Jonathan Edwards - The Religious Affections: Appendix Letter to Gillespie 1747

Jonathan Edwards
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The following is a letter from Jonathan Edwards to a Mr. Gillespie in answer to his objections to some things in the Treatise on the Religious Affections.
It is dated Northampton, September 4th, 1747.
Reverend and dear Sir, I received your letter of November 24th, 1746, though very long after it was written.
I thank you for it and for your offering me a correspondence with you.
Such an offer I shall gladly embrace and esteem it a great privilege, more especially from the character I have received from you from Mr. Abercrombie,
who I perceive was intimately acquainted with you.
As to the objections you make against some things contained in my late book on religious affections,
I am sorry you did not read the book through before you made them.
If you had, perhaps the difficulties would not have appeared quite so great.
As to what is contained in the 74th and 75th pages, I suppose there is not the least difference of opinion between you and me,
unless it be concerning the signification and propriety of expressions.
I am fully of your mind, and always was without the least doubt of it,
that everyone, both saint and sinner, is indispensably bound at all seasons by the divine authority
to believe instantly on the Lord Jesus, and at the command of the Lord, 1 John 3, 23,
that we should believe on the name of His Son, Jesus Christ, as it is a prescription of the moral law,
the less binds the sinner to immediate performance than the commandment not to kill,
to keep the Sabbath day, or any other duty.
As to the present performance of which, in way of duty,
all agree the sinner is bound, and that men are bound to trust the divine faithfulness,
be their case with respect to light and darkness, sight and so on, what it will.
And that no situation they can be in looses them from obligation to glorify the Lord at all seasons,
and expecting the fulfillment of His words,
and that the sinner that is without spiritual light or sight is bound to believe,
and that it is a duty at that very time incumbent on him to believe.
But I conceive there is a great deal of difference between these two things, namely,
it's being a man's duty that is without spiritual light or sight to believe,
and it's being his duty to believe without spiritual light or sight,
or to believe while he yet remains without spiritual light or sight.
Just the same difference it is between these two things, namely,
it's being his duty that has no faith to believe,
and it's being his duty to believe without faith, or to believe without believing.
I trust there is none will assert the latter, because of the contradiction that it implies.
As it is not proper to say, it is a man's duty to believe without faith,
because it implies a contradiction,
so I think it equally improper to say it is a man's duty to believe without these things
that are essentially implied in faith, because that also implies a contradiction.
But a spiritual sight of Christ, or knowledge of Christ,
is essentially implied in the very nature and notion of faith,
and therefore it is absurd to talk of believing on Christ without spiritual light or sight.
It is the duty of a man that is without these things,
that essentially belong to faith, to believe,
and it is the duty of a man that is without these things that essentially belong to love,
to love God,
because it is an indispensable obligation that lies on all men,
at all times, and in all circumstances, to love God.
But yet it is not a duty to love God without loving Him,
or continuing without those things that essentially belong to His love.
It is the duty of those that have no sense of the loveliness of God,
and have no esteem of Him, to love Him,
as they be not in the least excused by the want of this sense and esteem,
and not loving Him one moment.
But yet it would be nonsense to say it is their duty to love Him
without any sense of His loveliness or any esteem of Him.
It is indeed their duty this moment to come out of their disesteem
and stupid wicked insensibility of His loveliness, and to love Him.
I made the distinction, I thought very plainly,
in the midst of those sentences you quote as exceptionable.
I say expressly, page 74,
it is truly the duty of those who are in darkness
to come out of darkness and to light and believe.
But that they should confidently believe and trust
while they yet remain without spiritual light or sight
is an anti-scriptural and absurd doctrine.
The misunderstanding between us, dear sir,
I suppose to be in the different application of the particle without,
in my use of it, and your understanding of it,
or what we understand is spoken of and supposed in the expression
without spiritual light or sight.
As I use it, I apply it to the act of believing,
and I suppose it to be very absurd to talk of an act of faith
without spiritual light or sight,
wherein I suppose you will allow me to be in the right.
As you understand it, it is applied to duty or obligation,
and you suppose it to be not at all absurd
to talk of an obligation to believe without spiritual light or sight,
but that the obligation remains full
where there is no spiritual light or sight,
wherein I allow you are in the right.
I think, sir, if you read what I have said in my book on this head again,
it will be exceedingly apparent to you
that it is thus that I apply the preposition without,
and not as you before understood it.
