Life of Napoleon (Episode 4) - A Whiff of Grapeshot

Napoleon Bonaparte
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As the ruins of Toulon still smouldered, Brigadier-General Napoleon Bonaparte made
his way west to Marseille. His reputation preceded him. Here was the architect of victory at Toulon,
a two-star general at twenty-four, a man of ambition and the talent to back it up.
Napoleon enjoyed friends in high places. Representatives on mission like Augustin
Robespierre and Paul Borat, friend and countryman Antonio Salachetti,
Generals Cioverni and de Gaumier, impressed by Napoleon's conduct at Toulon,
and then there were newfound friends, Ando Chouinot and André Masséna.
Napoleon's name and exploits were even known to Maximilien Robespierre himself.
And yet, despite early success, Napoleon's position was perilously compromised.
Martial success could only carry him so far without political support. His role in the
siege of Toulon had been undersold in French propaganda, in favour of lionising de Gaumier
and Salachetti. And as a kind-carrying Jacobin, Napoleon was bound at the hip to the vagaries
of Paris politics. Moreover, the word of the representatives on mission echoed far and wide.
Borat and Salachetti might help, but they could just as easily hinder.
There was some delay in deciding what to do with Napoleon after Toulon. He had been field-promoted,
sure, but it took months for this information to reach the Committee of Public Safety in Paris,
and once mulled over, filter back down south. Thus, Napoleon spent the first few months of 1794
in administrative limbo, awaiting word of his next assignment.
It was with these worries on his shoulders that Napoleon arrived in Marseille. Once there,
he surveyed the city's defences, its forts, coastal batteries and redoubts. With this information,
Napoleon drew up maps and recommended numerous alterations or improvements. Experience had
shown French ports to be vulnerable, so his recommendations were taken seriously,
but often ignored. On February 12th, Napoleon observed Riley. They had spent a good sum of
money on the coast, and made a hash of it. To aid Napoleon in these endeavours were the
members of his General Staff. We've met two already. Auguste Marmont had acquitted himself
well at Toulon, and Dandos Junot served not only as Napoleon's secretary, but was also a close
friend. The two got along famously. By contrast, Chef de Battalion Berlier and Napoleon were not
on good terms. Napoleon was rapid-fire with his orders. Berlier could scarcely keep pace.
As per instructions, Napoleon continued to survey the defences along the French Riviera,
from the Rhône to the Var, as he put it, revisiting Toulon in the process.
For two months, this busy work kept Napoleon occupied, if underutilised. The wheels of
bureaucracy finally turned over on February 7th, when Napoleon's rank was confirmed.
The paperwork asked Napoleon to confirm whether or not he was a nobleman.
Shrewdly, he said he was not. Duly promoted, Napoleon received his next assignment,
the post of Commander of Artillery to the Army of Italy. Despite appearances,
this appointment was something of a lateral promotion. The Army of Italy was by far the
most neglected of France's field armies, and in the kind of stagnant mountain warfare of
the Italian campaign thus far, there was little chance for glory. There was also the problem of
the army commander, General Pierre d'Umberion. It wasn't long after arriving in Nice that Napoleon
met d'Umberion, and he was less than impressed. By all accounts, d'Umberion was a completely
capable, if unremarkable commander. His real deficit was a lack of initiative,
born of survival instinct. French generals had a nasty habit of winding up dead for failures in
the field. D'Umberion's solution was to observe the will of the representatives on mission in
all things. He even went so far as to ask for their advice on what to do, and simply followed
through on that plan, regardless of its efficacy. But there was a silver lining to d'Umberion's
deference, because it was Augustin and Salicetti who were currently attached to the army.
Both men trusted Napoleon and could vouch for his abilities. It wasn't long before these two were
strategic advice from Napoleon, and passing it along to d'Umberion as orders. So in effect,
Napoleon was indirectly in strategic command of the army of Italy.
And the strategic outlook appeared grim. By 1794, France was blockaded and exhausted,
increasingly afflicted by famine and economic deprivation. The French economy groaned under
the needs imposed by an army of 1 million men, and a population of 30 million that still needed
to be fed and make a living. All the while, French ports were blockaded, so the import-export
trade economy was annihilated. These economic woes had contributed heavily to the outbreak
of the Federalist revolts, and the defection of French ports in Brittany, Normandy, and as we've
seen, Provence. The only real hope public safety had to stabilize a collapsing economy was to
return to the strategic offensive. Offensives of 1792 and 1793 had either been dismal failures
or temporary successes. What public safety wanted was permanent occupation of foreign territories,
whose taxes would be raised and treasures looted to maintain the army. In exchange,
these territories would be liberated, either annexed into the Republic directly,
or formed into new sister republics. Liberated peoples of occupied territories would be treated
well, albeit economically exploited, in a policy dubbed War on the Castles, Peace to the Villages.
