australia has a bit greater population, 28 million.
Ukraine probably, you know, around that somewhere.
Australia has a significantly larger GDP.
Okay, and our military is in the mid tens of thousands
from modernized military, and that is already exceptionally expensive.
We could not inflate except in absolute.
world war existential crisis times to those sort of figures anymore,
especially with the expense
of a modern military. So Ukraine's military size,
I think that Russia's being stupid about like,
we need limitations. The limitation will be the economic capacity,
unless the remainder of Europe
basically have Ukraine as a military welfare state,
that it doesn't need to actually make its own
economic sense, that all this money
is flowing in just to maintain a huge
sacrificial military there, which is what the situation is now.
Will they maintain that
status quo? Maybe that's why Russia wants
to put in these limitations. Maybe.
Now, on EU entry, I hope that Ukrainians themselves have a plebiscite,
a vote, something to actually
get a say on EU entry,
because they're fought like hell for their independence, okay, that
I hope they get a say on entry into the EU,
given where I see the EU compasses pointing,
given what you'll have to sign up to within the EU,
especially as one of the weaker partners
of this, I hope people there have a say,
and if they do, great, listen to the people.
But I hope they have a say.
Because if it's all about independence, you sign this,
the next thing it's like, right, you need a workforce.
Of course.
Here you go.
Yeah.
And mirroring Russia's 21 demands ahead of its invasion,
the paper says Russia wants NATO to pull back its troops and bases
to the alliance's 97 borders before it began to expand
into Central and Eastern Europe,
a step that would weaken the ability of the alliance's
most vulnerable members, such as Poland.
Poland is ******* nowhere near the most vulnerable member.
Honestly, I think Poland...
...is, other than nuclear weapons,
the most powerful country in, actually, other than Turkey.
Thank
Poland, not only their equipment they've got,
their history in fighting war,
and the build-up, and that nationalism still is alive there,
you
incredibly powerful country.
They're vulnerable because they're close.
very
Nowhere near vulnerable like Estonia
or Latvia or Lithuania to that degree.
No, no, no.
Turkey, Germany are probably the most powerful NATO states
much.
outside of the US to defend themselves.
But it would also weaken NATO's ability to exert force and influence.
So, yes, would it weaken the ability of defence?
Yes.
Would it weaken the ability of exertion of force?
Yes.
Now, you may say, but this is a defensive alliance.
Sure.
But intent...
And capability are different when you're assessing
and making political military decisions.
Why?
Well, intent can change incredibly rapidly.
We were allied with China and the Soviet Union in the Second World War.
America was incredibly close friends with Iran.
And where do we see that switch the exact opposite?
So intent changes very, very rapidly.
So what you do in your nation state
is you balance against your region's neighbours,
you balance against their capability.
So you go, well, they've got this, so we need that.
Because their intent can change fast, capability can't.
Very, very simple, okay?
So even if the intent to push NATO into Russia is not there,
which I agree with, but there is intent to break up Russia,
but not an intent to move into Russia, but that intent can change.
So the Russians go, we need to balance against what you've got,
you'd balance against what I've got, we've got,
and the intent can switch on a dime.
This is where...
I see that I think we'll see tension into Europe.
I think as we start seeing more tension grow,
as there's a more controlled-ish descent
and the powerful states actually start really a further dichotomy
of distance between the powerful and middling states grows,
like Germany.
I think we'll see further tensions into Euro
because we will see like France and Germany
re-militarizing at such an extent.
They'll go, yeah, okay,
the intent is not there at the moment.
There's a piece of paper that shows not to have intent,
but there's also 2,000 tanks of capability.
So you balance on capability, not intent, okay?
97 borders.
Now, of course, you may be familiar with this,
but in the, I hope you're not ******* colorblind,
the dark purple, of course, 97.
Purple, normal purple, since 97.
So pulling back a lot of areas back to here.
Now, this is hard because there's a lot of nuance to be added.
Are these countries still NATO?
Can they still have all their weapon systems?
And I don't think that's the demand.
I think it's more the US large systems pulled back out
of these regions.
Again, difficult to know exactly what it is here.
Is Russia going to achieve that?
No.
Is it going to be a very high area of demand
so when they come back down to just across
Belarus and Ukraine, then it appears as if they're making a concession?
Maybe.
That's what Trump's art of the deal would say,
is ask for too much and then seek what
appears to be a compromise.
Now, of course, I'm not saying Trump is good
at making the art of the deal because, of
course, well, he's won the Iranian war 60-odd times now.
Now, again, Witkoff, Kushner,
they're looking to fulfil the promise to end the war from Trump
and have deepened talks about business dealings.