I thought I had very plainly manifested
that what I meant by being in darkness
was a being in spiritual blindness,
and so in a dead, stupid, carnal, and un-Christian frame and way,
and not what is commonly called
a being without the light of God's countenance
under the hidings of His face.
We have a great number of people in these parts
that go on that supposition in their notions and practice,
that there really is such a thing as such a manner of believing,
such a kind of faith as this, namely,
a confident believing and firm trusting in God in the dark,
in the sense mentioned,
that is to be sought after,
and is a subject manner of divine prescription,
and which many actually have,
and indeed there are innumerable instances as such
as are apparently in a most senseless, careless,
negligent, apostate, and every way un-Christian and wicked frame,
yet yet encouraged by this principle
retain an exceeding strong confidence of their good state,
and count that herein they do their duty
and give much glory to God under the notion of trusting God in the dark,
and hoping against hope,
and not trusting on their own righteousness,
and they suppose it would show a legal spirit to do otherwise.
I thought it would be manifest to every reader
that I was arguing against such a sort of people.
You say it merits consideration
whether the believer should ever doubt of his state.
On any account, whatever,
because doubting as opposed to believing is absolutely sinful.
Here, sir, you seem to suppose
that a person's doubting of his own good estate
is a proper opposite of faith,
and these and some other expressions in your letter
seem to suppose that doubting of one's good estate and belief
is the same thing,
and so that being confident of one's good estate and faith
are the same thing.
This I acknowledge I don't understand.
I don't take faith in a person's believing
that they have faith to be the same thing,
nor do I take unbelief or being without faith
and doubting whether they have it to be the same thing,
but entirely different.
I should have been glad either
that you had taken a little more notice of what I say on this head,
pages 76 and 77,
or that you had said something to convince me
that I am wrong in this point.
The exercise of faith is doubtless a way to be delivered
from darkness, deadness, backsliding, and so on,
or rather is a deliverance,
as forsaking sin is a way to deliverance from sin,
and is a deliverance itself.
The exercise of grace is doubtless a way to deliverance
from a graceless frame
that consists in the want of exercise of grace,
but as to what you say or seem to intimate
of a person's being confident of his own good estate
as being a way to be delivered from darkness,
deadness, backsliding, and prevailing iniquity.
I think whoever supposes this to be God's method
of delivering his saints
when sunk into an evil, careless, carnal, and unchristian frame,
first to assure them of their good estate in his favor,
while they yet remain in such a frame,
and to make that the means of their deliverance,
does surely mistake God's method of dealing with such persons.
Among all the multitudes I have had opportunity to observe
I never knew one dealt with after this manner.
I have known many brought back from great declension
that appeared to me to be true saints,
but it was in a way very diverse from this.
In the first place, conscience has been awakened,
and they have been brought into great fear of the wrath of God,
having his favor hid,
and they have been the subjects of a kind of new work of humiliation,
brought to a great sense of their deserving of God's wrath,
even while they have yet feared it,
before God has delivered them from the apprehension of it,
and comforted them with a renewed sense of his favor.
As to what I say of the necessity of universal obedience,
or of one way of known sin, i.e. so as properly to be said
to be the way and manner of the man,
be an exception enough against a man's salvation,
I should have known better what to have said further about it,
if you had briefly shown how the Scriptures that I mention,
and the arguments I deduce from them,
are insufficient for the proof of this point.
I confess they appear to me to prove it as fully as anything
concerning the necessary qualifications of a true saint
can be proved from Scripture.
You object against my saying, page 276,
nor can a true saint ever fall away,
so that it shall come to this that ordinarily
there shall be no remarkable difference
in his walk and behavior since his conversion
from what was before."
This, I think, implies no more than that his walk over the same ground,
in like circumstances, under like trials,
will have a remarkable difference.
As to the instance you mention of David and Solomon,
I don't know that the Scripture gives us anywhere
so much of a history of their walk and behavior
before their conversion as to put us into any proper capacity
of comparing their after-walk with their former.
These examples are uncertain.
But I think those doctrines of the Scripture are not uncertain,
which I mention in the place you cite to confirm the point,
which teach that converts are new men, new creatures,
that they are renewed not only within but without,
that old things are passed away and all things become new,
that they walk in newness of life,
that the members of their bodies are new,
that whereas they before were the servants of sin
and yielded their members servants of iniquity,
now they yield themselves servants of righteousness unto holiness.