Napoleon's own Army of Italy fit into this larger strategic picture as a force poised to reopen
trade with neutral third parties. In the south, the near-term objective set by public safety
was to reconnect the economy to Genoese imports and them to French exports. The Republic of Genoa
was a neutral state, whose imports had supplied the French with grain and provided an outlet for
their exports, until the British had come along and cut off trade. The Royal Navy ruled the waves,
while the Sardinia-Piedmont Territory of Ornelia prevented overland trade. The French Republic had
tried diplomatic strong-arming and strategic manoeuvres to try and restore lines of trade
with Genoa, but to no avail. After the outbreak of war in early 1792, the French had advanced
and captured numerous outlying Savoyard towns and cities. The most integral of these conquests was
Nice, taken in November after the Savoyard commander, Charles-François Touan, retreated
The Sardinia-Piedmontese were reeling from these losses, so for 1793, the French fancied their
chances were the follow-up offensive across the Alps. From their new base in Nice, General Louis
Gontort was in command. After Gontort achieved modest successes, Touan rallied along the strong
fortress at Saiozio. Despite his best efforts, Gontort was sent packing on June 12th after the
Battle of Saiozio. An elderly Austrian commander, Feldzeugmeister Nikolaus de Wynne, then assumed
command of coalition forces, launching a haphazard offensive in September. François Kellerman,
of Vimy fame, repulsed these attacks. However, it was around this time that the Federalist
revolts erupted. The French retreated to bases behind the Alps, while the coalition slowly
advanced. Winter set in, forcing both sides to wait for 1794's spring thaw. With his customary
confidence, Napoleon set about the daunting task of planning this offensive. Public safety was
deeply concerned by recent Spanish incursions across the Eastern Pyrenees, something which
Napoleon had referenced in his Superdepot care. Now he changed his tune, and proposed a defensive
posture in the Pyrenees, but an offensive in Italy. These plans he drew up alongside Junot.
Junot, after translating Napoleon's barely legible scroll, referred these plans to Augustin Robert
Spierre, who himself transmitted them to public safety. The committee gave the green light,
and the offensive was tentatively set for April. The Army of Italy confronted a formidable coalition
force of some 45,000 men. The Army of Sardinia-Piedmont was sitting pretty, in strong entrenchments that
ran the length of the Alps, all the way down to the coastline at Arnelia. Their largest concentration
was still at the Fortress of Sariogio, where the Sardinia-Piedmontese made their base.
Overall, coalition command was in the hands of De Vins, as we've seen, a grey beard with plenty
of experience, but little talent. He brought with him an Austrian division, which was held in reserve,
as well as subordinate generals Collimarchi and d'Argenteuil.
Fatefully, relations between the Austrians and Sardinia-Piedmontese were strained.
It was the intention of the reformist king Victor Amadeus III and De Vins to liberate
the lost city of Nice. However, De Vins counseled caution, whilst Savoy had commanded two more,
though the victor of Sariogio wanted to avenge his humiliating retreat of 1792
by rapidly reconquering Nice. Nice provided an excellent base of operations for the French,
and it was from Nice that Napoleon intended to launch the offensive.
He took the lessons of 92 and 93 to heart, tempering them with his own experience at
Ajaccio and Toulon. Dombinio would attack along the coast and take Arnelia, and to cover him,
Masséna would detach a division of around 5,000 men and launch a feint through the Alpine valleys
of Nervia and Roya, towards Sariogio. Troops were pre-positioned for the offensive on April 2nd.
The offensive commenced on April 16th. Dombinio took 20,000 men and advanced along the coast,
brushing aside light resistance. Masséna, meanwhile, led two brigades over the border
in a lightning attack that ignored Sardinia-Piedmont defences at Tarnado to fully occupy Ormea.
De Vins was caught completely off-guard and sluggish in his response. He ordered a withdrawal
from Sariogio, having overestimated the scale of the French feint. Masséna saw an opportunity and
wasted no time. He raced towards Sariogio and blocked the escape route. Trapped between
Dombinio to the south and Masséna to the north, a chunk of the Sardinia-Piedmont army surrendered
to Dombinio at the second Sariogio. Before long, the western approaches to Genoa, Aralbenia and
Luano surrendered to the French. By May, the French had built up their defences and controlled
the passes across the Alps. Napoleon's offensive had been a stunning success. Military historian
David Chandler identifies three key reasons for Napoleon's success. First, a deep internalization
of the tenets of mountain warfare, skills that will serve Napoleon extremely well in the years
to come. Second, the division of his forces in petite packets, or smaller parts. Dispersing
forces like this was a break from conventional military wisdom, which held that an army
dispersed was an army likely to be defeated in detail. Napoleon's innovation was to give these
packets leeway to conduct independent operations, but always in close proximity to other packets
and the main force, so as to provide mutual support. Here are the origins of Napoleon's
flying columns of the 1796 Italian campaign, and later on, his army corps of the Grande Armée.
The third innovation identified by Chandler was Napoleon's utilization of a strong reserve.
French and coalition numbers at campaign start were roughly even, but Napoleon had only deployed
half of his available force. Over 20,000 remained in the forts and garrisons on the French side of
the lines. Likewise, Dumbidignon led a large force that could provide reinforcements to Messina
should the need have arisen. Put another way, with Messina's excellent tactical leadership,
Napoleon had defeated 45,000 troops with 5,000. Without skipping a beat, Napoleon aimed to
capitalize with an immediate follow-up offensive. The goal this time was to completely destroy or
bypass the remaining forces of Sardinia-Piemo and end the campaign with the French occupying
fertile plains of Mondovi, a region that would easily sustain the French army of Italy.
Napoleon worked tirelessly to form his plan, exhausting Junot and Berlier in the process.
The representatives again signed off on the plan and sent it up to Paris.
