How will Russia retaliate to the mass shooting in Moscow? | Inside Story

How will Russia retaliate to the mass shooting in Moscow? An affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has claimed responsibility. The group has targeted Russia before. What are the implications of this latest attack? This is Inside Story. Hello again, I'm James Bayes. It's the worst attack on the Russian capital in more than a decade. Gunmen opened fire in a crowded concert venue, killing at least 150 people. An ISIL-linked group has claimed responsibility. But why is it targeting Russia? And how did such a major breach of security happen? We'll go to our panel in just a moment, but first, Fintan Monaghan has this report. An attack on one of Moscow's most popular concert halls. Panic in the aisles as gunmen opened fire at the crowds. Those who got out say they were lucky to escape. We've seen the shooting. There are many dead and wounded. A fire started there now. All I heard was gunshots. That's it. An ISIL affiliate claimed responsibility. In recent years, the group has carried out attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and killed nearly 100 people in Iran in January. Two years ago, a suicide bomber targeted the Russian embassy in Kabul. And the group was also behind the attack on Kabul airport in 2021, which killed 175 people and 13 U.S. troops. The U.S. says it warned Russia an attack was imminent in the days leading up to the shooting. President Vladimir Putin has promised revenge. We will identify and punish everyone who was behind the terrorist attack, who prepared this strike against Russia and its people. He also suggested Ukraine was involved, an accusation it dismissed. It's obvious that Putin is just trying to find someone else to blame. Instead of dealing with his Russian citizens and addressing them, Putin was silent for the whole day, thinking about how to link it to Ukraine. Only a few days before, Putin had been celebrating his victory in a presidential election. Now he's facing the pullout from a major security failure and questions about how he's going to ensure it doesn't happen again. Vincent Monaghan, Al Jazeera, for Inside Story. Well, now let's discuss all of this with our guests. Joining us from Lahore in Pakistan, Ahmad Rashid, a veteran journalist who specializes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He's the author of the best-selling books on the Taliban and Central Asia. In Rome, Owen Matthews, the author of Overreach, the inside story of Putin's war against Ukraine and a Russia specialist. And in Geneva, Jérôme Drevran, a senior analyst in jihad and modern conflict at the International Crisis Group. Jérôme specializes in non-state armed groups. Thank you very much, all three of you, for joining us. So let's start with who we think carried out this attack. If I start with you, Ahmad, the branch of ISIL that mainly we know for what it does in Afghanistan, say they did it. And they backed their claim later by releasing a video with body cam footage from one of the attackers, which matches other pictures that were taken from those that were in the hall. Do you see this as conclusive? I would definitely go with the claim that it is ISIS-Khorasan, because this is a strategy they've been following for quite some years now, and that is to kill as many Russians, Chinese and other big power, American, of course, big power states, and undermine them. And what we do know is that ISIS-K has targeted Russians in Kabul, in Iran, in other places. And this is all part of a strategy of hating Moscow and Russia, partly because of what the Central Asians inherited from the Bolsheviks and before that from even the czarist times, where Tajikistan was very neglected by the state, and nobody was prepared to invest in it or develop it in any way. And as a result, there was increasing resentment, especially among the Tajiks. And there are reports that some of the killers, bombers, the suicide bombers, may have been Tajiks. So I'm sure the Russians will be looking into that. Well, let's see what the Russians are saying right now, Owen, because it took 19 hours before President Putin made a televised address. He spoke for five minutes, and he didn't say who he thought had done it, but he did say this. Based on preliminary information, a window for crossing the border was prepared for them by the Ukrainian side. He's making a link to the war in Ukraine. Also, the authorities in Russia say the attackers fled in a white Renault car, and it was stopped about 340 kilometers from Moscow in the direction of Ukraine. What do you make of this claim that they were trying to flee across the border into Ukraine, because that's a very well-fortified border, and they'd have to go across that and then an active front line? Yeah, it's completely crazy. We should note that actually Bryansk, where the car was stopped and the suspects were apprehended, is also on the way to Belarus, which is actually a much better place to flee if you're fleeing. I think it's quite possible they didn't expect to escape, and the slowness and the ineffectiveness of the Moscow police and Russian National Guard response came as a surprise to the hostage-takers themselves. They didn't prepare a second getaway car. They made no attempt to change their getaway car. So it's possible they didn't actually plan very well where they were going to go afterwards. But the real significance, actually, of the whole Ukraine hint is I think we can safely assume that there is a team of FSB people in Moscow and around faking evidence, trying to put together some kind of body of evidence to pin this on Ukraine. I think we're going to be hearing from them pretty soon, unfortunately. So it seems you don't think it was linked to Ukraine. Armour doesn't think it was linked to Ukraine. Jerome, if it is this group that calls itself Islamic State in Khorasan, can you tell us who they are and explain that link, that word? It's a historical reference, Khorasan. Basically we are speaking about a group that emerged