As to those doubts and cases of difficulty you mention,
I should think it very needless for a divine of your character
to apply yourself to me for a solution of difficulties
for whom it would be more proper to learn of you.
However, since you are pleased to insist on my giving my mind upon them,
I would observe, as to the first case you mention,
of a person incessantly harassed by Satan and so on,
you don't say of what nature the temptations are that he is harassed with.
But I think it impossible to give proper advice and direction
without knowing this.
Satan is to be resisted in a very different manner
in different kinds of onsets.
When persons are harassed with those strange horrid injections
that melancholic persons are often subject to,
he is to be resisted in a very different manner
from what is proper in a case of violent temptation
to gratify some worldly lust.
In a former case, I should by no means advise a person
to resist a devil by entering the lists with him
and vehemently engage in their mind in an earnest dispute
and violent struggle with a grand adversary,
but rather by diverting the mind from his frightful suggestions,
by going on steadfastly and diligently
in the ordinary course of duty
without allowing themselves time and leisure
to attend to the devil's sophistry
or viewing his frightful representations,
committing themselves to God by prayer in this way
without anxiety about what has been suggested.
That is the best way of resisting the devil
that crosses his design most,
and he more effectually disappoints him in such cases
that treats him with neglect
than he that attends so much to him
as to engage in a direct conflict
and goes about to try his strength and skill with him
in a violent dispute or combat,
the latter course rather gives him advantage than anything else.
It is what he would if he can get persons thus engaged
in a violent struggle.
He gains a great point.
He knows that melancholy persons are not fit for it.
By this he gains that point of diverting and taking off the person
from the ordinary course of duty,
which is one great thing he aims at.
And by this, having gained a person's attention to what he says,
he has opportunity to use all his craft and subtlety.
And by the struggle he raises melancholy vapors to a greater degree
and further weakens a person's mind
and gets him faster and faster in his snares,
deeper and deeper in the mire.
He increases a person's anxiety of mind,
which is the very thing by which mainly he fulfills all his purposes
with such persons.
Concerning the other difficulty you mentioned
relating to the verifying of Romans 8, verse 28,
all things shall work together for good, and so on,
in a saint that falls under backsliding and spiritual decays,
it seems to be a matter of some difficulty
to understand exactly how this is to be taken
and how far it may from hence be inferred
that the temptations the saints meet with from Satan
and an evil world and their own declensions and sins
shall surely work for their good.
However, since you desire my thoughts,
I would express them such as they are as follows.
In order rightly to state this matter,
there are two things that may be laid down
as positions of certain and inducible truth
concerning this doctrine of the Apostle first.
The meaning cannot be that God's dispensations and disposals
towards each saint are the best for him,
most tending to his happiness,
of all that are possible,
or that all things that are ordered for him
are done by God with respect to him,
or in all respects better for him
than anything else that God could have ordered or done,
issuing him the highest good and happiness,
that it is possible he should be brought to.
For that would be as much as to say
that God would bestow on every one of us
as much happiness as he can confer
in the utmost exercise of his omnipotence.
And this sets aside all these different degrees
of grace and holiness here and glory hereafter,
which he bestows according to his sovereign pleasure.
All things may work together for good to the saints,
all may be of benefit to them
and may have a concurring tendency to their happiness,
and may all finally issue in it,
and yet not tend to or issue
in the highest degree of good and happiness possible.
There is a certain measure of holiness and happiness
that each one of the elect is eternally appointed to,
and all things that relate to him
work together to bring to pass
this appointed measure of good.
The text and context speak of
God's eternal purpose of good to the elect,
predestinating them to a conformity to his Son
in holiness and happiness.
And the implicit reasoning of the apostle
leads us to suppose that all things
will purely concur to bring to effect
God's eternal purpose,
and therefore from his reasoning
it may be inferred that all things
will tend to work together to bring to pass
that degree of good that God
has purposed to bestow upon them
and not any more.
And indeed it would be in itself unreasonable
to suppose anything else but this,
inasmuch as God is the supreme orderer of all things.
Doubtless all things shall be so ordered
that with one consent
they shall help to bring to pass
his ends, aims, and purposes.
But surely not to bring to pass
what he does not aim at and never intended.