Lazar Carnot, the great organizer of victory, was not completely sold. June 1794 would see
renewed French offensives along the Rhine and into the Austrian Netherlands, efforts that were far
more strategically important than a victory in Italy. Eventually, however, Carnot assented to
the plan and the offensive commenced, all going well. But once the arms had been fully taken,
Carnot refused to let the French descend into the plains for fear that it would stretch the French
thin elsewhere. Napoleon was cognizant of these worries and tried to allay Carnot's fears.
Of course, Napoleon lacked the clout to converse with Carnot as an equal, so with permission,
he wrote letters in Augustin Robespierre's name and made a case for an Italian offensive.
If the armies which were on the Piedmontese frontier should adopt an offensive principle,
they would compel the Austrians to protect its Italian possessions.
The principles of war are the same as those of a siege. Fire must be concentrated on a single point,
and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken, and the rest is nothing, the place is
taken. It is the Austrians that must be crushed. That done, Spain and Italy will fall of their own
accord. The attack must be concentrated, not dispersed. There was a wisdom in Napoleon's
words far beyond his years. An attack upon an exposed underbelly in Italy would draw away
Austrian forces from their Rhineland and Lowland positions, thereby improving the chances of a
French breakthrough. It's been well noted that this plan is the blueprint for Napoleon's 1796
campaign. Napoleon had rendered excellent service to France in only a few short months,
more than justifying his promotion at such a young age. However, he had achieved these
successes indirectly. At Toulon, de Gaumier was credited with the win, and now in Piedmont,
D'Umbidino and Messina were the stars of the show. Even Napoleon's sound strategic advice
had been communicated through intermediaries, namely Augustine. So despite Napoleon's success,
he was not rewarded with the rapid advancement he desired. Instead, he was still reliant upon
the goodwill of political benefactors. Augustine asked Napoleon for a favour in early July.
With lines of trade and communication to Genoa secured, public safety desired stronger diplomatic
ties. Senior diplomat Jean Tilly was sent along with a delegation that was meant to include
Augustine Robespierre. However, things were hitting up in Paris, so Augustine asked Napoleon
to go in his place and act as a military attaché. Secretly, Napoleon also carried orders from
another representative, calling for him to reconnoitre Genoa's defences should an invasion
be deemed necessary. This sort of assignment was not to Napoleon's liking. At this early stage of
his career, he had little in the way of diplomatic ambition. His eyes were firmly fixed on martial
glory. He waited on every update from the army, hoping to get back to the front. These hopes were
dashed in late July after a total political reversal up in Paris. The coup of 10 Thermidor
had been months in the making. Maximilian Robespierre's increasing paranoia and dogged
of his vision for a republic of virtue had alienated all but a few diehard loyalists.
Not only was the majority of the national convention now opposed to Robespierre,
but even the rump of his own committee of public safety had turned against him.
Otherwise opposed revolutionary factions were in agreement that Robespierre had to go.
After months of trying to get Robespierre to step away peacefully, the plotters drew the
long knives on the day of 9 Thermidor, July 26th. Their attempts to arrest the Robespierreists fell
through. Robespierre and his allies held out in the Hotel de Ville. One of these allies was Augustin,
who the previous day had insisted that he be allowed to die alongside his brother.
After an assault led personally by Paul Borat, the Robespierreists were seized.
In all, 70 were fed to the guillotine on the afternoon of 10 Thermidor.
This bad news reached Napoleon's ear at an otherwise joyous moment. On August 5th,
Joseph Bonaparte was married to Marie Clary, the daughter of a wealthy Marseille merchant.
The match went a long way to restoring Bonaparte finances, which were in the drain after the loss
of their estates in Corsica. Of course, the fall of the Jacobins cast a shadow over proceedings.
In a letter to Tilly, Napoleon dwelled on the death of his friend Augustin.
But aware that such support might endanger the Bonapartes, he was quick to condemn.
Quote, Had Robespierre been my brother, and despised to tyranny, I'd have stabbed him myself.
The next day, on August 6th, Napoleon was arrested on charges of treason for having
cited a gun battery overlooking Marseille way back in July. While in prison, Napoleon was
afforded some comforts by a friendly prison warden. Napoleon also wrote to Salicetti,
asking for his help. Little did he know, but it was on Salicetti's order that he had been arrested.
The sly devil had sold out his friend and ally to ingratiate himself to the new regime.
Even as Napoleon languished in jail, Salicetti scoured his papers,
looking for some hint of double-dealing. Eventually, Salicetti found what he was looking
for – the secret orders Napoleon had obeyed in Genoa. His fate was sealed.
It didn't take long for Napoleon to suspect Salicetti had sold him out,
but he refrained from angry denunciation and instead resorted to very even-keeled appeals
to his former comrades. One letter read, Salicetti, you have relieved me from duty
and ordered me under arrest. You have branded me without a sentence, or sentenced me without
a hearing. Have I not, ever since the revolution began, constantly shown my devotion to just
principles? Have I not taken my share in the struggles both against internal foes,
and as a soldier, against foreign enemies? I have sacrificed everything for the republic.
I served at the siege of Toulon with some distinction, and with the army I earned my
share of laurels at the capture of Saorgio. Salicetti, you have known me five years.
What have you seen in me that is suspect of the revolution?