around 2015 that was created by disgruntled Taliban Pakistan commanders, some also commanders from the Taliban, plus also some ethnic minorities, including among Uzbeks, Tajiks, and so on, who affiliated with Islamic State when Islamic State became very powerful in Syria and Iraq. And so since then, the group has been initially fighting against American troops in Afghanistan, but also against the Taliban. And since the Taliban takeover, basically Islamic State Khorasan, so Khorasan refers to the region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, broadly speaking. So the group has tried to orchestrate two types of attacks. First, it tries to destabilize the Taliban and the Taliban government within Afghanistan by targeting religious minorities, by targeting Taliban commanders, and so on, to prove to the world that the Taliban cannot ensure security within Afghanistan. So that's for one. And second, the group has been largely involved outside as well. So it has staged attacks in Pakistan, in Turkey. There have been multiple attempts as well in Western Europe, even though those were low-scale attacks. And so the attack in Russia very much fits with the modus operandi that has become common for the past few years, including reliance on ethnic minorities like Tajiks, who are dominating this network outside, but also the type of targets, targeting civilians so that they would try to increase the mediatic impact of the actions. So, Ahmad, just if you could add to that, this particular group, which, as Jerome has just said, has seen a lot of its activity recently in Afghanistan, how is it linked to the wider parts of ISIL, for example, in the Middle East? I mean, is there coordination, a joint command structure, or do they just share the same ideology? No, I think that there is a lot of cooperation, because you've seen ISIL active in all these countries around Afghanistan, and they have been devastatingly successful in some of the suicide attacks that have taken place in Pakistan, in Iran, and other places. So, I mean, I think what we are faced with, remember, that they also do not believe in the Taliban ideology. They believe in a much more extreme Islamic ideology than we have really seen in the region before. And the danger now is that there will be a general crackdown by the Russians, by the Central Asian regimes, against Islamic militancy. But how successful that will be, given the failure, this massive failure that took place in Moscow the other day, I don't think the Russian population is really going to believe in what they're being told about the future. And, Owen, they're not in Russia accepting there was a failure yet, are they? Well, Ahmed makes a superb point. How stupid and how gullible do we think the Russians are? I mean, clearly, 25 years of Putin's rule has brainwashed the people to a significant degree, but this is really a big ask, to actually demand that people see this as a part of the Ukraine war, rather than a catastrophic failure of Putin's security state. And it's a major political problem for Putin, because security is Putin's brand. He came to power in the wake of terrorist attacks in Moscow and around Russia. His contract with his people has always been that he keeps them safe in a hostile world. And now we see that there's a catastrophic basic failure of that security state that Putin has built to fulfill its basic function. They're very good at beating up babushkas with bunches of carnations, and they're very good at terrorising hipsters at demonstrations, but clearly they're not doing the main thing they're supposed to do, which is to keep people safe from this kind of appalling terrorist attack. Jerome, if I can go back to the group itself, just be clear for us. What are they trying to achieve, and what is your estimation of how strong they are and exactly where they are based? I mean, basically what they are trying to achieve in comparison to other groups, as was mentioned before, they don't believe in alliances with states. So for them, everybody is basically an enemy. Other states are enemies, Muslim states are enemies, but even other Islamic or jihadi groups are also enemies, because they're not proper Muslims for them. So in that sense, they're trying to destabilise their regional environment. But there is something quite paradoxical with ISK's foreign agenda. So the type of attacks that they've launched in Iran, in Turkey, now in Moscow, it's partially the outcome of their own weakness in Afghanistan, in the sense that they are still active in Afghanistan, but the Taliban for the past year has largely clamped down on them, dismantling their cells, arresting or killing some of their leaders, and so on. And so for the group, because of the huge pressure that they are facing in Afghanistan by the Taliban itself, they are trying to project violence elsewhere as an alternative to domestic violence within Afghanistan. So it's a bit paradoxical, but external violence is also part of the outcome of the failure to achieve something in Afghanistan. Let me get your take on that, Ahmed. How has the group's fortunes changed since August 2021? Because before that, they were targeted by the US, there were US raids, arrests and airstrikes, and of course now their adversary is the Taliban. How has that, in your view, changed their fortunes and their strength? Well, I mean, they've become much stronger, because with the departure of the Americans, the departure of the international community, the Taliban being generally a weak force, they have maintained security to some extent, but they can't do the kind of intelligence work required to deal with extremism. I mean, we have a very difficult situation for them. I mean, the world considers the Taliban a pariah. Now, does this attack mean that Russia is going to recognize the Taliban or work closely with the Taliban to identify ISIS-K militants? That may well be the outcome. And of course, there'll be shouts of protest from Afghan women and others who've been deprived of their jobs and livelihood by