God in his government of the world
is carrying on his own designs and everything,
but he is not carrying on that which is not his design.
And therefore there is no need of supposing
that all the circumstances, means,
and advantages of every saint
are the best in every respect
that God could have ordered for him,
or that there could have been no circumstances
or means that he could have been the subject of
that would with God's usual blessing
have issued in this greater good.
Every saint is, as it were, a living stone
that in his present state of preparation
is fitting for the place appointed for him
in the heavenly temple.
And in this sense all things undoubtedly work
together for good
to every one that is called according to God's purpose.
He is all the while, he lives in this world,
by all the dispensations of providence towards him,
fitting for the particular mansion and glory
that is appointed and prepared for him,
or hewing for his appointed place
in the heavenly building.
Secondly, another thing which is no less certain
and demonstrable than the position
that has been already laid down
and indeed follows from it is this,
when it is said all things work together for good,
and hereby cannot be intended
that all things both positive and negative
are best for them,
or that it is so universally
that not only every positive thing
that the saints are the subject of
or are concerned in will work for their good,
but also that when anything is absent
or withheld from them by God and his providence,
that absence or withholding
is also for their good in that sense,
or to be better for them
than the presence or bestowment would have been,
for this would have the same absurd consequence
that was mentioned before, namely,
that God makes every saint as happy as possibly he can,
and besides, if so, it would follow
that God's withholding greater degrees
of the sanctifying influences of his Spirit
is for the saints' good,
and that it is best for them to live and die
so low in grace as they do,
which would be as much as to say
that it is for their good to have no more good,
or that it is for their happiness
to have no more happiness here and hereafter.
If we take good notice
of the apostles' discourse in Romans 8,
it would be apparent
that his words imply no such thing.
All God's creatures
and all that God does in disposing of them
is for the good of the saint,
but it will not thus follow
that all God's forbearing to do
is also for his good,
or that it is best for him
that God does no more for him.
The following reading from Jonathan Edwards
is from Thoughts on the Present Revival of Religion.
If we look back into the history
of the Church of God in past ages,
we may observe that it has been
a common device of the devil
to revive a love religion.
When he finds he can keep men quiet
and secure no longer,
then he drives them to excesses
and extravagances.
He holds them back as long as he can.
But when he can do it no longer,
then he will push them on
and, if possible, run them upon their heads.
And it has been by this means chiefly
that he has been successful
in several instances
to overthrow most hopeful
and promising beginnings.
He has been successful, by degrees,
to overset the grand religious revival
of the world in the primitive
ages of Christianity,
and in a manner to overthrow
the Christian Church through the earth
and to make way for the great
anti-Christian apostasy.
That masterpiece of all the devil's works
was to improve the indiscreet zeal
of Christians,
to drive them into those three extremes
of enthusiasm, superstition,
and severity towards opposers,
as an everlasting warning
to the Christian Church.
Though the devil will do his diligence
to stir up the open enemies of religion,
yet he knows what is for his interest
so well that, in a time of revival
of religion,
his main strength shall be tried
with the friends of it,
and he will chiefly exert himself
in his attempts to mislead them.
One truly zealous person,
in a time of such an event,
that seems to have had a great hand
upon him, may do more,
through Satan's being too subtle for him,
to hinder the work,
than a hundred great and strong
and open opposers.
In a time of the great work of Christ,
his hands with which he works
are often wounded in the house
of his friends,
and his work hindered chiefly by them,
so that if anyone inquires,
as in, What are those wounds
in thine hands?
he may answer,
The errors of the friends of the work of God,
and especially of the great promoters of it,
give vast advantage
to the enemies of such a work.
Indeed, there are many things which are no errors,
but are only duties,
faithfully and thoroughly done,
that wound the minds of such persons
more than real errors.
But yet one real error gives opposers
as much advantage, and hinders and clogs
the work as much,
as ten that are only supposed ones.
Real errors do not threaten
gall the enemies of religion so much
as those things that are strictly right,
but they encourage them more,
they give them liberty, and open a gap for them,
so that some who before
kept their enmity burning in their own breasts,
and dared not show themselves,
will on such an occasion
take courage, and give themselves vent,
and their rage will be like that
of an enemy let loose.
Those who lay still before, having nothing to say
but what they would be ashamed of,
agreeable to Titus 2.8,
when they have such a weapon put into their hands,
will fight with all violence.