As far as Napoleon was aware, he could be guillotined at any moment. At this early stage,
the Thermidorians weren't cagey about killing their opponents, and Napoleon, a proud Jacobin,
ally of the Robespierres, war hero and foreigner, was not the kind of guy they wanted to keep around
to make trouble. In subsequent letters, including one written to the National Convention, Napoleon
aimed to clear his name posthumously. Quote, My heart is torn, and I feel that, with a cool head
but a fiery heart, I cannot endure a life that is under the cloud of suspicion. Young Junot
certainly feared the worst. He proposed to Napoleon a plan of escape. This Napoleon shot
down on August 19. I appreciate all the friendliness of the offer you make me, my dear Junot. You know
well the comradeship I feel for you. Men may be unjust to me, but my innocence remains.
My conscience is easy. Therefore do nothing. You would only compromise me.
Despite knowing that he may well be killed, Napoleon used his incarceration to pour over
materials concerning earlier French Alpine campaigns, not something many would do on the
eve of their execution. On the 20th, the Revolutionary Tribunal that had processed his
case could find no compelling evidence of wrongdoing. Of course, all of Napoleon's
conduct had been authorised and accounted for, even his secret mission. Charges were dropped,
and Napoleon was let go after two weeks. Incredibly enough, it was Salacetti that
had secured Napoleon's release. There was bad blood now, as might be expected,
but Napoleon was not one to hold a grudge, and agreed to Salacetti's proposal that he get
straight back to work. It soon became abundantly clear why Salacetti had been so eager to preserve
the life of a talented young general. The Army of Italy's actions over the last few weeks had
been embarrassing failures, and the offensive was stalled. It's debatable to what extent
Napoleon's absence contributed to their failures. In all likelihood, the stall would have happened
anyway. Either way, it's certainly the case that Napoleon was seen as the man to turn things
around. He submitted a third plan for Carnot's consideration. This time, the intention was to
blunt a brewing coalition counter-offensive and protect French gains on the Savona.
As a significantly reinforced Austrian field army, under the command of Feldzeugmeister Oliver von
Wallis, was massing along the river Bormida, the French advanced in two flying columns.
Tactical command was in Messina's capable hands, and he thrashed the Austrians at the Battle of
Digo. Casualties were light on both sides, but the Austrians, in a haste to retreat,
left behind all 42 of their guns. The coalition offensive had been dashed before it even began.
Napoleon was present for the Battle of Digo, though he had not been in command. The operation
had been launched without the approval of public safety, now restaffed with a number of Thermidorians.
Lazar Carnot remained and vetoed any further offensive operations, much to Napoleon's dismay.
D'Umbidion obeyed these directives, and the French Army of Italy retired to their positions in the
Though Napoleon had acquitted himself well, and D'Umbidion praised him in dispatches back to Paris,
the squandered opportunity left a bad taste in the young general's mouth.
Dissatisfaction was only compounded by a period of inactivity.
Napoleon did what he could to keep busy, organising his artillery, and most importantly,
reconnoitering the Alpine passes at Saint-Bernard. By March of 1795, Napoleon was transferred to a
new army that was forming at Toulon. Public safety had accepted plans to reclaim Corsica
from the British. A large force of some 16,000 men, and the 15 still-floating ships of the
Mediterranean fleet, put to sea on March 3rd. Of course, before reaching Corsican shores,
the French blundered into the closed fist of the Royal Navy. Admiral William Hotham's squadron
of 15 vessels was technically inferior to that of the French. His ships were smaller frigates,
and not the heavy 60 and 70 gunners of the French force. But Hotham's squadron was nimble,
his crews all sea-salt veterans. In a series of actions from March 11th to the 14th,
the French expedition was shredded. Two ships were captured, the rest badly damaged,
retreated to Toulon. The failed Corsican expedition set back Napoleon's career by
several months. Officers from the expedition, and from the Army of Italy, were reshuffled.
Dumbérion was recalled, and his replacement, Bartolomé Scherrer, wanted nothing to do with
Napoleon. By now, Napoleon's exploits were well known, but he was seen as overly aggressive,
hungry for career advancement. There was also only so far the Thermidorians were willing to
allow a former Jacobin to rise. So it was, in late March, that Napoleon was ordered to take
a posting with the Army of the West. Second to Toulouse-Auch for service in a backwater
region like the Vendée, Napoleon feared for his prospects. He delayed as long as he could,
and then, on May 8th, darted up to Paris, taking with him his brother Louis.
On May 25th, the Bonaparte brothers, in addition to Napoleon's staff,
established themselves at the Hôtel de la Liberté. Soon thereafter, Napoleon trudged
over to the Tuileries to make his case before the Ministry of War. The desires of this single
general, 139th in seniority, were completely ignored. In fact, Napoleon ended up harming
his own chances. After a series of damaging dialogues, he was humiliated with a demotion
to command of an infantry brigade, as opposed to his beloved artillery. When that failed to
Presumably, the Ministry expected that Napoleon would now feel forced to take up his post,
if only for the money. But they underestimated just how much pain Napoleon was willing to
endure to protect his pride. Louis was sent off to Châlons to complete his military education,
while Napoleon scraped out an existence in Paris, feigning illness to avoid service.
These were a tough few months for Napoleon, relegated to a pauper's existence in Paris,
his career stalled, possibly forever. In a letter to Joseph, Napoleon remarked,
I'll end up not stepping out of the way when a carriage approaches.