the Taliban. But this bombing has really created an enormous problem and a question for the Taliban and also for those countries who are refusing to recognize the Taliban. Ahmad, Jerome made the point that they're lashing out beyond Afghanistan because they're under pressure in Afghanistan. If you look at their recent attacks, there was, back in 2022, an attempt on the life of the acting ambassador of Pakistan in Kabul, a suicide bomber attacking the Russian embassy, Russia again the target, and also in 2022 attacking a hotel popular with Chinese nationals. Since then, though, attacks in Pakistan in 2023 and in January this year in Iran. Do you agree with Jerome that they are expanding? Yes, absolutely. I mean, this is the basic tactic they have as a suicide bomber, and they're now using that very extensively around the whole region. And this is their way of expansion. It's not necessarily a political way, but it's a way to use suicide bombers. And the fact that they can still recruit suicide bombers, presumably from all these neighboring countries, says a lot of their abilities for the time being. Now, how—you know, we haven't seen an attack by them in the West, but if an attack does come in the West, what are the Americans going to do? Are they going to launch a massive offensive like they did after 9-11? Or what are their options? These, I think, are huge problems that are now coming up to the forefront, being to be faced by NATO, the U.S., and they have to be thinking ahead of what these groups are capable of and thinking ahead of what can be done to curtail these groups. Jerome, they haven't, it seems, completely finished in Afghanistan because the day before the attack in Moscow, there was an attack, again, we believe carried out by this group, a suicide bombing on a bank in Kandahar. And, of course, Kandahar is not the capital of Afghanistan, but it is where the Taliban's supreme leader, Habibullah Akhundzada, lives. Yes, precisely. That's what they are trying to do. When you look at the attacks in Afghanistan, usually they try to attack either religious minorities, so their places of worship, or mostly civilians, because those are somehow easier to orchestrate because there are many of those places that can be targeted. So it's difficult to ensure security everywhere all the time. So they cannot really target high-level Taliban figures, for example, which could be part of their objectives to really destabilize the Taliban government, but they can't really achieve that. So instead, they are forcing their way into those low-level targeting in public places because for them it's simply easier to achieve. Owen, let me ask you, why would they target Russia, do you think? I mean, I assume you're going to refer all the way back to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Russia's role in Syria. Yes, well, you've answered your own question, James. That's exactly why. It's also a relatively easy target. Moscow is full of Central Asians. They are the gast arbiters who do all of the dirty work. Most of the borders between the free movement within the customs union, so Tajiks and Uzbeks and Kyrgyz workers from Central Asia can freely come to and from Moscow. And it's just a target of convenience as much as ideology, simply because it's easier to hit Moscow than it is to hit the West. Western Europe is harder to get into, you need to get visas, you need to travel, whereas you can literally drive from Central Asia to the Crocus City Hall. It's right by the Ring Road. It's just a turn off the main motorway and you're in Crocus City Hall. Ahmed, I noticed you were trying to get in there. Yes, I mean, you know, I really feel that the driving factor in this is the hatred of the Russians by many of these ethnic minorities who are fighting either for Islam or they're fighting for an independent state. They're both extreme nationalists and extreme Islamists. And this is an area that really has not been explored. I spent two years trying to track down some of these Uzbek and Tajik militants in Tajikistan, and they're very well organized and very much in control of the areas that they occupy. But it's very difficult to reach them. And the local governments are just not capable of—you can imagine what the local governments are doing. If Putin can't put together a force to tackle them, the local governments are facing even bigger problems. Let's examine this Tajikistan link, because my understanding is there are 11 people, according to the Russian Interior Ministry, who are being held. All they say is they're all foreign nationals. But there's also been state TV footage of interrogations of at least two suspects. One is clearly speaking Tajik, which is a version of Persian very close to Dari. Jérôme, tell me about Tajikistan and why this might be important and why that country might be a recruiting ground for this group. There are two reasons. The first one is about Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, IS has largely tried to rely on ethnic minorities. They tried to portray the Taliban as a Pashtun-only group. So they say they're not really a proper Islamic Emirate. They are mostly a group dominated by Pashtuns. And so they also tried to recruit among minorities so that the Taliban, in reaction, clamped down on these minorities so that it reinforces IS as a means to protect those, in a way. So that's one of the reasons. So that's outside of Tajikistan. And the second reason is also about the Syrian conflict. Many individuals from Central Asia, but also from Russia and particularly Chechnya and so on, went to Syria to fight in the ranks of IS. Many of them got killed. But some of them, after IS lost its territory by 2019, left Syria. They went to Russia. Some of them went to Ukraine. Some of them simply dispersed throughout the region. And so ISK has tried to rely on those individuals. So there are ethnic entrepreneurs within ISK that rely on ethnic minorities who trust one another better, who speak the same language, who are, in a way, connected to one