And indeed the enemies of religion
would not know what to do for weapons
to fight with, were it not for the errors
of its friends.
And so must soon fall before them.
Besides, in real errors,
things that are truly disagreeable
to the rule of God's word,
we cannot expect a divine protection,
and that God will appear on our side
as if errors were only supposed ones.
Says therefore the errors
of the friends and promoters
of such a glorious work of God
are of such dreadful consequence.
It seems the devil, being sensible of this,
is so assiduous, watchful, and subtle
in his attempts with them,
and has by this been so successful
to overthrow religion heretofore.
Certainly such persons
ought to be exceedingly circumspect
and vigilant, diffident
and jealous of themselves,
and humbly dependent on the guidance
of the good shepherd, 1 Peter 4.7.
Be sober, and watch unto prayer,
and 1 Peter 5.8.
Be sober, be vigilant,
because your adversary the devil is a roaring lion
walketh about.
For persons to go on resolutely
in a kind of heat and vehemence,
despising admonition and correction,
being confident the name must be in the right
because they are full of the Spirit,
is directly contrary
to the import of these words,
be sober, be vigilant.
It is a mistake I have observed in some,
by which they have been greatly exposed
to their wounding, that they think
they are in no danger of going astray,
or being misled by the devil,
because they are near to God,
and so have no jealous eye
upon themselves,
and neglect vigilance and circumspection
as needless in their case.
They say they do not think
that God will leave them to dishonor Him
and wound religion as long as they keep near to Him,
and I believe so too
as long as they keep near to God,
and maintain a universal, intelligent watch
and care,
to do their duty, avoid sin and snares
with diffidence in themselves,
and humble dependence and prayerfulness,
but not merely because they are receiving
blessed communications from God
and refreshing views of Him,
if at the same time they let down their watch
and are not jealous over their own hearts
by reason of its remaining blindness
and corruption,
and a subtle adversary.
The following is taken from
Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards
and it deals with the sincerity of
desires,
showing that in the unregenerate
they come from mercenary motives.
The sincerity of desires
and endeavors which is supposed to
excuse in the non-performance of things
in themselves good,
particularly considered.
It is much insisted on by many
that some men, though they are not able
to perform spiritual duties,
such as repentance of sin,
love to God,
the cordial acceptance of Christ
as exhibited and offered in the gospel,
and so on,
yet may be sincere in their
desires and endeavor after these things
and therefore must be
excused, it being unreasonable
to blame them for the omission of those
things which they sincerely
desire and endeavor to do
but cannot.
Concerning this manner, the following things
may be observed. Number one,
what is here supposed
is a great mistake and gross absurdity
even that men may sincerely
choose and desire those spiritual duties
of love, acceptance,
choice, rejection
and so on, consisting
in the exercise of the will itself
or in the disposition and inclination of the
heart and yet not able to
perform or exert them.
This is absurd because it is
absurd to suppose that a man
should directly, properly
and sincerely inclined
to have an inclination which at the
same time is contrary to his
inclination. For that is
to suppose him not to be inclined to that
which he is inclined to.
If a man in the state and acts of
his will and inclination
properly and directly
falls in with those duties
he therein performs them
for the duties themselves consist
in that very thing.
They consist in the state and acts of the will
being so formed and directed.
If the soul properly and sincerely
falls in with a certain proposed
act of will or choice,
the soul therein makes that choice its own.
Even as when a moving body
falls in with a proposed direction
of its motion, that is the
same thing as to move in that direction.
Number two.
That which is called a desire and willingness
for those inward duties
and such as do not perform
them has respect to these duties
only indirectly and remotely
and is improperly so called
not only because, as was observed
before, it respects those
good volitions only in a distant
view, and with respect to
future time, but also because
of remore. Not these things
themselves, but something else
that is foreign is the object
that terminates these volitions
and desires.
