Democrats will soon have control over Congress. Can they force through aid to Ukraine? Today's video examines the plausibility of such a scenario. The road ahead will not be straightforward on this front. Many moderate Republicans would need to defect to secure a large enough supermajority to override a presidential veto. However, there is an alternative strategy of bundling together multiple issues into a single bill, which may have a chance at working.
0:00 The Upcoming Challenges Democrats Face 1:55 Veto-Proof Supermajorities 8:03 The Hegseth Impeachment Vote 12:34 The National Defense Authorization Act 15:58 Agenda Control 19:22 Blue vs. Trump Priorities
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Both US liberals
and most Westerners outside of our star-spangled bubble
felt pretty good after last Tuesday's blue tsunami.
However, curiously blue parts of the map like Texas are one thing.
It is a whole nother thing to convert blue polygons
on maps to actual policy changes.
And for the folks on the other side of the pond,
the main question is how US policy toward Ukraine might change.
Remembering that Europeans
were much happier under Biden than they have been for the last
two years under Trump. Now,
as I have forewarned for weeks on this channel, there is a gap between
expectations and reality.
In the United States, the president controls foreign policy, and there
are only limited tools that Congress has to rein in the president,
blue tsunami or not.
However, having limited tools is not the same thing as having no tools.
So, today, I want to explore the options
that Democrats have to alter Ukraine policy, and
whether that stands a realistic shot of happening.
The feasibility of the situation depends primarily on two things.
The pliability of congressional Republicans,
and Democrats' ability to control the agenda
that reaches the president's desk.
I will describe the brute force method
that involves Republican support,
plus some of the early signals about whether that will work.
But even if the brute force method fails,
how close Democrats can get on that front
will correlate with how much agenda control they can exert.
I will therefore explain how agenda control works,
followed by whether Democrats will want to use
those levers for Ukraine or something else.
But let's start with the brute force method.
If you have been stuck learning about
the intricacies of U.S. constitutional law over
the last few weeks, one, I feel sorry for you,
but two, you know the drill.
Passing legislation ordinarily requires
a majority of both the House and the Senate
to support it, plus the president's signature.
However, the brute force method measure we
are starting with overrides the president's
veto by simply having two-thirds
of each chamber vote in favor of a bill.
With about 260 House Democrats and 56 Senate Democrats,
that means pulling about 30 House
Republicans and 11 Senate Republicans into the mix.
I would describe this as unlikely but not
implausible, especially on very specific issues
as it relates to Ukraine. How far that goes depends
on the political mood of the country
and what Republicans think of their 2028 chances.
We have discussed how the Democrats will now have subpoena power.
Part of what makes anything plausible here
is that scandalous revelations
may come out of Congressional testimony,
which may alter some Republicans' thinking here,
both from a U.S. national security standpoint
and from political pressure at home.
But let me try to get deeper into this and look
at the individual Senator level.
And as we delve into this,
I want to focus on the Senate here for a couple of reasons.
One, it is a more tractable problem to discuss in a single video,
though I am sure you have
staffers on Capitol Hill trying to work out all
of these details for the House.
And two, it appears to be the stiffer barrier,
because a greater portion of Republicans in
the Senate would need to defect to override the veto.
Political scientists try
to estimate left-right ideology based on voting records.
And fortunately, we have data on every Republican entering the Senate,
except just two, because
everyone else is getting a promotion from the House.
The 11th least conservative Republican,
and thus the most likely pivotal voice on your
average Senate bill, is Julia Letlow from the great state of Louisiana.
That is likely an abstract metric,
so as a basis of comparison, it has only gotten about
two seats easier, in some sense,
to meet this threshold following the blue tsunami.
If that seems like a surprisingly small
difference despite Democrats picking up
nine seats, the situation is a product
of a great irony in electoral incentives.
The seats that Democrats were most likely to win
also tended to be held by the most moderate of
Republicans, who needed to conform as such to win in the first place.
Prior Ukraine supporters like
Susan Collins of Maine lost.
Tom Tillis of North Carolina got so fed up with the situation with
the Republican Party that he chose to retire,
and the seat ultimately turned blue. Joni Ernst
of Iowa had similar feelings, retired,
and ultimately saw her seat turn blue.
John Cornyn of Texas lost in a Republican primary
for a seat that ultimately turned blue,
and as one final random one,
Lindsey Graham of South Carolina passed away
and his sister failed to hold his seat.
Oh, and to make life just a little more difficult
for Democrats, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky retired
and will be replaced by someone a
bit more conservative than him.
The two wildcards here are in Montana and Tennessee.
Kurt Alm is the Senator-elect from Montana,
and lacks a voting record to compare to.