another. So, in a way, it facilitates the mobilization and facilitates the organization of armed attacks abroad. So it's not necessarily only about Tajikistan. It's also about the Tajik diaspora and what is happening to them. Ahmed, I'd like your take on Tajikistan. You spent a fair bit of time there. Very impoverished country, and it's had the same leader for three decades. This is a headache for the Tajik government, is it not? Absolutely. I don't see how they're going to cope with this, especially if tomorrow Moscow names a bunch of Tajiks responsible for this bombing. I agree completely with the previous speaker, what he said, that the real danger is the problem of what to do now and the fact that this problem has been neglected for so long. We are faced with multiple crises now in this part of the world in which there is very little understanding of the forces that are active, who is doing what, and Western intelligence is no longer up to par, what it was before when the Americans were in Afghanistan. So, the need now to ally with regional countries and regional governments and beef up their intelligence and help them deal with the present crisis, that's the agenda for now. A huge problem then for Tajikistan, but perhaps an even bigger problem, Owen, for the Kremlin right now, because this was a very large concert venue, one of the glitziest venues in Russia. This is a very well-known band, I'm told, Picnic. More than 6,000 people were at this sold-out show. Where was the security? Can I just come back on Ahmed Rashid's point? Of course. Because, actually, there is the assumption that Putin is a rational actor, that he will address, and his security services and military forces will address the actual problem which has attacked them, in other words, a resurgent Central Asian Islamist movement based in Tajikistan. That would be what a sensible, rational government would do. Unfortunately, the tragedy and the danger in this situation is that, actually, Putin doesn't really have the bandwidth, either politically or militarily, to do anything about it. He's deeply engaged in Ukraine. That's his war. He claims that it's Nazis in Kiev that are the major existential threat to Russia. In no way does the Islamist threat track with his political messaging. He's spending 40% of his state budget on fighting that war. It may be that he actually wishes to escalate that war. I suspect that he doesn't want to escalate the war, but he will be forced to do something by this terrorist attack. It's a challenge to his authority, as I said in my earlier comments. And he'll have to do something. But what can he do in Central Asia? He's not going to send massive forces to assist the Tajik government to root out its insurgents in its own territory or Afghans. I mean, he conceivably could do that, but that would be a massive distraction, and he'd be fighting, effectively, a war on two fronts. The tragedy and the paradox of the situation is that it has to be about Ukraine, because that's where Putin is committed. And the reaction, I think, is not going to be in Central Asia. The major reaction is going to be in Ukraine. Paradoxical as that may seem, and Ukraine has got nothing to do with it, but it's the only place that Putin really has the capacity to react. How do you think, Ahmad, they are looking at this well beyond the region we're talking about, perhaps in China, perhaps in Western capitals? How are intelligence services and leaders looking at this, and how worried should they be? I think they should be very worried, because they really have very little information about this region and what is going on in this region and the forces which is driving militancy. I'd just like to make the point that the Russians are disliked intensely in Central Asia, except by the various elites that occupy the role of government. And the question, for example, is NATO or any other active partner going to get help from the local political billboards or not? And I fear very much that a whole panoply of questions is going to crop up now, which, frankly, we don't have the tools to really properly analyse. Jerome, is it that history is repeating itself? I know it was only 2021 when the US left, but has this vital region been ignored yet again? It is being ignored, mostly seen from a security angle. Ultimately, we're speaking about a political issue. If we're speaking about the interactions between Western countries and the Taliban, it cannot be only seen through the angle of security, but also politically. Politically, this group is controlling Afghanistan, it is effectively the government. So what are Western strategies to address this group and to potentially engage it, despite all the obstacles and difficulties? And I wanted to build upon one of your points earlier about Western intelligence. When we speak to Western sources working in security, they are increasingly worried about this group. Some countries, like Germany, point out that 90% of the plots, including our link to IS, are linked directly to ISK. So it's a real risk. At the same time, it's also very different from what we saw in 2015 and 2016, when IS in Syria and Iraq would recruit Western youth, European youth, send them to Syria, train, and then send them back to Europe to fight. In that case, the reliance on ethnic networks, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, and so on, means that they are not able yet to organize very complex armed activities. But still, the group is perceived as the main threat at the moment. Thank you very much. Thank you to all our guests today, Ahmed Rashid, Owen Matthews, and Jerome Deveran. And for more on this story, with plenty of context and analysis too, go to the Al Jazeera website at aljazeera.com. I'm sure you have your views to do on today's discussion. Go to our Facebook page, that's facebook.com forward slash AJ inside story. We're also on the old Twitter, now called X, where you'll find us at AJ inside story. From me, James Bayes, and the whole team here in Doha, stay safe. Bye-bye for now.