A drunkard who continues in his drunkenness,
being under the power
of a violent appetite to strong
drink, and without any love
to virtue, but being also
extremely covetous and close,
and very much exercised and grieved
at the diminution of his estate and
prospect of poverty, may
in a sort desire the virtue
of temperance, and though
his present will is to gratify
his extravagant appetite,
yet he may wish he had a heart to
forbear future acts of intemperance
and forsake his excesses
through an unwillingness to part
with his money, but still he goes on
with his drunkenness, his wishes
and endeavors are insufficient and
ineffectual. Such a man
has no proper, direct, sincere
willingness to forsake this vice
and the vicious deeds which belong
to it, for he acts voluntarily
in continuing to drink to
excess. His desire
is very improperly called a willingness
to be temperate. It is no
true desire of that virtue,
for it is not that virtue that
terminates his wishes, nor
have they any direct respect at all
to it. It is only the saving
of his money or the avoiding of
poverty that terminates
and exhausts the whole strength
of his desire. The
virtue of temperance is regarded only
very indirectly and improperly,
even as a necessary means of gratifying
a vice of covetousness.
So a man of an exceedingly
corrupt and wicked heart, who has no
love to God and Jesus Christ,
but, on the contrary, being very
profane and carnally inclined,
has the greatest distaste
of the things of religion
and enmity against them,
yet being of a family that from one
generation to another have
most of them died in youth of an
hereditary consumption, and so
having little hope of living long,
and having been instructed in the necessity
of a supreme love to Christ,
and latitude for his death and
sufferings, in order to his salvation
from eternal misery,
if under these circumstances he should,
through fear of eternal torments,
wish he had such a disposition,
but his profane and carnal heart
remaining he continues still
in his habitual distaste of
and enmity to God and religion.
And holy without any exercise
of that love and gratitude is doubtless
the very devils themselves,
notwithstanding all their devilishness
of their temper, would wish
for a holy heart, if by that means
they could get out of hell.
In this case there is no sincere willingness
to love Christ and choose him as his
chief good. These holy dispositions
and exercises are not at all the
direct object of the will.
They truly share no part of the
inclination or desire of the soul,
but all is terminated on deliverance
from torment. And these
graces and pious volitions,
notwithstanding this forced consent,
are looked upon as in themselves
undesirable, as when a sick man
desires a dose he
greatly abhors in order to save his
life. From these things it
appears that this indirect
willingness is not that exercise
of the will which the command requires,
but is entirely a different
one, being a volition of a different nature,
and terminated altogether
on different objects, wholly falling
short of that virtue of will to which the
command has respect.
This other volition, which has only
some indirect concern with the duty
required, cannot excuse
for the lack of that good will itself
which is commanded, being not
the thing which answers and fulfills the
command, and being wholly destitute
of the virtue which the command seeks.
Further, to illustrate
this manner, if a child has a most excellent
father that has ever treated him with
fatherly kindness and tenderness,
and has every way in the highest degree
merited his love and dutiful regard,
and is withal very
wealthy, but the son is of so
vile a disposition that he
inveterately hates his dad,
and yet apprehending that his hatred of him
is like to prove his ruin, by
bringing him finally to those abject
circumstances which are exceedingly
adverse to his avarice and ambition,
he therefore wishes it were
otherwise. But yet remaining under
the invincible power of his vile
and malignant disposition, he continues
still in a settled hatred of his father.
Now such a son's
indirect willingness to love and honor his
father at all acquits or excuses before
God, for his feeling of
actually exercising his dispositions
towards him, which God
requires, it must be on one of
these accounts, number one, either
that it answers and fulfills the command.
But this does
not by the supposition,
because the thing commanded is love and honor
to his worthy parent.
If the command be proper and just as is
supposed, then it obliges to the thing
commanded, and so nothing else but that
can answer the obligation.
Or number two, it must be at
least because there is that virtue or goodness
in his indirect willingness
that is equivalent to the virtue required,
and so balances or
countervails it, and makes up
for the want of it. But that also
is contrary to the supposition.
The willingness a son has
merely from a regard to money and honor
has no goodness in it, to
countervail the lack of the pious
material respect required.
Sincerity and reality in that
indirect willingness, which has
been spoken of, does not make it the
better. That which is real and
hearty is often called sincere, whether
it be in virtue or vice.
Some persons are sincerely bad,
others are sincerely good,
and others may be sincere and hearty in
things which are in their
own nature indifferent, as a
man may be sincerely desirous of
eating when he is hungry.
But being sincere, hearty,
and in good earnest is no virtue
unless it be in a thing that is virtuous.
A man may be sincere
and hearty and join in a crew of pirates
or a gang of robbers. When the
devils cried out and besought Christ not
to torment them, it was no
mere pretense. They were very hearty
in their desires not to be tormented.
But this did not make
their will or desire virtuous.
