Milton Friedman - Healthcare Reform (1992) pt 2/4 Debunking Universal Healthcare

Outstanding Economics
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Oct 23, 2023
necessarily. I don't know.
Look, I think it's a great
mistake to try to figure out
what devices a market will
produce. We're not smart
enough to do that. If we
were, we'd be central
planners. And so I would say
that you want to set up a
system under which the right
people have the right
incentives. Okay, but let me
just say in this particular
thing about insurers
contracting selectively is
that the reason the market
didn't produce that until
about ten years ago is
because the doctors in the
hospitals didn't want that.
They wanted a kind of
insurance where once you
were insured, you were free
to go to absolutely anyone.
Oh, I understand. And it
was really a political
battle to overturn the law
against that and to allow
people to make choices. And
when people wanted to make
choices, they started
choosing HMOs and preferred
provider insurance. That is
arrangements where the
insurance premium you paid
was linked to the doctors
you choose. So if you chose
economical doctors, that
held down your premium. But
let's keep these things
separate. Okay. For the
great bulk of people, year
after year, the cost that
they would bear would be of
the same order of magnitude
as the kind of cost they
bear now to buy beer and
cigarettes for those who
smoke or to engage in
recreation, much less than
they spend on food. Because
for decades, total medical
care costs were about 4% of
income, 4-5% of income. And
if we separate out these
major medical costs, and
they too, the total of
those, would only need to
be a few percent of income.
What's happened now is that
we have an enormously
inefficient system with
tremendous waste, with the
most extraordinary
administrative complexity
you can imagine. So let's
go back. For most people,
they ought to engage, they
will get their ordinary
health care. Actually, look
at the facts. They're
striking. The difference in
the premium you pay for an
insurance policy which has a
large deductible and an
insurance policy which has a
small deductible is
extremely high. If you buy a
policy with a deductible of
$3,000 versus a deductible
of $100, the difference in
premium is almost $3,000.
Sure. Of course, there's a
very important reason for
that, which is given a
choice, the people who do
not expect to go to the
doctor this year choose the
high deductible and the low
premium because they expect
to pay just the premium,
whereas the people who are
sick and expecting to go to
the doctor soon, they choose
the low deductible. I don't
doubt that that happens.
Right. That's rational
behavior. Yes, but it's also
rational behavior. If I have
a low deductible, I will be
much less careful about how
much I spend on medical care
than if I have a high
deductible. But let me go
back to the main point. You
were starting to say that
given that we have a system
in which the employers do it
and I take it also you're
taking another and that is
ruling out the possibility
of personal medical IRAs.
Well, I wouldn't rule that
out. I'm all in favor of
incentives for saving and
for responsible behavior in
the economy, but I want to
keep coming back to keep
reminding you that most of
the costs and the most
inflationary element of the
costs are in that 70% that
goes with the 10% of the
people who are really sick.
I don't agree with you that
that 70% would not be
affected, that the 70%
itself would not be very
strongly affected. Let me
come back to another aspect
to this which is, is this a
market that can be
organized effectively at the
level of the individual
consumer and on the one
hand and the insurance
company on the other hand.
And I think that for several
reasons we need to have some
collective functions that
are today performed by large
employers which needs to be
performed by some other
agency. Let me just explain
here. First, the
administrative costs in
individual health insurance
because of the marketing,
the contracting, everything
else are very high, like 40%
of premium. Not for high
deductible insurance. I beg
your pardon, you keep
insisting, you keep adopting
the common practice now that
unless a person has
insurance, he can't get
medical care. Now that's
nonsense. It depends on the
kind of insurance. Most of
the people who are
uninsured, you know,
there's all this talk about
35 million people. Most of
them are healthy young
people who have decided it
isn't worth the cost of
getting insured. Because
they know somebody will take
care of them if they're
seriously ill. And I believe
that there is a case for
requiring everybody to have
a major medical insurance
program. I believe there is
a case just as there's a
case for requiring everybody
who drives an automobile to
have a liability policy.
And so I'm not quarreling
with that. In my favorite
arrangement, it would be
required that everybody has
a major medical insurance
program, but a very, very
high deductible. Not 3,000,
but something like 10 or
20,000 or 10 percent of
income, 20 percent of
income, whichever is lower.
So in some cases it would
be 3,000. Now let's for a
moment argue on my grounds
rather than yours. Let's
just assume that you could
have a major medical program
for everybody who had a
major medical of that kind.
Now do your arguments have
as much cogency? Well, I
think so. Why? Well, I'd be
worried about two things.
One is- we're in a world
now where everybody just
has major medical
insurance. I'm still
thinking about the need for
some collective action.
First of all, insurers are
becoming increasingly
skilled at charging high
premiums to the people who
have high medical costs and
low premiums to the people
who have low costs. That's
right. They should. They
should. You're not opposed
to risk premiums for
automobiles. And indeed
we've discovered that we
had a national disaster
because we don't have risk
premiums for deposit
insurance. Surely risk
premiums are- there's
nothing wrong with risk
premiums. Well, I think in
the case of health care
that it comes up against a
social value that sick
people ought to be cared
for and that risks ought to
be spread. Well, hold on
about risks being spread.
We have a redistributive
income tax system already.
I've always thought it
amazing that we should have-
first of all, we have a
redistributive income tax
system so that tax rates go
up as incomes go up. And
then for each individual
separate program, we also
have a redistributive
thing. Why should we have
housing distributed on a
progressive income tax
scale? Why should we have
medical? I don't believe
that the risks of people-
first of all, many
illnesses are self-imposed.