He will likely track with his predecessor who handpicked him, though,
which places him beyond the Letlow threshold.
Tennessee is the bigger wildcard.
You will remember that this is Marsha Blackburn's seat,
which she will fill once she transitions to
governor. Glenn Cain Jacobs remains the favorite,
but has only served as a mayor,
and his best-understood political ideology is libertarian.
That is probably good news for Ukraine, because it will have
him sometimes break from the traditional left-right spectrum.
Jacobs has described Putin as fascist,
but libertarians are generally averse to foreign entanglements.
So, based on first principles,
he would seem to be against Trumpian diplomacy,
though I would not expect him to support a flood of aid,
unless you think that libertarianism means supporting others
and their right to be left alone.
And we are not even broaching the fact that,
in a previous kayfabe life,
he once assaulted and battered the current secretary of education.
And the secretary's son-in-law accused him of necrof-
You know what? Nope. Not going to read that.
Not going to read that.
Let's not forget that this is a family show about war.
And as if a man who once followed in the footsteps of Abraham Lincoln,
who is, and this is a real fact,
by some accounts the first person in recorded history to perform a
chokeslam, as if the presence of Kaine was not a wildcard enough,
there is the bigger point that
Ukraine often breaks traditional left-right predictions anyway.
Overall, the Democrats
would need roughly six new Republicans
to break from their traditional positions.
That would involve bringing in Senators like Dave McCormick
from the Great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
who have expressed positive sentiments about Ukraine before,
but not broken away from Trump as much as would be necessary here.
They will eventually face competitive re-election campaigns,
and they might have a vested interest
in distancing themselves from the lame duck President.
So, the general point that I want to conclude with here,
for the pure speculation part of this video,
is that this whole thing is plausible,
but it is not as easy as a nine-seat flip would
make it seem like it should be.
That leaves us with trying to sort out some of the empirical
evidence. And we got the first early indicator this week,
with the House vote on articles of
of impeachment against Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.
You will remember that on Monday,
Thomas Massie, a Republican from Kentucky,
submitted eight such articles.
The full House has a five-seat Republican edge,
but there was an expectation
that a handful more Republicans would defect and impeach Hegseth
during the lame duck session.
What ended up happening was more complicated and has been
misread as a strictly negative sign
for bipartisan support against Trump come 2027.
Many had also speculated that some lame duck Republicans would
not return to Washington for the vote.
Yet, it ended up being 11 Democrats who missed it.
In a very DC thing to do, and I am not making this up,
many of them blamed traffic.
Now, seven Republicans also indeed missed the vote,
but it seems that the vast majority of
them were around the Capitol
and could have been called in to vote as necessary.
In turn, most of the conversations surrounding
who was present missed the bigger picture.
If the votes were really there,
then Hegseth would be impeached right now.
If traffic was truly the only problem,
the Democrats could introduce a new privileged
set of impeachment articles and force a new vote.
But with Republicans controlling the timing of a floor vote,
there will be no cheap tricks
Where Democrats can win because of a lack of Republican attendance.
Their real problem was that only Massey
is willing to defect from the bunch,
and that is not enough to win a vote.
Observers have correctly comprehended that the core problem
is a failure to crack the red voting bloc,
but there was a subtle reason for Democratic
optimism about bipartisan cooperation come January.
Broadly, there were three plausible
ways that the impeachment question could end.
One was to table the discussion,
Effectively, flat out killing the impeachment effort.
The second was to refer it
to the House Judiciary Committee for further debate.
The third was to outright impeach Hegseth,
shifting the process to the Senate for a
conviction vote. The second option won.
Now, the reporting here has treated this
as a de facto loss for Democrats.
Like every other committee, the Judiciary Committee has
a Republican majority, and the chair of it is Jim Jordan.
Jordan is on the right wing of the party,
has a history of combating with both Democrats
and even moderates within his own party,
And was chosen as the House Republican's leader for the next session.
If that tells you anything about the mindset
of the median representative in the caucus.
With under two months to go in the term,
the committee will stall out with fact-finding reports.
If there is a vote, it will fail to make it out of the committee.
Hence, the impeachment effort is dead
in the water for this congressional session.
Nonetheless, shifting the matter
to the committee keeps impeachment as a part of the political
conversation, even if the committee chooses
not to do much with the articles. That is in contrast
to tabling the question entirely.
The fact that Republicans did not do so tells us that the
leadership did not have the votes to do so.
In other words, at least a handful of moderate
Republicans did not want to have an outright no on their voting record.
That handful forced the rest of the Republican caucus
to vote to refer the articles,
because the alternative would be that the Democrats align
with those moderate Republicans
and outright pass the impeachment resolution.
I recognize that we are now getting
into what seems like the minutiae of House rules,
but this will matter come January.