And if men have sincere desires
which are in their kind in nature no better,
it can be no excuse for
the lack of any required virtue.
And as a man's sincerity
in such an indirect desire
or willingness to do his duty,
as has been mentioned, cannot excuse
for the want of performance,
so it is with endeavors arising
from such a willingness.
The endeavors can have no more goodness
in them than the will of which they are
the effect and expression.
And therefore, however sincere and
real, and however great a person's
endeavors are, yea, though they
should be to the utmost of his ability,
unless the will
from which they proceed be truly
good and virtuous, they can be
of no avail or weight whatsoever
in a moral respect.
That which is not truly virtuous
is, in God's sight, good for nothing,
and so can be of no value
or influence in his account to make
up for any moral defect.
For nothing can counterbalance evil
but good. If evil be in
one scale, and we put a great deal
into the other of sincere and
earnest desires, and many in
great endeavors, yet if there be no
real goodness at all, there is no weight
in it, and so it does nothing towards
balancing the real weight, which is
in the opposite scale. It is only
like subtracting a thousand knots
from before a real number, which leaves
a sum just as it was.
Indeed, such endeavors may have a
negatively good influence, though
things which have no positive virtue
have no positive moral influence,
yet they may be an occasion of persons
avoiding some positive evils.
As if a man were in the water with
a neighbor to whom he had ill will,
and who could not swim,
holding him by his hand, this neighbor
was much in debt to him.
The man is tempted to let him sink
and drown, but refuses to comply
with the temptation, not from
love to his neighbor, but from the
love of money, and because by his
drowning he should lose his debt.
That which he does in preserving his neighbor
from drowning is nothing good
in the sight of God, yet by this
he avoids a greater guilt that would
have been contracted if he
designedly let his neighbor sink and
perish. But when Arminians
in their disputes with Calvinists
insist so much on sincere desires
and endeavors as what must excuse
men because accepted of
God, and so on, it is manifest
they have respect to some positive
moral weight or influence of those
desires and endeavors.
Accepting, justifying, and
excusing on the account of sincere
endeavors, as they are called, and
men doing what they can, and so on, has
relation to some moral value,
something that it accepts as good,
and as such countervailing some defect.
But there is a great and
unknown deceit arising from the ambiguity
of the phrase sincere
endeavors. Indeed, there is
a vast indistinctness and
unfixedness in most, or at least very
many of the terms used to express things
pertaining to moral and
spiritual manners, whence arise
innumerable mistakes, strong
prejudices, inextricable
confusion, and endless
controversy. The word
sincere is most commonly used to
signify something that is good.
Men are habituated to understand
by it the same as honest and upright,
which terms excite an idea
of something good in the strictest and highest
sense, good in the sight of him
who sees not only the outward appearance
but the heart, and therefore
men think that if a person be sincere
he will certainly be accepted.
If it be said that anyone
is sincere in his endeavors,
this suggests that his heart is good,
that there is no defect of duty
as to virtuous inclination.
He honestly and uprightly desires
and endeavors to do as he is required,
and this leads him to suppose
that it would be very hard and unreasonable
to punish him, only because
he is unsuccessful in his endeavors,
the thing endeavored
after being beyond his power.
Whereas it ought to be observed
that the word sincere has these different
significations. First,
sincerity,
as the word is sometimes used,
signifies no more than
reality of will and endeavor
with respect to anything that is
professed or pretended, without
any consideration of the nature of the
principle or aim.
Whence this real will and true endeavor
arises, if a man
has some real desire,
either direct or indirect
to obtain a thing, or does
really endeavor after it, he is said
sincerely to desire or endeavor
without any consideration of the goodness
of the principle from which he acts,
or any excellency or worthiness
of the end for which he acts.
Thus a man who is kind to his neighbor's
wife, who is sick and languishing,
and very helpful in her case,
a show of desiring and endeavoring
her restoration to health and vigor,
and not only makes such a show,
but there is a reality in his pretense,
he does heartily and earnestly
desire to have her health restored,
and uses his true and utmost endeavors
for it. He is said sincerely
to desire and endeavor after it,
because he does so truly or
really, though perhaps the principle
he acts from is no other than a
vile and scandalous passion.
Having lived in adultery with her, he
earnestly desires to have her health
and vigor restored, that he may
return to his criminal pleasures.