But this gloomy episode did have a silver lining. Her name was Eugénie Désirée Clary,
16 years old to Napoleon's 24. Désirée was young and pretty, if a bit plain. She had come into
Napoleon's world back in 1794. Wealthy Marseille merchant and industrialist, François Clary,
had died in early 1794, leaving for his two daughters, Julie and Eugénie, a chimeric
inheritance. A shedload of money, but the stain of counter-revolution, as François had supported
the Federalists. Quite fortuitously for the Bonapartes, Joseph had caught the eye of Julie,
the elder Clary daughter. Their match suited both families. The Clary were insulated from
revolutionary appraisal, and the Bonapartes enjoyed a dowry of 400,000 francs, enough to
set up Laetitia and the kids in some comfort at Antibes. Joseph and Julie were married on August
1st. Nineteen-year-old Lucienne had followed some time after, marrying Christine Boyer,
an amicable 22-year-old woman who had enamoured Lucienne after a chance encounter in a Provençal
tavern. It only remained for Napoleon to complete the trifecta by finding his own match. Désirée
was the choice of both heart and mind. Sparks flew, and Napoleon began courting her as soon as
they had met. While out on campaign, he spent every spare moment writing letters to her,
confirming his love and devotion. They were engaged in April 1795. Of course, Napoleon's
prospects took a tumble after his arrest. It was only in September that ties were re-established,
in a flurry of correspondence. Quote,
The most imperative need of my soul, in Napoleon's own words.
These missives fall far short of the nauseating love letters of fiction. In fact, the letters
carried a familiar stern edge. For as often as Napoleon professed his love, he also gave
For instance, he insisted she read a whole range of books, expand her repertoire of music and poetry,
and generally just improve her intellect. There was something quite earnest in Napoleon's desire
to intellectually stimulate Désirée. In an age of entrenched sexism, it was not considered normal
for a woman to engage with history, arts and science, except perhaps maybe as a passing
distraction. Certainly, Napoleon wanted Désirée to be a cut above her peers, albeit for selfish
reasons. Napoleon could not abide an idiot for a wife. Anything less, and he would lose interest.
Désirée, for her part, seems to have responded happily enough. She enjoyed being pursued,
and flirted right back in letters to her fiancé. Such letters often bore flirtatious jibes.
In one letter, Désirée teased, quote,
Only the most sensible of women love the coldest of men.
Napoleon took the bait, and replied,
There is no pleasure in which I do not wish to include you.
No dream of which you do not furnish half. Be certain, then, that what you say
is an iniquitous and ill-judged and unjust phrase, which you did not believe in writing.
Your heart disavowed it, even as your hand wrote it.
For a time, Napoleon even considered buying a long-abandoned estate out in Burgundy.
Not only would this provide for his family, but more importantly, prove his earnest intentions
towards Désirée. As it was, Désirée's mother was having second thoughts about marriage to yet
another Bonaparte. And flighty Désirée was discovering that she was quite the eligible woman,
suited to far better. Her attentions wandered.
Napoleon reared this saddening state of affairs in a flurry of letters to Joseph.
Distraught, he lashed out, proclaiming women, the men who pursued them,
and the whole business of love and marriage. For all his brilliance,
this was a battle Napoleon could not win. Withdrawing from love's battlefield,
every bit as dangerous as those in Italy, Napoleon found distraction in Paris' vivid social scene.
A brief window in the relaxation of censorship post-Thermidor had unleashed a range of satirical
plays and once-banned operas. With what little cash he could scrape together, Napoleon visited
the Théâtre Francais, the Fédu, and the Opera, particularly enjoying tragedies, which he claimed,
quote, excite the soul and create heroes. During the day, Napoleon frequented Paris'
dozens of salons and clubs, listening to and participating in lively debates.
Furthering his own budding interest in astronomy, he also toured the Observatory
and the nearby Institut de France. Though Napoleon was a fixture of Paris' intellectual
and social scene, he left a poor impression. Socialites fixated upon his awkwardness around
women and a lack of bearing. Unable to afford proper clothing, Napoleon made do with what he had,
which was often ill-fitting and unfashionable. One observer, socialite Laura d'Abrantes,
described Napoleon as, quote, without gloves, with ill-made and ill-blackened boots,
thin and with a sallow complexion. She nicknamed him Puss in Boots.
Spurned from the fashionable social circles, at a vulnerable time, Napoleon moped to Joseph
and Junot, decrying the fashionistas and socialites as tacky reprobates.
Ultimately, all of these social forays were distractions from the main event,
which remained to be appointed back to the artillery and be given a decent posting.
Sometime in June, Napoleon visited the estate of General Marmont as a friend of the family.
Towards the end of the month, Austrian counterattacks had driven General Kellerman
back from Napoleon's hard-won gains, losing some 15,000 killed and wounded.
The progress of his two unabashed successes were undone in an instant.
Through July, the Committee of Public Safety took these developments as indicators that the war in
Italy was all but lost. There was talk of abandoning the offensive altogether, merely
bottling up the enemy with a strong Alpine defence. But the experience of politically
ascendant Paul Barat and Louis Frérot, as well as Carnot's own insight, convinced the
National Convention to endorse a renewed offensive. The task of drafting this fourth
plan of attack was to be undertaken by the Topographic Bureau. Established by Carnot in
1792, the Bureau had been intended as a kind of brains trust for public safety, basically a group
of senior officers who could offer sound military advice at a moment's notice. Once the crises of
debated, this temporary Bureau was formalised and given over to Carnot's favourite general,
Henri Clark. Their purview was then extended from merely offering advice to outright war planning.