At that point, Democrats will have agenda-setting power.
And as I will explain further in a minute,
Being the agenda setter gives you way more
power than it might seem from the outside.
Moderate Republicans will no longer be able
to hide from compromised solutions,
like referring a motion to a committee.
Rather, Democrats can force votes,
which will in turn force those moderate Republicans to make a decision.
The only problem here is that we
do not know how many such moderate Republicans there are here,
since every red vote pooled together on the referral option.
Nonetheless, we will soon get a second signal,
this time from debate on the National Defense
Authorization Act, or NDAA for short.
It is the annual bill that sets defense policy and approves
military programs.
Congress is expecting to debate it in December, when bonuses to members
of the military are set to expire.
The House passed a version of the NDAA in July, but the
Senate failed to reach an agreement.
The heart of the matter is the Iran war.
Congress has the power of the purse.
And while the NDAA does not directly fund the military,
it approves the programs
and funding that a separate appropriations bill pays for.
The White House wanted $1.5 trillion.
Democrats wanted about $1 trillion instead,
With the balance limiting what
the Trump administration could do in Iran.
Failure to reach a deal here would generate all sorts
of problems for the US military.
As a result, the complete absence of a deal is unlikely.
In fact, elements of last fiscal year's NDAA expired on September 30th,
and the military
gears keep turning only thanks to permanent provisions
and a stopgap appropriations bill.
New programs and new multi-year contracts cannot start under a stopgap.
Yet such stopgaps are the norm for the start of the fiscal year,
rather than the exception.
Surprise! DC is dysfunctional.
Rather, new programs need an NDAA and full-year appropriations.
Thus, we will see some type of actual vote this year.
And, as compared to the impeachment question,
one that will be both more directly connected
to Ukraine and more difficult to dodge on procedural grounds.
Consequently, this will give us a better indication
of what moderate Republicans are thinking
heading into the new term.
There is one further point worth recognizing here.
You might note that Democrats could just hold
out until January so they can write their
own bill, leaving a stopgap to cover the interim.
And that may very well happen.
But the logic of bargaining is complicated,
and a Democrat's ability to hold out does
Does not explain why a deal will not get done sooner.
You see, Republicans are also well aware
that Democrats have this incentive.
In turn, if they try passing
a bill extremely favorable to the Red Party,
Democrats can filibuster in the Senate
to prevent that from ever reaching a vote.
Working a step up, Republicans can think about the type of bill that
Democrats would be able to pass in January as a baseline.
Then Republicans can fudge the bill a bit in their own favor,
exploiting how stopgaps are costly for Democrats to incur.
As a result, the next session can shape
the bills that the lame duck passes,
well before any of the fresh faces step foot in office.
If this idea sounds familiar,
it is the same logic as crisis bargaining.
You do not need to go to war to get what you want.
Because fighting is costly, you can, in principle,
demand something commensurate with what
the expected outcome of bargaining failure would be,
and you can cheat a bit further by virtue of how
the deal means that your opponent does not incur any costs.
All of that said, if you were skeptical
that enough moderate Republicans will pivot away from Trump,
fair enough. But there is still
a more technical strategy Democrats can pursue instead.
Much of the discussion about legislative challenges
for Democrats focuses on how
their individual policies are at odds with the Trump administration.
So if the Democrats put forth a bill
that outright increases aid spending to Ukraine,
Trump will veto it, and we will be back
to asking about the status of a veto override.
However, that is not how the vast majority of legislation works.
Instead, you tend to get omnibus bills
that combine together dozens of policies,
often some that are completely dissimilar.
And one reason is that doing so can force
through more of Congress's preferred
policies than would otherwise be the case.
For example, suppose that Trump really wants some particular policy,
say funding to build
a White House ballroom.
Congressional Democrats are not enthusiastic about that.
But simultaneously, they do not really care much.
In contrast, perhaps they care a little more about aid to Ukraine.
Thus, they package the two together.
Trump sees the bill at his desk and is annoyed,
but he cannot get ballroom funding any other way,
so he reluctantly signs the bill.
There are all sorts of ways to manipulate the agenda like this.
And it could go both ways in theory,
but in practice, Congress sets the agenda.
I mentioned earlier today that agenda-setting power is underrated,
and this is part of the reason.
Of the multitude of possible bills that could go to the President,
some that link issues to force
a more favorable result to the President,
and others that force a more favorable outcome to Congress,
the party in charge of Congress gets to choose
which are actually proposed.
There are a couple of noteworthy limitations here, though.
First, you still need to get the bill through the Senate.
That requires ending debate and navigating the filibuster.
In turn, the 56 Senate Democrats still
need four Republican votes for cloture,
even if those Republicans do not ultimately vote in favor of the bill.