Ukraine supporters have said they're only willing
to hold such negotiations with Russia
after it ended its invasion, furthermore,
after it's pulled back out of borders as well.
The Prime Minister of Luxembourg,
which has 690,000 people with 1,200 active personnel,
which includes professional soldiers and civilian staff, **** yeah,
has said, but they also talk about the future of Europe.
We say, well, you cannot talk about the future
of Europe without us being at the table.
But again, yeah, but my answer would be if you're
not at the table, then you're on the
menu.
And if you're not willing to be at the table
with these incredibly much more powerful states
such as America, Russia, Germany, France,
China, India, et cetera, then you're on the
menu.
And yeah, okay, maybe within the institutions here,
you guys have the same votes on this.
It's not how it works in reality.
But let's look at this.
What we see is that Putin's position has been unwavering
and has doubled down on it.
What we can observe is that Ukraine's has changed dramatically.
So if they're saying Putin holds the same position,
well, Ukraine's definitely doesn't.
Ukraine's was nothing but 1991 borders,
all back in NATO entry, Russian defeat.
That was the goal, remember?
That was the position.
Now it's changed, and it was illegal to discuss with Putin.
Now we see that move dramatically
to a freeze along the current contact line.
We see political discussions.
We see, so what you see is that it is,
Ukraine's position has moved a shitload from what it
was in 2022.
And why does this reflect to me?
Well, I think this likely reflects command
and the leadership's closed-door assessments
of the war.
So not their public assessment,
the closed-door assessment of, right, this is probably the
contact line is maybe the best we can get.
We're not going to militarily achieve Crimea, okay?
So we see that that has moved a ---- load, though.
But I think the concern for Ukraine
and Europe should be that Ukraine's moved like this.
Russia's, according to this, hasn't moved.
So either they're being delusional in their assessment.
Or that you say, hey,
they have lost this much and they're willing to continue.
****, where do we seek a compromise here?
This is why this is so difficult.
Now, lastly, the danger for Europe
and why I bring up this part from the Prime Minister of Luxembourg.
Is Europe has a shrinking global influence?
It's sinking into, in my opinion, global irrelevance,
cultural relevance, irrelevance when it comes
to the actual architecture of the globe.
What do I mean by that?
Well, you've got the developing superpowers.
You've got then the hyperpowers of US and America.
You and you've got, you've got, of course, sorry.
US and America, China and the US, below that,
you've got, say, Russia, India, likely become
Indonesia, and where Germany and France used to sit in that,
yeah, maybe Germany might,
France might, there is a decline here.
But as far as Europe as a whole,
its relevance to the globe has, of course, where it was
in the 20th or 19th century,
absolute top of the food chain, has really sunk.
Now, why do I bring this up?
Well, the problem is the US may move on without or above them.
What do I mean?
Well, you've got Xi, Putin, Modi, Trump,
and US has their own then aspiration as well.
Their aspiration is to maintain the status quo of being a regional,
hegemon, global,
dominant power.
Not a hegemon, but dominant power.
And therefore, U.S.-Russian relations lifting
of sanctions is actually essential to this
for the U.S. plan to contain China.
The U.S. is looking at containment strategies on China.
Now, my opinion is that China has left, what do they call it?
It's an escape velocity.
I don't think the U.S. has the levers to contain China.
It has the levers to have hurdles.
I don't think it can contain it.
Um
But you've seen what they've done in Venezuela,
in Iran, and other sorts.
Russia would be a key element to do that.
you
And the containment of China or slowing down of China for America,
the key element would
for
be Russia.
And Europe's danger here is,
as they're becoming more irrelevant, is that the US go, I can't
having
be fucked with you.
You're now on the menu.
We're moving forward on this.
Because Trump would go and the Pentagon would say.
me.
Russia is not the same, not even close,
the same level of competitor to the US that China
is in the international sphere.
And this is where I see that Russia will become
the great power balancer between the West
and East.
Because let's say America and China are very similar economic
and military powers, okay?
So you could do this, but let's just,
this is whoever had the balance of Russia on their
side tips that scale dramatically.
Okay, it's always been where like France
and Germany has been in historic wars as well.
So that'll be interesting to see.
But I think it's important that Europe still maintain relations
with the US and don't place
themselves on the menu.
They still have to work with this.
So a hell of a lot to go over.
Will this negotiation lead somewhere?
I don't believe so.
I still...
I doubt that this will be fought to its military conclusion
and negotiating positions will continue to decrease
as the war continues to move,
as we've seen the rhetoric do then and mirror and reflect this.
Legends, have a fantastic day.
I will speak to you tomorrow.
Thank you.
Bye-bye.