Put another way, the Topographic Bureau was the first general staff in military history,
making plans that politicians could then accept, deny or modify.
The Bureau had an entire staff dedicated to the Italian front, and it was decided that Napoleon,
who had actually been successful on that front, would make a fine addition.
But initially, Napoleon was very standoffish and rebuffed the Bureau's attempts to court him.
In the first two weeks of August, he still sought a frontline posting with the artillery.
And since the French weren't putting out, Napoleon gave serious consideration to serve
the Ottoman Sultan as a general for hire, no doubt imagining the possibility of his
own Anatolian exploits to stand alongside those of Alexander. According to Lucien,
Napoleon even considered serving the East India Company. The Russians were likewise interested.
Letizia nixed these ideas pretty quickly, prompting Napoleon to redouble his efforts.
The Ministry of War was having none of that and demanded he present himself along with proof of
incapacitating illness. His bluff called, Napoleon was narrowly saved by the timely intercession of
the Topographic Bureau. On August 20th, one year after leaving the anti-base jail cell,
he begrudgingly accepted their offer. It was to prove one of the most important
decisions of Napoleon's career. Installed at the Bureau's offices in the Tuileries,
Napoleon worked part-time, four-hour shifts, one in the afternoon and one in the early morning.
His job was to work through the correspondence and reports from the front and offer
recommendations and instructions to on-the-ground officers. To aid in these efforts were, of course,
his own personal staff of Junot and Berlier. Marmont was retasked, sent over to the Army
of the Rhine for the siege of Mainz. In terms of seniority, Napoleon was not high up.
But this was a prime learning experience, and he learnt a great deal from working with Generals
as well as the pedigreed César Gabriel Berthier, brother of the far more famous Louis-Alexandre
Berthier, who we will come to know well. Bolstered by the experience of his fellow Generals,
and with the aid of a fine staff, Napoleon furnished public safety with a fourth offensive plan.
In his own words,
In the present situation, the King of Sardinia Piedmont most certainly desires peace.
Therefore, we must carry the war to his country and maneuver the Austrians into such a position
that we can eventually threaten their southern flank. The Army of Italy must drive the enemy
from the heights of Loano, threaten Piedmont, conquer Lombardy, penetrate into the Tyrol,
and affect its junction with the advancing Army of the Rhine. As per his recommendations,
thousands of reinforcements were called up and dispatched to General Schara.
The Army of Italy still suffered from severe shortages of even basic supplies,
and there was only so much Napoleon could fix from a thousand kilometres away.
By September, Schara had around 33,000 effectives, to defend's 42,000.
It was, however, on the eve of a new offensive, that Napoleon's political fortunes took another
ill-timed tumble. Louis Fréron was on the verge of being indicted by the National Convention,
but Ra was similarly afflicted. Out of favour, Napoleon was summarily sacked on September 15th,
for his refusal to take the post in the Vendée. Thus, Napoleon's plan went into effect without
his further input. Worse still, it was delayed for as long as the resource-hungry Army of the
Rhine desperately held their position in Germany. But the delay ended up inadvertently aiding the
French. Down in Italy, the Coalition was suffering from a severe lack of coordination at the command
level. Disagreements over their exact course of action had squandered the Coalition victory in
July and given the French ample opportunity to recover. De Vins resigned in protest,
handing the reins off to Wallis just as Schärer attacked. On November 23rd, the Army of Italy was
divided into three separate divisions. Messena, who had stuck around in Italy, led one of these
divisions over the mountains and around the Austrian lines. The second division, led by
Pierre Augereau, flanked around as well. At the subsequent Battle of Loano, on November 25th,
the Austrians and Pierre Montiz were routed. However, the French pursuit was ineffective,
as Schärer, perhaps sensibly, chose to secure his rear lines.
Of course, having been fired, Napoleon was ill-informed of happenings in Italy.
His primary concern now was to secure the Bonaparte family's position as best he could.
Joseph's prospects seemed the most secure, and Napoleon spent much of August trying to set his
brother up with a gig in the convention or even just the Paris municipal government. By September,
Joseph was reduced to considering appointments in provincial backwaters,
something Napoleon strenuously denied. Amidst these personal worries, he continued to write.
Inspired by Goethe's bestseller, The Sorrows of Youth, Napoleon penned his own romance novella,
professing his unrequited love for Desiree. Glissant et Eugénie was all but autobiographical,
with the character of Glissant, a name borrowed from one of Napoleon's friends,
being a self-insert. A lovestruck Glissant meets a young, virginal Eugénie at a spa,
and the rest of the book follows their idyllic life together. By the end, Glissant sacrifices
himself in battle, leaving Eugénie a widow. While a self-indulgent and uninteresting experiment,
Glissant et Eugénie is at least informative. It's certainly interesting to note that Glissant,
Napoleon, lived the quiet life of a country gentleman, was generous to the poor,
and ultimately a martyr for France. This was quite a sea change for Napoleon,
who was evidently deep in love, both with a woman and his adoptive homeland.
Sadly, in late 1795, Napoleon was spurned by both France and Desiree,
seemingly reeling from one dead end to the next. There seemed to be no way out of this rut,
until, through the vagaries of fortune, Napoleon's prospects would be completely revived.
The origins of this revival stretch back to earlier in the year,
as the National Convention formally adopted a new constitution for France.