So if that earlier conversation about all
of the difficulties of obtaining a two-thirds
veto-proof majority seemed like a waste of time, it was not.
It still informs how far Democrats can bend the Senate.
Come January, the filibuster left-right pivot will be Chuck Grassley,
who both described the Anchorage summit as a favor to Putin,
without anything in return,
and has lobbied to use frozen Russian assets
to purchase weapons to send to Ukraine.
And there are actually four more of them
who have outright put on the record
that they want more aid to Ukraine. Murkowski,
Wicker, Moran, and Curtis too.
Curtis even visited Kharkiv two months ago.
The other tricky question
is to ask what priorities Democrats and Trump have,
and how intense those priorities are.
Because Democrats cannot sneak through everything.
There needs to be some judiciousness
in pairing things that Democrats want,
and Trump does not care much about,
with things that Trump wants, and Democrats do not care much
about. Mercifully, that takes us to our final topic of the day.
What are Democrats' priorities
in relation to concessions that Trump is willing to make.
As a starting point, we might look
at what exit polls say about voters' priorities.
In order, they were roughly affordability,
the state of democracy, immigration, healthcare,
and foreign policy.
I will underscore how low foreign policy is on this list,
because Europeans find this puzzling.
Only 4% of voters ranked it as a priority,
consistent with the long-running reality
that Americans live in a geopolitical bubble.
Now, some of that is misleading.
Affordability is at the top of the list,
and the Iran war is the primary driver there,
with tariffs being a notable secondary cause.
So, voters would not much care about what is happening in Iran,
as long as energy exports were free-flowing out of Hormuz.
In contrast, voters see
the indirect connections between Ukraine and affordability
as nebulous at best, meaning that they are pushing
any thoughts about that down
into the low-priority foreign policy category.
That might initially sound like bad news
for those seeking more aid to Ukraine,
but keep in mind the relative weightings matter more.
If Trump cares even less about the issue,
then Democrats might still want to sneak it through.
And there is further good news on
that front. Trump has been somewhat pliable about Ukraine aid,
so long as he can be convinced that
there is some benefit to the United States.
Still, you need something to pair that with.
And, ironically, Iran funding might be the first place to look.
Despite affordability problems causing the blue tsunami,
most Democrats do not want to hand Iran
a win either. In fact,
prolonging the crisis puts the Democrats in good position for 2028.
Trump is stuck with the problems as the executive,
but he desperately wants to see the conflict
through so that there is some chance
that his long-term legacy will improve there.
Republicans may suffer as a result.
But Trump is a lame duck unconcerned about
his personal electoral prospects,
and he does not exactly strike me as the type of person
who might take one for the Republican team.
Democrats can limit funding for the hot war,
and they probably will, but it is unclear whether that
is actually contrary to what the White House wants.
The blockade is working.
Transits over at Malacca, a more reliable measure than Hormuz,
because tankers actually have
their transponders turned on as they head to Asia,
are returning to normal levels.
Gas prices have dipped recently, mostly driven by reduced demand
from an end of the summer travel season
and marginal increases in refinery operating capacity.
There is still work to be done here
in returning refined product exports to pre-war levels,
but sustained convoying through the Strait
of Hormuz is the easier way to do that,
not restarting a hot war.
The end result here is that Democrats will likely use Iran funding
as the basis of passing a bill
that also includes some bluer priorities. Thus, the thing that
Ukraine advocates have to worry about
is Democrats preferring to go in a different direction.
And there are other reasonable options here,
like constraining tariff policy and reining
in ICE operations.
Even within security policy,
aid to Israel is a more intense issue among the Democratic
base.
How this ultimately plays out, again,
depends on what Trump finds relatively more tolerable
compared to Democratic priorities.
And that is hard to predict in advance,
so I cannot give you a firm prediction there.
I will say, however, that Ukraine optimists can note that tariffs,
ICE, and Israel policies
are nearer and dearer to Trump's heart.
I would expect Democrats to try pushing
partially on all of those fronts. But Ukraine policy will be relatively
easier to push through, so it would not be surprising to see.
Just do not expect
aid to magically return to Biden-era levels.
Trump still has a veto here.
Prioritizing weapon shipments to Ukraine,
paid for by Europe, is a much easier sell,
especially with less pressing needs in the Gulf region
if the hot war is not about to restart.
That is a lot to digest in one sitting, but we made it.
Actually, everything in the news
this week has prevented me from doing my usual
I will get back to it next week.
For now, you can watch last week's session here,
and ask your questions on that video
in preparation for next week.
And if you enjoyed today's video, then please like,
share, and subscribe, and I will see
you next time.
Take care.