People who smoke, people
who engage in unhealthy
habits, and I do not see
any case for risk sharing
in those cases except
through purchase of
insurance any more than I
do in the case of
automobiles. Should
uninsured automobile- let's
take automobile owners who
are uninsured, who don't
insure- should the cost
they impose on themselves
be risk shared, shared
across the public at
large? No, but I think
health care is different.
Why? In fact, more people
mess up their health in
automobile accidents than
in almost any other way.
It is fair enough to say
that a lot of ill health
comes from irresponsible
behavior and self-inflicted
ill health- smoking, lack
of exercise, and so forth.
Let alone unsafe sex
practices. Right. Fair
enough. On the other hand,
it's also true that a lot
of ill health comes from
involuntary misfortune.
And I think here we're up
against a question of
social value. I believe
that to the extent that
it's involuntary
misfortune, there needs to
be some way of spreading
that risk when the costs
get large. That is that
people need to be- But
we've already done that
with having assumed major
medical insurance. No,
because the major medical
insurance you're talking
about, if it just works at
the individual level, the
insurers will skillfully
underwrite each person and
they'll look at person A
and say, you've had a
history of cancer, and so
next year we're going to
quadruple the premium in
your policy. This happens
to individuals in small
employment groups all the
time. In effect, we're
going to readjust the
premium each year to your
expected medical costs in
the coming year so that
the risk-spreading part of
insurance breaks down. I
want to separate issues.
Okay. So let me go to a
more extreme case, which I
don't like, but which would
be far better than what we
have now. You have
universal major medical
with the deductibles I've
stated, very high, paid for
by the federal government.
Well, what bothers me about
that is, again, I keep
coming back to seeing a
regime where the 70 percent
of the dollars are going to
be in a cost-uncontained
mode because moral hazard
will take over. The patient
says, I don't care what it
costs because I'm insured,
and the doctor says, I don't
care what it costs because
you're insured, and there's
no mechanism to force-
Where do those 70 percent
come from? They come from
costs per bed in hospitals
going up 26-fold, and that
happens because you have
employer-based thing,
because you have government
assuming responsibility not
simply to pay the insurance
premium. See, I would have
the major medicals provided
by private people, by
private insurance companies.
Yeah, not by the government,
sure. Right. And you have
government providing
Medicare and Medicaid now,
and those are enormously
expensive, much more
expensive than they need to
be. Right. So I'm very
dubious of your 70 percent
figure based on a present
crazy system. Well, that is
the figure. It's pretty well
documented. The Rand
Corporation did a health
insurance experiment in
which they found, for
example, that in any given
year, the 1 percent of
patients who had the highest
costs accounted for 28
percent of the costs. But
take automobile insurance.
Yeah, but this is very
different from automobile
insurance. Why? Well, for
one thing, because when
people are seriously ill,
let's say they have clogged
coronary arteries, there is
just no end to what can be
done on their behalf, and
the costs can become
enormous. So with soft organ
transplants and all these
things now, we're talking
about many therapies that
cost $100,000, $200,000,
$300,000. But even on major
medical insurance, you
ought to have a
coinsurance payment, just
as you do on almost
anything. Fine. The problem
with that is that just
relying on the coinsurance
is that people demand
financial protection. So
they'll want to have a
stop-loss, and they'll say
after I paid $5,000 out of
pocket or something like
that, let's say 20 percent
of income, then I want a
stop-loss and I want the
insurance to pay all the
rest. And I would say the
problem is most of the
dollars are beyond the
stop-loss and in the free
care zone. And so I think
we need to create an
insurance mechanism where
doctors who practice
economically can affiliate
with an insurance scheme
that can offer people a low
premium. And that is a key
mechanism. But you don't
have to compel that. No, I
think that a market system...
I'm not objecting to them.
Of course. I'm not
objecting to that development.
A market system would
produce that. I'm not
objecting to the emergence
of HMOs or hospital
insurance. On the
contrary. In fact, back in
1962 when I published
Capitalism and Freedom, I
made a case that the
organized medicine was
preventing the efficient
organization of hospitals.
And I think organized
medicine was preventing it.
In fact, to this day- was
that 1962 now? Thirty years
later, I'm very happy to be
able to tell you my
students read that in my
course and we talk about
that. And I think it was
marvelously prescient. You
talked about- it made so
much sense. It would be
like a department store
because, of course, the
individual consumer isn't
going to know who's the
best ologist that he might
need in the middle of the
night. So he needs some
reputable organization,
somebody he can trust that
he can choose ahead of
time. And so you'd use the
analogy of a department
store with their buyers and
all that. It made a lot of
sense. Today we would call
that a multi-specialty
group practice. But why
didn't it develop? It
didn't develop at that
time because of the
opposition of the medical
monopoly. And I think the
right answer would have
been to eliminate the
medical monopoly. We're
slowly chipping away at
that. You know, I'll tell
you something. In my
opinion, there's only room
for one monopolist at a
time. We are chipping away
at the medical monopoly by
replacing it by a
government monopoly. And as
between the two
monopolies, I'm very
uncertain which is worse.
Because at the moment,
because of this chipping
away, we seem headed
inevitably toward complete
socialized medicine. And I
think that would be such a
disaster for a country like
the United States. That we
ought not to rule out the
possibility of getting
substantial changes like
medical IRAs. I understand
the difficulty that you
tend to get very
incremental changes in any
system. And that is an
incremental change, but a
big increment. But let's
suppose for a moment that
we had the medical IRAs.
Let's suppose...