The Constitution of Year 3 was intended to secure the gains of the Thermidorians
Of course, the Constitution had all of the revolutionary bells and whistles,
and was couched in revolutionary language. France would stay a republic, there would be elections,
albeit reserved for tax-paying males, and all of the existing institutions would remain in place.
But despite the nice packaging, the contents would remain the same.
Power vested in the butter fingers of a politically ascendant middle class.
For our purposes, the most significant change was that the National Convention
would be superseded by a bicameral system of two legislative houses.
The Council of 500 for the lower house, and the Council of Ancients as an upper house,
there to serve as a conservative backstop. A small five-man directory would hold executive powers.
All of this meant that elections were in order.
In the lead-up, the political situation in Paris deteriorated rapidly.
Already, the Convention had been brought to their knees by numerous journées,
basically coordinated uprisings, launched by the pissed-off Parisian sections
after reactionary Thermidorian policy had annihilated the social and economic gains
of the revolution. In late September, another journée was looming. Ominously, Napoleon recorded
in his diary, quote, everything here is quiet for the moment, but it may be that a storm is brewing.
The Constitution had been accepted by the Convention on August 19th,
but it still required a referendum to be ratified nationally.
Returns demonstrated that support for the Thermidorians was now puddled deep.
Even once-supportive royalist and conservative groups were fed up.
Everybody's specific hang-up was over the issue of the Renewal. The Convention intended to simply
transition into power without new elections, meaning that the 750 seats among the two new
councils would be filled by the current crop of despised delegates. Though the Constitution was
accepted, the Renewal was only accepted by some creative accounting from the Convention.
Nobody was fooled by this obvious deception, and on September 7th,
47 of the 48 sections of Paris formed a committee to organise resistance.
Over the next few weeks, tensions rose, reaching a head on September 2nd,
11 Vendémiaire. The left-leaning sections of Paris' north and east had been thrashed after
their most recent failed journée, and lacking effective leadership, none were willing to risk
further damage combating the Renewal. On the other hand, the conservative
Le Pelletier section was willing to do battle. This was an embittered royalist section from the
Meeting in the Théâtre Francais that night, they decided to go it alone. The storm had arrived.
However, the Le Pelletier had only a few thousand armed supporters to their name,
and even buoyed by the Jaded Jeunesse Dorée, a royalist militia, this was hardly an overwhelming
force. Nonetheless, the National Convention had taken the threat extremely seriously.
Over the last few months, the military build-up in Paris had seen the National Guard reinforced
by the regular army. Chasseurs patrolled the streets, guards garrisoned civic buildings,
the heart of government at the Tuileries was itself a heavily defended fortress.
Late on the 9th of October 4th, General Jean-François Meunier, sympathetic to the royalists,
had been dispatched with a sizable force to crush the Le Pelletier. He advanced into the rebellious
section, but found the streets empty, the buildings abandoned. Spooked, and with his
heart not really in the fight, Meunier negotiated his own retreat. This was a debacle that allowed
the Le Pelletier to regroup. A defected general named De Nikon barreled headlong toward the
Tuileries. Days prior, the National Convention had formed a small emergency committee to oversee
their defence. Despite their preparations, they were caught off guard by the sudden onset of armed
attackers. With Meunier arrested, the emergency committee now had to find a senior officer to
lead the defence. Problem was, they had so few officers that were on hand, and even those that
were could not be relied upon to fire on civilians if push came to shove. Having proven decisive for
the Thermidorian coup, and acting as the current convention president, Paul Barras was offered the
gig. He accepted, and set about fortifying the Tuileries and the nearby Church of Sound Rock.
The long Rue Saint-Honoré, that passed right by the Tuileries complex,
was blockaded with multiple barricades. The bridges over the Seine were similarly defended.
Sightlines along the Place de la Concorde were cleared.
Joachim Marat, major of the 21st Regiment of Hussars, patrolled the streets. Should the
unthinkable happen, and the Tuileries fall, he was expected to cover the retreat and escort
the convention delegates to safety. Marat surveyed these defences, and correctly surmised that it was
too little, too late. Outnumbered and with limited firepower, the odds were not in his favour.
He also questioned whether the National Guard would fire on the mobs.
Cannons might even the odds, but Barras had none. They sat in storage two miles away at
the Champ de Sablon. It was at this critical moment when a young artillery officer approached
Barras and offered his services. Napoleon had been at the theatre the night before,
when he caught word of the imminent journée. As Manu was on the march, Napoleon was working
his way toward the Tuileries, arriving late in the night, just as Barras was despairing
as to their chances. In Napoleon's own account, he claimed,
I found several deputies in a state of great alarm, among others convoceres. They expected
to be attacked the next day, and didn't know what to do. My reply was, give me a cannon.
The name Napoleon was well known to several leading delegates, including Jean-Baptiste
Tallien, Garneau, Frérot, and of course Barras, who were all well aware of Napoleon's exploits.
Even the aforementioned Régis Convoceres knew this young officer, if only for the fact that
he'd signed off on Napoleon's firing. Confident and capable, Napoleon was immediately field
commissioned as a General de Division. However, Napoleon only agreed to serve on one condition.
He got to choose where the guns were positioned. Barras agreed. If this cocky kid could perform
a miracle and snag the guns from the Sablon, then why not let him position them?
Quick to the mark, Napoleon ordered Major Barras to take a detachment of Hussars and
secure the Sablon guns. Anyone who interfered was to be considered hostile.