Or number two,
by sincerity is meant not merely a reality
of will and endeavor of some sort,
and from some consideration
or other, but of virtuous sincerity.
That is, that in the
performance of those particular acts
that are the manner of virtue
or duty, there be not only
the manner, but the form and essence of virtue
consistent in the aim that it governs
the acts, and the principle
exercised in it. There is not
only the reality of the act,
that is, as it were, the body of the duty,
but also the soul, which should properly
belong to such a body.
In this sense a man is said to be sincere
when he acts with a pure intention,
not from sinister views.
He not only in reality desires
and seeks the thing to be done,
or qualification to be obtained,
for some end or other, but he wills
the thing directly and properly,
as neither forced
nor bribed.
The virtue of the thing is properly the object
of the will. In a former
sense a man is said to be sincere
in opposition to a mere pretense,
and show of the particular thing
to be done or exhibited, without any
real desire or endeavor at all.
In a latter sense a man
is said to be sincere in opposition
to that show of virtue there is, and
merely do in the manner of duty,
without the reality of the virtue itself
and the soul. A man may be
sincere in the former sense, and yet
in the latter be in the sight of God,
who searches the heart of vile
hypocrite. In the latter
kind of sincerity only, there is anything
truly valuable or acceptable
in the sight of God.
And this is what in Scripture is called
sincerity, uprightness,
integrity, truth
in the inward parts,
and heirs of a perfect heart.
And if there be such a sincerity
and such a degree of it as there ought to be,
and there be anything further that
the man is not able to perform,
or which does not prove to be connected
with his sincere desires and endeavors,
the man is wholly excused
and acquitted in the sight of God.
His will shall be surely accepted
for his deed. And such a
sincere will and endeavor is all that
in strictness is required of him
by any command of God.
But as to the other kind of
sincerity of desires and endeavors,
having no virtue in it
as was observed before,
it can be of no avail before
God in any case to recommend,
satisfy, or
excuse, and has no positive
moral weight or influence whatsoever.
Application
number one. Hence it may be
inferred that nothing in the reason
and nature of things appears from
the consideration of any moral weight
in the former kind of sincerity,
leading us to suppose
that God has made any positive
promises of salvation,
or grace, or any saving
assistance, or any spiritual
benefit whatsoever
to any desires,
prayers, endeavors,
striving, or obedience of
those who hitherto have no
true virtue or holiness in their
hearts, though we should
suppose all the sincerity and the utmost
degree of endeavor that is
possible to be in any person
without holiness.
Some object against God requiring
as a condition of salvation those
holy exercises which are the result
of a supernatural renovation,
such as a supreme respect
to Christ, love to
God, loving holiness
for its own sake, and so on,
that these inward dispositions
and exercises are above men's
power, as they are by nature,
and therefore that we may conclude
that when men are brought to be sincere
in their endeavors, and do as well
as they can, they are accepted,
and that this must be all that
God requires in order to their being
received as the objects of His favor,
and must be what God has appointed
as the condition of salvation.
Concerning this, I would
observe that in such manner of speaking
as men being accepted because they are
sincere, and do as well as
they can, there is evidently a supposition
of some virtue,
some degree of that which is truly good,
though it does not go so far
as were to be wished.
For if men do what they can, unless
their so doing be from some good principle,
disposition, or
exercise of heart,
some virtuous inclination or act
of the will, their so doing
what they can is in some respect
not a whit better than if they did nothing
at all. In such a case,
there is no more positive moral goodness
in a man doing what he can,
than in a windmill doing what it can,
because the action does no more proceed
from virtue, and there is nothing
in such sincerity of endeavor,
or doing what we can, that should
render it any more a fit recommendation
to positive favor and acceptance,
or the condition of any reward
or actual benefit, than
doing nothing. For both
the one and the other are alike nothing
as to any true moral weight or
value. Application
number two. Hence also it follows
there is nothing that appears in the
reason and nature of things, which
can justly lead us to determine
that God will certainly give the necessary
means of salvation, or some way or other
bestow true holiness, and
eternal life on those heathens
who are sincere in the sense above
explained, and their endeavors
to find out the will of the deity,
and to please him according to their light,
that they may escape his future
displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness
in the future state, through
his favor."
From the Freedom of the Will
on the Inclination and Sincerity
of Endeavors, by Jonathan
Edwards. Thank you for tuning in
to the Puritan and Reformed Audio
Podcast.