By around 6am, Barras had returned, guns in tow. Over the next three hours, Napoleon positioned
the guns. Two on the Rue Saint-Nicques, and another two sighted down the Rue Saint-Honoré,
alongside the Place Vendôme. Along the Pont-Royal, he placed two more to lock down the bridge.
Barras' headquarters at the Saint-Roch were protected by the last two cannon,
which Napoleon sighted in such a way as to provide overlapping fields of fire into the
plaza outside the church. There hadn't been any time to properly fortify the gun positions,
so Napoleon instead had infantry stand by to defend them. Between reloads,
musket fire would cover the gunners. Napoleon was in his element,
sighting each gun personally, racing around on his horse, preparing the defences.
Deneken had delayed his attack, amassing followers all the while. He had something like twenty to
thirty thousand at his disposal. With such crushing numbers, he could probably have gone
in a few hours earlier, but Deneken was convinced that affection and demoralization would do the
At ten AM, he sent forth women and children to demoralize the already wavering National Guard.
Seeing his men falter throughout the day, in the late afternoon, Barras emerged from the Saint-Roch
and in his booming voice, ordered the mobs to disperse or be fired upon. Undeterred, the mob
advanced. Shots rang out from the rooftops, either Barras' own skirmishes or trigger-happy
insurrectionaries. No matter who it was, the first shots had been fired and the bloodshed commenced.
Barras delivered the order to fire. The infantry let loose,
cutting through the ranks of the attackers. The fire was nasty but insufficient,
and the insurrectionaries, knowing the Saint-Honoré's medieval allies all too well,
outflanked the defenders. The situation was critical just as the long guns began to roar.
At Napoleon's order, all the cannon had been loaded with grapeshot, also known as canister shot.
Large canvas tubes of several hundred musket balls, or even just jagged pieces of metal,
could fire a shotgun-like blast out to ranges of several hundred yards.
This concentrated burst of shrapnel could quite literally eviscerate a person,
as in their one second reduced to giblets the next. For all the upheaval in revolutionary Paris,
this terrifying weapon had not once been deployed. Napoleon would have the ignominious honour of
being the first to deploy canister shot in the city, and against civilians no less.
This was his infamous whiff of grapeshot. Dead and dying littered the Rue Saint-Honoré.
More grapeshot rippled down the Pont-Royal, from cannon's position on the Quai Voltaire.
Denikin's main effort was concentrated down the bridges. A bad idea as it turned out,
because the already incredibly destructive fire of the cannons was amplified when focused down
the narrow confines of a featureless bridge. Over the next few hours, hundreds of the
attackers were killed in their droves. The survivors lost heart, retreating deep into
the sections. Murat, held in reserve, was let loose, pursuing the insurrectionaries all
throughout the city, cutting down dozens more. It was quite the twist of fate that Napoleon,
having twice before witnessed assaults upon the Tuileries, would himself, a few years later,
defend the Tuileries from a mob. But what exactly took place on the bloody day that was 13 Vendémiaire
provided a great deal of fodder for anti-Napoleon propagandists.
Indeed, this event was the archetype of most anti-Napoleon propaganda,
especially that published by London-based papers, which depicted Napoleon as a bloodthirsty,
continental brute. There's no question that Napoleon killed a lot of people on 13 Vendémiaire.
At one stage, he advanced his cannon to within about 50 metres of the insurrectionaries,
to terrible effect. By comparison, only a handful of his own men were killed,
so the slaughter would appear disproportionate. And bearing in mind that Napoleon was helping
to put down a revolt, and not, as per his self-professed revolutionary principles,
joining in, the whole whiff of grapeshot affair does at least on the surface seem
to paint Napoleon as something of a hypocrite. But such assessments aren't quite fair.
This is the definitive assertion of Napoleon as the defender of order.
The royalist insurrection threatened a convention Napoleon would be quick to admit he'd been hard
done by. But they were still a legitimate government, and at least as far as people
understood things at the time, still a revolutionary government. In later years,
Napoleon's heart would harden. He somewhat embraced his reputation as the bringer of order.
For instance, he remarked, quote,
Good and upstanding people must be persuaded by gentle means. Rabble are only moved by terror.
However, in the immediate aftermath, Napoleon was far from sanguine.
A few hours after the fighting ended, Napoleon wrote to Joseph,
At last, it's all over, and first thought is to send you the news.
The royalists were growing bolder by the day. The convention had ordered the section
the Pelletier to be disarmed, but the section resisted. Menuet was immediately relieved of
duty. The emergency committee selected Barade to command the defence, and I as second-in-command.
We made our arrangements. The enemy attacked us.
We killed a great many. We've disarmed the sections.
Good fortune is with me. Send my love to Eugénie and Julie.
This black mark on Napoleon's career doesn't withstand much scrutiny,
though it does, nonetheless, remain a lamentable loss of life.
At the time, Napoleon did not relish his role, but he did expect to be rewarded. And so he would be.
Time and time again, he'd proven to be extremely capable and steadfastly loyal.
From Giassio to Toulon, from Genoa to Dago, whether at a desk, pen in hand,
or as now, over the gunsights at Vandermeer, Napoleon had proven his mettle.
And yet, his political fortunes had failed to reflect an otherwise stellar record.
That was until now. The convention was weak and frail. They needed all the help they could get.
The services of General de Division, Napoleon Bonaparte,
was something France required to weather the storm.
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